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LECTURES

ON THE

HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

LECTURES

ON THE

HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

BY

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EDITED

From the Author's MSS. with Notes,

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

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LECTURE IV.

ON THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF PLATO.

GENTLEMEN:—

The Platonic Philosophy.

WE have traced the chief lineaments of those minor philosophies which engaged the Grecian world during the latter life, and immediately after the death, of Socrates. In reviewing them, marked as they are by strong characteristic differences, we have been, as it were, modulating through a diversity of *keys* in the human soul; but all these are only the prelude to the more solemn and profound harmony to follow. It is not without emotion that I arrive at that stage of our progress which brings me to the philosophy of Plato,—a philosophy which, whether regarded in itself, or with reference to its influences upon the history of reflective man, rises before us in all the dignity of the mightiest and most permanent monument ever erected by unassisted human thought exercised upon the human destinies. It is true that, in the opinion of the multitude, this majestic structure can now be considered as little more than the *ruin* of ancient glory: the interest that still belongs to it is, in their mind, the interest that attends the decay of every thing which bears the impress of former greatness, and that makes all forever venerable which once was venerated. Even in this view the speculations of Plato would amply recompense the inquiry of every mind which has learned to find its Present in the Past, and which, seeing little in the world

Subject approached.

around it to engage or gratify, would gladly compose its favourite scenery of thought from the ideal excellences of a world that cannot return. But the claims of the Platonic philosophy far overpass this inferior ground. Its powerful *influences* in every age sufficiently demonstrate this. They prove that, whatever opinion we may justly form regarding the details of its reasoning, and however we may be disposed to criticize their legitimacy, there is, in the body of the system itself, a something which finds its echo in the heart, and its reflection in the reason, of universal man; and they suggest that even its errors, if they exist, are, from their peculiar complexion and character, likely to be better worth investigation than the truths of narrower theories. We may refuse assent to the express decisions of the Master, we may often lament his wavering indecision of style, and his conclusions in which nothing seems concluded; we may regret also that Imagination should flush with her rich and changeful hues those very regions which it is the declared purpose of the philosopher to present in the ethereal transparency of pure Reason; and, lost in the bewildering labyrinth of beauty, we may sometimes sigh for the cold exactness of Plato's great pupil and rival: but, in defiance of all our exceptions, objections, and perplexities, there is a spell in the page, and no man, worthy to read Plato, *can* read him, and not own himself in the presence of a mighty Interpreter of the human Soul.

The widespread influence of Plato's writings attests their intrinsic value.

It is not wonderful, then, that Plato (like one of his own Ideal Forms) has since manifested himself in our world in every variety of external shape. Every view of human nature which exalts its condition and its destinies allies itself by a natural sympathy with the philosophy of Plato; and even by those who reject his reason-

Causes of this influence. The main conclusions of Platonism commend themselves to great thinkers in all ages,

ings in their original form, these wonderful conclusions are accepted, as presenting in a poetical or mythic shape the highest results of subsequent speculations. Platonism is immortal, because its principles are immortal in the human intellect and heart. After captivating the serene reason of Cicero, after receiving the strong tincture of Oriental infusions yet maintaining itself undestroyed in the schools of Alexandria, after supplying language to the mystic interpretations of Origen and the aspiring affections of Augustine, it disappears to rise unmutilated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; it possesses half the South of Europe, it encourages the speculations of Descartes, it fills and animates the whole capacious mind of Leibnitz, it affects the tone of theological exposition in every Christian country, and peculiarly in one remarkable school of divines in England;[1] and, outriding the storm

though some of its details may appear faulty or fanciful.

Examples: Cicero,

The Alexandrines,

Origen and Augustine,

Descartes,

Leibnitz,

the Cambridge Platonists.

[1] [The so-called Cambridge Platonists,—H. More, Cudworth, John Smith, Whichcote, Worthington, &c. See an interesting notice of these divines in Burnet's *History of his Own Times*, i. p. 187. It is remarkable that some of the warmest promoters of the new mathematico-physical philosophy in Cambridge are numbered among these Platonists or their disciples,—Wilkins, for instance, and Barrow. It was to these men that the name of Latitudinarians was first applied by "men of narrower thoughts and furious tempers." Burnet, ib. The impiety of Hobbes's opinions, which had "spread much," led "this set of men at Cambridge to assert and examine the principles of religion and morality on clear grounds, and in a philosophical method." "They were all very zealous against Popery." "And now that the main principle of religion was struck at by Hobbes and his followers, the papists acted upon this a very strange part, They went in so far even into the argument for atheism as to publish many books, in which they affirmed that there was no certain proof of the Christian religion, unless we took it from the authority of the Church as infallible." In the present state of opinion in England, no apology seems necessary for inviting attention to this curious statement of Burnet.- Ed.]

of the ultra-sensualism of France, it finally reappears in the *Critique of the Pure Reason* of Kant, which reminds us even more of the ideal abstraction of the Platonic than of the minuteness of the Aristotelian dialectic. How Platonism has since then fared, it is needless to tell you. Its influence is at this moment on the increase. It has of late engaged the exegetical labours of the Continent far more than any other classical or critical subject; and elaborate translations of the entire works of Plato have been among the tributes of his admirers in France and Germany. High as are the unquestioned merits of his rival, minute and comprehensive as were his labours, clear as is his course of didactic exposition, accurate as is his reasoning and its expression, and aided as he has been, and is, for these reasons, by the direct patronage of our great Universities, the influence of Aristotle is again waning before the triumphant star of his master,—if, indeed, since the expiration of the scholastic ages, he could ever have been regarded as mingling in the general current of human thought with the depth and force of Plato.

Kant.

Its influence is still increasing.

Causes of this influence further examined.

[1.] One cause for this influence is, doubtless, to be found *in the attractive and affectionate tone*—in the high and consoling doctrine—with which, from the depth of antiquity, Plato still addresses every elevated spirit. Wearied with the daily nothingness of a life which mocks with the illusion of happiness that retreats as we approach it, it is wonderfully soothing to speak, across the chasm of ages, with one who could thus distinctly perceive in the nature of his own reason the promise of an eternal heritage above and beyond the visionary scene of earthly life; and, though to us from external testimony surer argument of this mighty truth is given than any which the investigation of the soul and of its correlative ideal world can confer, assuredly in no well-

The lofty tone of Plato's writings commands sympathy.

taught mind is its fellow-feeling with the nobler efforts and aspirations of reason on *that* account diminished. On the contrary, I am persuaded that the very tendency of *faith*, when it becomes an abiding principle, is to *internalize* more and more our proofs and convictions of a future world, to loosen their dependency on the evidence of witnesses, and thus to bring them, if not into coincidence, at least into sympathy, with the very class of proofs on which the Platonist loved to dwell.

[2.] In glancing at this link of connection, I have, indeed, fallen upon that which constitutes perhaps the most powerful cause of the prolonged influences of the writings of Plato,—the harmony of many of their sentiments with some parts of our divine religion. Limited as are our ideas and our expressions, it would be strange indeed if all the nobler views of the destinies of human nature did not in *some* measure correspond: "deep calleth to deep" in the human soul, and all that understand *it* must in some degree understand each other. A Revelation, though it descend from the Supreme Wisdom Himself, must be compressed into a size adequate to the human faculties to be a Revelation to *them*, and must, therefore, in many cases, traverse ground already trod, and in all cases employ phrases already employed. We are not therefore to wonder—and I trust no short-sighted jealousy will pervert the honesty of our judgment—when we recognise in the high-wrought speculations of Plato, among much that is fantastic and much that is false, glimpses of a world not unlike that which Christianity has disclosed, and when we hear the Holy Spirit that breathed in the Evangelists utter, to indicate supernal truth, words and phrases not unfamiliar to the student of Plato. This may perhaps be the fitting time to pause for a moment upon an objection which has been

Their congeniality with Christian sentiment,

and the coincidence of their language with that of Christian doctrine.

Prejudice hence arising.

answered in just as narrow a spirit as it has been alleged; nor the less fitly *now*, that in many minds it has hardened into a resolute prejudice against the whole subject of Platonism, and may, therefore, be properly resisted at the outset. You will, however, consider it a digression, (though a necessary or expedient one,) and be ready, after a brief delay, to return to our main topic.

This prejudice examined, and objections answered.

Infidel writers, who discern in the theology of the New Testament, and even in the discourses of its Divine Founder, expressions, and perhaps forms of thought, of a Platonic cast, have eagerly seized this characteristic as a pretext for humanizing its entire system and origin; and one,[2] more eminently, has, with unmatched powers of sarcastic insinuation, represented the whole as a mere copy of the fashionable Platonism of the day. Various answers have been given, rebutting this charge by a reference to the historical facts of the case,—answers completely satisfactory to every candid mind as respects

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[2] [It is scarcely necessary to observe that the writer alluded to is the celebrated author of the *Decline and Fall*, whose twenty-first chapter is well characterized in the text. Gibbon's notions of Plato were confused enough: those of M. Guizot, his commentator, though much more precise, are scarcely more true. One point, indeed, the illustrious Frenchman has clearly stated; he has shown that there is no Logos in Plato! but he is as clearly mistaken in supposing that St. John was indebted for the term or its equivalent only to Hebrew sources. Nothing is more striking than the coincidence of phrase between the Evangelist and Philo; and Mr. Milman properly calls attention to the "long residence of St. John at Ephesus, the centre of the mingling opinions of the East and West," in proof that he was acquainted with the Alexandrine literature. Mr. Milman's conclusion nearly agrees with the views set forth by Prof. Butler in the text:—"The simple truth may be, that St. John took the familiar term, and, as it were, infused into it the peculiar and Christian sense in which it is used in his writings," (*D. and F.* chap. xxi. note, p. 314, ed. Milm.) Those interested in the subject would do well to compare Dorner *Von der Person Christi*, especially the Introduction to that valuable and now well-known work. ED.]

the total improbability of the connection alleged. But when minuter discussion approaches the doctrines or phrases themselves, a *jealous dread* is evinced of allowing, in the remotest degree, the analogy contended for. Now, as concerns the *doctrines* in question, especially that cardinal doctrine which is placed in front of the controversy, it would be premature to speak; because any fair discussion of the subject would involve a lengthened consideration of the supposed Platonic models. It may be enough for the present to say that the resemblance is at most nothing more than that faint similitude which may naturally be anticipated between the independent conceptions of a very gifted reason, and the general outlines of truth in even its most mysterious regions. Of the "Persons" (to use a very imperfect phrase) of the blessed Trinity we know little more than a distinction of offices; and such—or something approaching to such—a distinction of offices in the Supreme Essence is not, perhaps, wholly beyond the antecedent conjecture, however beyond the demonstrative certainty, of contemplative reason. And every such speculation, if it cannot much corroborate, cannot at all enfeeble, the truth.

But with regard to the *phrases*, especially with regard to one which holds a high place in the vocabulary of Christian Faith, there can be little *doubt*, but surely as little difficulty. Those who idly dream that he compromises Christianity who willingly concedes the fact of the use of an old and recognised term to express a truth till then unknown are little aware *how far* their principle will carry them. For example, the learned labours of Wetstein, Schoettgen, and others, seem to have shown us many of our Lord's expressions, and even parables, among the relics of *Rabbinical* literature. Granting the critical question of priority decided, need the Christian advocate fear to assume a wider ground? is there any thing unworthy of a divine Instructor in such

adoptions? or, rather, are they not themselves a mark of superiority to that ambition of even the best human hearts, —the ambition of exclusive originality? Surely, we may conceive that, out of thousands of possible forms of expression, an instructor liberated from earthly weaknesses would select precisely that which was most suitable, because most congenial, to his auditory; and this, though he possessed a complete acquaintance with every other form in which the same commissioned message of wisdom could have been fashioned. There seems to be no law of divine interference more certain than that God always uses the machinery prepared to His hand, as far as it can be consistently employed. I need not point to baptism, circumcision, and many other rites, as instances of this. It must be remembered that the natural world itself is His property no less than the supernatural, and that there is *no* right product of human thought of which He is not Himself the producer by the instrumentality of created minds. It seems to me most manifest, that the anxiety to claim absolute novelty for every the minutest element and circumstance of our belief is only one of the many forms of our habitual degradation of God to our own standard. Were *we* charged with the publication of a system of belief, and allowed unbounded liberty in devising it, doubtless we should delight in startling the unbelieving world with unexpected terms and propositions; and we ascribe this petty pride to that Majestic Governor whose impartial care is over all His works, "and whose purpose, when He came among us, was, not to triumph in the mistakes of His noblest creatures, but, without respect of persons, ages, or countries, to bring in *an everlasting* righteousness."

St. John borrowed the term LOGOS *from Alexandrine Platonism.*

Now, the use of the expression mainly alleged in this discussion is a prominent example of the very principle of adoption of which we have spoken. That the term *Λόγος* was already

in use, and already employed in a sense not dissimilar to that in which it is consecrated by inspiration, is unquestionable. It is found in the writings of the Jewish Platonist Philo; it is found in a sense far less definite indeed in the writings of Plato himself; its Hebrew form was familiar to the Jewish theologians. The object of the great Evangelist was, manifestly, not to *invent* a term, but (what was much better) to declare that there *was* a Being who really possessed the same or similar attributes with those which his hearers had, from various sources, learned to ascribe to their Λόγος and their Memra* Jah; and with this view he makes (as it were) their Logos the Hero of his narration, incorporating in his own account, by the very adoption of the term, every fragment of truth which the world already possessed, and rather enlarging, fixing, and clearing the received notion, than introducing one radically new. You will perceive how natural, or, rather, how necessary, is such a process, when you remember that this is exactly what every teacher must do who speaks of "God" to a heathen: he adopts the term, but he refines and exalts its meaning. Nor indeed is the procedure different in any use whatever of language in sacred senses and for sacred purposes. It has been justly remarked, by (I think) Isaac Casaubon, that the principle of all these adaptations is expressed in the sentence of St. Paul, Ὃν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν. And in its most general aspect—that He who has given us faculties for reflection and conjecture should now and then condescend to accept our poor products as materials for His own purposes of enlightenment—is only another

What is implied in this admission?

* Memra is a Chaldaic term, signifying the Word. In many of those passages in the Pentateuch where the ineffable Name Jehovah occurs, the Chaldaic paraphrasts have substituted the term Memra, thus ascribing Divinity to the *Word*. Vid. Calmet, *Dict. in voc.* T. W.

instance of the same condescension, which, to the exaltation of His own glory, and of ours in His, accepts our temples, our praises, and our prayers.

Such are the principles on which I would recommend you to regard this controverted question,—principles which I have here introduced with a view to their accompanying you in the course of studies which must perpetually bring you to points where Christian analogies will arise. You will everywhere see how freely our Revelation has adopted its language from every quarter, to what higher purposes and more assured hopes it has consecrated it; and in this very freedom in the use of its subordinate materials you will (if I have succeeded in impressing my own view) recognise the calm superiority of independent truth.

Further remarks on Platonism, and its relation to Christianity.

But, with respect to the prolonged popularity of the Platonic philosophy as dependent on its connection with the Christian faith,—the subject on which we were engaged,—you will readily apprehend that the foundation of this connection lies deeper than any coincidence of occasional phraseology. As I have already intimated, the true bond of union was to be found in a certain similarity of sentiment upon the ultimate destinies of human nature, and upon the character of the Supreme Being.[3]

Theological and ethical coincidences.

On these subjects, which necessarily occupy so much of the Christian's thoughts, the Platonic treatises supplied expressions, views, and arguments adapted without difficulty to Christian purposes. And, however inferior to the warm-hearted ethics of Christianity in all that concerns the reciprocal duties of men, and too absorbingly contemplative in its whole

[3] [In the *Tübinger Zeitschrift* for 1837 will be found an interesting essay by Baur, entitled "Das Christliche des Platonismus, oder Socrates und Christus." Ackermann had previously published a treatise on the same subject:—"*Das Christliche in Platon, &c.*" ED.]

tone, it is easy to conceive how this very character might possess attractions for those who had rather think and feel than resolve and act.

But, while the reputation of Platonism has thus been upheld by its partial sympathy with the genius of revealed truth, I need scarcely remind you that this alliance has not *always* been favourable to its encouragement.* With many of the stricter fathers of the Church Plato was sternly pronounced to be the "Condimentarius hæreticorum."[4] A later authority furnishes the warning, not, perhaps, always unreasonable, to the weaker order of minds,—"Platonem tum præcipue cavendum esse, cum piis dogmatibus magis similis esse videtur." And Clement VIII. was earnestly dissuaded by the famous Cardinal Bellarmine from sanctioning by his pontifical patronage this too seductive counterfeit of Christian piety. But, while noticing the more general grounds of its perpetuation, I must not now suffer myself to be drawn into any detailed account of the history of Platonism,—one of the most interesting, indeed, but also one of the most complicated, subjects in literary history. We may find an occasion to trace it hereafter.

Subject dismissed.

Of a thinker who has thus deeply impressed his image upon the subsequent fortunes of the human mind, every reader acknowledges a natural curiosity to learn the personal story,—to pene-

Of the personal history of PLATO. (*Born* B.C. 429 *or* 428.)

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* One or two terrible characteristics of the original Platonic writings, which those at all conversant with them will too readily recall, could scarcely fail to mingle a darker colouring of dread (not to say abhorrence) in the admiration that accompanied a Christian's perusal; and the very resemblance of the higher elements of Platonian to Christian sentiments offered unhappy facilities to the endless caprices of heresy.

[4] [Doleo bona fide Platonem omnium hæreticorum condimentarium factum. Tertull. *de Anima*, c. 23. ED.]

trate to the springs of that mighty river which has since spread so widely through every region of thought. The minute history of the life and mind of Plato, executed by his own inimitable pen, would be the richest biographical treasure in all uninspired literature. But the fountain of his wisdom (apart from the suggestions and excitements of the Socratic teaching) is nearly as secret as those sources of Nile which he is said to have spent so many mysterious years in reaching. He himself soon became the god of a mythology more fantastic than that which he had lavished such treasures of fancy in beautifying.[5]

His early studies.

His first essays were poetical, epic, lyric, dithyrambic; and we may conjecture, from the character of his writings, how deeply he enjoyed the wild and imaginative legends of his national history. At the age of twenty he became the hearer of Socrates, and, charmed with the vista which the converse of that teacher opened to his ardent and far-reaching intellect, abandoned the outward profession of poetry, too often, perhaps, only to embody it in the more dangerous form of philosophical enthusiasm. We have scarcely a trace to guide the conjecture,—How did Socrates receive this mighty pupil? Anxiously looking for facts, we are presented by Apuleius with a vision of a swan that predicted to Socrates the first arrival of Plato. The strong common sense of the old master could scarcely have approved the more daring flights of the pupil; yet his penetration cannot but have detected the germ, and admired the expansion, of extraordinary faculties. The few indications of their connection are honourable to Plato. Illness prevented his presence on the

His first introduction to Socrates, (an. æt. 20.)

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[5] [The particulars of this "mythology" are detailed by Diogenes Laertius, in his Life of Plato. See also Apuleius *de Dogm. Plat.* init. ED.]

day which he has immortalized in the *Phædo;* but he had endeavoured in vain to raise his voice among the mob of judges that condemned his venerable instructor, and his purse was then at the service of Socrates, who, however, declined to accept it. Our curiosity regarding the intercourse of the master and pupil is the more heightened, that the intellect of Plato had arrived at its mature development before the death of Socrates; and a uniform tradition represents the *Phædrus* and *Lysis* as written during his life. At the fall of the leader, Plato, with the rest of the scattered army of Philosophy, fled to Megara. Shortly after, he commenced those travels of which so much has been said and so little can be believed. At Cyrene he studied mathematics under Theodorus, whom he has introduced in more than one of his dialogues. If the duplication of the cube be justly ascribed to Plato, these lessons were not without fruit. In search of a still deeper wisdom, he continued his course to Egypt, where some of his biographers secrete him for thirteen years, penetrating with the zeal of a kindred mind the mysterious learning of the priesthood. *Αἰγύπτου ἠράσθη*, says Xenophon:[6] but there are few traces of this preference in his works; and the doctrines supposed to have been derived from thence, he might

On the death of Socrates Plato flees to Megara. (B.C. 399, *an. æt.* 30.)

Thence to Cyrene,

and Egypt.

[6] [Not Xenophon, but a late Sophist who assumes his mask. The document from which the Greek words in the text are taken is one of those "Socratic Epistles" the credit of which has been thoroughly destroyed by Bentley. (*Works*, vol. ii. p. 199, ed. Dyce.) The letter in question turns on the supposed feud between Xenophon and Plato: hence the disparaging remark upon Plato's sojourn in Egypt. But the feud itself has been shown by a great living scholar to be but weakly attested, and the only passage in Xenophon's writings in which Plato's name occurs indicates respect rather than dislike or contempt. (Boeckh, *De simultate quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur.* Berolini, 1811.) ED.]

Exaggerated accounts of his travels.

more easily have obtained from that source which Xenophon sarcastically classes with the former, —the *Πυθαγόρου τερατώδης σοφία*. No one understood better than Plato the influence of supposed antiquity over the imagination; and accordingly the *μάθημα πολιὸν* (*Tim.*) of Egypt meets us in the allegoric fictions of the *Timæus* and *Phædrus*, &c.; but, instead of that frequent and reverential allusion which a philosophic speculator can rarely help making to the source of his knowledge, Plato, in his more critical mood, seems to notice the wisdom of Egypt with cold and slighting reference.[7] Whether true or false, the picturesque language of Valerius Maximus makes it worth citation:—"Ægyptum peregravit, dum a sacerdotibus ejus gentis Geometriæ multiplices numeros, atque cœlestium observationum rationem, percipit. Quoque tempore a studiosis juvenibus certatim Athenæ Platonem doctorem quærentibus petebantur, ipse Nili fluminis inexplicabiles ripas, vastissimosque campos, effusam barbariem et flexuosos fossarum ambitus, Ægyptiorum senum discipulus lustrabat." (Val. Max. viii. 7.) With a spirit of enterprise not unlike that which some of our own explorers of the mysteries of the Chinese empire have evinced, the philosopher is said to have gained access to the country in the disguise of an oil-merchant. The Christian fathers

[7] [As in the *Laws*, v. p. 747, and *Repub.* iv. p. 436. In another passage Plato lauds the Egyptians for their proficiency in arithmetic. He nowhere appeals to the Egyptian priests as to authorities in questions of theology; nor does Cicero, when he speaks of Plato's having received "numeros et cælestia" from that quarter, intend by "cælestia" *divine things*. These two seemingly superfluous remarks are suggested by Note 11 to the celebrated twenty-first chapter of the *Decline and Fall*, where, after quoting the passage of Cicero referred to, Mr. Gibbon observes that "the Egyptians might still preserve the traditional creed of the patriarchs." The coincidence of the quotation and the comment compel us to believe that this usually vigilant author seriously held both the opinions alluded to. ED.]

delighted to trace him on his tour of inquiry among the *Hebrew* nation, and attributed to this period, as well as to his Egyptian investigations, those sublime views in which they regarded him as the transcriber or amplifier of revealed truth. Plato's voyages to Sicily are better authenticated. His ineffectual efforts to reclaim Dionysius, and his attachment to Dion, are minutely related in the epistles appended to his works,—epistles whose legitimacy, however, (with perhaps the exception of one or two,) the severity of modern criticism refuses to acknowledge.[8] The general fact that Plato travelled to Southern Italy, and there studied the congenial philosophy of Pythagoras, cannot be fairly questioned. Hermogenes is said to have been his instructor in the philosophy of Parmenides, which he has delivered and enriched in the very abstruse dialogue that bears that name; Cratylus, from whom another remarkable treatise has its title, taught

His voyages to Sicily.

The Platonic Epistles.

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[8] [Mr. Grote is probably the only living scholar of eminence who adheres to the belief, which was not abandoned by Bentley, that all the so-called Platonic epistles were written by the persons whose names they bear. Ast condemns all indiscriminately; and the same is Niebuhr's judgment, (*R. H.* vol. i. not. 27,) though, it must be confessed, on erroneous grounds, so far as regards the seventh epistle. Special essays on the subject have been published by J. A. Grimm, Berl. 1815, and by Herr Salomon, Berl. 1835. The general impression of the learned is perhaps faithfully represented in the following remarks of Brandis:—"The Platonic epistles were too meanly esteemed by Ast. Though undoubtedly *not genuine*, they are in all probability the work of comparatively early authors, who may have been exactly informed of the historical particulars referred to in them." (*Handbuch*, ii. p. 145.) Bentley founds his belief in their authenticity mainly on the circumstance that they were acknowledged by the Alexandrine grammarians. This, were the letters intrinsically more worthy of Plato, would be a strong subsidiary argument; but, while they contain many repetitions of phrases peculiar to the philosopher, their general style is exceedingly inferior to that of the dialogues, and in many of them the matter is as trivial as the diction is inflated and rhetorical. ED.]

him the theories of Heraclitus, and Archytas of Tarentum those of Pythagoras, of which he is reported to have secured a more permanent memorial in the purchase of the books of Philolaus, by which, if we may believe Laertius, the Pythagorean system was for the first time divulged.[9] Thus, rich with the spoils of all previous philosophies, this great genius returned at length to Athens, to devote his remaining life to the establishment of that comprehensive system which was to combine, to conciliate, and to supersede them all. The gardens of Academus have left the proof of their celebrity in the structure of language, which has derived from them a term now common to all places of public instruction. It will be readily believed that Plato soon became the most frequented of the Athenian teachers of wisdom; and not only the distinguished men of a most distinguished time, but the literary *ladies* of Athens, crowded the gymnasium of the philosophic analyst of beauty and of love. One of the strongest proofs of his popularity is to be found in an accusation which the libellous pen of Athenæus has recorded. That amusing but abusive writer presents us with a fearful list of the future tyrants who heard the lessons of Plato. Plutarch (*adv. Colot.*[10]) meets us with a

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[9] [The obligation to Cratylus is witnessed by Aristotle, *Metaph.* i. 6, that to *Hermogenes* only by Laertius. Plato was the pupil of Cratylus *before* he heard Socrates. How much of the lore of Pythagoras could be acquired in Greece Proper it is hard to say; but it seems unreasonable to doubt that Plato returned from his Italian sojourn a more accomplished Pythagorean than he went. The purchase of Philolaus's book (not "books") may be assumed as a fact. Boeckh's *Philolaus* contains all that is known on this subject, with a searching critique of ancient accounts. A very graphic passage in the *Theætetus* (p. 179, D) lends great probability to Ast's conjecture that Plato had sought to improve his knowledge of the Heraclitic philosophy in Ephesus, its birthplace. ED.]

[10] [c. 32. He mentions Dion the liberator of Sicily, Python and Heraclides of Thrace, Aristonymus the lawgiver of the Arcadians, Phormio

list of the champions of freedom formed in the same school. A combination of the catalogues shows us among the pupils of Plato all the *aspiring minds* of their day.* The point here established Plato himself well understood. "The soul of the young philosopher," declares his hero, in the sixth book of the *Republic*, "is warped from philosophy by the very qualities we have admired in him. . . . Every plant, every animal, which finds where it is placed neither suitable nourishment, nor season, nor climate, corrupts in proportion to the very vigour of its nature. . . . Think you that great crimes and consummate wickedness arise from an ordinary soul, and not from one of the highest natural force, whose lofty endowments have been depraved by circumstances of education? or do you imagine that a feeble spirit can ever do either much good or much evil?" To obviate such unhappy results, Plato did all which the lessons of a moralist could do; but he himself acknowledged how ineffective were his labours, and that God alone (as the heathen impressively declared) could save the young men of his age from ruin. "When seated"—if I may again venture to offer a feeble copy of the magnificent original —"in the public assemblies, the courts, the theatres, or wherever the multitude gather, they blame or approve words or actions, equally tumultuous and extravagant in their censure and their approval, while the echoes of every wall reverberate the cries of both,—what effect can such scenes produce on the heart of a young man? What principles of education can escape shipwreck in this storm of contending judgments, and not run adrift with the current? Must not the young man judge, with

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and Menexenus, Eudoxus and Aristotle, who performed the same office at Elis and Pyrrha, Cnidus and Stagira. Chabrias and Phocion are also mentioned among Plato's pupils. For the counter-list see Athen. xi. p. 508. ED.]

* Ritter draws this very sensible conclusion.

this multitude, of honour and shame? Will he not love what they love, and become what they are? . . . backed as they are by the power of degradation, fine, and death! No; there is not, there never was, there never will be, a moral education possible that can countervail the education of which these are the dispensers; *human* education, that is: I except, with the proverb, that which is divine. And, truly, any soul that in such governments escapes the common wreck can only escape by the special favour of heaven!" (*Rep.* vi. 6, 7.) When we read these melancholy and indignant allusions to the political and social condition of his country, as forming the invincible obstacle to the moral advancement of its members, we may perceive how deeply Plato felt the responsibility and the importance of the office of a public instructor. They show us also how little he is to be blamed for inevitable inefficiency. His Alcibiades is the ideal representative of the young Athenian political adventurer of his day. His Socrates is the representative of that philosophy which would have recalled these brilliant wanderers to the principles of a high, inflexible morality, and which exhausted every allurement of fancy to win them to truth. But of Plato, in this character of a philosophic reformer of his degenerate countrymen, it would now be premature to speak: we shall have abundant opportunity to consider the subject in the sequel.

Death of Plato, B.C. 347.

At the mature age of eighty-one, in the second year of the 108th Olympiad, Plato died, leaving the inheritance of his school to teachers who appear to have but feebly sustained his celebrity, and who, though their successive names and order are recorded, seem to have left but little impression upon the philosophy of antiquity. In the hands of a subsequent succession, who had little in common with Plato but the gardens in which he taught, his tenets were disguised, corrupted, and enfeebled into a system of almost

unmodified skepticism. Had the opinions of Plato been consigned to traditional preservation, the most positive and *doctrinal* of philosophers would probably have descended to us as a dreaming doubter, floating the air-blown bubbles of fancy upon every breeze for the amusement of watching the beauty of their tints and the rapidity of their dissolution. Fortunately, we have surer evidence of his views. Plato has the singular fortune of coming down unimpaired to posterity. The collections of his writings err by excess, not defect: several performances are ascribed to him which custom alone now preserves among his works; but, as far as we can discover from the remotest catalogues and allusions, no one vessel has foundered of the large squadron which Plato committed to the stream of ages.

Plato's writings all in the form of dialogues.

These famous writings are, as you know, couched in the form of dialogue, the favourite shape for the philosophical literature of the Socratic age. Laertius ascribes the first adoption of it to Zeno, the Eleatic logician;[11] but it is probable that the dialogues of this stubborn arguer consisted rather in the rapid interchange of logical difficulties than in the graceful play of intellect and fancy which makes the Platonic conversations still unrivalled in their line of art. To Alexamenus of Teos (an island or city of Ionia) the honour is likewise ascribed of originating this agreeable form of disquisition. But all its cultivators are forgotten in the merit of Plato. The dignified plainness of Xenophon is without his variety and skill, the solidity of Arrian is without his copiousness. In Cicero (besides the immeasurable inferiority of the language in

Invention of the dialogue variously attributed.

Plato compared with other writers of dialogues.

[11] [Diogenes Laertius (iii. 47) attributes the invention to Zeno. It was Aristotle, according to Athenæus, (p. 507,) who made Alexamenus the first writer of dialogue. — Ed.]

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which he wrote) we miss his ease and divine simplicity. Our own Berkeley presents a very pleasing copy of some features of the dialogues of Plato; and Shaftesbury recalls him often, though the evident imitation perhaps too often disturbs the effect. The opinion of antiquity seems unanimous upon the literary merits of Plato. The greatest of ancient orators was probably his hearer, ("Audivisse Platonem *Demosthenes* dicitur," Cic. *Brut.* c. 31;) and an age which could better understand the excellences of a yet living language has unhesitatingly placed the founder of the Academy in the foremost ranks of the artists of Grecian style. A single passage of Lucian,[12] which some of you will probably not have forgotten, briefly enumerates the excellences which the subtle apprehension of Greek criticism recognised in Plato:—

Ancient testimonies to the excellence of his style.

Σοῦ, ὦ Πλάτων, ἥ τε μεγαλόνοια θαυμαστή, καὶ ἡ καλλιφωνία δεινῶς Ἀττική, καὶ τὸ κεχαρισμένον, καὶ πειθοῦς μεστόν, ἥ τε σύνεσις, καὶ τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν ἐν καιρῷ τῶν ἀποδείξεων, πάντα ταῦτά σοι ἀθρόα πρόσεστιν. It would be endless to cite the attestations of Cicero:—"Quis uberior in dicendo Platone! . . . non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi, gravissimus auctor et magister . . . longe omnium quicunque scripserunt aut locuti sunt exstitit et suavitate et gravitate princeps . . . divinus auctor, varius, multiplex, copiosus . . . quidam deus philosophorum." Such are a few of the phrases in which Cicero is accustomed to speak of his philosophical master. A judge not less accomplished than Cicero describes his more elevated style:—"Multum supra prosam orationem et quam pedestrem Græci vocant, surgit; ut mihi non hominis ingenio, sed quodam Delphico videatur oraculo instinctus." (Quint. *Inst. Orat.* x. c. 1.) Such was the critical estimate of the writings of

[12] [*Piscat.* c. 22. ED.]

Plato when Greek was still a living tongue, and those more delicate differences were palpable which have now perhaps forever disappeared to our less instructed organs. Ancient critics declared his style to be the *medium* between prose and verse. Accordingly, in the midst of his severest discussions, Plato mingles the strange fictions of his national mythology and the venerable traditions of foreign lands, and endeavours to supply authority for his less assured decisions in the records of an immeasurable antiquity. Nor, however a colder judgment may disapprove of this combination, is it without an inexpressible charm to imaginative students of the past. "To speak," he declares in the *Timæus*,[13] "concerning the other gods, and trace their generation, is beyond my power. In this case we must trust to the accounts of the elder sages, who, being themselves the children of the gods, must have

Plato's introduction of myths.

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[13] [*Tim.* p. 40, D. In this passage the practised student of Plato will not fail to detect a savour of irony, which has wholly evaporated in Prof. Butler's not very exact translation. Mr. Sewell (*Plato*, p. 87,) would probably have avoided the same error, and with it the necessity of inserting in his translation words which have no counterpart in the original, had he been aware that this ironical purpose was acknowledged by Eusebius. (See *Præp. Evang.* xiii. p. 640.) The Greek, however, tells its own tale:—*περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν τε καὶ γνῶναι μεῖζον ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς. πιστευτέον δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἐμπροσθεν ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν οὖσιν, ὡς ἔφασαν, σαφῶς δέ που τούς γε αὑτῶν προγόνους εἰδόσιν· ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἰκεῖα φάσκουσιν ἀπαγγέλλειν, ἑπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον. Οὕτως οὖν πατ' ἐκείνους ἡμῖν ἡ γένεσις περὶ τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐχέτω καὶ λεγέσθω· Γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ παῖδες Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς κ.τ.ἑ.* Where, as Eusebius dryly observes, the philosopher can hardly be in earnest when he styles the *poets* children of the gods, (*χλευάζειν μοι δοκεῖ—διαβάλλει ἐξῆς τοὺς θεολόγους—παίζειν δ' ἔοικε.*) The remarks which follow in Prof. Butler's text are not, however, deprived of their importance by the selection of an infelicitous example. The loftier the "aspirations" of Plato, the less was it to be expected that they would find satisfaction in the theogonies of Orpheus and Hesiod. ED.]

known the story of their parents. Wrong would it be not to believe the children of the gods, even though they could produce no arguments of scientific value. They speak of that to which they are naturally allied; and therefore, duly obedient to law and right, we should bow to their tradition." That harsh and contemptuous criticism to which it is not given to appreciate Plato may discern in such declarations the proper food for a feeble ridicule; they who see in the illustrious Greek an invaluable study for historians of the human soul will recognise those aspirations after a light supernatural and divine, which Plato inherited from his master, and which both acknowledged at every turn in the progress of thought. "O Solon," cries the Egyptian priest in the same work, "you Greeks are ever children; there is not an old man in Greece! . . . You are all young in soul; you have no tradition venerable through ancient report, no doctrine hoary with years!" In this spirit, when he would recur to remote antiquity, he often professes to derive his knowledge from distant sources. Thus, it is an Armenian who delivers the remarkable portrait of the future state of recompense, in the tenth book of the *Republic*,—the same representation which is further illustrated in the close of the *Gorgias*. We can never rightly estimate the labours of Plato unless we regard his writings as themselves works of art, and no less than transcripts of doctrine. His versatility in the dramatic representation of character has made some of his dialogues far more resemble what we should style "genteel comedy" than a philosophical exposition. Thus, the entire *Euthydemus* is nothing less than a *dramatic satire*, of boundless humour and variety, upon the follies of the sophistic professors, and assuredly lies much nearer to Aristophanes than to Aristotle. The

His affectation of appealing to antiquity.

The Platonic dialogues are works of art, and must be judged accordingly.

Their dramatic merit exemplified in the Euthydemus,

Protagoras, in like manner, while it treats an important philosophical question,—the possibility of communicating virtue by didactic discourses,—includes a dexterous exposure of the same class of pretenders. *the Protagoras,* The *Hippias Major* discusses and rejects the vulgar and narrow definitions of Beauty, but, *the Hippias Major,* in doing so, makes the mercenary trader in wisdom from whom it derives its title eminently ridiculous. The *Ion* speaks of poetry, but incidentally exposes another class of self-sufficient professors,—the rhapsodists, or reciters of verse. Indeed, the student of Plato will find how few of the absurdities which the Molières or the Congreves of modern times have exhibited on the stage can claim originality in extravagance; while he will find what authors professedly dramatic have scarcely ever presented,—the entire exhibition of human folly made subservient to the establishment of a high-toned and presiding morality. It is remarkable, too, how in his loftiest flights this great author never forgets the reality —even the lowest reality—of human nature. In the *Symposium*, Socrates has scarcely concluded his magnificent picture of the love of the eternal *the Symposium,* Beauty, when Alcibiades enters the apartment: the tone suddenly alters, and we are presented with the wild ribaldry of profligacy and drunkenness. The speech of Callicles, the shrewd man of the world, in the *Gorgias*, might have been spoken, without *and the Gorgias.* the alteration of a syllable, in a Parisian drawing-room of yesterday. Is *this* new to our ears?—"My dear Socrates, you talk of *law*. Now, the laws, in my judgment, are just the work of the weakest and most numerous of human minds: in framing them, they never thought but of their own interests; they never approve or censure except in reference to *this*. Hence it is that the cant arises that tyranny is improper and unjust, and to struggle for eminence, guilt. Unable to rise them-

selves, of course they would wish to preach liberty and equality. But nature proclaims the law of the stronger. . . . We surround our children from their infancy with preposterous prejudices about liberty and justice. The man of sense tramples on such imposture, and shows what Nature's justice is. . . . I confess, Socrates, philosophy is a highly amusing study,—in moderation, and for boys. But, protracted too long, it becomes a perfect plague. Your philosopher is a complete novice in the life *comme il faut.* . . . I like very well to see a child babble and stammer; there is even a grace about it, when it becomes his age. But to see a man continue the prattle of the child is absurd. Just so with your philosophy," (p. 484, fol.) Or is not the maxim he interposes worthy the school of La Rochefoucauld?—"The philosopher cunningly avoids the life in which he knows he could not *succeed*, and praises such habits as suit his temper, insinuating, under these generalities, applause of *himself*."

Perhaps, however, it is in parody of the graver pretence of his day that the exquisite dexterity of the pen of Plato most appears. The bustling Hippias, hot from Elis, charged with an embassy, and boasting his encyclopedical knowledge, equally conspicuous in shoemaking and in syllogism,—the long-winded and pompous Protagoras,—the declamatory Gorgias,—all are transplanted into his page with unerring accuracy, and all successively contrasted with that one inimitable old man, who, ever the same, is never wearying, whose shrewd simplicity laughs in their face, while protesting the most unqualified humility, and who, meekly conceding every thing, is gradually gaining all. Perhaps there is not in literature a more perfect specimen of this assumption of style than is presented in the course of a dialogue (the *Theætetus*) to which I shall have soon to introduce you at greater length. Socrates assails by irresistible proofs

The Theætetus.

the famous dogma of Protagoras, that truth varies with the variety of opinion, and, lamenting that Protagoras himself was no longer alive to champion his own tenet, undertakes in his stead to exhibit it to the best advantage. The speech in which this is effected is not only an imitation of sophistry, but of the precise sophistry of Protagoras, and not this merely, but (as we can plainly detect) a formal copy of the inmost peculiarities of his style. So much does Plato delight in individualizing his characters, indeed, that we have sometimes to regret the restriction under which the proprieties of the speaker seem to lay the spirit of the reasoning itself. I have always felt this, for instance, in perusing a very remarkable dialogue, (the *Euthyphron*,) in which a great question—the independence of the principles of morality upon the mere will of a Supreme Governor—is perpetually approached, yet never fully met. Euthyphron is a heathen priest, and argues as one; and Socrates, though triumphantly exposing the discordance of polytheism with the unity of religious morality, scarcely penetrates to the question in its ultimate form. He declares, indeed, with great precision, that an act is not holy because the gods love it, but that the gods love it because it is holy; but the fundamental question of the eternal coincidence of these two terms in the divine nature could not be effectively stated to the minister of polytheism. It is, therefore, glanced at, and dismissed. Of the point itself, however, his whole philosophy sufficiently proclaims his opinion. We shall soon see how, abstracting from those acts which we approve the quality which we approve in them, and which we designate "just" or "good," he made the Divine Mind the eternal depository of a goodness and a justice of which these were the copies or participants, and thus identified the will and the rectitude of God.

The Euthyphron.

LECTURE V.

ON THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES.

GENTLEMEN:—

Further remarks on the Platonic dialogues considered as works of art.

My last lecture closed with some remarks on that style of Plato which has been the object of so unbounded an admiration to the critics of antiquity. A few further observations may not be superfluous before we proceed to contemplate the body that is clothed in this attractive dress.

Their excellence in this respect has been thought to derogate from their scientific value.

I remarked to you that the dialogues of Plato are to be regarded as specimens of *art*, no less than as philosophical treatises. But it may be questioned whether their excellence in the former view has not tended to impair their value in the latter. The characteristic excellences of the philosophic style are perspicuity, precision, and method; the single-minded inquisitor of truth grows impatient at interruptions, and is not to be reconciled to deviations from the highroad of reasoning by any occasional prospect, however novel or extensive. The flowery by-paths of Plato's digressive style are, therefore, pronounced tedious and tantalizing by the dogged pursuers of a *conclusion;* and their indignation is not much alleviated by finding (what is not at all unusual in this writer) that at the close of a dialogue, "Magna et præclara minantis," they are as far as ever from a settled declaration of opinion. This freedom from all the ordinary restraints of argumentative style was, indeed, not the least of the recommendations of the dialogic form

of disquisition to its author. "Shall we return to our subject?" asks Socrates, in the *Theætetus*. "Not at all, Socrates," is the reply. "You have justly said that we are not the slaves of our discussion, but our discussion of us. . . . We are not like the poets, subject to judge or spectator, to preside over our conversations, to reprimand our deviations, and to issue directions which we must obey," (p. 173, B.) But, perplexing as these capricious changes are to the baffled student, perhaps the more rigorously methodical arguments are sometimes not less so. Plato is then metamorphosed from the enthusiastic visionary, whose soul seems at every turn of the discourse impatient for the pure empyrean of contemplation, into the most microscopic analyst of words and propositions. No hasty enthymeme, no unpermitted assumption, will then escape. We seem to see the conclusion within an inch of our eyes, but we are compelled to approach it by infinitesimal gradations. The adversary's arguments must die, as Molière's physician despatched his patients, *selon les règles*. On other occasions there is the same minuteness, but the purpose intended is long imperceptible; and, when the final inference does arrive, we cannot avoid the suspicion that it has been strangely shuffled into the cards by some logical sleight-of-hand, invisible to us from the rapidity of the artist's motions. For my own part, with unbounded admiration for this great writer, I have often, in reading some of his more paradoxical discussions, sympathized with the candid perplexity of Adeimantus in the sixth book of the *Republic*. "My dear Socrates, it is quite impossible to oppose a word to all these reasonings of yours; but observe the manner in which those are affected who listen to your arguments on this subject. They think that, entirely from their own inexperience in the art of asking and answering,

Plato's apology for his own discursiveness.

Minuteness, and seeming sophistry, of his dialectic.

they are by degrees brought on from question to question, until these minute deviations, accumulated at the end, betray a direct contradiction to their original proposition. And just as at draughts the beginner is at length blocked up by the skilful player, so as not to know how to escape, so we novices are blocked up in this logical game of yours, without truth being at all the more concerned in the matter," (p. 487, B.)

Occasional difficulty of detecting the irony of Plato.

The difficulty of these cases is augmented by our frequent uncertainty whether the author is really in earnest; whether he is amusing himself in parodying the affected precision of the Sophists, or whether, from long familiarity with their style of debate, and from that "catching" which the old proverb pronounces to be the penalty of "mocking," he has unwittingly fallen into their wire-drawn prolixity.[1] These, however, if they be blemishes, are but occasional blemishes; and I ought in justice to add that the thorough idolaters of Plato, with the gifted perspicacity of devotees, invariably discover all the rarest treasures of wisdom in those very passages which I have dared to pronounce prolix and fatiguing. How ready are we to reflect praise on ourselves in praising our author, and to extol *that* as food only for the gods which we rejoice to think few but ourselves have been able to digest!

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[1] [An advocate of "the Sophists" would find much to complain of in this sentence. Certainly none of the fraternity with whom we are acquainted equalled or approached the dialectical *ἀδολεσχία* of Socrates. Apologies for this seeming desultoriness and prolixity are not unfrequent in the dialogues. The passage recently referred to in the *Theætetus*—one of the most desultory—has evidently this intention; but in the *Parmenides* prolix discussion is no longer apologized for, but urged upon the youthful inquirer as a sacred duty:—*καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ,* (p. 135, c.) ED.]

His intentional obscurity,

Besides incidental difficulties of this kind, it seems also certain that this great Philosopher sometimes assumes a veil of *intentional* obscurity. His language seems constantly to point to a gift requisite in his reader which no reading can give. "The father of the world is hard to discover, and, when discovered, cannot be communicated."[2] Meditation, laborious and protracted, alone can reveal the mysteries of intellectual truth. In the *Phædrus*[3] he speaks earnestly against *writing* itself, and the spurious knowledge it confers. "Every man must obtain the heavenly fire for himself, and, by uniting with the mind's celestial object, kindle that divine and circumfusing flame which alone can truly illuminate the mind." "On these things," he reiterates, "it is vain to write. Whoever attempts it will fail. Except a few divinely-gifted men, whom God has made capable of finding these truths of themselves, he will only cause some to despise him, and swell others with a miserable arrogance as if they apprehended mysteries of which they are profoundly ignorant."[4] You will easily perceive how such a conception as this, of the incommunicability of the supreme truth, must have led to a despair of satisfactorily expressing it; and how the deficiencies of language, and its dependence on sense, must have beguiled him into those varieties of mythic representation which form not the smallest of the difficulties that meet the interpreter of Plato.

and depreciation of writing as the vehicle of truth.

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[2] [*Timæus*, p. 28, c. Ed.]

[3] [P. 275, c. Ed.]

[4] [This and the preceding quotation are somewhat freely paraphrased from the 7th Epistle, p. 341, d, fol. The entire passage is curious, and should be compared with Ep. ii. 314. Neither passage, it may be observed, lends any support to the Warburtonian distinction of "exoteric and esoteric dialogues." They rather prove that *all* Plato's writings are exoteric,—his esoteric views having been communicated *orally* to the initiated. On the genuineness of the Platonic Epistles, see note (8) to Lect. IV. of this series. (Vol. ii. p. 16.) Ed.]

Nor can we doubt that the peculiar position of Plato must have necessitated this voluntary assumption of a protecting veil of enigmatical language. I see, indeed, little ground for the hypothesis which Warburton, to buttress his theory, has advocated, of the division of the dialogues into esoteric and exoteric, —understanding the former term as involving a secret and mysterious learning, and the latter as including the inculcation of popular fallacies for politic purposes. The very instances to which he appeals seem to contradict his assertion; for assuredly the *ἀπόῤῥητα*—"the unity of God and the detection of polytheism"—are *as* openly exhibited in the alleged exoteric as in any of the other dialogues; and the immortality of the soul (the doctrine on which Warburton would charge Plato with insincerity) appears in those very dialogues which are supposed to contain his real thoughts, (*Theætetus*, *Phædo*, &c.) But, with all this, it is manifest that (the fate of Socrates before his eyes) Plato must have felt the necessity of employing such language as, while it would be intelligible to the thoughtful, might yet admit of a popular interpretation for the jealous defenders of the popular system of belief and worship. And hence, while no mind to whom the discovery could be profitable can fail to read the main lineaments of the divine character—single, sempiternal, and supreme—in his page, the same page is filled with as multitudinous a throng of gods and demons as could be demanded by the most unlimited appetite for a polytheistic theology.

Warburton's distinction between exoteric and esoteric dialogues shown to be unfounded.

One obstacle to the full intelligence of Plato can only be removed by persevering study. In the last series of Lectures delivered in this place I endeavoured to supply somewhat of a clearer and more methodized account of the earlier Greek philosophies than you are likely to find

Plato cannot be understood without a knowledge of the systems which preceded his.

in the unconnected chaos of our common text-books. Without penetrating to the spirit of these systems, the true position of the illustrious Founder of the Academy can never be understood. You are not to tear Plato forcibly from his native soil, to transplant him into the trim gardens of modern philosophy, and to judge of the size or proportions of this lord of the forest deprived of all his natural accompaniments and condemned to droop in an unpropitious clime. The works of Plato are the result of all that had gone before them; they must be estimated as a result; they could have been produced at no other conceivable time. They are a refutation, and a system supplanting rejected systems. They assume theories as well known, of which the mere modern knows nothing; they enter into discussions of subjects which then reverberated through every school in Athens, but of which the critic must now bend a patient ear to catch the faintest echo. Such considerations as these will suggest to you the value of the criticisms of cursory despisers of Plato. *He* could form but a defective estimate of the merits of Thomas Reid who had not before him the writings of Locke, of Hume, and of Berkeley: the poems of Parmenides, the Pythagorean books of Philolaus, the "dark saying" of Heraclitus, should be our own before we could confidently pronounce on the merits of Plato. "Quamvis de diversis officinis hæc ei essent philosophiæ membra suscepta;—naturalis ab Heracliteis, intellectualis a Pythagoreis, rationalis et moralis ex ipso Socratis fonte, unum tamen ex omnibus, et quasi proprii partus corpus effecit."[5] Those inimitable excellences, indeed, which arose from the depths of the author's own mind, and which address man equally in every age, we can scarcely fail to perceive unless hopelessly unfitted for the higher

[5] [Apuleius *de Dogm. Plat.* i. 570. ED.]

offices of speculation and feeling; but how many are the remarks that now drop dully upon our ears which in their own day were decisive and significant! how many an argument which, after the labours of innumerable subsequent thinkers, may now seem ineffective or superfluous, was then, without the waste of a single needless word, the very answer the time demanded!

To put the reader, as far as practicable, *exactly in the position which Plato occupied*, is the task of criticism. In this field much has been done by the successive labours of a vast number of learned men; and more in our own age, perhaps, than in any preceding one. The inquiry into the *origines Platonicæ* has been carried into the remotest quarters.

Opinions of the Christian Fathers respecting Plato examined.

The singular sublimity, and often the antique cast, of his sentiments, his own love for the authority of tradition, and the legends of his mysterious wanderings in Egypt and the East, have united to engage many critics of the highest celebrity to endeavour to trace a wisdom so exalted to a *divine* source, and to see in Plato a commissioned "apostle of the Gentiles." This opinion of the derivation of the Platonic philosophy from the Hebrew Scriptures was among the Christian Fathers nearly universal.[6] Justin, Clemens, Eusebius, Augustine, insist upon it, and evince, by their prompt adoptions of the phraseology and, wherever possible, of the theological views of Plato, how justifiable they considered it to enlist in the cause of divine truth the services of this eloquent commentator on primitive revelation. "What

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[6] [*Præp. Evang.* xiii. p. 663, D. According to Gibbon, it was Josephus who persuaded the Christian Fathers that Plato derived a part of his knowledge from the Jews, (*D. and F.* c. 21, note 11.) See Josephus, *c. Apion.* ii. c. 16. However this may be, the belief was current among the Alexandrine Jews at a much earlier period. ED.]

is Plato," says Numenius, (cited by Clemens Al.,) "but (*Μωΰσης Ἀττικίζων*) Moses in the dialect of Attica?" Eusebius cites an assertion of the Jewish Aristobulus, that a version of the Old Testament existed before that of the Seventy, and that Plato drew his wisdom from its perusal.[7] This seems, however, too unsupported by any corroborative testimony to be admitted; and it certainly would be extraordinary that no traces should be perceptible, in the writings of Plato, of his acquaintance with the singular people from whom this hypothesis would deduce his wisdom. Something has been made of the curious legend in the third book of the *Republic*[8] which Plato calls a *Phœnician Mῦθος*; but unfortunately no admissible parallel can be discovered for it in the Scriptures,—for that which Eusebius instances is utterly visionary.[9] A more circuitous route is proposed for the transmission of this divine teaching. The Israelites had commercial connections with the Egyptians; the captivity of Jehoachaz, and the residence of Jeremiah and Baruch in the country of the Pharaohs, nearly synchronized with the travels of Pythagoras. The disciples of Pythagoras communicated his treasures to Plato, who himself might

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[7] [Aristobulus pretended that this earlier translation had been made "before Alexander's conquest of the Persians," (Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* p. 663, D.) See Valckenaer's *Diatribe de Aristobulo*, xvi. Ed.]

[8] [P. 414, c. A mythus more palpably Greek it is impossible to imagine. Those who dream that these elegant fictions embody the "wisdom of the East" would do well to consider a passage in the *Phædrus*, which seems designed to refute by anticipation any such hypothesis:—*Ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὁποδαποὺς ἂν ἐθέλῃς λόγους ποιεῖς*, p. 275, B. "It is no trouble to you, Socrates, to invent any story, whether it please you to lay the scene in Egypt or in any other country." Ed.]

[9] [*Præp. Ev.* xii. p. 613, *a*. The supposed parallel passage is in Ezekiel xxii. 18. This is a rather extravagant instance of the mode in which the Fathers (*viri optimi sed ταχυπειθεῖς*) were accustomed to deal with Plato. Ed.]

when in Egypt have conversed with the grandchildren, or even the children, of the exiles of Israel. This hypothesis, which is not altogether destitute of reason, would perhaps be more readily accepted if its advocates had not done all that could make it ridiculous, by the frequency of their violent adaptations of Plato to his supposed model. If Eusebius reads in the *Laws* of good and bad demons, he protests that Plato must have had the first chapter of Job before him. If Plato commands the seller of a commodity not to exaggerate the merit of the article, he was plagiarizing from the book of Proverbs. And Dacier pronounces that he must have been more than man, if he sketched the character of a legislator as laid down in his *Laws*, without borrowing from the history of Moses.[10] The Soul of the World is the "Spirit that

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[10] [Frequent use has been made by the Christian Fathers of two passages in the Epistles, which it is worth while to transcribe. In the second Epistle we read, (p. 312, E:)—*περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστί, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν. δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα.* And in the sixth as follows:—*τὸν τῶν πάντων θεὸν ἡγεμόνα τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων, τοῦ τε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα κύριον ἐπόμνυντας, ὃν, ἂν ὄντως φιλοσοφῶμεν, εἰσόμεθα πάντες σαφῶς εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμόνων.* These mystical passages have been supposed by some to have been inserted by a Christian hand; in which case they must be understood as referring to the Christian Trinity. But the text bears no marks of such interpolation. The conjecture that the entire epistles in which the passages occur were the handiwork of a Platonizing Jew of Alexandria is more reasonable; and it is borne out by the resemblance of the mystical phrases in the letters to expressions of Philo relating to his Logos, &c. The difficulty arising from a later date of the Alexandrine's writings is removed by the supposition, generally adopted, that his views and language were to a considerable extent inherited from earlier allegorizing speculators of his own nation. (See Mangey's Preface to his ed. of Philo.) Eusebius truly says that no Greek before Plato would have dreamed of "speaking of the creative Father as the Lord;" and, though we cannot accede to his hypothesis that *Plato* borrowed the language in question from the Hebrews, we can find no difficulty in acknowledging the obligations

moved on the face of the waters;" and the Soul that animates the heavens was the misconception of a phrase in Isaiah. But when the remoteness of the resemblances to antecedent passages of Scripture, and the supposed similarity to subsequent revelation, at once increases the interest of the problem and renders *this* solution inapplicable, many of these writers do not hesitate to advance another more direct and decisive. Plato himself comes before us in the mantle of *immediate* inspiration. Augustine, Origen, (in controversy with Celsus,) Jerome, Eusebius, Clement, do not hesitate to affirm that Christ himself revealed his own high prerogatives to the gifted Grecian. From this hypothesis, however, the facts of the case force them to make many abatements. In the mid-current of this divine revelation are found errors fantastic and frivolous, which it is impossible to ascribe to the celestial illuminator. Plato, then, was *partially* enlightened, and clouded the heavenly beam with the remaining grossnesses of the natural sense. When the question arrives at this state, its decision becomes more and more perplexed. The natural providence and the supernatural interferences of God are

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of the *pseudo*-Plato to that source. (See Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* xi. p. 534, *d*, *e*.) The following account of the Philonic triad may save the necessity of quotations, which might be multiplied indefinitely, from the Alexandrine himself:—"Duabus superioribus Dei virtutibus Deo et Domino (Κυρίῳ) quæ *al ἀνωτάτω al δύο πρῶται δυνάμεις* audiunt, si quis adnumeret copulam, qua utraque conjuncta tenetur, sive Verbum Divinum, sive Deum ipsum, existit sanctissima quædam Trias." Dähne, *Questiones Philonicæ*, p. 25, not. 98. An English writer of the last century, who exhibits great sobriety of judgment in dealing with other passages in Plato, which had turned the heads of more learned men, ventures on the bold supposition that those in the Epistles refer, not to any Jewish speculation, but simply to the distinction in the *Philebus*, 31, c, between *τὸ αἴτιον τὸ πέρας* and *τὸ ἄπειρον*. (Cæsar Morgan, *Trinity of Plato*, pp. 43–46, ed. Holden, 1853.) This opinion is, unfortunately, quite untenable. ED.]

separated by a line we cannot always draw. If He be the author of the faculties that apprehend truth, He is the author of every apprehension of truth. How far, then, the Deity was energizing in the mind of Plato, risks becoming a question of words; while this supposed revelation surrounded with dangerous error becomes almost useless to those who are not furnished with an additional revelation to fix the demarcation.

The age in which the Fathers of the Christian Church flourished was not an age of criticism in our sense of the term. These great men may have been employed upon weightier duties; they certainly were little employed upon this. It is proper, therefore, to suggest, as a circumstance of some importance in this controversy, that the writings in which the *most* startling resemblances occur—the *Epinomis* and the Epistles of Plato—are, by the more searching sagacity of modern criticism, refused to that author. Their precise history is, however, very uncertain. The eagerness of the Neoplatonics to match the divine features of Christianity with parallel doctrines unquestionably led to interpolations, which their adversaries had not always the learning, or the caution, to expose; and the necessities or conveniences of exposition would often lead a Christian preacher to accept with complacency forms of expression which enriched his own vocabulary, and, still oftener, to present to the enemy the impressive argument derived from exhibiting the name most reverenced by philosophic paganism as a herald of the divine truth,—as "not *that light*, but to bear *witness* of that light." In whatever way you decide the question of these resemblances of phraseology and sentiment, let me recommend to you all, in the mean time, the admirable language of one who leaves few to improve what he has once delivered. "Whatever," says St. Augustine, (*De Doctr. Christian.* ii. 40,) "those called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, may have said

true and conformable to our faith is not only not to be dreaded, but is to be claimed from them, as unlawful possessors, to our use. For as the Egyptians not only had idols and heavy burdens, which the people of Israel were to abhor and avoid, but also vessels and ornaments of gold and silver and apparel, which that people, at its departure from Egypt, privily assumed for a better use, not on its own authority, but at the command of God, the very Egyptians unwittingly furnishing the things which themselves used not well; so all the teaching of the Gentiles not only hath feigned and superstitious devices, and heavy burdens of a useless toil, which we severally, as, under the leading of Christ, we go forth out of the fellowship of the Gentiles, ought to abhor and avoid; but it also containeth liberal arts filled for the service of truth, and some most useful moral precepts: as also there are found among them some truths concerning the worship of the one God Himself, as it were their gold and silver which they did not themselves form, but drew from certain veins of Divine Providence running throughout, and which they perversely and wrongfully abuse to the service of demons. These the Christian, when he severs himself from their wretched fellowship, ought to take from them for the right use of preaching the gospel. . . . For what else" (he continues) "have many excellent members of our faith done? See we not how richly laden with gold and silver and apparel that most persuasive teacher and blessed martyr Cyprian departed out of Egypt? or Lactantius? or Victorinus, Optatus, Hilary,—not to speak of the living? and Greeks innumerable? And this Moses himself, that most faithful servant of God, first did, of whom it is written, that 'he was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians.'" "Let every good and true Christian," he says elsewhere, "understand that truth, wherever he finds it, belongs to *his* Lord." (Ib.) "By whomsoever truth is said, it

is said through His teaching who is the truth." (Ep. 166.)

The connection of the Platonic philosophy with the inspired wisdom of the Hebrews you will find maintained at great length by Gale, Lamy, Dacier, and Huet, and resisted by Le Clerc, Menage, and L'Enfant.

Influences of the earlier Greek philosophies.

The influence of the antecedent philosophies of his own country upon the formation of the views of Plato is far more palpable. The brief record of ancient criticism, authenticated by Plato's greatest pupil, and evidenced in the writings themselves, is, that "he followed in Sensibles, Heraclitus —in Intellectuals, Pythagoras—in Morals and Politics, Socrates." To the second number of this division must be added a strong *Eleatic* infusion. And as we shall see that the philosophy of Plato was eminently ethical—all else being subservient to this—we shall anticipate that the influence of *Socrates* would be everywhere discernible. Now, it is well worth considering how much of even the purely speculative tenets of Plato are directly connected with the characteristic peculiarities of his Master. For example, an unquestionable authority, Aristotle himself, (*Met.* i. 5,) refers the theory of Ideas to the Socratic custom of *definition*. After noticing the impression which the gloomy doctrine of Heraclitus (of the incessant change of all that encompasses us in the world) had made on Plato, Aristotle proceeds:—"On the other hand, Socrates being occupied with morals, and no longer with a physical system, and having sought evermore in morals that which is universal and first directed his attention to *definitions*, Plato, who followed and continued him, was led to think that definitions ought to belong to an order of beings apart, and have no relation to sensible objects; for how should a common definition apply to things sensible, the subjects of perpetual change?

Socratic influence.

Connection of Platonic "ideas" with Socratic "definitions."

Now, these beings apart he designated Ideas," &c. It is here evident that Plato sought to combine the *universality* of the Socratic definition with a *stability* beyond that of physical science, and thus not only generalized with Socrates, but abstracted and realized his generalizations to meet the objections of the Heraclitian.

Socratic tendencies in Plato's Ethical,

Again: we recognise the habitual doctrine of Socrates—that the best good of man is in the perfect development of reason—in those tenets which abound in the Platonic dialogues, which identify vice with ignorance, and even pronounce that no man is voluntarily evil, *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός.*

and in his Physical speculations.

The physics (again) of Plato are little more than an explanation by final causes; and, in the fanciful suppositions to which this leads, we can read an exaggerated result of the Socratic convictions of a Divine Providence as evidenced in the structure of the world. But the luxuriant fructification of the Socratic germ transplanted into this rich soil is even more remarkably exhibited when we seem to see doctrines gradually formed out of the very habits of the master's conversation. Thus, it can scarcely be doubted that the Platonic doctrine of *Reminiscence* was at least partly suggested by that extrication of preconceived truths which Socrates was wont to call his "maieutic art." In the very course of the dialogue (the *Meno*) in which the doctrine is most explicitly set forth, we have an example of the process by which the doctrine itself was probably suggested.[11]

The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις suggested by the practice of Socrates.

To the ethical principles of Socrates it is manifest that Plato added views for which he was much indebted to the lofty metaphysic of

Pythagorean element in Plato.

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[11] [In the celebrated conversation with the slave, in whose untutored mind a succession of judicious leading questions operates a "reminiscence" of certain mathematical theorems. *Men.* p. 82, fol. ED.]

The Phædrus.

Pythagoras. The *Phædrus* is said to have been the first of his dialogues,[12] and in that wonderful performance the youthful author is evidently fresh from the study of the mystic moralist of Crotona. The essential activity, and thence the essential immortality, of the soul, a doctrine held, as we know, by Alcmæon of Crotona, and altogether Pythagoric,—the metempsychosis,—the ten periods of the soul,—all these show that if Plato at this period had not mastered the secrets of Pythagorism, he had at least been conversant with its

[12] [Against the tradition that the *Phædrus* was the first-born of Plato's genius, several modern authorities have ventured to rebel. The arguments of C. F. Hermann (*Gesch. d. Plat. Phil.* p. 375) are especially entitled to attention; and we can only regret that the work in which they occur is written in a style which even a German must find difficult and repulsive. Among the internal reasons for fixing a later date for this dialogue may be enumerated,—1. Its Pythagorism, implying that Plato when he wrote the *Phædrus* had studied in Magna Græcia. (See Cicero, *de Repub.* i. 10, 16; *de Fin.* v. 29, 87.) 2. The multifarious learning displayed in it,—a learning of which there are few traces in his youthful works. 3. The maturity of its ethical views—as in the tripartite division of the soul under the figure of the charioteer and two horses, (*Phædr.* 246,) &c.—contrasted with the Socratic crudity of the *Lysis*, *Protagoras*, &c. 4. The clear exposition of the principles of philosophical method, (Ib. p. 265,) and the advanced views of the nature of "ideas" implied in the great mythus, (p. 247.) Lastly, the exquisite perfection of the *Phædrus* as a work of literary art. On the other side, we have the testimony of early—apparently Peripatetic—authorities. See Diog. Laert. iii. 38,—a passage from which some infer that the *juvenility* of the *Phædrus* was a fiction invented by way of apology for its supposed bad taste. Much stress has also been laid on the passage relating to Isocrates, (*Phædr.* 279,) who, it is argued, would not have been painted in such flattering colours at a later period, when the shallowness of that plausible rhetorician could no longer have escaped the penetration of the philosopher. This argument has the more force, if we admit that the description of the *ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφὸς* in Euthyd. 304, D, is intended for a portrait of Isocrates, as Schleiermacher was the first to suggest. The description is, however, too general to enable us to build any inference upon it with safety. ED.]

exoteric doctrine. Nothing, indeed, can be more interesting to the student of the mental history of Plato than the whole examination of this remarkable dialogue. It is to the other writings of Plato what Plato himself is to the more measured style that succeeded him. We find him in the *Phædrus* still encompassed with the poetry of his early days, and unable to contemplate truth except through the prism of imagination.[13] He is now *in love* with philosophy, and he delights to lavish his richest treasures of decorative fancy upon the object of his love. The necessity of an eternal world of intellect to form the basis for science he perceives as clearly as ever; but perhaps never again does he picture its scenery with colouring so bright and so varied; nor even in the *Symposium* itself is the tendency of the soul to the absolute and central beauty painted in words so glowing. The very scenery of the whole is fraught with mystery, and adapted with exquisite art to second the effect of the main subject. The consecrated waters of Ilissus, the Muses' temple, the haunts of ancient song,—of Boreas, and Orithyia, of the nymphs, and of mystic Pan,—such is the locality where the hierophant of the ideal world unfolds the story of the soul. Elements even more ancient than the wisdom of Pythagoras are to be found scattered through this composition, but all blended together with such masterly skill as to present a perfect and harmonious uniformity. Plato, who introduced

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[13] [The *inability* is a mere assumption. The *Phædrus* contains specimens of the dryest dialectic. If the argument were good for any thing, it would prove that the *Symposium* and *Timæus* are youthful works; which it is known they were not.

Notwithstanding the poetical colouring of the *Phædrus*, the ideal theory shines quite distinctly through the Erotic mythus, which, as well as that in the *Symposium*, is a deliberately-planned *allegory*, differing from many of Plato's myths in this respect,—that the sign and the thing signified are always perfectly distinguishable. ED.]

many neologisms, is reported to have been the first inventor of the word "Poem:"[14] the *Phædrus* alone would make it appropriate that he should be.

Of the other philosophies which contributed to form that of Plato, the proper time to speak will be in direct connection with the doctrines he established, to conciliate or to refute them.

The "unwritten dogmas" of Plato.

Although, as I have already said, we may conclude that we possess all the written works of Plato, it is not certain that we possess all his opinions. Certain *ἄγραφα δόγματα* are spoken of in the *Physics* of Aristotle,[15] which have given rise among his votaries to discussions almost as anxious as those which our own age witnesses on the subject of unwritten traditions far more important. Aristotle also collected his *διαιρέσεις*, or Distinctions, which are preserved by Laertius,[16] and some of which are to be found in his writings, but which are of little value in estimating his opinions.

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[14] [The word occurs several times in Herodotus. Plato may possibly have been the first who used it in the restricted sense. ED.]

[15] [*Phys.* iv. 2, 3. Suidas asserts that Aristotle arranged the "unwritten opinions of Plato" in a work of his own *περὶ τἀγαθοῦ*. All the accessible information upon this curious subject may be found in Trendelenburg's *Platonis Doctrina de Ideis et Numeris*, Lips. 1826, and in the treatise of Brandis, *De perditis Aristotelis Libris*, Bonn, 1823. ED.]

[16] [These "distinctions" are alluded to by Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.* ii. 3:—*καθάπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν.* Compare Diog. L. iii. 80:—*διήρει δέ, φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.* The author of the 13th Epistle also mentions them:—*τῶν τε Πυθαγορείων πέμπω σοι καὶ τῶν διαιρέσεων*, p. 360, B. C. F. Hermann, from whom I transcribe these references, calls attention to certain *γεγραμμέναι διαιρέσεις* alluded to by Aristotle, *de Part. Anim.* i. 2, (where the philosopher refers to the *Sophista*, p. 220, B,) as evidence that no separate collection of *διαιρέσεις* was made by Plato himself. (See *Gesch. d. Platonischen Philos.* i. p. 549, not. 224.) The *ὅροι* or Definitions which appear in the editions of *Plato* are attributed by some editors to Speusippus, but without sufficient reason. ED.]

Disputed genuineness of some of the Dialogues.

The genuineness, and the chronological order, of his dialogues have been largely debated by modern critics; and the skeptical spirit of the criticism of Germany has shown no more mercy to the "Attic Moses" than to his venerable prototype. *Socher* denies us four of the most important of the entire collection.[17] *Schleiermacher* is content with refusing his critical passport to two or three; but the wholesale severity of *Ast* will not be satisfied unless twelve[18] of our precious relics be sacrificed. The reasons upon which this bold decision is founded are totally unsatisfactory. An ideal is formed of the Platonic style, and all which seems to fall below this conception is declared to be the feeble imitation of some ambitious pupil. Some construct this ideal in reference to the perfection of *style*, others in reference to force of *doctrine;* some look to the artist, others to the philosopher;

[17] [As the *Parmenides*, *Sophista*, and *Politicus!* ED.]

[18] [Not twelve, but twenty-one; to wit, the *Laws*, the *Epinomis*,* the *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Alcibiades II.*,* *Menexenus*, *Laches*, *Hippias I.* and *II.*,* *Ion*,* *Euthyphron*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Theages*,* *Anterastæ*,* *Hipparchus*,* *Minos*,* *Clitophon*,* *Epistles*,* besides those already condemned by Diogenes Laertius! Those marked with an asterisk are rejected by the Zurich editors, who condemn the first *Alcibiades* also, and not without good reason. The second is given up even by Stallbaum. The genuineness of the *Laws* has been called in question by some very recent German critics, one of whom—Zeller—has since recanted. The *Epinomis*, the second *Alcibiades*, the *Theages*, *Anterastæ*, *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, and *Clitophon* have few, if any, supporters: but most of the remaining dialogues in Ast's list are not only worthy of Plato, but could not have proceeded from an inferior author. The difference of style observable in the *Laws* is, in the opinion of most critics, satisfactorily accounted for by the tradition that it was left by Plato ἐν κηρῷ, *i.e.* that he did not live to write a fair copy. A certain degeneration of manner is observable in other probably late dialogues, of undoubted authenticity; but, were the literary merit of the *Laws* less than it really is, we should have no right to question a work which Aristotle expressly acknowledges to have been written by his master. ED.]

but all equally adopt a principle against which the genuineness of none of the more voluminous authors of antiquity could stand.[19] No one is more ready than myself to admit that among the Platonic dialogues are *some* which appear miserably unworthy of the author of the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic;* but when I find the *Hippias Minor*, with its barren paradoxes, authenticated by the express reference of Aristotle,[20] I learn to distrust *à priori* criticism. Plato's writings were spread over a long and meditative life; they were produced under various influences, and probably under many changes of temper and feeling: the Columbus of the Ideal World could not always steer steadily and exultingly for the land of his discoveries and his reputation; nor can we tell what conjunctures may have given pertinency to discussions that now seem arid and unprofitable. The partiality of a writer for early essays may have induced Plato to permit imperfect sketches to shelter their imperfection under the shadow of maturer greatness;[21] and his deep reverence for Socrates may have sometimes induced him to forbear qualifying with his own more finished excellence a few of those

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[19] [This remark has undoubtedly great force against the sweeping criticisms, or *un*criticisms, of Ast. On the other hand, there is an antecedent probability that Plato would find many imitators, and that their imitations would vary in merit. Some of the coarsest forgeries were rejected by the ancients, (see the list in Laertius;) but the unresisting acquiescence in the genuineness of compositions so open to suspicion as the Platonic Epistles is a proof that the Alexandrine sieve had large meshes. ED.]

[20] [*Metaph.* iv. 29, 5, where, however, Plato is not cited as the author of "the *Hippias.*" The same dialogue, with the same omission, is referred to by Cicero, *de Orat.* iii. 32. ED.]

[21] [If this remark has any force, it constitutes a reason against the early date of the *Phædrus*, in which Plato's powers both of language and arrangement appear in their most perfect state of development. ED.]

paradoxical discussions in which the old master kept his unrivalled powers of casuistry in play and breathed himself for more momentous encounters. By the aid of such considerations as these, there are none of the works of Plato, authenticated by fair *external* evidence, which we may not receive as possible, or probable, products of his mind.

In what order were the Dialogues composed?

Amid a collection so varied and so extensive it is impossible not to feel some curiosity as to the *order of composition*. With the exception of the tradition before noticed relative to the priority of the *Phædrus* and *Lysis*, and a statement in Plutarch's life of Solon, that the completion of the *Critias* was prevented by the author's death, the ancients give us little light on this subject. That some of the dialogues were intended to be mutually connected is unquestionable. Thus, the *Theætetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Politicus*,—the *Republic*, the *Timæus*, and the *Critias*,—are expressly conjoined by their author; though it may at first sight seem strange that a treatise of physics should form the middle term between a great political essay and a high-wrought moral romance. If the *Clitophon* were a genuine dialogue, it should form the introduction to this series. The usual division is the old classification by tetralogies,[22] which, we are told, Plato himself adopted, in imitation of the tragic writers,—a

Classification by Thrasyllus in tetralogies.

[22] [Thrasyllus, who lived under the Emperor Tiberius, is the authority for this, (in Diog. L. iii. 56.) He divided the whole series of dialogues into tetralogies, of which Laertius gives a list. It is quite certain that his division was not Plato's; though some of his tetralogies are asserted with considerable intelligence. The two or three tetralogies projected by the philosopher himself were never finished: thus, in that in which the *Theætetus* stands first, we are promised a fourth dialogue to follow the *Politicus*, but the promise is not fulfilled. Thrasyllus completes the tetralogy by prefixing the *Cratylus* to the other three,—an expedient for which there is no justification in Plato's text.

proof to you how distinctly he himself, or at least the ancient critics who received these works, (if the division by tetralogies began with *them*,) regarded the Platonic dialogues as works of art, as philosophic *dramas*. Another classification of great antiquity is based upon the style and purpose of the dialogue,—as maieutick, anatreptick, endeictick, and so forth. But all these divisions throw little light upon the literary biography of Plato. As the only remaining resource, efforts have been made to arrange the order of production by the internal evidence of the writings themselves. In this enterprise Schleiermacher has displayed especial perseverance, and considerable sagacity. Of his reasonings, depending as they must on minute details, and comparisons of phrases, style, subject, and sentiment, it would, of course, be impossible to present you with any satisfactory account. The general result is thus stated by another able Platonist, who regards it as substantially justified by a close examination of the writings thus estimated. "He divides the works of Plato into three classes. To the class of the writings of his youth belong the *Phædrus* and the *Protagoras*, as well as several other minor moral dialogues in the Socratic vein; the second class comprises particularly those works of the higher dialectic which are mutually connected,—the *Theætetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus;* finally, the dialogues directly instructive—the *Republic*, *Timæus*, and *Laws*—form the last class of the writings of Plato." The writer whom I cite adds that the *Gorgias* may mark the transition from the first to the second class; the *Phædo* and *Philebus*, from the second to the third. A *general* decision such as this is, perhaps, the farthest point that

Schleiermacher's principle of arrangement.

His selection of the wretched little *Clitophon* to head the series beginning with the *Republic* is another instance of injudicious ingenuity. ED.]

criticism can expect to reach without external evidence to assure its advances.

But, whatever may have been the precise order in which the works and the mind of Plato were developed, and whatever may have been the circumstances, now irreparably lost, which determined each successive direction of his thoughts, there is a unity in the whole which speaks the creation of a single mind, and which appears in even the earliest of his disquisitions with a distinctness which proves that the main lines of his philosophy were caught and fixed before he ever wrote a page.

These prominent features which decide the character of the whole are to my judgment discoverable from the first, and discoverable in all. And these, felt to be the fundamental notes, are the notes which have found their echo in every age. To be more precise, the teaching of Plato presented a double aspect, and each found its exaggerated likeness in succeeding forms of philosophy. On the one hand, the constant depreciation of the certainty and value of such knowledge as is derived through the channel of the *senses* was represented in the skeptical, or semi-skeptical, succession of the Academics; on the other, the loftier views of his more abstract tenets were resumed, and too often disfigured, by the Alexandrian mystics. In exhibiting the ultimate forms of his doctrines when *separately and exclusively* received, these schools afford very valuable instruction to the student of Plato. The double result is highly characteristic of the localities where it manifested itself. The subtle intellect of Greece soon adopted as its favourite that element of Platonism which gave room for endless distinctions, strange paradoxes, and scholastic conflict; the Oriental genius of Alexandria found food for its musing quietism in those remote and ethereal speculations which

Twofold aspect of the Platonic philosophy;

its skeptical

and speculative element;

represented, the first in the Academic, the second in the Alexandrian schools.

seemed to justify a life of meditative inaction, and even to exhibit, as its reward and inheritance, an immediate commerce with heaven. No inquiry can be more interesting and profitable to those who desire to grow wise upon recorded error—to erect, as it were, warning beacons upon every perilous passage in the vast sea of human speculation—than that which examines these two developments of Platonism, and traces to their consummate efflorescence the germs which already lay scattered through the old dialogues of the master himself. Every one feels that the danger of the Platonic philosophy from its earliest hour was its bias to *exclusive contemplativeness;* and in these developments you have the inevitable result.

Comparison of Platonism and Christianity.

Exactly as every one must recognise that one of the most wondrous evidences of divine wisdom in the Christian system is the perfect proportion in which it exhibits its impulses to the contemplative and active forms of holiness, giving to each its appropriate stimulants, and, while chiefly insisting upon the one which man's position in a world of social duties most requires, yet never allowing to it that absolute supremacy which could make the other wholly forgotten. It is, indeed, well worth notice, how, in the very aggregate of writings which divine Providence was pleased to preserve to the Church as the exemplar of practice, this balance seems purposely and carefully held in view, and the characters of the writers, and the portion of inspired precept they record, suited with exquisite accuracy to give the complex impression required. Yet we know that even in Christianity itself, at various ages, the separate elements have obtained disproportionate influence, and the due equilibrium of the New Testament been forgotten; and we may, perhaps, be inclined to indulge to the reputation of Plato results which the caprices and perversities of our nature have introduced more than once into the ethics of Christianity itself. At the same

time, I am willing to allow (as subsequent expositions shall evince) that any representation of Platonism would be imperfect which did not fairly state that the skepticism of the Academy and the dreamy theories of Alexandria were not unnatural results of certain tendencies discoverable in the writings of Plato himself,—tendencies for which his own well-balanced intellect, doubtless, provided sufficient counterpoise, but which too closely suited peculiar temperaments not to have been soon exalted into exclusive or predominant principles of speculation. As a depository of practical principles, it has been, so far as I can see, reserved for *the New Testament alone* to be absolutely incapable of misguiding any one who does not—from whatever disturbing influence—lose, or destroy, the moral proportions originally established in the volume itself. And I repeat—for the observation is important—that when you remember that these proportions are the combined work of a variety of distinct authors, each delivering an independent contribution to the ultimate result, you can scarcely see a greater proof of superior agency in the harmonious unity of a complex world than in the moral proportions of so composite a record. Convictions *like these* can scarcely be avoided by any candid student of ethical speculation; the study of ancient philosophy would be invaluable, were it only as producing them in a thousand forms, and thus compelling the intellectual monarchs of every age to cast their crowns at the feet of the present teacher of Galilee!

Concluding remarks.

With such admonitions as these—and they should never be forgotten—the student of the Platonic treatises may prepare to yield himself to a course of philosophical speculation which, taking all circumstances together, is probably the most ennobling that has yet proceeded from any human being unaided, directly or indirectly, by the notices of inspiration. How far such a philosophy can expect to obtain the

rights of citizenship in these countries under their present habits of thought, it is not easy to say. That its fundamental principles, when stripped of unnecessary hypothesis and fanciful decoration, (which Plato himself, perhaps, *intended* for nothing more,) are founded on eternal truth, I cannot doubt; but it is unquestionable that they represent a class of truths which, for many years, and from various causes, have been feebly portrayed in the popular philosophy of our language. With all our admiration for the energetic labours of the great naturalists of our day, and for the advances which the physical sciences are receiving through their combined exertions, we cannot refuse to see—and in all quarters the conviction is gaining strength among thoughtful men—that the spiritual world (except as far as *practically* presented by the preachers of religion) is in proportion eclipsed. It is, as it were, *unrepresented* in the parliament of philosophy. This huge material universe, with all its labyrinth of laws, seems to fetter and entangle us; and we are so overwhelmed by weight and motion, that matter and being become equivalent terms, and we cannot allow the *existence* of a world to which these material attributes are not attached. Now, if it be essential to a right estimation of things that we should evermore feel that there is that within us which can hold converse with truths that sense has never given and never *could* give,—that these truths are *real* truths, things far more durable than ever was earthly bond or material law,—that they manifest themselves on the stage of our conscious intelligence as the shadows of eternal realities,—that these realities converge to one centre, which centre is no other than God Himself,—if it be well that amid the dust of our laboratories these things should not be forgotten,—then is it well that the high-priest of reason—that Plato—should be heard and known. In truth, it was a wondrous vision that this man saw! Untaught (if he was

untaught, if any one moving in such a path can be said to move wholly without the guidance of God, but, for all outward evidence, untaught) by any supernatural instructor, he could look into his own heart and find there the image of eternity; he could see reflected in the human reason the divine, and catch, from the mysterious caverns of the soul yet imprisoned in flesh, dim echoes of another world! Whatever be the errors, the fantasies, the failures, of Plato, to have thus seen and heard, to have thus stood forward a witness for the design and destinies of man, places him—if we forget for a moment his less aspiring master—alone among the uninspired instructors of the earth. And in every age, when the tone of public opinion becomes relaxed, when its ambition becomes envy and its wisdom cunning, and men professedly determine to forget the inner for the outer world, the office of the *pulpit* is indeed plain and invariable; but as for the *schools*, who must speak by book and system, it has been their safety to inscribe the venerable name of Plato upon their standards, and, strong in the authority that belongs to recognised greatness when modern names might fail, to restore, under the charm and the power of this august philosophy, the falling fortunes of learning and the muse.

LECTURE VI.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO AS A WHOLE.

GENTLEMEN:—

Subject of the Lecture stated.

HAVING, at such length as our present occasion demanded, considered the chief characteristics of the life and writings of Plato, we are now to enter upon a much more difficult task,—that of briefly, but definitely, fixing our views of his philosophical labours. Upon the difficulty of the undertaking, however, I will not insist, as I should be sorry to suggest any thing which might deter you from making that personal investigation to which all my efforts in this place are only meant to be preparatory or auxiliary. Neither shall I (for reasons still more obvious) say any thing about my own qualifications to be your assistant in the study. *My* only claims upon your attention consist in this:—that what I shall offer you is at least the result of patient and conscientious examination of the original documents of this great master of reason; and, therefore, that if my conclusions should coincide with those already advanced in your ordinary text-books and treatises, they will possess the value (whatever it may amount to) of independent evidence; if they should *differ*, they will invite you to the tribunal where alone such differences can be properly decided,—the great originals, the *fontes integri*, themselves. If they effect this, they will procure you a benefit cheaply purchased by the trouble of listening for a while to a tedious or inefficient exposition.

In our present Lecture we shall consider the Philosophy of Plato generally, and as a whole.

The Philosophy of Plato as a whole. Its ethical character.

I. The quality which above all others manifests itself to the student of this philosophy is the *eminently ethical* character of the entire system. It is a contemplative philosophy only for practical purposes. Its ultimate object is the purification of the soul, and science is but the means for the attainment of this object. Thus, its tendency is to rationalize morals, and to moralize reason. Its phrases and definitions perpetually show this. Wisdom, or *σοφία*, is expressly declared to belong alone to the Supreme Divinity,[1] who alone can contemplate reality directly, and with whom, indeed, it seems more than once intimated that knowledge and existence *coincide:* Philosophy is considered as the aspiration of the soul after this perfect and immutable truth; that is, it is connected with perfect wisdom by the medium of a *divine affection*, (that *love* on which Plato so largely dilates;) in other words, it is itself essentially *moral*, no less than merely scientific, (*Phædr.*) In this spirit he pronounces "philosophy," properly speaking, to belong neither to the gods nor to the ignorant among mankind: the *aspiration* is below those who possess the reality, and above those who have never learned its value.[2] In establishing the proper object of philosophic science to be *the eternal and unchangeable*, (as far as man can attain it,) we find (in conformity with what I have stated) this supreme essence invested with *moral* attributes; it is alternately *τὸ ὄν* and *τὸ ἀγαθόν*; and all which can be the material of speculation in the system of the universe is pronounced to be an emanation of goodness. "What," asks one of

Platonic conception of Philosophy.

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[1] [*Phædr.* p. 278, D:—*τὸ μὲν σοφόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλεῖν ἐμοιγε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ Θεῷ μόνῳ πρέπειν.* Comp. *Apol.* p. 23, A. ED.]

[2] [*Sympos.* p. 204, A:—*θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι, ἔστι γάρ . . . οὐδ' αὖ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν, κ.τ.ἑ.* ED.]

the interlocutors in the sixth book of the *Republic*,[3] "is this science of which you speak as superior to all others, and what is its object?" "You have often heard me say," replied Socrates, "that the Idea of the Good is the object of the sublimest of sciences: . . . if we know not this idea, it will avail us nothing to know *all the rest*." "As eyes which should be unable to turn from darkness to light without turning the whole body, so the organ of intelligence ought to turn with the entire soul from the sight of that which is generated to the contemplation of that which alone *is*, and of that which is most luminous in Being; and have we not denominated that *the good?*" It is even said that the good is the *cause* of things known, and of [4]knowledge.* And, to render this ultimate ἀγαθὸν yet more definite, it is exhibited with a fixed and individual personality. The object of the particular sciences is said to be "to facilitate the contemplation of the Idea of Good,"[5] thus synonymous with reality itself: and this essential goodness is described as "the happiest of all beings, and whom the soul ought evermore and in every

The Idea of the Good its ultimate object.

Use of the particular sciences.

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[3] [P. 505, A, and vii. 518, C. ED.]

[4] [*Rep.* vi. p. 508, E:—*τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, αἰτίαν ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, κ.τ.λ.* So vii. 517, C:—*ἡ τ. ἀγ. ἰδ . . . πάντων ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, . . . ἐν νοητῷ αὐτὴ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη.* ED.]

* "The Good is *the Sun* of the Intelligible World: it sheds on objects the light of truth, and gives to the soul that knows the faculty of knowing." "Consider," he proceeds, "this Idea as the principle of science, and of truth, considered as subject to knowledge; and, however beautiful be science and truth, you will deceive yourself, if you set not the idea of the Good apart from and above them. As in the visible world we justly believe that sight and light are analogous to the sun, yet are not the sun, so in the intelligible sphere we regard science and truth as analogous to the Good, but it would be a grievous error to take them for the Good itself, which is far more precious than they."

[5] [*Rep.* vii. p. 532, C:—*πᾶσα . . . ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν . . . ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν.* ED.]

way to contemplate."[6] Every special science is valuable only so far as it aids to enfranchise the soul for this free flight into the infinite excellence.* Accordingly, when Plato is engaged with the discussion of the particular sciences, he resolves them into the science of Good; when engaged with the particular virtues, he resolves them into the virtue of Science. The *Laches* is a discussion on valour, and it is shown to be as nothing where not directed by that presiding knowledge which alone can raise it into the sphere of virtue; while, on the other hand, mathematics, music, astronomy, are below the level of the philosopher where not made strictly subordinate to the art of converse with the supremely good.[7] You will have now perceived that, in Plato, philosophy is only another name for *religion*; philosophy is the love of Perfect Wisdom; perfect Wisdom and perfect Goodness are identified; the perfectly Good is God Himself:[8] philosophy, then,

Treatment of the particular virtues.

The perfectly good is God.

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[6] [*Rep.* vii. 526, E:—*τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος, ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν* (sc. *τὴν ψυχὴν*) *παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν.* The epithet *εὐδ.* is *perhaps* explained by *Phædr.* 250, B, C:—*μακάριον ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν . . . τῶν τελετῶν ἣν θέμις λέγειν μακαριωτάτην*, where the "blessedness" is the attribute of the spectators, not of the object contemplated. ED.]

* And though this unimaginable Excellence is declared to be super-essential,—above Being itself,—*ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος*, (*Rep.* vi.,) it is yet identified with moral entities by manifesting itself in and through them.

[7] [*Rep.* vii. p. 521, C, fol. ED.]

[8] [Whether Plato really identified the idea of Good with God is still an undecided question. His ancient interpreters undoubtedly so understood him,—Platonists and Neo-platonists alike; and the same is the view of most of his German expositors. The principal exceptions are Stallbaum and C. F. Hermann,—the former holding that the Idea of Good is itself, in Plato's view, the creation of the divine Intelligence; the latter, that it is to be regarded as its coeternal object, immutable, uncaused, independent as God is. The opinion adopted in the text is evidently difficult to reconcile with the personality of the divine Essence, and with those passages, in the *Timæus* and elsewhere, in

is the Love of God. Whatever you may think of the soundness of this reasoning, or the practicability of realizing it, you can at least perceive how susceptible was the language of Platonism of Christian adaptations, and how naturally the Evangelists, in rendering the expressions of their divine Master into the language which Plato spoke, adopted phrases analogous to those which Plato used. Such are those, especially, which speak of the *knowledge* of God as itself involving a spiritual state of the soul, and which, in like manner, make that spiritual state the path of access to that knowledge. The judicious student of the New Testament will not fail to observe the internal evidence of supernatural guidance which is contained in the *very moderation* with which phrases are used which may be so easily urged to mysticism, and which, in point of fact, formed the text upon which the extravagances of gnosticism were founded, and by which the impracticable theories of the later Platonists sought to obtain the countenance of antiquity.

Union of the Good and True in the Platonic scheme.

Such, then, is the predominating quality of the Platonic philosophy,—the professed union of the Absolute Goodness with the Absolute Reality, of perfect Truth with perfect Virtue, of *human* virtue with philosophy. It is thus that So-

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which that personality seems to be clearly asserted. Are we to suppose that such passages (which the reader will find quoted abundantly in the notes to subsequent Lectures) are to be taken in an exclusively mythical or popular sense, and that we are to look to the *Republic* and *Philebus* as conveying Plato's interior meaning? It does not fall within the province of the Editor of these Lectures to pronounce upon this most obscure but profoundly interesting question: at the same time, it would have been unfair to pass it over in silence. Those who would compare the arguments on both sides are referred to C. F. Hermann's tract, *De Idea Boni ap. Plat.* Marb. 1832, to Stallbaum's Prolegomena to the *Philebus*, p. xxxiv. and those to the *Timæus*, p. 46: and, as an able defence of the more generally received opinion, to E. Zeller's *Philos. d. Griechen*, vol. ii. § 23.]

crates on one occasion describes the votary of this celestial wisdom in language whose purport we shall just now understand more distinctly:—"He who possesses the true love of science naturally is carried in his aspirations to the *real Being;* and his love, far from suffering itself to be retarded by this multitude of things whose reality is only apparent, knows no repose until it have arrived at union with the essence of each object by the part of the soul which is akin to the permanent and essential; so that, this divine conjunction having produced intelligence and truth, the knowledge of *Being* is won, and the true life in the bosom of the sage attained free of the painful throes that accompanied its birth!"[9] "He whose thoughts are really occupied with the high contemplation of the eternal Existence has no leisure to cast his eyes upon the doings of men, to war with them, and cherish envy and bitterness against them: his gaze forever fixed upon objects which preserve the same mutual arrangement and relations, and which, without seeking each other's evil, are all submitted to the law of order and of reason, he makes it his object to image forth in himself their perfect harmony. For how can one be unceasingly in the company of an object that excites love and admiration without an effort to resemble it? . . . Thus the philosopher, by his communion with that which is divine and subject to the law of order, becomes himself a subject of order, and divine, as far as it competes to humanity."[10] I cite such passages as these, partly to establish the predominatingly moral complexion of the Platonic notion of science,—which is, in some measure, the key of his whole philosophy,—partly, I confess, (as the spies of Sacred Writ,) to exhibit some specimen of the productions of this promised land, and to animate you to penetrate it for yourselves, undis-

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[9] [*Rep.* vi. p. 490, B. ED.]

[10] [Ib. p. 500, B. ED.]

mayed by the reported terrors of those *Anakims* of ancient philosophy,—Ideas, and Essences, and Essential Forms.

The philosophy of Plato, then, being, as we have intimated, founded upon the eternal *Unity* of Goodness, Order, and Truth, and all the departments of Knowledge being referred to the Ultimate Reality in which these were considered to be combined, you will of course expect to find in the Platonic philosophy an *intimate relation of all its parts to each other*, as well as to their common object. This indeed is in some degree a character of *all* ancient, as contrasted with modern, philosophy; but it is more eminently observable in Plato than in any of his contemporaries or successors. There is no philosophy the entire of which so easily resolves itself into a few fundamental ideas. He is said to have divided his own speculations into three main departments,—Dialectics, Physics, and Ethics, (for, like every *à priori* reasoner, Plato had a tendency to take the *entire* field of philosophy into his grasp;) and it would not be difficult to show that all these regions, as Plato regarded them, are directly and immediately connected. But, as we have already laid down the principle that the *ethical* character is that which predominates in all the views of Plato, it is from this that we set out in exhibiting this *second* characteristic of the Platonic philosophy.

Platonic identification of the speculative and practical exemplified in his dialectics,

II. When Plato examined the Idea of Humanity, he found its principal character to be the gift of reason. The rationality of man was his essential attribute; and the perfection of man must consist in its development. The proper object of reason is truth,—truth as single, identical, and immutable as reason itself. The apprehension of truth is, therefore, that which eminently belongs to man; in greater or less degrees to all men; in the highest degree of earthly cultivation, to the sage.

As far, then, as man perceives truth,—not truth physical and transitory, but truth unchangeable and eternal,—so far is he aiming at the proper perfection of his nature. But the perfection of man is virtue itself; virtue therefore is evermore identified with the apprehension *of truth;* and the practical and speculative sciences are thus identified. I need not, to any of you who remember the attempt which I made to illustrate the views of Socrates himself, repeat that this view of thought is pre-eminently Socratic. To such a degree does Plato carry this conviction of the identity of true science with true virtue, that he repeatedly maintains that all vice is ignorance,—in other words, is a *mistake* as to the nature and distinctions of good and evil. *The knowledge of good*, therefore, of that good which diffuses itself through all inferior goods and gives them their character, is the main point of philosophical virtue. But how shall man attain to the knowledge of good? By what pathway shall he learn to climb to this dominant citadel of wisdom? Now, to solve this, we must remember that the knowledge of good, as being *knowledge*, must presuppose an object stable and unchangeable,—an object, then, beyond this transitory scene. It must be a *science* (in the Platonic language) of that which *is*, and not an opinion (δόξα) of that which appears. The science which thus treats of everlasting existences, and among them, as supreme, of the Ultimate and Absolute Good, this is no other than the Platonic *Dialectics*.

and in his physics.

But, again, we have seen how morality itself, in the Platonic estimate, was referred to that Being who is essential order. The world itself is but the image in the sphere of sense of those ideas of order which perpetually inhere in the intellect of that great and central Being. To study the constitution of the world is then to contemplate, in a blurred and distorted reflection indeed, but still to contemplate, the divine

mind; and though the main business of philosophy is to rise above the transitory and phenomenal, yet, while held in its subordinate place, even the world of appearances may minister to the purposes of ethical discipline. At least its study may serve as a *relaxation*. For (I quote a sentiment which will sound strangely in modern ears) "if any man, with a *view to relaxation* from higher pursuits, should cease for a while from speculations regarding the eternal, and follow out arguments analogical or conjectural (*εἰκότας*) regarding the temporal, and by such means find himself in possession of unrepented pleasure, (*ἡδονὴν ἀμεταμέλητον*,) he will secure himself a temperate and proper recreation."[11] But the directly moral purpose is still the main one: "God gave us sight," Plato declares, in the same dialogue from which I have quoted, "that on surveying the circulations of the heavens, themselves the result of intellect, we may fittingly dispose the revolutions of our own thoughts, which are kindred to these celestial motions, and thus may correct the tumult of our mind by the harmonious progressions of their intellectual periods."[12] And thus it is that the treatise I have cited, which contains the Platonic view of the physical universe, is only the *sequel* of a lofty exposition of practical and political philosophy.[13] By such ties as these—slender and attenuated, perhaps, to us, but solid and forcible to their illustrious Author—the cultivation of the moral reason was united with the study of *Physics*.

Once more: the world itself was the imitation of ideas. The science of these archetypal ideas was involved in Dialectics. Physical knowledge was thus reduced under the sway of this all-controlling science,

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[11] [*Timæus*, p. 59, D. ED.] [12] [Ib. p. 47, B. ED.]

[13] [That is to say, of the *Republic*, of which the *Timæus* is professedly a continuation. See *Tim. init.* ED.]

and, in point of fact, became in the hands of Plato a science partly *à priori*, and partly dependent on the investigation of *final causes*. But of that which, you have seen, he regarded as a mere relaxation from the proper business of philosophy, it was not to be expected that he should think or discourse much. A single dialogue, the Timæus, comprehends nearly all which Plato has given us on physical science. The whole does not contain the record of a single experiment; and nearly a third of the entire is occupied with purely metaphysical dissertation.

Platonic conception of political science, as the realization of the idea of Justice.

If we have thus seen the strict connection of the main regions of the Platonic philosophy, if we have seen that this philosophy is but the idea of the Absolutely and Eternally Good carried into all the regions of thought, morals being the imitation of it, physics the sensible result of it, dialectics the investigation of it, it will be unnecessary for me to direct you to the obvious bond that unites the *Politics* of Plato with this central notion. The *Politics* of Plato are the realization of the just; they are that in the social world which his *Physics* are in the inanimate. His *Republic* is a republic of philosophers, and could exist with no other inhabitants. "I complain," says the Platonic Socrates, on one occasion, "of finding no form of government that suits a philosopher. Thus it is that we see the character itself decaying. Just as a seed sown in a foreign soil loses its raciness and takes the quality of the soil in which it is deposited, so the philosophic character loses in this situation its proper spirit and changes its whole nature. On the contrary, should it but meet a government whose perfection corresponded to its own, then should we see that it involves in it a something essentially divine, and that in all but *it*—in men, their characters and pursuits—there is nothing but

what is miserably human."[14] So that the polity of which Plato presents us the outline is, even confessedly, inapplicable to the ordinary world; it is the prophecy of future possibilities, when individuals were to carry out, each for himself and for the community, that scheme of perfection which God had shadowed forth in the sensible universe. And so completely identified are the *Politics* of Plato with purely ethical speculation, that many critics[15] have contended that the whole *Republic* is but an allegorical description of an individual human soul.

We have seen the relationship that combines into one vast aggregate the entire philosophy of Plato. The manner in which he connected, as dependent satellites, all the inferior and special sciences with the central science of divine contemplation, we shall observe presently. It is now time to exhibit (as clearly as I can find and express it) the *most general* features of that philosophy and philosophical character which Plato had formed to himself as the ideal of *science* and the ideal of perfect *humanity*. Particulars and specialities belong to our subsequent analyses.

Plato's ideal of philosophy and the philosopher illustrated from his own writings.

III. "Those," says Plato, "are to be termed philosophers, and those alone, who attach themselves to the contemplation of the essential principle of things."[16] This sentence is the close of an animated discussion, and comprehends the inference to which that discussion leads. Let us endeavour to represent the substance of this important reasoning. In being the reasoning of *Plato*, it will (I regret to say) differ from the representations of too many of his professed expositors, whose statements evince very

[14] [*Rep.* vi. p. 497, B. ED.]

[15] [As, for instance, Morgenstern, in his elegant *Commentationes de Platonis Republica*, 1794. ED.]

[16] [*Rep.* v. fin.:—*οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι.* ED.]

clearly that they have derived them from every source except the original writings.

"Answer me," says Socrates:[17] "when one says that a person loves any thing, does one mean that he loves only such or such a part of it, or that he loves it in its totality (*παντὸς τοῦ εἴδους*)? Certainly, in its totality. So of the philosopher, he loves wisdom universally? Unquestionably. And just as a hungry man is not fastidious about peculiarities of diet, so we can scarcely call him philosopher who makes difficulties about peculiar sciences: . . . but he who manifests a taste for all kinds of knowledge, who joys in learning, and knows no satiety in the acquisition of truths, think you," (continues Socrates,) "does he not merit the name of philosopher?" "Why," returns his companion, whom Socrates, with his usual skill, had brought not to *learn* the point intended, but to *discover* it for himself, "at this rate the world would abound with philosophers: for it appears to me that our lovers of brilliant shows (*φιλοθεάμονες*) are philosophers as far as the pleasure of novel learning is concerned; and our lovers of the gratification of the ear (*φιλήκοοι*) very queer philosophers, and who would not very willingly take part in such a discussion as ours, but who seem as if they had hired out their ears to all the choruses at the feasts of Bacchus, missing not one in town or country. Are we to call such as these *Philosophers*, merely from their ardour for new information?" "Certainly not," replies the master; "not philosophers, but resemblances of philosophers. But the true,—who are they? Those sight-lovers alone who love the sight of *Truth*."* This calls for explanation, which

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[17] [*Rep.* p. 475, B. The passage is paraphrased, with omissions, to the end of the Book. ED.]

* The original is beautifully emphatic:—*Τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη τίνας λέγεις; Τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμονας.*

accordingly Socrates undertakes. "You will grant me, the beautiful and the ugly are distinct.* And if so each is *one*. It is the same with just and unjust, good and evil, and all other ideas, (*πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν*:) each in itself is *one;* but in their relations with actions and bodies they assume a thousand forms, that appear to multiply these primary unities. . . . Here, then, lies the true distinction between these sight-lovers, and art-lovers, (*φιλοτέχνους*,) and men of practical skill, and those to whom alone the name of philosophers is fitly given. How, Socrates? The former, curious of sight and sound, love beautiful voices, beautiful colours, beautiful forms, every thing that is constructed out of such; but their intelligence (*διάνοια*) cannot see and embrace the nature of *the Beautiful itself*. . . . Are not such men rare indeed, who can advance to this Beautiful itself and see it in its essence (*καθ' αὐτὸ ὁρᾶν*)? . . . And what is the life of a man who believes in beauteous things (*καλὰ πράγματα νομίζων*) but is a stranger to the Beautiful itself, and is powerless to follow those who would show it to him? is it a dream, or a reality? What *is* to dream? Is it not —sleeping or waking, I care not—to take the resemblance of a thing for the thing it resembles? Surely it is. What then? he who can contemplate the Beautiful, whether in itself or in that which participates of its essence, (*καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα*,) without ever confounding the object partaking with the essence partaken,—seems *his* life a dream, or a reality? Doubtless, a thorough reality." Socrates is then represented as establishing the distinction between knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and opinion, (*δόξα*.) "If," he declares, "Science refer to Being, and Ignorance to Non-Being, we must seek for that which holds the medium between existence and non-

* *καλὸν* and *αἰσχρόν*, words of a moral as well as æsthetic purport: our English "*fair*" is similarly susceptible of a double significance.

existence, something intermediate between science and ignorance." This is no other than *opinion*, a faculty (*δύναμις*) distinct from science,—opinion, which is the faculty of judging by appearance, (*δοξάζειν.*) It is, then, equally evident that we possess the two faculties, and that they have distinct objects. Opinion cannot rise to know what science knows, nor science descend to estimate as opinion estimates. The latter, less luminous than science, less obscure than ignorance, finds its object in that which, holding the mean between pure being and pure nothing, at once *is and is not.* This object, itself subject to perpetual variation, contrasts with the world of science, which is ever one and identical; and the *φιλοθεάμων*, untaught to repose in the absolute Beauty, is condemned to hover in a region of incessant and unsatisfying change. That which in one point of view presents itself as beautiful and just, in another point of view shall lose these high characteristics; and it is the same with every attribute that can affect the objects of the sensible world. Such objects then can hold their fitting place only between true being and absolute non-existence." Socrates then proceeds triumphantly to the close. "We have discovered," he pronounces, "that this multitude of things to which a multitude of persons ascribe beauty and the like hovers between the absolute reality and total negation. Agreed. But we had settled beforehand, that of such things as these we would properly affirm that they are the object of the intermediate faculty of opinion and not of science, (*δοξαστὸν οὐ γνωστόν.*) Certainly. As for those who, gazing on things beautiful, perceive not the absolute beauty, and are unable to follow him who would lead them thither,—who observe many things justly, but never justice itself, and so of the rest,—all their judgments, we shall say, are opinions, not knowledge. Certainly. On the contrary, those who contemplate the unchangeable essences of things (*κατὰ ταὐτὰ*

ὡσαύτως ὄντα) possess not opinions but knowledge (*γινώσκειν ἀλλ' οὐ δοξάζειν*)? Equally certain. Shall we not say, then, of both, that they have attachment and love, the one for those things which are the objects of knowledge, the other party for those which are the subjects of opinion? Have we not said that these last are gratified with beautiful things, sounds, colours, and so forth, but that they cannot endure that one should speak to them of the Absolute Beauty as something itself real (*ὅς τι ὄν*)? So we said. Thus we shall do them no wrong if we call them *φιλόδοξοι* rather than *φιλόσοφοι*,—the aspirants after opinion, not after wisdom. Shall they take it ill of us if we style them so? not if they be persuaded by me; for none should take ill the truth itself. Be those then alone deemed 'philosophers' who in each object seize the essential reality." I know not how many of you will join in the *παντάπασι μὲν οὖν* with which the pupil, Glaucon, receives this decision: such, however, is the notion which Plato had formed of that which constitutes the only veritable philosophy. The reason embraces in its own eternal world coeternal realities; it apprehends these by a power which belongs to it as truly as the power of vision belongs to the natural eye; it apprehends them naturally, for all this transcendental knowledge is the heritage of every human soul; but the vast proportion of mankind die without ever realizing their own calling, and are starving in the midst of plenty. You will perceive how distinct an apprehension Plato had obtained of all that sphere of *physical* inquiry upon which modern philosophy vaunts its eminence, and to which it would so often confine the energies of the human spirit. It is that which he here styles *τὸ δοξαστόν*, elsewhere *τὸ φαινόμενον*,—and to which he appropriates as its special organ the *δόξα ἀληθής*, a phrase which, in compliance with custom, I have translated *opinion*, but which scarcely corresponds to our ordinary use of that word.

The δόξα of Plato rather answers to the experience, or empirical information, of the modern philosophy of Germany,—one instance of the many in which you will find *Kant* little more than a commentator (though the profoundest of all commentators) on Plato.

Allegory of the Cave.

The same general view of the object of philosophy is presented to the imagination in that exquisite allegory in the opening of the seventh book of the *Politeia*, which has in all ages been the admiration alike of philosopher and poet. I feel how miserably defective must be any attempt which I can make at exhibiting this beautiful passage; but I also feel that a single sentence of an original author is, for auditors who can themselves reflect, worth a thousand laboured commentaries; more especially where, as in this case, the perspicuity and precision of the original transcend all illustration. The great philosopher, having in the preceding book compared that primary Nature from which Truth and Science flow, to the sun of the visible world, proceeds thus:—"Now, I resumed,—to conceive our condition when educated and when uneducated,—make this supposition. Imagine a subterranean cave, having its whole length open to the light, and in this cave men confined from their infancy by fetters which so bind their limbs and necks that they can neither change their place nor turn their heads round, and can behold only what fronts them. The light comes to them from a fire which is kindled at some distance and pretty high behind them. Between this fire and our captives rises a low wall like those screens that jugglers draw between them and the spectators, and above which their wonders are exhibited. Now, conceive that there pass along this wall men carrying objects of all kinds, which appear above the screen,—figures of men and animals in wood and stone, and other varieties, some of the bearers, as we

may suppose, speaking, others silent. Strange similitude, Socrates! and strange captives these! Here, nevertheless, is our own condition. In the first place, do you suppose that they will see, of themselves and of those at their sides, any thing but the shadows traced by the firelight on the opposite side of their cavern? Certainly not, since you suppose them unable to turn their heads round. And of the objects we have represented as borne along behind their backs, shall they see but the shadow? Unquestionably. Now, if these poor prisoners could converse together, do you not think that they would regard as the entire things themselves the shadows they saw passing? And if the prison had an echo, whenever any passer-by spoke, would they not conceive that they heard the shadow itself speak, which alone they saw? In short, would they not attribute a *perfect reality to the shadows?* . . . Now, let us suppose them freed from their chains and their ignorance, and what would be the result? Take one of these captives, force him suddenly to rise, to turn round his head, to walk forth and face the light: he will never be able to do this without considerable uneasiness, and the dazzling splendour will prevent him from even discerning the objects with whose shadows he was before so familiar. What would *he* say, if some friend were to tell him that till then he gazed but on phantoms, that at length nearer to reality he saw more justly, and, showing him each object as it passed, should obliged him by force of questioning" [you recognise the *Socratic* method] "to say what it was? do you not think he would feel utterly perplexed, and even think his old shadows more real than the objects he now beheld? . . . Let him look at the fire! His eyes are pained, and he recurs to those shadows which gave him no trouble! He thinks them far more *truly visible* than all he is now taught to gaze on! . . . But once

more: suppose him snatched from his cavern in spite of all his efforts, dragged, by a pathway steep and rugged, to some eminence from which he is to behold the full lustre of the sun: will he not complain bitterly of this as cruel violence? And when he does come into the blaze of noonday, shall his eyes, filled with the splendour, be able to see any one of the objects that we call real? No, surely; not at first. It is not without long use that those feeble eyes can get familiar with that upper sphere. First he will easiest discern shadows, then images in the water, and at last objects themselves. Thence he will direct his eyes to the heavens, which he will be able better to bear during moonlight and starlight than while the sun appears. . . . But at length he will have the power not merely to see the images of the sun in the waters or elsewhere, but to see it where and as it is! . . . Then shall he learn that that sun was the cause of all he had beheld in his cavern. . . . And when he thinks of what he and his fellows in captivity thought once was wisdom, shall he not deplore their misery and rejoice in his own emancipation? And if in that cavern-world there were honours and public prizes for the most successful analyst of that shadow-science,—for him who best could tell in what order they pass and combine, and best could predict their recurrence,—think you this freedman would covet their distinctions, even the loftiest? or would not rather say, with Homer, that 'twere better be a peasant's hireling in the upper world? . . . But once again: suppose him to redescend into the cavern and take his seat in his old place, [the sage returning into the vulgar world:] in this passage from clear day to darkness, shall not his eyes be as it were full of darkness? . . . And if while he still sees confusedly, not yet accustomed to the darkness, which requires some time, he is called on to give his opinion on the shadows, and dispute with

his fettered companions, will there not be a universal laugh at his expense? Will they not be sure to say, From going to such heights the poor man has lost his sight,—that it is clearly not worth while to attempt leaving their place, and that if any one proposes such schemes he be if possible caught hold of and despatched? . . . Here then, Glauco, is the picture of our condition! The subterranean cave is this visible world; the fire that illumines it is the light of the sun; this captive who escapes to the higher region and contemplates it is the soul that rises into space intelligible, (*νοητὸν τόπον.*) Such is my view, since you wish to know it. God alone can say if it be true! . . . At the utmost bounds of the intellectual world (*ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία*) is the Idea of Good, perceived with difficulty, but which, once seen, makes itself known as the cause of all that is beautiful and good; which in the visible world produces light, and the orb that gives it; which in the invisible world directly produces Truth and Intelligence, (*νοῦς.*)"

Explanation of the allegory.

This allegory exhibits, in the forms of the world of imagination, the progressive discipline which it was the object of the Platonic philosophers to realize. With this scope perpetually in view, Plato considered all the particular sciences as valuable only in proportion as they conducted by natural gradations to this master-science. In the same work from which I have just quoted he states with great clearness their comparative value in relation to this end.[18]

Disciplinary uses of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy.

Arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy are specially fitted to guide the reason into this serener sphere of contemplation; both because they are calculated to force upon men the study of *essences*, and because, by habituating the soul to the cal-

[18] [In the seventh book of the *Republic*, p. 521, c–535. ED.]

culation and observation of *harmonious proportions*, they lead to faint conceptions of that infinite perfection which is the fountain of all order. For the full apprehension of these views I must send you to the original; as it would be impossible to represent in any simpler form that progress from thought to thought which, beginning with the conception of mere numbers, eventuates in the "Dialectic" of Plato. But to say a brief word of each. From what has been said, firstly, you can perceive the force and spirit of that rule of the Platonic teaching which forbid any unacquainted with *geometry* to enter the portals of the Academy,[19] (*μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω.*)* Secondly, Assuredly in these days it would seem a strange element of political philosophy, to insist on the knowledge of the science

[19] [I believe that the only extant authorities for this inscription are Johannes Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle *De Anima*, D_{III}, *reverse, line* 9, and a verse in the *Chiliads* of Tzetzes. Both these were pointed out to me some time ago by Cambridge friends. Stephens in his *Thesaurus* (v. *ἀγεωμέτρητος*) falsely gives *οὐδείς*,—a solecism of his own introducing,—and, as his manner is, without any reference. Sir W. Hamilton, in his *Essays on Philosophy*, (p. 271, note,) dates the tradition at least six centuries too late. Philoponus lived ten, not "sixteen, centuries subsequent to Plato," and he is not to be suspected of inventing the inscription. Sir William seems to have attributed the fable, as he calls it, to the much-abused Tzetzes, who seems to me as incapable as his laborious namesake of producing so good a story. ED.]

* "Besides those *ἀρεταὶ καθαρτικαί*," says one of the most gifted of our English theological Platonists, "by which the souls of men were to be separated from sensuality and purged from fleshly filth, they devised a fourth way of separation, more accommodated to the condition of philosophy, which was their *mathemata*, or mathematical contemplations, whereby the souls of men might further shake off their dependency on sense, and learn (as it were) to go alone, without the crutch of any sensible or material thing to support them. . . . These were among their *ἀναβάσεις ἐκ τοῦ σπηλαίου*, steps and ascents out of this miry cave of mortality, before they could set any sure footing with their intellectual part in the land of light and immortal being." (J. Smith's *Select Disc.*, pp. 14, 15.)

of *number*, not merely by our chancellors of the exchequer and their subordinate officers of finance, but by every statesman in high authority; and this, as Plato declares, "not for the purpose of a mere superficial study, but in order to rise by the exercise of intelligence to a contemplation of the *essence of numbers;* not for low mercantile purposes, but to assist the soul in soaring to that eternal world where alone are reality and truth."[20]

Again, thirdly, as concerns the *astronomical* discipline for philosophy: "The adornings," declares Plato,[21] "which glorify the vault of heaven are certainly the most splendid of visible objects; yet they are but *visible* objects, and are therefore far inferior to the true magnificence which belongs to their eternal correlatives in the essential world: the beauty which we contemplate in the heavens is the same symbol of that other and intelligible beauty which a design of Dædalus is of absolute proportions; for what geometer, however he might admire the artist's statue, would dream of measuring *it*, in order to discover the abstract relations of figure and space? . . . We know," he continues,[22] "that astronomy is to the eyes something the same as music to the ears: now, observe our practical musicians! They will waste hours in endeavouring by the keenness of the ear to detect exquisite differences of proximate sounds,—some affirming they *can* appreciate the tone required, others that it is impossible, but all agreeing in preferring the authority of the ear to that of the mind. Our astronomers are not unlike these indefatigable artists; but he who cultivates the study with any other view than to gain clearer apprehensions of the beautiful and the good wastes his hours in unprofitable toil. . . . Glauco! all these studies are but

[20] [*Rep.* l. 1. p. 525, c. ED.]
[21] [Ib. p. 529, c. ED.]
[22] [Ib. p. 530, D. ED.]

preludes to the air that we are to learn:[23] he who studies not the *reasons of things* has not yet entered upon that better science of which I speak." Need I say that this "air," to which all the special sciences are but preludes, is no other than "Dialectic,"—that high philosophy of reality which, though it be altogether the work of *reason*, I have already typified by the progressive advances of the organ of vision, which, at first exercised on the objects of earth, rises at length to the stars, and lastly fixes on the sun itself? So he who advances into this study, soaring by pure intelligence to the essence of things, pauses not until, having attained to gaze upon the essential goodness, he beholds the true Sun of the intelligible universe.

"Finis coronat opus;" and the "end" that was to crown this "work" of intellectual discipline in the view of Plato was no other than *death*. Convinced that *death* was the emancipation of the purely rational element of human spirits from all its corporeal accompaniments, this event was but the consummation of the very work of the whole philosophic life, that life which is therefore expressly designated as the *μελέτη θανάτου*.[24] The intellect struggles through life into the intelligible world; *death* is its peaceful entrance there. So forcibly was Plato impressed with this conviction (that death is the entrance of the reasonable substance into a supra-sensible world) that in the *Phædo*, where it is peculiarly enforced, he thinks it necessary to guard against a philosophic tendency to *suicide*. Socrates admits that the very soul of true philosophy (of this "Dialectic" of which we have spoken) is the unceasing aspiration after the future world of pure thought, and declines the path of suicide, only because the Deity has

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[23] [*πάντα ταῦτα προοίμιά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν*, p. 531, D. ED.]

[24] [*Phædo*, p. 81, A. ED.]

an inherent right over our actions, and, by locating us in this world, signifies his pleasure that we should not leave it until he himself has given the signal of release.[25]

We have now seen that the spirit of the Platonic philosophy is the contemplation of, and the tendency to, the Absolute and Eternal Good. We have seen that *this* spirit pervades all, unites all, and governs all. But this is only a distant and general prospect. We must prepare to examine separately the chambers of the vast edifice. At our next meeting (on Monday) we shall briefly analyze the Dialectic (or Metaphysic) of Plato.

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[25] [Phædo, p. 62, B. ED.]

LECTURE VII.

ON THE DIALECTIC OF PLATO—THE THEÆTETUS.

GENTLEMEN:—

The Platonic Dialectic,

I HAVE promised to give you on this occasion some account of that portion of the Platonic philosophy which its founder was accustomed to call his "Dialectic;" and which answers pretty closely to what, after the spread of the Aristotelian views, was usually known by the title of Metaphysics. At our last meeting, however, we saw in how intimate a union all the divisions of Platonism were combined; and you will be prepared to expect that no department of the entire system can be duly surveyed without occasional intrusions on every other. Thus—to go no further than our immediate subject—the Dialectic of Plato involves the elementary principles of his *theology*, and some of the fundamental notions on which his fanciful structure of *physical* science was erected. The term Dialectics (assuredly not well chosen) was derived from the Socratic mode of discussion, and a phrase expressive of the accidental *form* of speculation thus applied to its internal substance. It is, however, characteristic of the peculiar views of Plato, who always represented this highest region of philosophic thought as reached by a course of protracted previous meditation[1] and of anxious mental conflict. It was not until the partial solutions and petty differences of inferior sci-

its relation to sub-

[1] [Which is described as ὁ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γενόμενος. *Soph.* 263, D. Comp. *Theæt.* 189, E. ED.]

ordinate branches of science.

ences had been unveiled that this ultimate and reconciling science was felt to be indispensably demanded. Now, as this exhaustive process was usually conducted in the form of argumentative disquisition, it was not unnatural to apply to the speculations it produced a title expressive of the conferences by which it produced them. And thus the serenest and most contemplative of sciences bore a name that perpetually attested the pains and crosses that accompanied its birth; and he who was fortunate enough to reach this upper world of repose could never forget, in the very title of the blessed territory, the region of storm and tempest through which he had struggled to attain it!

Steps by which the mind of man ascends to science.

To man, considered as an *intellectual* being, the great object is the attainment of satisfactory *certainty*,—certainty as to that which is directly exhibited to his experience; certainty, still more, as to that which transcends experience, and, outlying its whole domain, is of course apprehended by different faculties, or by different applications of them, from those which the world of immediate experience requires. Were a human being to stand alone in the vast solitude of nature, and to be (by whatever means) aroused to the exercise of his rational powers, it will be conceded, by all theorists of the mind of man, that certain instinctive principles of belief and of action would, whether gradually or immediately, be developed,—sufficient to guide and support him in the ordinary processes of human life. For example, though prior to direct observation he could not venture the faintest conjecture as to the consequences of any concurrence of events,—though until his eyes had *seen* the stone fall, or the fuel blaze, he could not conceive these results at all more probable than their opposites,—it is certain that, after experience has once connected

Empirical theory of knowledge.

1. *Principle of Expectation, which infers the future from the past.*

them, an innate principle of belief connects them forever, and he would be astonished to find that *not* happen which antecedently to observation he had no reason to expect would ever happen. The present moment is thus, by man's mental construction, an index to him, practically infallible, of the past and the future. And were the being we have supposed to be the sole human intellect in the universe, about to pass into annihilation, he might instantly, before ceasing to exist, profess his confident anticipation of the indefinite continuance of a series of events to which he was never to have any direct relation whatever, with which he was thenceforward no more connected than if he had never existed at all.

Here, then, is a principle which generalizes immediate experience through every moment of time and every point of space,—which declares of that which *is*, that it may be expected always and everywhere. It is the simplest of practical generalizations, and the *foundation* of all.

2. *Principle of Analogy, which binds sequences together.*

Again: if thus a single connection of events indicates a connection fixed forever, so likewise a connection thus established extends conviction beyond itself, gives probability (in all its various degrees) to thousands of connections *similar* to itself, and thus becomes (in proportion to the reflective habits of the mind) a key to large regions of nature. From believing that the same will happen in the same circumstances, we pass to believing that the same will happen in *similar* circumstances, and from thence to confiding that the similar will happen in similar circumstances,—the anticipation varying, of course, with the degree of the similarity. As the former principle reveals to us *the stability*, so this reveals to us *the unity*, of nature. And this—the principle of analogy—is the source of all discovery in every department of physical

science. Here, then, is the second, and the higher, form of the practical generalization of observed events.

These two are the constituents of physical science,

These two principles provide for the foundation, and the augmentation, of the knowledge of nature, as obtained through the instrumentality of observation and experiment. And if of that which lies beyond the mere limits of our internal consciousness, and beyond deductions from our own suppositions, that is, beyond mental experience and mathematical demonstration,—if of all the external infinity of existences we have no knowledge except by the aid of observation and experiment,—then these principles (the principle of the perpetuity of sequences, and the principle of analogy) are sufficient for all the science that man can possess of that which is *not himself*. If this be the case, it may be well to contemplate the amount of our inheritance: whether in wealth or penury, it is at least useful to know the exact extent and value of our available resources.

Now, of these principles one very obvious character is this, that they are altogether *conditionate* principles; that is, they assert that *if* a certain event happen another may be expected to happen; or, *if* a certain combination of events happen, a similar combination may be expected in similar circumstances to happen also; but they assert nothing whatever as to whether the events, *absolutely* considered, shall happen or not. The only certainty they bring is manifestly a hypothetical and dependent certainty.

which accordingly admits degrees of certainty,

Another characteristic of these principles is this, that they seem in their nature *capable of augmentation or diminution of certainty.* I do not mean this of any special instance, but of the principles themselves as attributes of the human mind. It is universally felt to be one of the most striking examples of providential arrangement in the adaptation

of man to the world, that the antecedent conviction of the stability of nature is answered by the corresponding stability itself. Now let us suppose that this was *not* the case; that, the mind remaining unaltered, the series of events in the external world became utterly irregular, —a different consequent every instant following what was known to be the same antecedent: is it not obvious that the mental conviction could not stand against this outward contradiction, and thus that the principle of the invariability of sequences, though capable of being called into play upon the occasion of a single observation, is not *independent* of the confirmation of subsequent experience? While, on the other hand, no one, I suppose, will affirm that we are as vividly assured of the future descent of bodies to the earth on the first instance perceived in infancy, as after the unbroken experience of forty or fifty years. The theory of Hume, who attributed the conviction altogether to habit, derived its plausibility from the fact that, though habit cannot originate the belief, it undoubtedly tends to corroborate it. It tells us (as it were) the mind and purpose of Nature, and assures us that it is fitted to vindicate our anticipations; in much the same manner as our confidence in a *friend* grows with the duration of our acquaintance with his truth, even though we had originally felt the strongest prepossession in his favour, or had received irresistible testimonies to his character.

its conclusions being liable to the corrections of subsequent experience.

Hume's theory of cause and effect is partially true.

It is also observable of these principles of belief on which our physical knowledge is ordinarily rested, that they are eminently *practical* in their nature; by which I mean that they are less calculated to be the elementary principles of satisfactory *scientific* conviction than the indices and guides of practical conduct and operative

art. Perhaps nothing evinces this more forcibly than the experience, which I believe few will deny, that these convictions are felt to be much stronger as regards the future than as regards the past, (from which the fundamental principle itself is usually termed "an expectation of the stability of nature;") and that the expectation itself is felt to lessen in assured confidence when the period to which it points retreats into the farther depths of an infinite futurity. If there be any one who, assuredly believing that a stone discharged from the hand will drop to the earth within the next ten minutes, has the same intensity of conviction with regard to the same event one hundred millions of years hence, I can only ascribe the perfect equality of his conviction in the two cases to principles that lie far deeper in the constitution of the mind of man than the instinctive and mechanical "expectation" to which our modern guides would reduce the whole logic of natural science.

Unsatisfactory nature of the empirical theory described above.

These remarks (which it would now perhaps be unseasonable to extend much further) may serve to intimate to you how unsatisfactory the ordinary accounts of physical knowledge must appear to any one who (whether rightly or erroneously) conceives that the human mind is made for the possession of *absolute certainty*. If it be the whole office of physical science to classify observations, and (by an instinctive but unreasoning faith) to trust to their continued verification, it is obvious that, for the perfectness of absolute certainty, we must have recourse to something which is *not* physical science. It was for this that Plato struggled in the construction of his "Dialectic," a department of knowledge which was to contain the principles of independent unconditional truth; and in which the highest faculty of man was to be brought in presence of its proper and sufficient counter-

The craving for a principle more certain than experience led Plato to the construction of a Dialectic.

part, namely, the supreme existence itself, the absolutely perfect,—and the emanations of that supreme existence dispersed through nature, and of which all nature participated,—the "*ideas*" of things. If you have been at all engaged in the study of the history of speculation, so similar in all its changes, you will at once recognise that this is but one attempt out of many to solve the problem of the prerogatives of the human reason, to pronounce whether it truly has an office higher than that of enumerating and arranging the products of experience. It was (as I have before intimated) the firm conviction of Plato and his followers, that it *has* such an office; and that there exists a sphere of being not in any way appreciable by sense or by imagination, (the minister of sense,) of which the Reason of man is the only and the direct organ, and which that Reason by an innate and inalienable right grasps with utter and absolute certainty. But it is this very similarity of the problem and of its solutions in all ages that makes it now necessary for me to endeavour to catch the peculiar point from which Plato viewed it, and the peculiar form of his verdict on the question. I have as yet addressed you as readers fresh from the popular philosophy of the day: we must now descend into the dusky depths of antiquity to discover there the principles of which we have spoken, half formed, it may be, in that primeval world, and often scarcely disencumbered of their tangling embellishments of allegory and fiction; yet still very discernibly the same principles, and often—to a degree altogether unsuspected by modern readers—the same details.

The Platonists believed this certainty attainable.

To stand, then, where Plato stood, and to see what Plato saw, we must consider his philosophy of the human reason as the result of a pertinacious controversy which occupied the literary and speculative circles of his day. On the one side stood the philosophers of Elea, (or

State of philosophical opinion in Plato's day.

1. *The Eleatics and their followers a School of*

pure rationalism.

those who had imbibed their general principles,[2]) whose solution of the general question as to themselves and the universe was (as I have more than once shown you), that all existence was absolutely *one*, variety being only apparent and illusory; that truth had no reference to any thing diverse or multiple; that, therefore, the sole office of reason—the organ of truth—was to recognise this underlying unity, that faculty being incapable of application to that which was more than one single essence, equally indivisible and infinite. By these speculatists, then, the rights of Reason were loudly acknowledged; but its inheritance was impoverished: they admitted the validity of the title, but the estate itself offered only the unbroken solitude of a desert. On the other hand was found a class of thinkers[3] who denied the title altogether; who refused to allow the existence of any faculty beyond the receptive energy of sense; and who, placing all truth in the perception of the qualities or modifications of *its* elements, as a very natural consequence affirmed that truth itself altered with the alteration of the senses, or, in the language of him whom Plato found the most distinguished champion of these tenets, that "man was the measure of all things." This latter doctrine is evidently, in its spirit, not confined to mere "sensation;" it is the doctrine of all who, with whatever views as to the constitution of the mind, agree in holding that truth is purely subjective and individual; Plato, however, seems to have found it invariably connected

2. The Sensationalists or Empirics.

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[2] [Euclides and the Megarics and Eliacs. See vol. i. series 2, lect. 2. ED.]

[3] [Comprising, 1. the followers of Heraclitus, (as Cratylus in Athens, and in Ephesus the school portrayed in *Theæt.* p. 179,) 2. Protagoras, who had learned in that school,—not, as vulgarly stated, under Democritus, —and, 3. the Cyrenaics, headed by Plato's contemporary, Aristippus. ED.]

with the theory of mere sensation, and speaks of them both—in the case of Protagoras—as identical.

Plato endeavoured to mediate between these two extreme parties.

Now, Plato is to be considered as a *mediator* between these opposing theorists; as holding with the Pythagoreans and Eleatics that the Reason of man contemplates by direct intuition a sphere of being beyond and above the sensible universe, but as denying that that sphere of being contains no diversity; as holding, with the rival party, that there is a world of sensation, the object of a special faculty or set of faculties in the mental constitution, but as denying that science or truth in their proper significancy can be at all concerned with that world, can be dependent on its phenomena or affected by its changes.

If I were not relating but investigating, I might enter largely upon the discussion of this general question, and by adding the lights of subsequent philosophy exhibit it in a form perhaps more luminous than the original Platonic one. As, however, my present purpose is to endeavour to assist you in seeing with the eyes of Plato, and not with those of Leibnitz or Descartes, I shall content myself for the present—and I trust you will feel it far more profitable to be contented—with the humbler office of giving you some account of one remarkable discussion in which—as far as a refutation can establish any thing—the first elements of the Platonic theory of science are established; perhaps I might rather say (for the dialogue has no express conclusion) the ground is partly cleared for the future and still distant structure.

The Theætetus.

The *Theætetus* has the advantage of being one of the most regularly consecutive of the compositions of Plato; and for this reason, probably, more than one expositor has directed attention, in the first instance, to this important dialogue. At the same time, it cannot be denied that it also contains subtleties whose true scope and meaning (though doubtless in their own day

intelligible enough) it is now nearly hopeless to attempt adequately to comprehend or to convey; while on the other hand, as if to evince the boundless versatility of the author, it also includes in the pauses and transitions of the metaphysical argument passages (especially *one* passage) of a sublime and solemn beauty which Plato has never surpassed in any other composition whatever.

Analysis of the dialogue.

On these latter attractions of style we have now no time to rest; nor shall I detain you with any minute account of the scenery, decorations, or *dramatis personæ* of the performance. Theodorus, the mathematician, Theætetus, (a young Athenian of great promise,) and Socrates, are the interlocutors. After some preliminary conversation, Socrates comes upon the question which occupies the dialogue:—"What is science?" His young friend, in the manner so often exemplified by Plato in the argumentative adversaries of Socrates, answers by instancing a *variety* of sciences,—an error which Socrates represses by calling him at once to the question, which regards *the idea or essence* of science itself: and you may here observe an instance of that process of definitions customary with Socrates, to which we saw that Aristotle ascribed the origination of the "ideas" of Plato. At length, after many approaches, and many digressions, and many modest excuses, the young student attempts formally to answer the question, and the "business"—as dramatic critics would say—of the dialogue fairly commences.

Its subject: the idea of Science, or Knowledge properly so called.

Three definitions of Knowledge or Science proposed.

Three several answers are offered; and all three are successively rejected. We shall briefly sketch the arguments involved by each,—requesting you to remember that, if these arguments seem to your modern apprehensions occasionally deficient in force, and, still more, occasionally obscure in purport, they are not at all on that account the less *his-*

torically interesting. But, for my own part, I confess I cannot discover much that even our latest inquiries have added to this ancient refutation of the narrow theories of human knowledge; the theories and their refutations have been reiterated in many ages with little substantial difference; the soil of human nature (to which in its present state truth and error are *both* indigenous products) remaining the same, these flowers and weeds have risen together in each recurring crop; and the first mingled harvest, as we find it here heaped together, might nearly serve as an image of all that followed it.

FIRST DEFINITION. *Science consists in sensation. Theæt. p.* 151, D.

The first answer of *Theætetus* is, that science consists in *sensation*, (*αἴσθησις.*) Now, sensation being in its nature variable, altering equally with the alteration of the sentient organ and of the subject perceived, the knowledge which depends on it must be likewise subject to perpetual change. If, as Heraclitus and Empedocles held, the whole machinery of sensible perception is in continual flux, never remaining the same for two successive instants, if motion be (as they conceived) the very principle of preservation, and rest, of corruption,[4] it is obvious that the knowledge which is confined to these ever-mutable elements must itself be mutable. If nothing "*exists*," but all "becomes,"[5] science built upon a principle of incessant alteration loses all claims to permanence or stability.[6] The colour of an object (for example) has no claim to "existence:" it has no determinate properties, it is not

This theory of knowledge finds its objective counterpart in the Ephesian doctrine of perpetual flux. Ib. p. 152, D.

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[4] [*Theæt.* p. 153:—*τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία . . . ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ σώζεται.* ED.]

[5] [Ib. p. 152, D:—*γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδὲν ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται.* ED.]

[6] [Ib. p. 182, E:—*οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη.* Comp. 183, A. ED.]

the same to another and to me, nay, it is not the same to myself at any two separate observations. It is so with every sensible object; for all such are but aggregates of qualities themselves incessantly variable, and sensation the result of a compound action between the object and the organ.[7] Hence it is argued that the assertion that science consists in the simple reception of sensations, or even in the active operations of the faculties upon them, resolves itself into the doctrine of Heraclitus, and leads at once to irrecoverable skepticism. But, again, the sensation-theory supposes *every* sensation accurately and completely *true*, as otherwise sensibility could be no basis for *knowledge*. Now, it would be impossible to prove that any two persons experience the same sensations; while, on the contrary, we have innumerable instances of the difference of the effects produced in the same circumstances upon different men. Above all, he observes, we have the striking instance of the phenomena of dreams and of madness,[8] and must admit the impossibility of proving ourselves at any moment awake, as the evidence of the dreaming and the waking mind is equally peremptory in favour of the reality of the state experienced: knowledge, then, must upon this theory be purely relative,[9] and truth vary with every variation of the mind. This theory of knowledge dependent on sensation

The same theory in its subjective aspect: Sensation is relative to the sentient individual;

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[7] [*Theæt.* p. 152, E:—ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασιν . . . ἤδη γάρ ἂν εἴη τε ὂν που ἐν τάξει καὶ μένοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο . . . καὶ ὃ δὴ ἑκαστον εἴη χρῶμα οὔτε τὸ πρόσβαλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἰδιον γεγονός· ἢ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὀτῳοῦν ζῴῳ; Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἐγωγε. Ib. 156, A:—κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, . . . δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον τὸ δὲ πάσχειν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας . . . γίγνεται ἕκγονα . . . δίδυμα . . . τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. Compare 159, C, D:—ἕκαστον δή. ED.]

[8] [Ib. 157, E–158, E. ED.]

[9] [Ib. 160, A:—ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γέ-

amounts therefore to the doctrine of Protagoras,[10] that "man is the measure of things," and that that which he thinks to exist exists, that which he thinks not to exist is by that very conviction deprived of real existence. I may observe that the whole of this preliminary discussion abounds with very just views of the whole process of sensation and the relation of the conscious being to external nature.[11]

a proposition equivalent to the dictum of Protagoras,—"Man is the measure of all things."

νωμαι . . . ἐκεῖνό τε τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὺ ἢ πικρὸν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται· γλυκὺ γὰρ μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι. Ed.]

[10] [*Theæt.* 160, D:—*εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέπτωκε κατὰ μὲν . . . Ἡράκλειτον . . . οἷον ῥείματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν . . . πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον . . . αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι.* Ed.]

[11] [Plato's theory of perception is that denoted by some modern writers as the "representative-theory." Of things as they are in themselves, the *senses* give us no knowledge: all that in sensation we are conscious of is a state of mind or feeling, (*πάθος*;) the existence of self or the perceiving subject, and of a something external to self,—a perceived object,—are revealed to us, not by the senses, but by a higher faculty. The *negative* portion of this theory Plato holds in common with the Cyrenaics, with Protagoras, and with the later Academics and Skeptics. It was controverted by the Stoics, who maintained that the external world is the object of *immediate* consciousness, (*καταληπτόν.*) But all the remaining schools of antiquity—skeptical, dogmatic, and mystical—agree with Plato in denying that our sensations reveal to us any thing beyond themselves. They are modifications of consciousness, feelings, states,—*permotiones intimæ*, (as Cicero has it,)—and *nothing more.* (*τὸ περὶ ἡμᾶς συμβαῖνον πάθος ἑαυτοῦ πλέον οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυται*, Sext. Emp. *de Placitis Cyrenaicorum*, Math. § 194.) So far, then, as regards the theory of sensation, Plato is to be understood, not as refuting, but as explaining,—nay, confirming,—the dictum of Protagoras, "Man (*i.e.* the conscious individual, *ὁ ἀεὶ ἄνθρωπος*) is the measure of all." But here an important divergence takes place. After showing that the Protagorean principle pushed to its legitimate consequences annihilates the reality of the outward world as well as the identity or independent existence of the mind, or conscious subject, (*ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι . . . ἐκεῖνό τε τινί . . . ὅταν γλυκύ . . . ἤ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται. Th.* 160, A; comp.p. 166, C,) Plato proceeds, by a bold appeal to the *inner* consciousness, to establish the reality of object and subject. See *Theæt.* p. 184–187,—a

Plato, having thus argued the identity in substance of the three theories,—that of sensation alone constituting knowledge, that of the continual flux of all things, and that of man's beliefs being the true measure of existence,—proceeds, upon popular grounds and with great variety of illustration, to refute principally the last of these views as being the most general and the most dangerous of the three, but with constant allusions to the others also. For instance, on what grounds does Protagoras himself, by virtue of his calling as a philosophic instructor, profess *to teach* knowledge, if, as his principle declares, knowledge belongs equally to every human mind, and the peasant's apprehensions be as truly the measure of real existence as the philosopher's? Again, if the sensible *occasion* of knowledge be knowledge itself, it would seem that to read or to hear an unknown language would be completely equivalent to perfectly knowing it, and that every varied circumstance of sensation (as, for example, seeing with one eye or with both) must, by force of this hypothesis, alter the reality

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passage of which it suffices to quote the expressions following:—Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας . . . ἢ διανοεῖ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστίν; Ἔγωγε.—Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα (sc. οὐσίαν, ὁμοιότητα, ἀριθμὸν) διὰ τίνος . . . διανοεῖ; . . . Αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται . . . ἐπισκοπεῖν.—Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογιστῷ. He had previously drawn Theætetus into an admission of the unity of the sentient subject:—εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ᾗ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

Those who would thoroughly understand the *Theætetus* would do well to read with attention the account given by Cicero in the *Prior Academics* of the controversy between the Stoics and the Academy, renewed in modern times by Reid and Brown, of whom the former held with the Stoics that our knowledge of the external world is intuitive, the latter, with Plato and the majority of philosophers, that it is *inferential*. Sir W. Hamilton's masterly critique on the various theories of Perception (Essays, p. 38) will be read with profit even by those to whom it is not given to acquiesce in his conclusions. ED.]

of science,[12]—a notion so frivolous that even the ingenious audacity of Protagoras himself could scarcely venture to accept it. Nor this alone. If it be involved in "knowledge" that it should be the direct perception of the sensible organ, it would seem that all which is retained by *memory* is blotted from the treasuries of science,[13] that man hangs upon the ever-varying present, and that all which refers to past or future is absolutely annihilated. But even on his own grounds Protagoras may be convicted. For all experience establishes that some do arrive at a *greater degree* of knowledge than others, (as the physician, the musician, &c.,) and all the world implicitly believe it; so that, if truth be determined by momentary opinion, Protagoras, on his own hypothesis, is overthrown by a vast majority, the only decisive test admitted by his philosophy: nay, he personally subscribes his own error; for, all opinion being (as opinion) equally authentic, he pronounces his adversaries to speak true, in the very argument that assails them as mistaken.[14] Another palpable form of self-confutation is built upon the doctrine of Heraclitus. If, argues Socrates, every thing be in a state of incessant change, it cannot be affirmed of any thing that it *is* rather than is not. Now, this (if worth any thing) must be a formula *universally* applicable, as no reason can be shown why it should be applied to one region of nature rather than to another. Sensations, then, are, along with every thing else, involved in this predicament, and therefore no affirmation can be with certainty made as regards *them;* consequently, by the conditions of the

2. By its inconsistency with itself.

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[12] [P. 163, E. ED.]

[13] [P. 164, B. *συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὐ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἔτι μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾷ.* ED.]

[14] [P. 170:—Ἐπειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον· ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, ξυγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἁπάντας. ED.]

argument, it may be as reasonably asserted that sensations are *not* science as that they are.[15] The great object of the doctrine of Protagoras was to unsettle the principles of *moral* obligation, by denying the permanence of moral distinctions. Accordingly, Plato soon proceeds to examine his theory in that light. His argument is simple and convincing. He shows that the universal experience of man establishes that there is a known, assignable difference between the *useful and the injurious*:[16] this, indeed, is an idea totally distinct from that of the just and the unjust; but as far as concerns Protagoras's argument they are completely on a par. *Both* are beyond the immediate scope of sensation; the calculations of the teacher of gymnastics as to his own art, or of the physician as to the results of medical applications, as much transcend the sphere of pure direct sensation as even the perceptions of right and wrong. But even beyond these objections to the theory which makes the variations of sense the judges of scientific truth, is the decisive obstacle to its admission, that, by reducing science under the control of faculties which we share with even the brute creation, it makes *every sensitive being* equally the judge of truth with man himself, —a consequence beyond which the argument can scarcely be carried.[17] From all these considerations, it is evident that the boasted solution of the question of science, which identifies it with simple sensation, is unable to stand examination, its defenders being on every side convicted of palpable inconsistency. Before closing this part of the

[15] [P. 182, E:—*οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκριναμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὅ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη.* ED.]

[16] [P. 177, C–179, E:—*παντὸς μᾶλλον ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἐστὶ δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἐωσπερ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τἀγαθοῦ οὐδένα . . . τολμᾷν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἃ ἂν ὠφελίμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῆται καὶ ἔστι.* ED.]

[17] [P. 161, C:—*τεθαίμακα ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς ἀληθείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὗς ἢ κυνοκέφαλος.* ED.

discussion, Plato, affirming that science is the attribute of the *soul*, furnishes a most perspicuous proof of the unity of the thinking-principle, and its distinctness from the complicated system of bodily organs whose reports it receives and estimates.[18]

I need now scarcely remind you that the principles here stated and refuted are substantially the principles of skepticism in every age; and I believe you will find very few forms of reply to these logical perplexities of which the discussion just analyzed does not offer an example. But, though this constitutes a very important incidental advantage of such studies, I must remind you that my present object is, simply, to arrive progressively at an estimate of the views of *Plato himself* regarding the prerogatives of the human reason and the immutability of the truth it apprehends. Avoiding, therefore, extraneous comment, I continue his own exposition.

Theodorus, who very amusingly describes the logical frenzy of the Heracliteans in supporting their theory of the ceaseless fluxion of the universe, tells us that they are unfixed in their very thoughts and language, as if they were afraid that even there the appearance of fixity would destroy their cause.[19] You will anticipate, then, that the advocate who in some measure represents their views should be prepared, on being driven from his first position, to fortify a new one. Unable to find science in pure sensation, he endeavours to discover it in

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[18] [P. 184, c, to 186, E. Ed.]

[19] ["They are living instances of the unrest their books proclaim," *ἀτεχνώς κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται*, 179, E. Theodorus speaks of Heracliteans in Ephesus: but the most celebrated representative of these views was the Athenian Cratylus, of whom Aristotle speaks as an advocate of extreme "movement" opinions, *Metaph.* iii. 5, 18. It was by him that Plato, in his early youth, was initiated into these Ephesian mysteries. Ib. i. 6. Ed.]

a region higher than sensation, and he pronounces that science is "right judgment, or opinion," (*δόξα ἀλήθης.*) In this part of the dialogue we enter upon a region characterized by all the peculiarities of the ancient logic, and which, therefore, can scarcely be made as familiar to modern readers as the preceding disquisition. If science be true opinion, what constitutes a *false* opinion? This question is thus analyzed. We can only judge of what we know or do not know. Four possible cases arise. A man may be in error, by judging that a thing he knows is really some other thing he does not know, or some other thing he does know; or, again, by judging that some thing he does not know is some other thing he does know, or some other thing he does not know. All these cases are rejected, as presenting apparent impossibilities. Another method of examination is proposed:—to estimate the matter not in relation to knowledge or ignorance, but in relation *to existence or non-existence,*—that is, as he defines it, judging according to the truth and reality of things.[20] But here he finds as little satisfaction. For he argues that, as he who sees at all must see something which exists, so he who judges must judge what in some sense *exists;* and that he who judges that which does not exist (whether in real or abstract beings) cannot properly be said to judge at all.[21] Is then "false opinion" the mistake which arises when,

SECOND DEFINITION. *Science is true opinion. Theæt. p.* 187, B.

This proposition implies that there is a false opinion.

Investigation of the nature of false opinion.

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[20] [P. 188, D:—Ἆρ' *οὖν οὐ ταύτῃ σκεπτέον ὃ ζητοῦμεν κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι . . . ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μή*; The cases here suggested involve an obvious confusion between "judgment" and "simple apprehension." They are, in fact, Cynical fallacies. See vol. i. p. 427, note 8. Socrates shows this presently, by distinguishing the mental processes in question, 189, E:—*τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἆρ' ὃ περ ἐγὼ καλεῖς*; κ.τ.λ. ED.]

[21] [P. 189, B. ED.]

taking one real existence for another, we affirm that one *is* the other?[22] This, again, is shown to be mentally impossible.[23] Once more: is "false judgment" the erroneous application of an inward conception to an exterior sensation? (exemplified in the view of an object *at a distance* which we may mistake for *another*.) This is rejected as too *limited* an account.[24] In this way, by a diversity of examples, Plato endeavours to show that a correct conception of "*error*" has not been presented in any of the ordinary theories: for I have little doubt that these solutions, which appear at first sight strangely chosen, were actually known as theories of the subject in the popular metaphysic of Plato's age.[25] Returning from this digression, the philosopher once more demands, Can "true opinion" satisfy the notion of science? and, feeling that it cannot

All the proposed explanations of false opinion rejected as either impossible or inadequate.

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[22] [Ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῆ φαμεν εἶναι δόξαν. Ib. ED.]

[23] [To make this plain, we are presented with an elaborate examination of the phenomena of judgment (189, E) and memory (191, D,) the latter illustrated by a comparison of the receptive faculty to a tablet of wax, more or less retentive of impressions as it varies in purity and consistence. To this part of the dialogue Locke's celebrated chapter on Memory presents a striking parallel. (*Essay*, b. ii. chap. x. §§ 4, 5.) ED.]

[24] [P. 196, C:—ἀλλ' ὁτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἴσθησιν παραλλαγήν· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐψευσάμεθα; *i.e.* if error consist *solely* in mistaking a particular sensible image for a particular notion in the mind, every process of *pure* thought must be exempt from error. ED.]

[25] [For a specimen of this "popular metaphysic," see *Phædo*, p. 96, B:—πότερον . . . ὁ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων . . . ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης, λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. We can hardly err in conjecturing that the "wax tablet" before alluded to was borrowed from the museum of the school whose "theory of the human mind" is here sketched. The dove-cote (197, D) may have come from the same or a neighbouring repository. ED.]

rise above the evidence of testimony or analogy, he denies its claims.[26]

THIRD DEFINITION. *Science is "True Opinion combined with explication." Theæt. p. 201. c. By "explication" may be meant either enumeration of all the components,*

A third and last attempt is made to define the notion of that which alone deserves the title of knowledge. Science is pronounced to be "opinion *μετὰ λόγου*,"—a qualification which seems, from the subsequent tenor of the discussion, to signify judgment "*with explication.*" For, it is observed, no primary element is knowable or explicable; it is merely perceptible, (you will remember Locke's undefinable "simple ideas;"[27]) whereas *compounds* are decomposable, and thence definable: of simples, then, there is "just apprehension," but no genuine "science." The answer to this preliminary statement is remarkable. Socrates is represented as illustrating his meaning by words and syllables and letters; and he replies that, if the syllable

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[26] [The refutation of the proposition, "Science or Knowledge is true opinion," is based on the necessity imposed on its advocates of admitting that of the two terms of every Judgment one at least is given as known; for no Judgment, true or false, is conceivable, of which both terms are unknown. Hence the definition in question is faulty; for it means nothing, unless that which it professes to explain—the nature of knowledge—be assumed to be already known. *Πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεῳ τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γιγνώσκομεν καὶ οὐ γιγνώσκομεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὡς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. Theæt.* p. 196, E. It is true that a remembered impression is not a "knowledge" in the Platonic sense; but those who hold that right opinion is science acknowledge no other. See the quotation from the *Phædo* in the foregoing note. From a higher point of view the refutation appears sophistical; for it seems to confound two different acts,—*γιγνώσκειν* (*cognoscere, kennen*) with *ἐπίστασθαι*, (*scire, wissen.*) But then this higher point of view is not yet attained, being indeed the very thing sought in the present inquiry. It would not, and could not, be conceded by the empiricists with whom Plato is arguing. The "maieutic" or suggestive purpose of the dialogue is here sufficiently obvious. ED.]

[27] [*Essay*, b. iii. c. 4, § 4. ED.]

consist of the mere letters, it cannot be known (as matter of science) unless they are known; for, assuredly, science cannot be compounded of absolute ignorance; but if the syllable be not the mere total of the letters, but a new and distinct being, then the being itself (or "form") becomes an indecomposable, and therefore, by the hypothesis, an *inexplicable*, thing. But what does this λόγος or additional *explication* really signify? Is it the image of thought by words, simply? In this case every "true judgment" will have explication, and all possessors of right opinions will possess genuine science; for every thinker, not deaf or dumb, can achieve such explication as this. But is it the determination of the whole by the elements that compose it? Even this does not reach the idea of the Platonic "science," which refuses to honour with its name a process of simple decomposition. Shall we declare, then, that "explication" answers to the assignment of a genus and essential difference?[28] and is *this* what converts a "true opinion" into "science"? But to this it is answered that (however this differentiation may assist clearness of expression) the perception of the distinguishing qualities must be presupposed in the mere apprehension of the individual object, to make it individual.

or description "per genus et differentiam."

It does not appear, then, that any of these accounts of scientific knowledge reach the problem. There is, in the apprehension of truth, as fixed beyond possibility of change, a something which none of them include. When you have arrived at this period in the original Platonic discussion—a good deal wearied perhaps by subtleties which, even in the most rapid analysis, I can scarcely expect to engage much

Negative result of the dialogue.

[28] [P. 208, c:—τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν. ED.]

interest—you anxiously look out for the luminous conception which is to enlighten the obscurity of this mazy controversy, and by its own contrast to call out the fainter lineaments of the past reasoning in bold and clear relief. But you will expect this in vain. Socrates, after thus dissolving the structures of his brother-teachers, hastily closes the discussion by merely observing that this removal of errors may clear the soil of his hearer's mind for future fruit; and by the still colder consolation that it will at least prevent him from idly imagining that he understands the subject when he really knows nothing whatever about it.

Its real import.

But the true object of the whole is, nevertheless, manifest enough. If you have at all maintained your attention to the progress of the reasoning, you will perceive without difficulty that it refers to *three great aspects* of intellectual philosophy,—the theory of mere sensation, the theory of mere judgment upon sensation, and the theory of logical definition, as comprising the office and functions of the human reason in relation to attainable truth. And if you have but slightly contemplated the history of speculation, you can scarcely fail to perceive that these are three forms of philosophy which, under endless superficial changes, have perpetually reappeared in almost every age of the history of reason. Am I, then, delaying you here upon unprofitable obscurities, when I exhibit to you this great Reasoner, in his own graceful simplicity of dialogue, thus holding forth, (as if in prophecy,) in the very childhood of philosophy, a mirror which was to reflect the future fortunes of human thought? What is the first of the theories he meets and prostrates, but that very account of human nature which, in language scarcely altered from the phraseology which he furnishes to it here, degraded all France, and from France half Europe, during the greater part of the last century? What is

the second of these theories, but that very amelioration of the former which, allowing to man a faculty of apprehending the relations of thoughts, permits that faculty to wander no further than the experience of receptive sensibility will supply him with materials? What, finally, is the third which Plato consigns to reprobation, but that theory which reduces all the prerogatives of reason to the logical offices of defining and dividing and classifying names? And what is that which Plato considered they all equally wanted, without which he deemed them structures fair and artificial, but without foundation,—bodies comely and proportioned, but without life? He believed that they wanted substantial *reality*, a principle of absolute and ultimate certainty; he conceived that until the reason of man—by virtue of its inherent power—were brought in contact with the Infinite itself, were considered as an inward attestation of certain unconditional and consummate truths self-supported and independent, that until thus the human intellect was, as it were, incorporated with the very *existence* of the real universe around it, no anchorage could be found in the fathomless deep of philosophical skepticism. By what bonds he essayed to bind together that mystic Triad—the Creator, the Creation, and the Reason that images both—will form the subject of our next meeting.

LECTURE VIII.

THE DIALECTIC OF PLATO, CONTINUED—THE IDEAL THEORY.

GENTLEMEN:—

Dialectic of Plato, continued General reflections.

WE have now seen that the ancient investigators of the principles of human knowledge had largely examined the subject, had submitted reason to its own reflective analysis, and had evolved theories to systematize its processes and operations not at all dissimilar from those which later efforts have so elaborately presented. Differences of language, differences of habitual associations, differences of historical position, must produce difference in the *form* of exposition: but truth is limited; and, where the facts of the case lie in no very extended compass, we may assuredly anticipate that the faculties of theorists will march in paths not widely separated from each other. Human nature recurs unchanged in every successive generation; its powers, its instincts, its prejudices, remain the same; and when you find that, even in the simplest questions and most palpable determinations of external physical science, philosophical heresies are seen, in spite of demonstration itself, to arise, you can scarcely wonder that the various ages of intellectual history have been found to return the echoes of old errors, to rush with all the ardour of novelty and inexperience into illusions long before exposed, and to mistake, again and again, *that* for the authentic coinage of eternal truth which a forgotten antiquity had proved to be the base alloy of prejudice or the gilded forgeries of a too active imagination.

Such a research as that which I then took occasion to make will not have failed in one important object, if it have recalled or strengthened your respectful regard for our forefathers in the philosophy of mind; if it have led you to contemplate in these men inquirers whom no age need blush to desire as its own, thoughtful and gifted speculators who possessed all our faculties long before ourselves, and whose very exclusiveness of devotion to these peculiar studies, though it unquestionably lost them the benefit of lights flashed from other points of the intellectual heaven, yet gave them all the advantages of patient concentration and enthusiastic perseverance in the work of exploring the region of their own peculiar choice. A spirit of most misjudging contempt has for many years become fashionable towards the metaphysical contemplations of the elder ages. Alas! I cannot understand on what principles. Is it, then, a matter to be exulted in that we have at length discovered that our faculties are only formed for earth and earthly phenomena? Are we to rejoice at our own limitations, and delight that we can be cogently demonstrated to be prisoners of sense and the facts of sense? In those early struggles after a higher and more perfect knowledge, and in the forgetfulness of every inferior science through the very ardour of the pursuit, there is, at least, a glorious and irresistible testimony to the loftier destinies of man; and it might almost be pronounced that, in *such* a view, their very errors evidence a truth higher than all our discoveries can disclose! When Lord Bacon, with his clear and powerful reasonings, led our thinkers from these regions of ancient thought (then newly opened to the modern world) to the humbler, but more varied and extensive, department of inductive inquiry, I represent to myself that angel-guide, all light and grace, who is pictured by our great poet as slowly conducting the first of our race from Paradise, to leave him in a world vast indeed and varied, but where

thorns and thistles abounded, and food—often uncertain, and often perilous—was to be gained only "by the sweat of the brow" and in the downcast attitude of servile toil!

Subject of the present Lecture.

These haughty prepossessions against the speculative researches of antiquity are nowhere more necessary to be resisted than in approaching the subject of our consideration this day,—a subject which has become almost proverbially the type of fantastic hypothesis. On this prejudication I shall make but one remark; but it is a remark worthy your consideration. Whether the IDEAL THEORY of Plato be or be not a system of pompous illusion, you will remember that it was a system chosen and supported by one who had before him nearly every objection your ingenuity could marshal against it. It was not the system of a novice, confident in opinions which he had never learned to contrast with their opposites. Our ordinary estimators of the Platonic philosophy (undertaking their office upon a careless and defective examination of his writings) exult in exhibiting the extravagance of the ancient realism, and in contrasting with its follies the simplicity, perspicuity, and truth of their own adopted theory. Hume pronounces Nominalism (the system which denies all universal essences, whether real or mental) to be one of the most important "discoveries" of modern times, and rejoices in being even a subsidiary labourer in the work of extending and strengthening the influnce of this novel solution. Yet we know that this very theory was upheld by the ancient Stoics in opposition to the Platonics, and, as I am strongly inclined to think, was known to the Megarics and Cynics, and therefore *to Plato himself*. It is,

The Ideal Theory of Plato.

Popular prejudices against this theory considered.

Its supposed incomsistency with modern Nominalism,

[1] [Antisthenes not only knew, but seems to have deliberately adopted, the Nominalistic theory, though in a somewhat crude form, and en-

at least, remarkable, that the very objections against Realism which were supposed to establish the Nominalism of the twelfth century are by Plato advanced in the *Parmenides;* and, as some of these objections would seem to lie equally (or nearly so) against the theory of universal conceptions, it seems not at all improbable that Plato had this third, or Nominalist, theory within his view, but perhaps considered it not of sufficient force to require special mention and elaborate reply. I mean, not of sufficient force when regarded as an adequate solution of the *entire* question of the Reason of man; for (strange as it may appear) I am strongly inclined to think that Plato, in his mere doctrine of *abstraction*, was nearer to what would now be called Nominalism than to any other theory of that mental process. It is certain that he seems frequently to intimate, and to lament, the impossibility of obtaining, while we work on sensible materials, a general notion pure from sensuous admixture; and to insinuate that, if we could, the task would be achieved which death alone can effect,—the immediate perception of essences as they exist in the intelligible world. Aristotle, on the contrary, seems to have believed that the *νόημα could* be thus obtained,[2] and in the spirit of that belief (as well as on other grounds) to have discarded the ulterior speculations of Plato.

and Conceptualism.

The other theory which is opposed to the Platonic

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cumbered with gratuitous absurdities. Compare Arist. *Metaph.* iv. 29, 4:—Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο εὐήθως μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἓν ἐφ' ἑνός; and Ib. vii. 3, 7:—οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι . . . ἠπόρουν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστιν ὁρίσασθαι,—with Plato, *Theæt.* 201, E:—αὐτὸ . . . καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνόμασαι μόνον εἴη; where, however, the reference to the Cynics is doubtful. ED.]

[2] [Aristotle frequently approaches the question involved in the Nominalist controversy, as *Categ.* c. 2 and 5; *Metaph.* vi. 13, 2; *Phys.* ii. 1. All these passages are decidedly anti-realistic; and still more so the well-known dictum in the *De Animâ*, i. 1, 5. τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἢτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον. ED.]

idealism, and which is known by the title of "Conceptualism," is in the same dialogue expressly stated and rejected. "Perhaps" (Socrates is represented as urging) "each of these εἴδη is nothing but a thought (νόημα,) and can exist nowhere else than in the souls of men."[3] And so of several other objections. I do not mention these facts in order to pronounce any immediate opinion regarding the relative merit of these solutions, but simply to remind you that, whether right or wrong in his choice, Plato saw these alternatives, deliberately rejected them as insufficient or untrue, and deliberately preferred to follow his own theory. If, when made aware of this, we continue to dismiss his views with contemptuous slight, surely we must possess a large share of confidence in ourselves to prefer deciding that Plato devoted his life to circulating despicable reveries, rather than that we do not perfectly enter into his views and reasonings. Unfortunately, these reasonings *are* expressed in a form which it requires much patience to penetrate; and, though we may be enabled to perceive much that inspires respect and admiration, he would be a bold critic who would affirm that he has left the Dialectic of Plato without difficulties. We may enter far enough into the vast and hallowed edifice to catch the general grandeur of the design and the symmetry of the proportions; but to gain that point from which the whole is beheld at a glance, in all its complicated relations, has, I believe, been truly given to few of those who profess to have been *so* favoured.

I shall now endeavour to give you an outline of the theory of Plato considered in relation to its aim and purport. My object shall be to attempt to seize the spirit of the whole, without departing from his own habits of thought. Detailed accounts of detached dogmas you will find abundantly supplied by many writers and

[3] [Parmenides, 132, B. ED.]

commentators: I must attempt something more systematically connected, because this combination or harmony is that which our learned investigators of particular questions most usually neglect to offer.

Historical genesis of the Ideal Theory.

We saw that in the ancient world, at the time of Plato, the subject of the nature and the limits of human knowledge had attracted deep and general attention. Had the early inquiries on this great question been calmly and candidly conducted, there might have been agreement, or disagreement without extravagance. But it is one of the many evils of the controversial spirit that it inevitably urges opposition to extremes. The "odium theologicum" is theological, only because theology is to us the most important of speculative questions: the thoughtful ancients, when they did not fear the results, too much despised, or too wholly forgot, the gods of the people to allow their passions to be enlisted in assailing or protecting them; and *philosophy* became to them what *religion* is to us—the theme of incessant disputation—because of the deepest speculative interest, and therefore of the most passionate controversial excitement. Accordingly, the primitive differences about knowledge, or the relation of reason to the Universe, gradually widened until they formed into *two theories* that may be considered as occupying the opposite poles of human thought,—the theory that reduces all knowledge to the accidental receptive quality of the organs of sense, and the theory that denies the existence (except as an utter *illusion*) of the whole sensible world, and refers all knowledge to the apprehension of the One immutable essence which it hides behind it. But between these lay two less extravagant accounts of the nature and limits of man's knowledge,—the one declaring it to be "right opinion," but without any further basis

Plato's perception of the defects of previous theories concerning the relation of the mind to being:

of reason, the other purporting to supply this deficiency by adding to the just opinion a logical explication by definitions and distinctions. Now, you must conceive Plato as having gradually travelled from the first of these theories[4] (or that of pure αἴσθησις) through the two last which rise higher and higher in the rational scale, until from the utmost verge of the logical system of science he discerns that furthest (or ultra-rationalist) system of Unity. Arrived at this, the philosopher proceeds to estimate *its* value, and to determine whether it can satisfy the problem of the true nature of science and the true prerogatives of the human reason.

1. *Of the empirical.*

To make this gradual advance more distinct, you must remember that there are, by the admission of all reasonable thinkers, at the least *two* separable faculties in human minds,—a faculty of *receiving impressions* and a faculty of *conceiving relations*. Now, the first of the systems I mentioned restricted our intellectual energies to the former, and (considered as an account of knowledge) we have seen that Plato overwhelmed it with argument and ridicule. The second and third systems (however mutually different as accounts of the cognitive powers of man) certainly agreed in adopting the two faculties,—the receptive sensibility, and the

2. *Of the empirico-logical.*

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[4] [Comp. Arist. *Metaph.* i. 6, 2:—"Plato in his youth became familiar with Cratylus, and through him with the Heraclitic opinions of the flux of sensible objects, and their consequent unfitness to become objects of science; and this creed he continued to hold in his later years." It nowhere appears that at any period of his life he held "the doctrine of pure sensation," except in this negative way. His intolerance of the skeptical state of mind doubtless impelled him to seek elsewhere for a ground of certainty. So understood, the account in the text is true; but the formula, "sensation is knowledge," is evidently susceptible of a dogmatic sense, alien from the whole spirit of Plato's speculations, early as well as late. ED.]

power of judgment. But we find that, even in the higher form, he was totally dissatisfied with this representation. And the reason was, doubtless, this: that, carry these theories to the utmost, they yet leave us without (as he conceived) any substantial principle of *certainty*. Our opinions and our definitions may, as comparisons and distinctions of thoughts, be perfectly correct; they may be consistent with each other, and with the entire scheme of thought: and yet they may be (for aught that these theories involve) *absolutely disconnected with reality*. Exactly as in mathematics it is altogether unimportant to the strict cogency of the demonstration whether beyond the conceiving mind there be a single inch of real space in the world. They comprised general expressions indeed, the names of classes or genera; but these classes were themselves raised out of particular objects of sensuous experience; and, if the sensible world was itself changeable, fleeting, and uncertain, how much less claim to fixed reality had these shadowy classifications of shadows! Now, if to the reflective mind there arise an invincible conviction that it is formed for absolute certainty, and that on many points it possesses a certainty which declares to it the laws and nature of things as they would be though every subordinate intellect perished, then no account of human knowledge can be adequate which does not solve the phenomena of these absolute certainties, which does not in some manner bind together the universe beyond the soul and the soul itself.

3. *Of the unitarian or ultra-rational doctrine.*

Under these circumstances you may conceive that Plato approached with a more favourable prepossession the *Eleatic* system of the mind. For this, at least, purported to connect the reason with the rational element in the universe; that is, it (though, perhaps, indistinctly) admitted that there was, beyond mere sense and mere comparison or in-

ference or generalization or abstraction, a faculty of which the inherent prerogative was this:—that it could pronounce, independently of all sensible experience, certain truths regarding the universe; applying itself to that which was rational or intelligible therein, as truly as, but more intimately than, the eye can apply itself to light, or the ear to the pulses that generate a sound. But, though an important step was here effected,—a stride from the transitory to the permanent, from the temporal to the eternal,—the subsequent result was barren of profit and altogether inadequate to the demands of the question. In various parts of his writings[5] Plato meets and refutes the theory which would represent the rational substratum of the universal system as *one* in a sense so exclusive as to be incapable of diversity. Accordingly, his own views far more resemble the earlier doctrines of Pythagoras, whose arithmetic metaphysics acknowledged this variety and attempted to account for it, than the unwarrantable refinement by which the school of Elea professed to prove that the reason admitted no shadow of diversity in its objective counterpart. There is, then, an intelligible world, as the Eleatics assert; but that world, though governed by one grand and presiding unity, is yet diversified by a boundless variety of intelligible essences.

Conceivability of the Platonic theory.

You can now enter easily into the aim of the theory of Ideas. That man's soul is made to contain not merely a consistent scheme of its own notion, but a direct apprehension of *real and eternal laws beyond it*, is not too absurd to be maintained. That these real and eternal laws are things *intelligible*, and not things sensible, is not very extravagant either. That these laws impressed upon creation by its Creator, and

[5] [More particularly in the *Sophist* and *Parmenides*. ED.]

apprehended by man, are something distinct equally from the Creator and from man, and that the whole mass of them may be fairly termed the world of things purely intelligible, is surely allowable. Nay, further, that there are qualities in the supreme and ultimate Cause of all, which are manifested in His creation, and not merely manifested, but in a manner—after being brought out of his superessential nature into the stage of being below him, but next to him—are then, by the causative act of creation, deposited in things, differencing them one from the other, so that the things participate of them, (*μετέχουσι*,) communicate with them, (*κοινωνοῦσι*,) this likewise seems to present no incredible account of the relation of the world to its Author. That the intelligence of man, excited to reflection by the impressions of these objects thus (though themselves transitory) participant of a divine quality, should rise to higher conceptions of the perfections thus faintly exhibited,—and, inasmuch as these perfections are unquestionably *real* existences, and *known* to be such in the very act of contemplation, that this should be regarded as a direct intellectual apperception of them,—a union of the reason with the Ideas in that sphere of being which is common to both,—this is certainly no preposterous notion in substance, and by those who deeply study it will perhaps be judged no unwarrantable form of phrase. Finally, that the reason, in proportion as it learns to contemplate the perfect and eternal, *desires* the enjoyment of such contemplations in a more consummate degree, and cannot be fully satisfied except in the actual fruition of the perfect itself,—this seems not to contradict any received principle of psychology, or any known law of human nature. Yet these suppositions, taken together, constitute the famous THEORY OF IDEAS, and, thus stated, may surely be pronounced to form no very appropriate object for the con-

tempt of even the most accomplished of our modern "physiologists of mind."[6]

The Ideas of Plato compared with the Numbers of Pythagoras.

It appears, then, that the Ideal Theory, historically considered, is to be regarded as a reaction from the Eleatic Theory of Unity,—a return from the doctrine of the absolute simplicity of the rational world to the prior Pythagorean doctrine of Unity in Multiplicity.[7] That the "Numbers" of Pythagoras and the "Ideas" of Plato were closely analogous cannot be doubted; and much investigation has been lavished on the question of their precise relation to each other. The differences between these philosophers in their elementary principles are noted by Aristotle at great length, (in the first, twelfth, and thirteenth books of his *Metaphysics;*) but the obscurity of his language, and the difficulty of particular phrases, render it impossible to obtain any tolerable conception of this exposition without careful perusal of the entire original itself. A single sentence may be quoted as, apparently, the most comprehensive; though it will require some meditation to detect its exact purport. He tells us[8] that

Aristotle's testimony on this head.

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[6] [The object of this brilliant paragraph being evidently to commend the Platonic scheme to the notice of persons conversant only with the language of modern metaphysics, the author has very reasonably allowed himself considerable latitude in the use of phrases to which it would be difficult to find a precise counterpart in Plato's writings. I have therefore abstained from the attempt to support the several positions by quotations; which will be more appropriate to the detailed expositions which follow. ED.]

[7] [The question of priority is at least doubtful. It is remarkable that Aristotle nowhere connects the Ideal Theory with the Eleatic doctrine of Unity; while he devotes whole chapters to explaining its relation to the Pythagorean number-theory. But Plato has fortunately left us in no doubt of the fact of the former connection. See the *Parmenides*, passim; and especially p. 130, fol. ED.]

[8] [*Metaph.* i. 6, 6. The "duality" (δύας) is explained in a passage

Plato, with the Pythagoreans, held that *numbers* were the causes of things, and of their essence; but "to make a duality of this *unlimited** which they regarded as *one*, and to compose this unlimited of great and small, was his peculiarity." Furthermore, Plato (he tells us) held that "these numbers exist out of and beyond sensible things; whereas the Pythagoreans held that the numbers were the things themselves." It is singular that the technical phrases of the two masters would lead to a conclusion directly *opposite;* for Plato's *μέθεξις*, or participation, of ideas suggests an intimate embodying of these essences, while Pythagoras's *μίμησις τῶν ἀριθμῶν* rather brings with it the conception of a copy of a distant exemplar. On the whole, I would say that the "Ideas" of Plato were the natural product of a state of thought *more advanced* than that which the Pythagorean "Numbers" represent. The term "Idea," which must have been from the first more comprehensive in applicability and flexible in use than the *ἀριθμός*, evidences that the *theory itself* had risen to higher generalization in the mind of Plato. He, however, often employs fragments of the Pythagorean phraseology, with the inevitable consequence of obscurity which so forced and mystical a form of expression must involve. It would seem that after Plato's decease the arithmetical nomenclature rose again into fashion; for Xenocrates incorporated it in his fundamental dogmas, and Aristotle identifies it with the

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of the *Physics*, b. iii. c. 6, § 11:—Πλάτων διὰ ταῦτα δύο τὰ ἄπειρα ἐποίησεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὔξην δοκεῖ ὑπερβάλλειν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καθαίρεσιν. "Plato represented the unlimited as Two, because it is susceptible of infinite augmentation as well as infinite diminution or division." Hence there is no material unit; unity is ideal in its very nature:—ὡς ὕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὡς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν. *Metaph.* l. l. The word ἄπειρον means "matter," as Prof. Butler states, but matter in its Platonic sense, its predicates rather resembling those of pure space than any thing of a corporeal nature. See the following Lecture. ED.]

* Sc. *matter*, I presume: constantly so called.

Platonic philosophy to a degree not apparently warranted by the writings of Plato himself.

Theory of Ideas developed.

I must now proceed to regard the Theory of Ideas more closely and systematically. Plato believed that there is a perfect science of the reality of things, independent of sensible experience, which he considered (as is most true) incapable of bestowing absolute certainty. In every observation made by the senses, therefore, he considered that the reason might disengage an element exclusively its own, which, until that disengagement, had been mingled and hidden in the complex result.[9] Now, that this was no unwarrantable train of thought may perhaps be thus manifested. In the observation of any change whatever, the senses can detect only the *terms* of the change,—that is, the successive phenomena themselves; but it is unquestionable that every such change is accompanied with the irresistible conviction of the absolute necessity of a *cause* to effect it, in virtue of a principle above and beyond sense, which pronounces the universal truth that "every change requires a causal energy to produce it." Were we then to proceed no further, it is obvious that every sensible mutation brings the reason of man (which is the organ or depository of necessary principles) in contact with a genuine "Idea;" which, if it truly have (as it truly has) an eternal reality independent of the mind that apprehends it, may be fairly said to belong to a "world or sphere of ideas,"[10] the appropriate object of the inner world of reason.* But as yet we have gained only one presiding Idea; let us try if reason will not

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[9] [*Phædr.* p. 249, B:—*εἶδος ἐκ πολλῶν ἓν αἰσθήσει εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον.* ED.]

[10] [*νοητὸς τόπος*, *Rep.* vii. 517, B, al. ED.]

* For what constitutes a *distinct* sphere of being in any sense, but *independent reality*,—the qualities of *time and space* being here obviously inapplicable?

evidence a more varied inheritance as its property in the ideal world: as otherwise Plato has *not* been its correct interpreter, his theory assigning (to the endless perplexity of the systematizers of Platonism) ideas to *every thing* that can receive a name,[11]—ideas of *relations*,[12] of colours, of sounds,[13]—even of artificial instances of mechanism,[14] no less than of beauty, symmetry, and truth. Any account which does not comprehend this universality must therefore fail to catch the spirit of the Platonic reasoning. Now, as we saw in a former Lecture that *the Good* is the cardinal point of the philosophy of Plato, and by him enthroned in majesty supreme at the summit of the whole universe,[15] you must learn with him to regard the sensible world as a development of supreme perfection in an inferior and transitory form. From whatever cause, (for this inscrutable difficulty with all other philosophers he *evades*,) this manifestation of excellence, acting upon a subject that limits and embarrasses it, is in the world of sense necessarily imperfect; but, by a still nobler necessity, it

Every existence that can be named has its appropriate Idea.

The Idea of the Good is revealed, though imperfectly, in every phenomenon.

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[11] [Arist. *Metaph.* i. 9, 1:—*καθ' ἕκαστον . . . ὁμώνυμόν τί ἐστι, κ. τ. λ.* (speaking of the ideas.) Plat. *Rep.* x. 596, A:—*εἶδος . . . ἓν ἑκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν.* Ed.]

[12] [Of the "relations" to which ideas may be assigned, specimens may be found in *Republ.* v. 479, B. Comp. *Phædo*, 100, B. If I rightly understand Arist. *Metaph.* i. 9, 3, the propriety of this assignation was contested by some of Plato's followers. Ed.]

[13] [*Cratyl.* 423, E:—*αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅσα ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως τοῦ εἶναι.* Ed.]

[14] [As of chairs and tables, *Rep.* x. 596, B:—*πολλαί εἰσι κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι . . . ἀλλ' ἰδέαι γέ που περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκεύη δύο, μία μὲν κλίνης, μία δὲ τραπέζης.* Ed.]

[15] [As *Repub.* vi. 505, A, fol. vii. 517, B. *Phileb.* 20, B, fol. See esp. *Rep.* vi. 509, B:—*οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.* Ed.]

is also as perfect as circumstances will admit.[16] If this be granted, it will follow that in every phenomenon there may be contemplated an instance of absolute perfection in partial development; and as surely as sense cannot be explained without something beyond sense, so surely does there exist in the eternal world a special reason (consistent with the laws of beauty, goodness, and truth) for every separate apparition in the sensible world,—a reason antecedent to the sensible manifestation, but embodied in it, and to which therefore the sensible manifestation serves to guide the human intelligence. Nor is it a satisfactory account of this matter to identify these reasons with the very essence of God, and thus to pronounce that there is no *medium* between him and the transitory world of sense. The Divine Nature (which only by faint analogy we describe by what we can best conceive of excellence when we term it The Good) is as far above the world of ideas as ideas above sense,—a truth which seems manifest from the fact that reason, the apprehender of ideas, can form so indistinct and unsatisfactory a conception of the uncaused, illimitable, and all-containing God. Through ideas, however, we may hope to rise in perpetual progress towards this *supreme idea;* as from sense the reflective mind struggles into the sphere of idea.

constituting the reason of such phenomenon.

These "reasons" are separate from the Divine Mind.

Now, we know that there is a faculty in the mind of man which *generalizes* the facts of sense, or *abstracts* them, and to the result applies a common name. On the other hand, we have already laid down that there is a faculty altogether distinct and above it, which

The Ideas are not abstractions,

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[16] [*Timæus*, 29, D:—Λέγωμεν δὴ δι' ἣν τινα αἰτίαν γένεσίν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς . . . ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος. τούτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. ED.]

exists antecedently to all experience, and is the highest element of the rational soul: *distinct*, for no generalization can pronounce with certainty the universal, necessary, and absolute; *antecedent*, for, though gradually evoked into activity by the stimulus of observation, its dormant properties existed before they awoke. Here, then, are two faculties,—*logical abstraction* and *substantial reason;* the one the organ of general conceptions, or general names, the other the higher apprehender of eternal realities; the one gradually rising towards the universal, the other descending from above to meet it. Now, as the former in proportion to our increase of reflection perpetually swells to nearer and nearer approximation to the latter, general conceptions becoming more and more fitted to represent eternal reason, it is natural that Plato should regard them as a kind of *ideæ umbratiles*, shadowy assimilations of those everlasting Ideas which form the property of the pure reason when wholly emancipated from sensual confinements; nor are we to wonder that innumerable critics of Plato, mistaking the true purport of his philosophy of the reason, should have estimated him by modern standards, and, because they found little acknowledgment of any faculty for apprehending the absolute in our ordinary treatises, but abundance concerning the faculty of abstracting and generalizing, should have conceived *this alone* intended in the realism of Plato, and thus exulted in detecting in the teacher of ages the preposterous absurdity that the conceptions formed by abstraction had themselves as abstractions a distinct external existence. Yet I can scarcely point to a single one among the slighting and cursory notices of the realism of Plato, contained in the works of the Scottish school, in which this imputed absurdity is not ascribed to the founder of the ideal philosophy.

as some modern critics of Plato have imagined.

They are not merely archetypal conceptions in the Divine Mind, as Plutarch and others have supposed.

An opposite error—even more manifestly contradicted by the writings of Plato—has often been advanced for the purpose of vindicating the philosopher's reputation from the charge of supposed extravagancies. I allude to the attempt which Plutarch,[17] and others in various ages, have made to demonstrate that the "Ideas" of Plato were not meant as distinct realities at all, but simply as models conceived in the mind of God, in the same manner as models are imagined in the mind of man. The operation of the Deity is thus *conformable to Ideas*, in being the shadowing in the world of sense of his own conceptions of order. This carries with it the attraction of simplicity; but it is utterly inconsistent with the assertions of Plato, which everywhere, and in every form, distinguish between the reality of eternal forms and the mere conceptions of a mind. Holding that the "ideas" are intimately incorporated in creation, being its very life and substance, Plato could not, without identifying the Deity with his work, regard them as in any sense a portion of the divine nature itself. These "forms" or eternal laws of things are above us, but they are below God; and, though they point to us the character of that Supreme Essence of Essences, they are not to be worshipped as Him. God is not the aggregate of laws, nor are those laws only existent in His Intellect, (for then where were "creation"?) but He is the Cause, and Sustainer, and Substance of Laws. The theory which would represent the Ideas of Plato as simply

[17] [This view was adopted by some of the later Platonists. See the next Lecture, note (1.) It is unjustly attributed to Plutarch, whose account of the ideas in his *Platonic Questions* (p. 1001) is derived from good sources, and differs entirely from the superficial statement of the Pseudo-Plutarch in the *Placita Philosophorum*, (lib. i. c. 3.) It is to this latter, doubtless, that Prof. Butler refers. ED.]

divine conceptions of order would altogether misconceive the spirit of his views regarding the connection of God and the universe. In Plato's view, the *true* universe was *itself ideal*, an aggregate of ordered laws accidentally, not essentially, embodied in matter; and consequently the version of his philosophy which I am opposing would imply in strict consistency that, according to Plato, the *whole reality* of the universe was merely the mental reality of *a conception* in the Divine Intelligence. The error of these representations is irresistibly established by the authority of *Aristotle*, who, through the whole of his detailed examination of the Platonic Theory, never once regards the Ideas as being other than true and real and distinct existences.

The Theory of Ideas, as a solution, or rather a systematic statement, of the intercourse between reason and reality, requires, as I apprehend, a distinct discussion of three separate points,—the relation of Ideas to God, of Ideas to the universe, and of Ideas to man: it being evident that unless these three connections are granted the theory is inadequate. But this subject is too extensive for the present occasion; and I shall therefore devote the remainder of our time to a very necessary point, — the peculiar *phraseology* of the Ideal Theory.

Phraseology of the Ideal Theory; εἶδος and ἰδέα, not distinguishable.

It has been thought by some critics that Plato insinuates a distinction between the εἶδος and the ἰδέα; the εἶδος being the mental apprehension, and the ἰδέα its counterpart in nature; εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς being equivalent to ἀρετὴ καθόλου, —κατ' εἴδη σκοπεῖν to κατὰ γένος σκοπεῖν. But, though this distinction may appear sometimes maintained, it assuredly cannot be verified by larger examinations;[18]

[18] [The word ἰδέα, in its strictly Platonic or transcendental sense, as distinguished from the merely popular or logical meanings, "form,"

and in the writings of Aristotle on the ideal controversy we may observe in a single page the phrases used indiscriminately. This seems at first sight an unhappy instance of verbal confusion; but it was probably the result of deeper design in the original construction of this celebrated phraseology. We shall hereafter see how the theory of the *connection* of the idea *external* to man with the idea *internal* of the reason purported to illustrate the absolute certainty of the convictions of scientific intelligence; and I have no doubt that it was the object of Plato to bring these antithetical essences as nearly as possible into the position of mutual absorption and identity, without wholly doing so. Now, for

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"kind," "genus," which are common to Plato and other writers, occurs but in four or five dialogues. Its appearance is the signal of the completion of the ideal theory in the mind of its author; and the dialogues in which it is found are accordingly reckoned among his maturer productions, (Brandis, *Handb.* ii. p. 241.) They are the *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Phædo*, *Republic*, and *Timæus*. Passages may be quoted from one or two others in which the word *may*, but never (so far as I know) in which it *must*, bear this signification. Etymologically ἰδέα is but another form of εἶδος, and Plato as well as Aristotle uses the latter word in meanings parallel to all the senses of ἰδέα, including the highest. I apprehend, however, that Plato will be found to prefer ἰδέα in those cases in which especial accuracy is required,—as where he may wish to exclude the merely logical sense, or to present the "idea" under its aspect of a παράδειγμα, or *pattern*. See *Rep.* x. 596, B, where this sense is brought out. Εἶδος had been used just before, where the sense of "genus" is uppermost. So Aristotle, though in his critique on Plato he uses εἶδος and ἰδέα interchangeably, preferred to entitle his monography on the subject (now lost) περὶ Ἰδεῶν. For a like reason he never uses the word ἰδέα in developing the theory of εἴδη which forms so important an integral part of his own metaphysical system. And Aristotle's commentators evince a still more decided preference for ἰδέα, as the distinguishing characteristic of Platonism. These *nuances* are not without interest to the accurate student: I have therefore thought it worth while to qualify the generally true observations in the text, though at the risk of appearing enamoured of a distinction without a difference. ED.]

this purpose, the very *indifference of the names* would be one of the most obvious means of producing the impression required. When he uses the expression *εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*, however, he seems invariably to intend the Divine Idea itself, resident in the Divine Reason, not indeed as conception in man, but with a distinct individual existence.

Phrases denoting the connection between the Idea and the Phenomenon.

The usual phrases by which Plato endeavours to intimate the *connection* between the ideas and sensible phenomena are such as these:—*παρουσία*, *κοινωνία*,[19] *μέθεξις* (presence, communication, participation) of ideas. Sometimes he affirms that things in this world are *ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἐκεῖ*,[20] and that the phenomenon of sense is *τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ ὄν*, (something such as is the real.) Of all terms expressive of the original idea, none is more constantly used than *παράδειγμα*, an exemplar, to which corresponds *εἰκών*, a copy,[21] and no relation between the real and sensible more ordinarily attributed than that of *similarity*. The phrase which Aristotle has usually employed—*μορφὴ* or *form*—occurs more than once in the genuine writings of Plato.[22] It would likewise appear that in the ideal world itself he conceived that there were distinctions of rank and precedence; for, while to the ideas in general an eternity and incorruptibility is uniformly ascribed, he also speaks of certain *γεννητὰ παραδείγματα*,[23] which shared in some measure in the temporal and inferior character of the sensible world itself. These occasional inconsistencies (for such

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[19] [*Κοινωνία* is rather said of the relations of ideas to each other than of their relation to sensibles. See *Sophist.* 257, A:—*ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἡ τῶν γενῶν φύσις.* But in one passage of the *Phædo*, 100, D, we read, *ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία. μέθεξις* is used *passim*. ED.]

[20] [*Phædrus*, 250, A. ED.]

[21] [*εἰκὼν* and *παράδειγμα* occur *Tim.* p. 29, B. The latter *passim*. ED.]

[22] [*Phædo*, 104, D. ED.]

[23] [*Timæus*, 28, B. ED.]

they certainly seem) break the symmetry and precision of the theory: but we feel them to be only occasional; and if we were in possession of the oral discourses and traditionary doctrines of Plato, probably even these minor discrepancies would be resolved into more general formulas explanatory and even confirmatory of the main theory itself. Of the real world which is intercepted, and yet suggested, by the sensible, such phrases as these are customary, and are familiar to every reader of Plato: it is *τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν οὐκ ἔχον*,[24]—it is *τὸ ὄντως ὄν*,—it is *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν*,—*ὡσαύτως ἔχον*,—*τὸ ἀίδιον*; and, in reference to the special faculties by which it is apprehended, it is *νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτόν, μετὰ νοῦ καταφανές, τὸ νοητὸν* and *τὸ γνωστόν*, while *οὐσία* or essence is met by *ἀλήθεια* or truth, and *γένεσις* or generation in time by *πίστις* or faith.[25] On the other hand, the fleeting world of sense is characterized as *τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε*,—as *γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον*,—as *ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς γιγνόμενον*; and, in relation to the mental faculties that perceive it,—as *δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου περιληπτόν*,[26] —as *δοξαστόν*,—as *αἰσθητόν*. Many other forms of expression similar to these are scattered through the Platonic expositions; but the general purport of them all is the same,—to contrast the *seen and temporary* with the *known and eternal.*

Plato's popular expositions of the doctrine of Ideas.

It would, perhaps, have been well for the perspicuity, though scarcely for the popularity, of the Platonic philosophy, if its founder had always restricted himself to phrases such as these, distinct in their purport, and illumined by mutual contrast. But this is, indeed, far from being the case. The richest effusions of lyric poetry have never surpassed the profusion of imaginative decoration with which Plato

[24] [*Timæus*, 27, D. For the remaining phrases, see *Republic*, esp. vi. and vii. *passim*. ED.]

[25] [*Timæus*, 29, C. ED.]

[26] [*Timæus*, 28, A. ED.]

delights to adorn these cold and feelingless forms of the pure reason. It would seem as if, convinced that the imagination and senses were to cease to be ours beyond the grave, he was determined to tax them in this life to the utmost for the adornings of the philosophy of the eternal world. To the conception of Plato this life was itself a kind of perpetual allegory, an image in the language of fancy of truths infinitely beyond it; and his discourses are thus a picture, in the spirit of the Picture that evermore surrounded him. But in the midst of all this lavish ornament, and these constant appeals to the lovely scenery of sense, it is remarkable how little he suffered the seductions of sense to affect the substance of his teaching. Though there never were *discourses* more beautifully imaginative, there never was *philosopher* who more steadily discountenanced the subjection for an instant of moral or metaphysical truth to the perilous despotism of sense in any of its forms; and they are grievously mistaken who (judging from some misunderstood phrases) habitually endeavour to justify the refined immoralities and false sensibility of so much of our popular literature by reference to the teaching or opinions of Plato. Nothing can impress more strongly the truth of this superiority than the well-known opinion of the most poetical of philosophic expositors with regard to the exclusion of poetry in its usual forms from his ideal republic; and even when he speaks, in the course of argument or illustration, of that exquisite art which possesses so mysterious a control over the affections, and which forms, as it were, the link between the worlds of external sensation and inward emotion,—the art of *Music*, —it is with little respect for its pleasurable or exalting influences, (except as a useful practical fact,) and altogether with regard to any powers it may possess of suggesting by its sensible harmonies the harmony of that world of order where its charms are absent and forgotten.

Conclusion. If I am not mistaken in the views which I have this day presented of the scope of the ideal theory of Plato, you will now, I trust, have perceived in it a mighty substance of imperishable truth. I am not prepared to defend, I shall have at our next meeting to criticize, many of its details; but many fallacies should indeed be accumulated around it to obscure to any candid mind the dignity and symmetry of the structure itself. It may here and there betray feeble and unsightly additions; but for the most part they detach without much difficulty from the body of the edifice: it may seem to impatient pursuers of unadorned truth too profusely overlaid with flowers; but remove the flowers, and the pillars are disclosed unshaken. As an effort to exhibit the eternal existence of the laws which the reason apprehends in the universe,—their reality, independence, and truth,—the theory of Plato is noble in its aspirations, and (as I believe) unimpeachable in the justness of its ultimate object; though, as we shall see at our next meeting, in the details there may be difficulties into which he (and in him human nature itself represented) could, and can, scarcely expect ever thoroughly to penetrate.

LECTURE IX.

THE IDEAL THEORY, (*continued.*)

GENTLEMEN :—

Platonic Theory of Ideas, continued.

I ENDEAVOURED in the last Lecture to convey a general idea of what I conceive to be the substance of the Platonic theory of Ideas when, disembarrassed of mythological and imaginative decorations, it is exposed to the scrutiny of reason. I attempted to show you that this theory purports to affirm that there is in every sensible phenomenon a *rational* element, discernible by the intellect alone; which rational element determines the entire sensible apparition, and may therefore be regarded as standing to it in the relation of *a cause and reason*, or even, with some plausibility, may be considered its *model or exemplar:* that this rational element, being from its nature eternal, must be considered as antecedent to the sensible image, as independent of it, and therefore as belonging to a region of being essentially different from the sensible; while again, being united to the sensible world so as to form its true basis and reality, it cannot merely be regarded as a conception in the intelligence of the great Architect of the world, but as truly *existing*, distinctly from him, yet bound to him in the strictest bonds of coeternal existence. When in this manner you have gained a view of the *Ideas* of Plato, you at once perceive that they are no other than those *eternal Laws and Reasons of things* which even the most cursory examination cannot (I should suppose) deny to be a necessary element in every metaphysical

The Ideas are the eternal Laws and Reasons of things.

estimate of the universe,—and which, equally applying to every existence whatever, to the least as to the loftiest, to the artificial as to the natural, are justly represented in those "Ideas" which, we have already seen, are in the theory of Plato ascribed to every thing that has actual being. This UNIVERSALITY of the ideal reasons—which, from an imperfect apprehension of metaphysical truth, many of the later Platonists denied[1]—Plato understood the scope of his own reasoning too well not constantly to enforce. Thus, in a remarkable passage near the beginning of the *Parmenides*, "Socrates," says Parmenides,[2] (who, now the aged patriarch of the philosophical world, is introduced conversing with Socrates, just commencing his career of inquiry,)—"Socrates, how admirable is your earnestness in the pursuit of speculation! But tell me, have you indeed distinguished, as you say, on the one side these ideas themselves, on the other their participant objects (*τὰ μετέχοντα*)? And does similitude itself (*αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης*) seem to you to be really any thing beyond that similitude which we possess,—and in like manner unity, and multiplicity, and the rest, which you have heard from Zeno? Certainly, (replied Socrates.) And probably (said Parmenides) it is so with the idea in itself (*εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ*) of the just, the fair, the good, and such like? Assuredly. What? an idea of man apart from us and all

Erroneous restriction of the ideal Theory by the later Platonists,

which is anticipated and refuted in the Parmenides.

[1] [As Alcinous, *de Plat. Doym.* c. 9:—"Few of Plato's followers will admit that there are ideas of artificial productions, such as a harp or a shield; or of things which disturb the order of nature, as fever or cholera; or of separate individuals, as Socrates and Plato: they also deny ideas to vile and paltry objects, such as filth or chaff; and even to mere relations, as those of 'greater' and 'higher.' For they contend that the ideas are the eternal and perfect conceptions of the Divine Mind." The original may be found in Stallbaum's *Parmenides*, p. 44. ED.]

[2] [Plat. *Parm.* p. 130, B. ED.]

such as we are,—an independent idea of man, or fire, or water? In truth, replied Socrates, I have often hesitated, Parmenides, about these; whether we ought to speak of them just as of the others, or differently. And does your doubt extend, Socrates, to things apparently ridiculous, as hair, mud, filth, and every thing else that is worthless and vile?—do you hesitate whether we ought to pronounce that of each of *these* also there is an idea apart, distinguishable from what we handle? By no means, said Socrates. These are nothing more than just what we see them: to imagine an idea of these would be quite extravagant. Yet, I admit, it has often perplexed me whether the same thing does not take place with respect to *every* actual existence: but, after standing for a while to this, I have fled the thought, for fear of falling into an unfathomable abyss of absurdities; and, returning to those particulars for which we have admitted that ideas do exist, I devote myself wholly to contemplating *them*. Ah, Socrates, replied Parmenides, you are yet young, and philosophy has not yet got possession of you, as I think she will one day do,—when you will have learned to find *nothing truly despicable in any of these things*. But now your youth inclines you to regard the opinions of men." It is, indeed, quite manifest that the reasoning on which Plato built his theory applies with equal force to *every* positive being whatever. In short, if I may venture to present the essence of the theory in a yet simpler form, the whole conceivable universe is metaphysically divisible into Facts and Reasons, the objects of experience and the objects of intellect; with—as equally the ultimate point of both—that Supreme Essence who is at once the greatest of facts and the most perfect of reasons, holding in Himself the solution of His own existence. Now, this statement, though not perhaps adequate to Plato's entire meaning, yet marks with a line of light the distributions of his whole philo-

sophical picture,—presenting at once the essentially successive nature of the actual, the eternity of the rational, the equal subordination of every positive existence to its own special correlative in the sphere of reason, the complete generical distinctness of the two, yet the participation of the sensible in the intelligible through every part of its being, as qualified, differenced, and determined by it. Thus the object of Plato was to trace all that is offered by the senses throughout this wondrous world, down to its root in a deeper and invisible world, and to pronounce that the notion of *perfect* science is a delusion when it does not penetrate to this profounder reality. And I have already professed my own entire coincidence with the general principles of such a philosophy, and expressed, in language which they alone who depend on the vulgar representations of Platonism will regard as exaggerated, my admiration of the first full and systematic teacher of such views, as standing almost alone among the uninspired instructors of man.

But, while the general spirit of the Platonic theory is thus true and thus admirable, I do not affirm that we must not make occasional abatements in considering its details. Unquestionably, extrinsic influences so far affected the mind of Plato as to lead him to encumber his system with additions altogether superfluous and often deforming. These will offer themselves to you naturally in the sequel.

The Ideal Theory admits of being considered in a threefold aspect.

I stated, at the last Lecture, that it would be necessary to consider the Ideal Theory of Plato in three aspects,—the relation of ideas to the reason of man, to the sensible universe, and to the Supreme Being. Central between these three terms, ideas were supposed to embody the substance of truth, and to present it in different modes of communication to them all. I must demand your attention in this matter: you can scarcely expect that a sub-

ject so profound can be exhibited in a very popular form. I will, however, disembarrass it of every avoidable perplexity, and systematize the whole.

I. The relation of ideas to the human reason.

I. First, then, as to the relation of ideas to the human reason. It is certain that the human reason possesses an assured conviction with regard to the absolute truth of that great metaphysical law of the universe, that all which exists has beneath it a foundation in the reason of things, and exists only in virtue of that relation to the intellectual system of Being. Such a reason of existence is itself a *mental* essence, distinct indeed from the human mind which apprehends it, yet, as being mental, unquestionably of the same nature. The human intelligence knows that *there is* the ideal substratum, knows that it must be different for every different kind of perceived objects, yet cannot pretend to apprehend it with the plenitude of perfect vision. But, though this fulness of direct apprehension belongs to a better—as Plato believed, to a simply *incorporeal*—state,[3] there is, as I have shown, a contact sufficiently intimate between the soul of man and the ideal reason, to convince that soul of the reality of its possession; to assure it that it holds the treasure in its grasp, though it cannot pronounce its weight, or form, or value. If any one questions whether this is conceivable, he may be referred to the analogous argument for a Deity,—where from the irresistible law of causality and intelligent ordination the *existence* is demonstrated of a Being whose *mode* of existence our minds are totally inadequate to comprehend. A connection, then, is admissible between the human reason and the ideal forms, which, though manifestly in this state partial and imperfect, yet evinces

The reasons of phenomena are mental essences.

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[3] [*Phædo*, 66. D:—*εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἰσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον* (*τοῦ σώματος*) *καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, κ. τ. λ.* ED.]

a substantial homogeneity between the two. And thus on the one hand ideas are said to reside in the universal mind, and on the other the mind itself is designated as an idea,[4]—forms of phrase that attest the conviction of a substantial sameness in the nature of both. I need not add how such views were fortified in the ancient philosophy by the belief, which in former Lectures I showed to be nearly universal, of the essential divinity of the rational spirit in man. To this community of nature between the soul and its objects belongs that very celebrated portion of the doctrine of Plato, the *love* of ideal existence, which has since held so prominent a position in the romantic and fictitious literature, no less than in the theological speculations, of most countries. The theory of the Platonic love belongs more properly to another—the ethical—department of the present investigation; but its immediate relation to the argument before us requires a brief notice of its bearing here. Holding, as we have seen, an affinity between reason in man and the forms of reason in the universe, Plato found a strong confirmation of this doctrine in the process which in minds at all raised beyond a merely sensible existence he perceived to take place in the contemplation of objects characterized by beauty, order, and

The Platonic Eros.

[4] [*Theæt.* 184, D:—*εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει.* This, however, is one of the numerous passages in which *ἰδέα* is to be taken in a popular sense, as = *φύσις* v. t. q. A passage in the *Phædo* (103, E. fol.) is evidently incompatible with the assertion that Plato regarded the soul as an "idea." The whole argument—a very subtle one—in favour of the soul's immortality loses its force on this supposition. The error is Ritter's, and Brandis seems to countenance it, (*Handb.* ii. p. 231, *anm.*) Plato's real opinion is adumbrated in the figurative passage of the *Republic*, which sets forth the relation of the Soul to the Ideas as that of the *ἡλιοειδὲς* to the *ἥλιος*, the *sunlike* to the sun, (p. 508, fol.) The ideas are rational, the reason ideal in its nature; but neither are the ideas Reason, nor is the Reason an idea. It will be seen that the general tenor of the remarks in the text is not affected by this correction. ED.]

proportion. The mind, in such cases, instinctively refers the object to a standard of higher perfection which the object itself suggests. Pronouncing the visible phenomenon excellent in proportion as it approaches this higher standard, it yet is forced to avow that nothing earthly realizes it. This, however, is certain:—that even the earthly object is, by virtue of its partial exhibition of perfection, capable of awakening a tendency to itself varying in intensity according to the measure of the absolute beauty it manifests; and Plato, unquestionably taking advantage often of very ambiguous instances, attributed the admiration excited to the innate affection of the eternal spirit of man for that kindred exemplar of beauty which the object shadowed forth on the cloudy screen of the sensible world. Into the consequences of this theory (which you will find largely exhibited in the *Symposium* and *Phædrus*) I am not now about to enter, my object at present being merely to adduce it as an illustration of the intimate affinity which Plato maintained to exist between the soul and the intelligible essences. For this doctrine and the former, taken together, exhibit *both* regions of the soul—the intellect and the emotions—as equally attracted by congeniality of nature to the ideal world. It is easy to exemplify the two tendencies in a single instance. An act of virtue receives its name from its embodying the eternal "idea" of virtue in a transient shape, which "idea" the reason apprehends directly as its own appropriate object,—as the law of the intelligible world which forms the basis, modifies the quality, and fixes the whole character, of the act thus wrought out in the world of time and sense. At the same time, the soul, urged by this observed instance, rises from admiration of the fact to admiration of the law, and, feeling that even in the noblest exhibition of that law by man the reason finds something to desire, yearns for that blissful country of the soul where alone absolute perfection exists, and

where the essence, whatever it be, (for something it surely is,) of unclouded virtue shall be disclosed to the intellectual eye,—where, as it were, virtue and the soul shall unveil to each other, and one shall be seen, and the other shall see, both alike disenshrouded of the impeding embarrassments of their earthly and material organisms.

Use, according to Plato, of the faculty of Abstraction.

In the processes just mentioned, it is evident, as I stated in the last Lecture, that Plato necessarily regarded the faculty of abstraction as the threshold of the temple of philosophic contemplation; but it is also evident (contrary to the representations of so many of the modern censurers of the philosopher) that he was far from regarding it as insuring (except in a very subordinate sense) a position within the temple itself. The "Ideas" of Plato, those ideas to which he assigned a distinct existence in a distinct world, I must again repeat, were *not* the abstract ideas of the modern philosophy. They were designated by the same name, the "justice," of which experience instructs us to speak as an abstraction from observed facts, and the "just in itself," which forms its exemplar in the sphere of reason; because from the deficiency of our present faculties we are unable to rise above the abstraction, and therefore give to the higher essence, whose existence alone we can be properly said to know directly, the name of that which is most worthy to represent it. But, while the common name is thus from necessity assigned to both, Plato is careful to distinguish them in nature; and I know no single passage in his writings in which an abstract idea is said to have an existence outside the mind that conceives it. The faculty of abstraction is unquestionably represented as requisite in order to bring the reason into a position to hold such imperfect communion as it can in this embodied state attain with the Eternal Ideas; but the best conceptions it can form are still represented, however they may re-

fine the products of sensible experience, to be yet deficient in that *independent reality* which forms the great prerogative of the ideas to which they struggle. It seems to me that in such passages as the following from the *Philebus*[5] the two are not improbably distinguished from each other. "Whatever faculty we possess stable, and pure, and true, and, as we say, *sincere*, belongs to things which remain unmixed and forever immutable; or, next to them, to those which *are most kindred* (συγγενῆ) *to them*." When Plato reflected on the objective reality of the universal and necessary truths which the reason discerns to be the governing-principles of the universe, he might pronounce that in the apperception of them the reason held a *direct* communion with ideas, manifestly by a faculty altogether distinct from abstraction; when by the exercise of abstraction he obtained a general name, or conception, of the geometrical figure, the moral virtue, the physical quality, and along with this had, by the independent exercise of reason, pronounced that these characters of things thus common to many must have their ultimate reason, their model, their consummation, in the farther and invisible system, he might affirm that by this act of the reason he had cast a bridge across the abyss that divides the sensible and intelligible, while by the previous act of abstraction he had brought the sensible objects to the utmost verge of their own sensible territory. But I do not believe that Plato ever held that the abstraction itself could bridge the abyss, or transfer the seen to the unseen, the temporal to the eternal.

But what relation, then, *had* the generalizing-process to the apperception of ideas? This. The world of sense pictures the world of reason. Now, the sensible world is made up of a vast complication of qualities and of laws, which in the world of reason are presented in distinctness

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[5] [P. 59, c. ED.]

and simplicity. To represent this latter scene, therefore, the philosopher must study to disentangle complexity and separate accidental concomitants. To do this is to abstract. But the necessity also arose (in Plato's estimate) from the perversity and hostility of the sensible subject-matter itself; which, debasing the ideal perfection in every instance, obliged the aspirant after the better world to abstract these unhappy accompaniments in order to obtain that which truly found its model in the sphere of ideas. In this relation of the abstract to the eternal ideas, you will find sufficient reason for Plato's constant admiration of the abstractive habit, and his reverence for *language*, which is its creature. But that he did not urge its claims beyond the bounds I have assigned seems eminently manifest from this consideration. The mathematical sciences are the palmary instance of the abstractive faculty,—and to Plato the favourite one. Yet we know from Aristotle that the *μαθήματα* were *τὰ μεταξὺ λεγόμενα*, only *intermediaries* between sense and reason,—having gained even this advance from causes not now worth investigating; and we know that Plato himself considered them the mere *preliminaries* to the philosophy of essences.[6]

Plato's view of the intermediate character of mathematical truth.

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[6] [Arist. *Metaph.* i. 6 :—*ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φησι μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πολλ' ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἓν αὐτὸ ἕκαστον μόνον.* Plato himself, as stated in the text, regarded the study of mathematics as a preparation for speculative philosophy, and distinguished the mathematical faculty (*διάνοια*) from the higher speculative intelligence, (*νοῦς,*) as well as from the mere notion or opinion founded on sense, (*δόξα.*) *Republ.* vi. 511, B. The conceptions which the mathematician takes for granted as the basis of his reasoning, (*ὑποθέσεις,*) such as space, number, &c., are among those which the philosopher seeks to account for. Compare a remarkable passage in *Euthyd.* 290, B: *—οἱ δ' αὖ γεώμετραι . . . ἅτε χρῆσθαι . . . οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλὰ θηρεῦσαι μόνον, παραδιδόασι δήπου τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρῆσθαι αὐτῶν τοῖς εὑρήμασιν.* ED.]

Ideas and the "pure reason" (the phrase is Plato's own, *λόγος εἰλικρινὴς* or *καθαρός*,[7] though since appropriated) being thus essentially kindred although unhappily separated, knowledge being the conjoint result of both, and demanding both, it was not unnatural that Plato should have united them in a common eternity of nature. He usually argues the essential eternity of the soul from its faculty of self-activity;[8] but, from various hints and trains of thought, I cannot but think that the view I have stated strongly influenced his mind. The rational element in the human soul, that which addresses itself to the absolute, the necessary, the essentially true, is inherently eternal, because even in its incorporate state not truly dwelling in time or space, to whose laws or conditions it is in no sense amenable. It is not to wait for an hereafter; it *now* lives in eternity. Its spiritual vehicle, the portion of the mind which, operating in *time*, ministers to the imagination, (and thence ultimately to the senses,) by comparing or abstracting, must vanish with the dissolution of the machinery of sense; but it only vanishes to leave the purely intellectual essence where it found it, in its own intellectual home. Such reasoning as this (which I suspect to have passed through the mind of Plato) would of course establish—if the phrase be not itself inaccurate—the *anterior* eternity of the soul. This doctrine of pre-existences, however, Plato endeavoured to demonstrate by a very fallacious

The Platonic doctrine of pre-existence.

[7] [Νοῦς, not Λόγος, is commonly found in this combination. I remember no instance of "*λόγος καθαρὸς*" or "*εἰλικρινής*." The word *νοῦς* answers well enough to the German "Vernunft," but not so well to our "Reason," of which *λόγος* is the natural correspondent. Milton's distinction of Reason Discursive and Reason Intuitive represents fairly the difference between the two modes of mental action. Accordingly, in ascending to first principles the philosopher is said to employ *νοῦς μετὰ λόγου*, or *λογισμοῦ*. ED.]

[8] [Πᾶσα *ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον . . . μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν . . . οὔποτε λήγει κινούμενον. Phædr.* 245, c. ED.]

experiment; which purported to evince that all discovery, or even instruction, in abstract truth, was but the recollection of former knowledge; as if it were at all easier to conceive the mystery of remembrance than the mystery of successive suggestions, or the one were a whit more antecedently probable than the other.* The intellectual essence, then, Plato considered coeternal with those *ideas* which are its sole appropriate aliment; that which men call life was but a dark and transitory imprisonment, and time an episode in eternity. It dwelt of old in its own region; it sighs for it past, it longs for it to come; but, emancipated from the burden of flesh, it shall feel as one who awakes from a dream, discovering at length that, though surrounded by visionary forms, it never changed its real place through the entire; it reposes where it reposed before the vision began!†

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* This singular passage (in the *Meno*) I suspect to have been a merely popular illustration of a doctrine which Plato—or Socrates, if it was truly his—built upon a deeper basis.

† To qualify this statement, it must, however, be noted that in various parts of his writings Plato very distinctly lays down the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment; which it certainly is not easy to reconcile with this simply metaphysical conception of the eternity of the rational soul as the main ground of the belief of immortality. In these representations it is exceedingly difficult to detach the mythological dress from the substance of doctrine; but it would appear that, though rejecting the notion of a reintegration of the dissolved bodily integument, Plato held that enough of the conscious mind remained united to its rational element to form a subject for happiness and misery; and, if this were difficult to admit, that by the perpetual transition from body to body it continued to be provided with a corporeal vehicle until such a process of refinement had been effected as, by gradually weaning it from body, at length qualified it for a purely immaterial existence. We here observe the independent originality of the Christian tone of thought, which, while it countenances (as we have seen) some of the nobler views and adopts some of the more forcible expressions of Platonism, altogether denies its theory of the inappropriateness of a connection of *body* and soul in the state of perfect and consummate bliss.

With regard, then, to the connection of the reason and the essential forms, we may pronounce it the spirit of the Platonic theory, first, that a true knowledge or communion of reason with the reality of things is insured by the kindred, or even homogeneous, nature of reason and ideas;[9] secondly, that this intimate connection is testified by the impassioned aspiration of the instructed soul for the perfection to be found only in the ideal world;[10] thirdly, that the great business of the philosophic cultivator of his intelligence is, by the constant exercise of accurate abstraction, to fit the qualities of sense to represent the everlasting models of the sphere of truth and being;[11] fourthly, that we may well conclude the rational nature of man, formed as it is for ideal contemplation, to be *eternal* as ideas themselves;[12] and though the sensible world itself is, by the participation of ideas, as perfect as the dull obduracy of its material subject will permit, yet that to the philosophic soul it can never appear in any other light than as a restriction to the inborn energies of the spirit, suggesting, indeed, the absolutely good and

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[9] [*συγγενὴς οἶσα* [*ἡ ψυχὴ*] *τῷ θείῳ . . . καὶ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι.—Repub.* x. 611, E. Ed.]

[10] [*Phædo*, 68, A. Compare the erotic mythus in the *Phædrus*, p. 249, D, fol., and that in *Sympos.* p. 203. Ed.]

[11] [*Symp.* 211, C:—*ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυεῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τ. καλ. ἐπιτ. ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, ἕστ' ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτήσῃ, ὃ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἐστι καλόν.* Compare also a well-known passage in *Republ.* vii. 523, A–527, D, on the uses of the mathematical sciences as a preparation for philosophy or the science of ideas, (*ἑλκτικὰ πρὸς οὐσίαν.*) Ed.]

[12] [*Phædo*, 80, B:—*τῷ . . . θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχοντι αὐτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχήν.* Ed.]

fair and true, but clouding and concealing the very perfection it suggests.[13]

II. Relation of the Platonic ideas to the sensible universe.

II. We have, next, to define the connection of the Platonic ideas with the sensible universe. And here, as there is much obscurity, and has been much difference of opinion, I think it infinitely the best course to present you with the phraseology of the master himself,—a phraseology which will to the meditative student afford a safer and clearer light than could be supplied in many pages of comment.

The sensible world an imperfect image of ideal perfection.

Plato, as I have before shown, regarded the sensible as an *image* of perfection, whose adequateness to represent the perfect original was impeded by the unyielding nature of the subject on which it was impressed. He saw in the universal system, as all must, the two antagonist terms of good and evil; and his merit was that, in devising his theory of their mutual relations, he pronounced the principle of good naturally and eternally the superior principle; he pronounced the principle of evil to be itself devoid of real personality, and, as far as possible, of reality; and he pronounced that the evil—this dark negation of excellence—did not, and could never, stand in the relation of *effect* to the Almighty Personification of Good:—*Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον.*[14] You will therefore perceive that, whatever modifications it might afterwards have undergone, the original theory

Causes of its imperfection according to Plato.

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[13] [Compare *Phædr.* 249, D, fol., with *Phædo*, 65, A–66, C. *Symp.* 211, B–212, A. ED.]

[14] [*Republ.* ii. p. 379, B. In the sequel yet stronger expressions are used:—"It cannot be true, as the vulgar affirm, that 'God is the author of all things;' . . . all that is good in the world must be traced to him as its cause: evil—which exists in far larger measure than good—we cannot regard as caused by God: we must seek some other origin for it." ED.]

of Plato is absolutely distinct from every form of Manicheism. I need not say that this theory leaves the subject in much mystery: but this *every* theory must do: and the true merit in such a case is, not to explain the inexplicable, but to fix the mystery (which can never be absolutely evaded) *in such a part* of the question as will preserve the Divine characters and prerogatives unimpeached.* The material subject being thus opposed to the formative principle of good, the office of the eternal forms was to qualify and confine it; and hence Plato perpetually designates bare matter as the "*unlimited*," (*τὸ ἄπειρον*,) and the intelligible essence that impresses and controls it, as "*the bound or limit.*"[15] When he attempts to characterize the relation between these laws of perfect excellence and the sensible phenomenon, he speaks of it, as the relation, first, of one to many, (*τὸ ἓν* to *τὰ πολλά*, by which title the sensible world is constantly designated;[16]) and hence, secondly, as of that which is single to that which is internally opposite to itself, (*ἐνάντιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ*,) multiplicity admitting of this reciprocal opposition of parts;[17] and hence again, thirdly, as of that which is

His distinction of limit and the unlimited;

expressed in several different ways.

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* The great practical defect of the system of Plato (as afterwards appeared) was the identification of the material, or corporeal, nature with the nature of evil; which, unhappily, countenanced all the extravagances of the ascetic discipline of the East, and assuredly injured the simplicity of Christian practice in the early ages. But this belongs to future inquiries.

[15] [*Philebus*, p. 23, c:—*τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας.* Ed.]

[16] [Ib. p. 16, c:—*ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἐχόντων.* Ed.]

[17] [Ib. pp. 24, 25; *Tim.* p. 49, c, fol.; *Phædo*, p. 70, d, fol., compared with 103, b, where the contrast between that which *becomes* and that which *is* is clearly brought out:—*τότε μὲν ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐνάντιον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ . . . αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνάντιον ἑαυτῷ ἐνάντιον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο.* Ed.]

simple to that which is confused, (*συγκεχυμένον*;[18]) and, fourthly, as of that which is indivisible to that which is divisible, (*τὸ μεριστόν*;[19]) fifthly, as the unchangeable to the changeable,[20] the sensible being (as we have so often seen) never truly existing, but "becoming;" sixthly, as the Divine (*θεῖον*) to the necessary, (*ἀναγκαῖον*,) a connection very obscure, and by Plato treated briefly and hastily;[21] seventhly, as the absolute to the relative,—the sensible world being thus known by the very peculiar expression, (*τὸ ἕτερον*,) and its existence being constantly described as little more than a *relation* to the real. Hence every actual phenomenon is pronounced (in the *Timæus*) to be a composition of *same*, *different*, and *essence*,[22] (or *οὐσία*;) eighthly, as exemplar to copy,—the sensible being the picture of the invisible in the visible: this expression, though the commonest of all, is manifestly metaphorical; for there can be no proper resemblance between the sensible and ideal. There may indeed be conceived an analogy of elements correlatively connected in each; and to this, doubtless, it was that Plato referred in his *παράδειγμα* and *εἰκών*.[23] Ninthly, as the means for the display of good to the good itself; tenthly, as the object of science, pure and perfect and eternal Being, to the object of opinion, which is declared intermediate between being

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[18] [*Rep.* vii. p. 524, C:—*μέγα μὴν ἡ ὄψις καὶ σμικρον ἑώρα . . . ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι.* ED.]

[19] [*Tim.* p. 35, A, where *ἡ ἀμέριστος καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσα οὐσία* is contrasted with *ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μεριστή.* ED.]

[20] ['Αλλοιούμενον, *κινούμενον*, or *κεκινημένον*; *ἀλλοίωσιν* or *κίνησιν ἐνδεχόμενον*, contrasted with *τὸ ἀκίνητον*, *τὸ ἑστός*, *τὸ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον κ. τ. λ.* These phrases occur *passim*. ED.]

[21] [*Tim.* 68, E:—*δύ' αἰτίας εἰδη, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ δὲ θεῖον.* The passage is illustrated by p. 48, E:—*μεμιγμένη ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη κ. τ. λ.* ED.]

[22] [*ἐκ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἔκ τε οὐσίας.* *Tim.* 37, A. ED.]

[23] [*Tim.* 29, B:—*πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι . . . ὧδε οὖν περί τε εἰκόνος καὶ περὶ τοῦ παραδείγματος αὐτῆς διοριστέον.* Ibid 28, A, 48, E. ED.]

and not-being, even as opinion is intermediate[24] between science and ignorance.* Finally, as comprehending them all, and forming the technical term of the school of Plato, the relation of the intelligible to the sensible was as the original idea to that which *participates* of it, (*τὸ μετέχον.*) I have no time now to try your patience by a separate investigation of all these ways of bringing within the scope of our faculties the relation of the eternal laws of the universal system, themselves substantially true and good, to the sensible or apparitional world of experience. They illustrate, modify, and confirm each other; and from the union of those which I have collected from

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[24] [*Tim.* 28, A; *Symp.* 202, A; *Repub.* 477, A:—*τὸ μὲν παντελ ὡς ὂνπαντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ πάντῃ ἀγνωστον . . . εἰ δὲ δή τι οὕτως ἐχει ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι . . . μεταξὺ ἂν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὖ μηδαμῇ ὄντος. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνῶσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δ' . . . ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι, ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης.* 478, D:—*μεταξὺ ἄρα ἂν εἴη τούτοιν δόξα.* 479, D:—*τὸ δοξαστὸν . . . μεταξύ που κιλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς.* ED.]

* Bare matter, however, abstracted from its forms, Plato scarcely distinguished from *place*, and pronounced the connection to be almost that of entity to absolute non-existence. This was consequent upon his notions of the purely negative nature of evil, and of its coincidence with matter,—the receiver, but the debaser, of the eternal and all-perfect Ideas of God. In its primitive state this dark essence was characterized as *ἀνειδής, ἀμορφος, ἀσχημάτιστος*, and every artifice of language employed to convey the notion of pure negation, without directly asserting it. [*Tim.* p. 52, A:—*ἓν μὲν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ εἶδος ἔχον . . . τοῦτο ὃ δὴ νόησις εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν· τὸ δ' ὁμώνυμον δεύτερον αἰσθητόν, γεννητόν . . . δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως περιληπτόν· τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος ὂν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεί, φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἑδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἅπτὸν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν, πρὸς ὃ δὴ καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες, καί φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά.* These three constituents of created being are presently styled *ὄν τε καὶ χώρα καὶ γένεσις*, and the second, very expressively, *τιθήνη γενέσεως*, the nurse, or, as we should say, receptacle, (or substratum,) of the created or phenomenal world. See by all means Zeller's remarks on the Platonic conception of matter, *Phil. d. Griech.* ii. p. 222, fol. Compare also the following Lecture. ED.]

various portions of the Platonic dialogues, and of others which you may discover there, you will attain as clear a conception as is now possible of the meaning of the author, and, if not much light as to the true nature of the mysterious connection itself of the rational and irrational elements in the structure of the world, yet as much as our present state permits, which Plato himself regarded as at best a knowledge obscure, imperfect, and analogical only.

Difference between the Platonic and Peripatetic theory of the relation of ideal forms to sensible objects.

To this question of the relation of ideas to the sensible belongs the subtle controversy between the Aristotelians and Platonics, as to whether the forms of things were distinct from, or truly embodied in, the phenomena. The founder of the Peripatetic school argues at great length, in his book of metaphysics, against the theory of *exemplar ideas*, pronouncing them purely poetical metaphors,[25] and acknowledging no medium between the First Cause and that sensible world into which he has infused the qualifying forms of things. This metaphysical question has often been discussed in ages which we are now accustomed to regard as the peculiar era of verbal and unprofitable controversy. Into the voluminous writings of these disputants I cannot pretend to have struggled far; but I can, at the first aspect of the question, perceive that the controversy about the distinctness of forms is so far from being the puerile logomachy of dreamers, that it actually and necessarily involves the profoundest and most interesting of all philosophical questions. This will appear in the few words I can now devote to the third point proposed,—the relation of ideas to the supreme intelligence of God.

III. *Relation of*

III. I have often reminded you that the character of Platonism is eminently ethical, and its

[25] [*Metaph.* i. 9, 12:—τὸ δὲ λέγειν παραδείγματα αὐτὰ (τὰ εἴδη) εἶναι, καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν τἆλλα, κενολογεῖν ἐστι καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικάς. ED.]

great object the foundation on a permanent basis of the great principles of the moral law. Now, when the great philosopher contemplated the miserable destitution of his countrymen in all that regards a genuine sense of natural religion, he at once ascribed it to the necessary influence of polytheism, which, by erecting a multitude of divine standards of duty, all differing from each other, and many of them mutually contradictory, inevitably destroyed the connection between religious belief and ethical conviction. This he has very fully explained in the dialogue entitled *Euthyphron*,—which assuredly, if it was really a report of the Socratic conversation, may leave us little surprised at the fate of Socrates. But the reasoning of this precious fragment extends much further than to confute the extravagances of the Olympian theology: its spirit, and some of its express details, are equally directed against a dogma which has reigned far more extensively than the pagan multitude of gods ever spread their authority,—the doctrine, namely, that the moral qualities of actions are themselves dependent on the arbitrary constitution of a Supreme Governor. Plato saw that, even though the unity of God were universally received, the reception of this belief would be practically as injurious as the influence of absolute Atheism. Accordingly, his whole philosophy of ideas as related to God is a structure raised to fortify the elementary principles of the eternal law of right against the irruptions of this degrading tenet. *Ideas to the Divine Nature.*

To evince this, observe that we may be able legitimately to pronounce that a certain metaphysical connection does *not* exist between two terms, even though we are wholly unable to apprehend what their true link of connection is, and though, therefore, if we speak of it at all, we can do so only by the aid of analogies derived from experience. And such analogies may be logically

received, as long as it is understood that they are presented for no more than they are worth; and less to pronounce a positive principle in the ideal system of the universe, than to occupy a place where intrusive errors might enter, until such time as we may be enabled to apprehend the truth in its direct, explicit purity. Remembering this, you are now to remark that Plato accounted for the existence of things, by affirming that a nature beyond all natures *called the universe into being*, (whether from eternity or not, we are not now discussing;) that in so doing this Being held in view as the sole end of his acts absolute and unclouded goodness,[26] to be exhibited in the language of sensible objects; and that, the nature of goodness being coeternal with himself, not caused by him, nor dependent on him, but nevertheless the voluntary rule of his acts, he referred, in all which he did, to these eternal relations of things, and made his work—as far as the mysteriously opposing principle would allow—the copy of their perfection. That is, Divine goodness was the final cause, Divine energy the efficient cause, and the eternal laws of right —the "*ideas*" of holiness and proportion and beauty—the formal cause, of the world. The relation of Deity to the Ideal Models is, then, a most important and valuable element in the Platonic metaphysics, and stands manifestly opposed, in its whole spirit and consequences, to the theory which, by merging the Form in the Phenomenon, denies it *separate existence* or *antecedent reality*, and tends to exhibit it as a mere effect of Divine causation. Plato has, indeed, with his usual metaphysical accuracy, seen that the Eternal Laws of Right are in some mysterious bond (altogether beyond our conception) entwined with the Divine nature, and he accordingly represents

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[26] [*Timæus*, p. 29, B:—ἀγαθὸς ἦν (ὁ θεός) . . . πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. 28, C:—πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον ἔβλεπεν. ED.]

them as contained by him in his own Divine reason; but, nevertheless, he maintains their substantial distinctness from the personal activity or volition of God, and their relation to him, not in the bond of cause and effect, but—to express eternal truths by sensible analogies—in that of model or exemplar. They are coexistent, they may even be pronounced coincident; but they are not consequential, resultant, inferior; nor in the order of *reason* (for of the order of *succession* we speak not in eternal things) are they to be, with the Aristotelian, declared non-existent except in the phenomenal embodiment,—a theory which would render it impossible to characterize any act as right, any relation as proportionate, any form as beautiful, for any reason beyond its bare existence, or to affirm that the Divine Will acts according to justice upon any ground distinct from that on which we affirm that he acts at all. If the Deity operates in any sense he operates rightly; if he operates rightly he operates according to a rule; and, if he operates according to a rule, that rule is logically antecedent to the operation which practically exhibits it. God, then, is related to the eternal ideas as an architect is related to the model by which he labours.

Gentlemen, we have now surveyed the chief elements of the Metaphysical Principles of Plato; and, if I have at all rendered this lofty philosophy more familiar to your thoughts in the Lectures which I am now bringing to a close, I shall at least have done what I candidly confess I know scarcely where to point to you the means of otherwise effecting. The popular treatises are so inaccurate, the accurate treatises so tedious and obscure, that it may, I fear, be pronounced that our language does not contain a satisfactory exposition of the genuine philosophy of Plato. I will hope that I have awakened the curiosity of some of my hearers to become more tho-

roughly acquainted with the illustrious original, and may thus, perhaps, have been the means of exciting that spirit of inquiry which yet may gift our language with this great desideratum.

The physical and ethical systems of Plato still remain. The next term I may hope to investigate these.

THIRD SERIES.

LECTURE I.

ON THE PHYSICS OF PLATO—THE TIMÆUS.

GENTLEMEN:—

I RESUME the consideration of the Platonic Philosophy with which we were engaged when last I addressed you. We had at that time, as you may remember, traversed one large district of this sublime and impressive doctrine,—a district too which holds the key of all the rest, and which rightly to survey is to have caught those features that determine the expression of the whole. Undaunted by its reported terrors, we ventured to scale that Ideal World of whose obscure and cloudy elevation so much has been sarcastically said and written; and, though I cannot pretend to be the hierophant of all its mysteries, I trust you will at least have agreed with me that the theory, detached from some brilliant decorations of fancy, possesses a very discernible foundation in truth. Truth, both intellectual and moral, was beset by enemies in the days of Plato, exactly correspondent to those with whom you are all familiar in the last and current century,—enemies who endeavoured by the same arguments, urged with the same audacity, to impugn its evidences and question its very existence; and the Theory of Ideas was the first of those mighty appeals to the higher gifts and prerogatives of the human mind by which, under the guidance of the great lights of our race, such assaults have ever been resisted. When considering the foundations of the theory, I directed you principally to its *speculative* value, as an answer to the logical difficulties concerning the reality of our knowledge; but I took care to admonish you that with Plato

all things are subservient to a moral purpose. It is true that Platonism is a contemplative philosophy,—pervadingly, perhaps too pervadingly so,—but its contemplativeness is altogether directed to a practical purpose: it is an intuition of truth, but of truth as identified with goodness. It rejoices to behold the reality of things fixed on a rock against which all the waves of skeptical opinion beat in vain; but it never forgets to insist that it is the supreme Ἀγαθόν—that last and loftiest abstraction of intelligence—that, as the sun of the invisible world, quickens nature into being, and pours upon all things that revealing light of truth which makes them, in their ideas, the direct objects of human apprehension. Detached from these moral relations, Plato manifestly took little interest in the sciences: even his favourite pursuits, mathematics, music, and astronomy, are everywhere represented as mainly or solely valuable as elements of discipline for a science beyond them. In this respect Aristotle seems to furnish a strong contrast to his master, and will find far more sympathy in the existing condition of the world of thought. Plato would *not* have written the passage (noble, certainly, and awakening) with which Aristotle opens his metaphysical philosophy, by ascribing to the pursuit of causes the highest claims for its own sake. On the contrary,—though it may seem paradoxical to attribute to Plato any form of *utilitarianism*,—the founder of the Academy never speaks of knowledge as valuable when insulated from its practical scope, that of approximation to the source of perfection; and though I confess I see in this what is more than once to be seen in Plato, a view too simple and exclusive for the complexity of human nature, it is, nevertheless, one of the characteristics which contribute to make the study of Platonism a most salutary corrective for the opposite and far more dangerous excess into which the present and the last age (especially in our own country) have universally fallen.

With such views as these predominant in all his writings, you will not expect in the PHYSICS of Plato—the subject announced for this occasion—any thing analogous to the vast, various, and ascertained body of knowledge which the magnificent successes of modern inquiry have enabled us to attach to the word. The very fact that the dialogue to which we must have recourse in order to obtain those views contains a scheme of almost all the physical knowledge of the time—cosmical, anatomical, medical—is a sufficient indication how imperfect and superficial that knowledge must be. The departments of inquiry were so limited that the division of labour had scarcely commenced; and an accomplished teacher was expected to have mastered the whole.

THE PHYSICS OF PLATO.

Nevertheless, the *Timæus*—the performance of which I speak—is one of the most characteristic, and, in this respect, one of the most precious, of all the writings of this great master; but nothing is less understood than the *Timæus*.

The Timæus;

It would be very mistaken to imagine that in this work Plato dogmatically advanced an ascertained system of nature, or a system professing to be such. Were this the case, the practised disciple of Bacon might indeed close the book with contempt; and the ordinary sarcasms with which the "dreams" and "fictions" of Plato are received would be perfectly justifiable. But he can have a very faint perception of the peculiarities of the Platonic style who fails to see in this singular dialogue more than the surface exposes. But to illustrate this point (which really seems to have been but feebly caught by even the modern commentators on Plato) we must make a few preparatory remarks.

what it is not.

The word "Idea," which stands at the head of each district of the Platonic philosophy, is employed in senses which differ considerably

Platonic Ideas. Recapitulation.

from each other, though resolving into ultimate sameness. I do not here refer to the modern adaptations, but to the genuine Platonic uses, of the word. In our former discussions, regarding the Ideas mainly in their speculative aspect, I endeavoured to illustrate them by such expressions in the modern philosophy of Reason as seemed to approach nearest to the scope of Plato,—more particularly by such phrases as the "Grounds" and "Reasons of Things," which, though necessarily occurring more or less in all philosophies that do not overlook fundamental truth, have perhaps become peculiarly associated with that of Leibnitz. But there is a view in which Ideas are altogether Platonic, and in which all who have subsequently insisted on them have been the manifest followers of Plato. This second and most characteristic purport on which the Platonic *Ethics* are finally based, as his *Dialectics* on the former, is that in which the Idea is used as synonymous with *Paradigm* or *Exemplar*. This signification so far pervades all Platonism as to affect even the former or merely theoretic import of the word; for in this philosophy all things are blended in all: but an easy analysis separates them; and though, to be faithful to my author, I could not avoid introducing it even in the simplest view of the Platonic dialectics, it is unquestionably with the moral system that it holds its chief affinity. This we shall probably see more fully when the Ethics of Plato come under review. My present purpose is to detect it in what are regarded as his *Physics*.

Use of the Ideal theory in the construction of the Platonic Physics.

In firmly holding the absolute excellence of the Deity, and in regarding the visible world as His formation, the philosopher held that the world and all its parts were images, in the sensible sphere, and, as far as the sensible subject could receive their impress, of exemplars of un-

shadowed perfection,—of "Ideas," that is, in the sense which I have just instanced. Gazing upon these Ideas, the great Artificer projected the universe into being by a process such as Cicero describes when, speaking of the Grecian statuary, he tells us, "Nec vero ille artifex, cum faceret Jovis formam aut Minervæ, contemplabatur aliquem e quo similitudinem duceret; sed ipsius in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quædam, quam intuens, in eaque defixus, ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat," (*Orat.* c. 2.) [I may add that the process by which the *human* soul endeavours to *ascend* to these exemplars by a reverse course may be found described by the same gifted master of language in a very analogous passage in his treatise *de Inventione*, (ii. 1, 1,) where he relates the well-known story of Zeuxis's picture of Helen.] Now, as all the value and dignity of the sensible world lay in its presenting a faint copy of these invisible originals, it was natural to pronounce that the only utility of physical research—the only utility, at least, that philosophy could recognise—was to be found in its perpetually recalling these forms of perfection,—in its representing, in the language of visible facts, unseen excellence. This was but one case of a general principle. To portray *Ideals* is the perpetual occupation of Plato,—and that not as answering to what exists, but to what might or ought to exist. The use of such a practice is twofold. Sometimes it points out a model to which men may endeavour constantly to approximate,—"the curve," as it has been expressed, "to the asymptote" of their exertions; and of *this* object of Ideal representation the *Republic* of Plato is the palmary instance. Sometimes, where the subject is beyond the power of man to modify, the practice of Ideal Representation assists the mind in conceiving the exquisite order and simplicity by which actual results may have been

brought to pass,—*and to this purpose I would assign the composition of the Timæus.*[1]

The uncertainty of physical researches candidly admitted by Plato.

I am convinced that, if you read this remarkable work with this directive idea, you will find abundant confirmations of the truth of this conception of its real object. Instead of being the bold blundering dogmatism of pretended learning, you will find its hypotheses everywhere marked with the utmost modesty and candour, and the subordination of the uncertain suppositions to the great truth of Divine wisdom and goodness which they are meant to illustrate, everywhere impressed. "We attach ourselves in these explanations," he observes, "to whatever seems to carry *most probability*." "I will not undertake to propound the cause or the causes and reasons of all that exists; and I decline such an attempt, because altogether foreign to the plan of this discourse. Do not expect it from me; nor am I presumptuous enough to imagine myself competent to such an achievement. But, content with probabilities, I will, as all along, endeavour to give you opinions at least as likely as those of others, and to treat the subject, both generally and in detail, with somewhat more extent than usual."[2] "I who speak, and you who judge, partake of a common humanity; so that if you receive probabilities (τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον) you ought to ask no more."[3] These characters of uncertainty are meant by Plato to apply, partly to the very nature of physical as contrasted with pure intellectual inquiry, partly to the imperfection of existing materials of knowledge. As

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[1] [This thought is very well expressed by Stallbaum:—"Quemadmodum igitur in libris de Republica quæ ideæ boni vis in vita humana et publica et privata esse possit vel debeat ostenditur, ita in Timæo docetur eandam ideam per totam regnare rerum universitatem atque in humana natura quoque divino quodam beneficio elucere." Ann. in *Tim.* init. ED.]

[2] [*Tim.* p. 48, E. ED.]

[3] [Ib. p. 29, C. ED.]

if to prevent misconception, the author continually interposes these observations about the uncertainty of that which he can only propound upon conjecture; and even in the very *complexity* of some portions of his theory (as the mathematical calculations of the constitution of the soul of the world) we can easily perceive that these elaborate deductions are introduced on very much the same principle of instructing by harmless illusion which induces the novelist to complicate his narrative. The *Timæus*, then, is nothing more than an ingenious series of hypotheses meant to deepen and vivify our notions of the harmony of the universe, and the consequent wisdom and goodness of its Author. Whatever physical truths were within the author's reach took their place in the general array: the vacancies were filled up with the best suppositions admitted by the limited science of the time. Thus, and only thus, the *Timæus* enters naturally where we know Plato made it enter,—immediately after his books on a Republic: it is the Ideal of a physical, following the Ideal of a moral, harmony.

Moral and theological object of the Timæus.

It may, indeed, be asserted with truth that Plato had no clear conception of the advances that a true system of observation and experiment *might* make in the knowledge of nature; but I believe it most unfair to conclude that he considered the *Timæus* as having realized them. And when we deplore that the loftiest conceptions ever entertained by uninspired man of the moral advancement of our race were not united in one mind with the sagacious views of Bacon as to its artificial and exterior amelioration, we ought also to remember how much larger was the philosophic experience of a sage of the sixteenth century, how much ampler and safer therefore his survey of human errors, than could belong to one who, if he raised philosophy into the vigour of manly youth, rose in almost its childhood.

Plan of the Timæus. God's goodness the motive of creation, and its law.

In accordance with the representation which I have given you, Plato sets out by fixing Creation upon the absolute goodness of God, and thence evolving a system of optimism. He declares indeed (in a passage which has often been quoted, and censured, perhaps, without much reason) that "it is difficult to discover the Author and Father of the universe, and impossible after the discovery to make him universally known;"[4] but this difficulty concerns only his intimate essence and productive power, and does not extend to his moral attributes. "Let us pronounce," says Timæus,[5]—and I invite you to observe the exquisite simplicity, the decision, and the depth, of the statement,—"with what motive the Creator hath created nature and this universe. He was *good;* but in the good no manner of envy on any possible subject can subsist. Exempt from envy, he has wished that all things should as far as possible resemble himself. Whoever shall from wise teachers receive this as above all others the highest principle of the production of nature and the world, shall receive the truth. God, wishing that there should be as much good and as little evil as possible, took the whole fluctuating mass of things visible, which had been in orderless confusion, and reduced it to order, considering this to be far the *better* state. Now, it was and is utterly impossible that He who is most excellent should form any thing else but what is most excellent likewise." The same principle of the absolute perfection of the universal scheme which is here applied *physically* is affirmed in its *moral* aspect, in a noble passage of the Tenth Book of *Laws*,[6] which I shall here cite, as contributing to illustrate a cardinal point in Platonism. "Let us persuade this young objector," says the Athenian interlocutor who represents

This idea in its moral aspect illustrated from the Laws.

[4] [*Tim.* p. 28, c. ED.]

[5] [Ib. 29, D. ED.]

[6] [P. 903, B. ED.]

Plato himself in that work, "that He who provides for all has arranged all for the advantage of the whole; that each part does and suffers only what it is suitable for it to do and suffer; that guardians have been set to watch unceasingly over each individual, even to his minutest acts and affections, and to carry the general perfection into its smallest details. You yourself, thoughtless mortal! you are something in the common system of order, you are incessantly referred to it. But you fail to see that every production is produced with this relation to the entire and to its happiness; that the universe exists not for you, but you for the universe. Every physician or other skilful artist directs all his operations towards a whole, and makes them contribute to the greatest perfection of the whole; he makes the part for the whole, not the whole for the part; and your murmurs (at the unequal disposition of fortunes) are all for want of knowing how these relations co-operate according to the laws of the general scheme.[7]... The Monarch of the world, having observed that all our operations arise from the soul, and are compounded of vice and virtue, that the soul and body, although not eternal as the true gods, ought not to be allowed to perish, (for then all production of animated beings would cease;) and that it is of the essential nature of good, as it springs from the soul, to be advantageous, of evil to be mischievous; the King of the world, having known all this, conceived, in the general distribution, the system which he considered simplest and best, to the end *that good might have the upper hand and evil be undermost in the universe.* It is with this view to the whole that he has constructed his arrangement of the positions that each individual, according to his distinctive character, is to occupy,—at the same time that he has left to the dis-

[7] [Inf. 904, A. ED.]

posal of our own wills the causes on which these distinctive characters shall depend; for men are what men make themselves to be. . . . Thus, all animated beings are subject to various changes of which the regulative principle is *within themselves;* and, in consequence of these changes, each finds himself in the place marked out by the established law." He then proceeds to bring the retributions of the future world under those general laws whose final cause is the perfection of the universe, in much the same manner as has been so admirably done by the author of the *Analogy of Religion and Nature.* "Those who have undergone but slight alterations of their present state remove but slightly, and along the same plane in space; those whose souls are more radically perverted to evil descend into subterraneous dwellings; . . . and when a soul has made a marked advance whether in evil or good by a firm purpose and constant habit, if so united to virtue as to share in her divinity of nature, then passes that soul from its present dwelling to one altogether blessed and securely happy; if surrendered to vice, its abode is conformable to its condition. . . . In life, and in every successive death through the long annals of the soul, like meets like, and the natural results of actions are fixed. No man can ever evade this order, inviolably established by heaven." The dress borrowed from the religion of the times, and coloured by some of the peculiarities of Plato's own system of psychology, will not here hide from you the lineaments of a noble and rational view of the moral universe. And it is the very same conviction of an established scheme of perfection that Plato has attempted to embody in his account of the physical structure of the world. The description which *Socrates* is represented as giving, in the *Phædo*,[8] of his own early

[8] [Pp. 97, c, 98, b. Ed.]

love of physical investigation, his delight with the great principle of Anaxagoras, ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, and his subsequent disappointment at finding this principle apparently forsaken by the philosopher himself, perfectly harmonizes with this view of the purpose of the Platonic physics. "I sink at once from all my high hopes," declares Socrates, "when, on eagerly perusing his writings, I find the man never once employing mind, or any thing such as mind, to order the system of nature, but recurring to air and ether and water and the like."

Consequences.

From a physical system thus intended as illustrative of a principle of optimism, the following consequences may be expected, which accordingly you will find abundantly exemplified in the *Timæus*.

1. *Teleological character of Plato's Physics.*

First. That it will mainly concern itself with *final causes*. The universe being regarded chiefly as it is an indication of the Divine Intelligence, every phenomenon will be contemplated as it tends to display that intelligence: it is the volume in which the Deity inscribes his perfections, and is to be read in order to discern them.* It was, as we have just noticed, the neglect of these considerations which Socrates reprehended in the speculations of Anaxagoras, who had first placed philosophy on the road to detect them; and no plainer exposition of the importance of this view in the estimate of Plato can possibly be given, than the long and interesting passage of the *Phædo* in which Socrates refers all physical inquiry to the notion of The Best. A large body of treatises expressly devoted to the subject

* "The lover of reason and science," declares Plato, "will pursue, in preference to all others, those causes which flow from the rational nature; causes which are themselves but passive and necessary he will regard as secondary in dignity and in order of contemplation. Both should be specified, but the distinction should be maintained between those that with intelligence work out the fair and good, and those that, destitute of reason, operate without order and by chance."

within the last few years is one of the many proofs of the attention which this part of philosophic inquiry has received in modern times; but we can scarcely estimate, blessed as we are with distinct and independent proofs suited to all capacities, the importance which it must have assumed in the eyes of men who had little else to depend upon for the inculcation of a rational theology. And this is, perhaps, one of the many services which the belief in a Revelation has done to science: it has liberated it from the obligation of an almost exclusive attachment to this "Virgo Deo consecrata quæ nihil parit."[9] It is a singular instance of the caution with which the representations of Aristotle regarding his master are to be received, that he accuses him of *neglecting* efficient and final causes.[10] The entire current of Plato's researches will appear to modern readers to have been but too pervadingly imbued with both.

Use of Revelation in liberating Physics from subservience to final causes.

Aristotle's criticism on Plato.

Secondly. The next characteristic which may be expected in a system raised on such views is, that it will be mathematical rather than experimental. Intended to embody conceptions of proportion and harmony, it will have immediate recourse to that department of science which deals with proportion in space and number. Such applications of

2. *Plato's physics are mathematical rather than experimental.*

[9] [Bacon, *De Augm.* lib. iii. c. 5, speaking of the "inquisitio causarum finalium." ED.]

[10] [Arist. *Metaph.* i. 6, 9, compared with c. 3, 1. Aristotle is himself made the subject of a caustic critique by Bacon:—"Magis in hac parte accusandus Aristoteles, quam Plato: quandoquidem fontem causarum finalium, Deum scilicet, omiserit, et naturam pro Deo substituerit, causasque ipsas finales, potius ut logicæ amator, quam theologiæ amplexus sit." He adds, "neque hæc eo dicimus, quod causæ illæ finales veræ non sint, et inquisitione admodum dignæ in *speculationibus metaphysicæ:* sed quia dum in physicarum causarum possessiones excurrunt et irruunt, misere eam provinciam depopulantur et vastant." *De Augm.* lib. iii. c. 4. ED.]

mathematical truths, not being raised on ascertained facts, can only accidentally represent the real laws of the physical system:[11] they will, however, vivify the student's apprehensions of harmony, in the same manner as a happy parable, though not founded in real history, will enliven his perceptions of moral truth. And (as I before intimated) I do not conceive that the cautious and acute intellect of Plato ever contemplated any other purpose in presenting them as adjuncts to his philosophy. Many ingenious suppositions have indeed been advanced with a view to reconcile these abstruse and obscure calculations to the cosmical theory of modern times; yet, though some remarkable coincidences have been elicited, we are scarcely justified in concluding that Plato wrote in view of any theory correspondent to our own. But it is not, perhaps, impossible that he formed his calculations upon facts of a *different* region of nature, which subsequent investigation may discover to be connected under the bonds of a common principle or law with the actual facts of the planetary system. I may return again to this subject. I shall now only remark that, as the former characteristic of the Platonic physics contemplates the Deity as acting in the view of *goodness*, so this regards him as acting in the view of supreme *beauty;* and that, as Plato appears to have owed to Socrates and to Pythagoras nearly all which his own meditations did not produce, so we may consider the former as eminently the Socratic, and the latter

[11] [It is, however, Plato's merit to have discerned that the laws of the physical universe are resolvable into numerical relations, and therefore capable of being represented by mathematical formulæ. Of this truth I am not aware that Aristotle anywhere betrays the slightest consciousness. In many other points of physical science Plato's guesses contrast favourably with the dogmas of his disciple and critic; *e.g.* in his notions of a centripetal force, of the causes of gravity, of antipodes, and of the nullity of the popular distinction of "up" and "down." Compare *Timæus*, p. 62, c–63, D, with the passages from Aristotle's physical writings referred to in Stallbaum's judicious notes. ED.]

as eminently the Pythagorean, element in his system of nature.

3. Their anti-mechanical character.

Thirdly. Another peculiarity which we may anticipate in a system constructed with such a design is, an impatience of every merely *mechanical* theory of the operations of nature. The psychology of Plato led him to recognise mind wherever there was motion, and hence not only to require a Deity as first mover of the universe, but also to conceive the propriety of separate and subordinate agents attached to each of its parts, as principles of motion, no less than intelligent directors. These agents were entitled "gods" by an easy figure discernible even in the sacred language, and which served, besides, to accommodate philosophical hypotheses to the popular religion. Plato, however,—though the later Platonists, to meet certain peculiarities of the Christian theology, misrepresented his words,—carefully distinguishes between the sole Eternal Author of the Universe on the one hand, and that "soul," vital and intelligent,[12] which he attached to the world, as well as the spheral intelligences, on the other. These subordinate deities or spirits, though intrusted with a sort of deputed creation, were still *only* the deputies of the Supreme Framer and Director of all.[13] This soul, or moving and intelligent principle infused into the world, is that which binds and secures it according to the will of its Author; it is formed in time, and, if incapable of decay, is so only because the goodness and wisdom of the Supreme determine its conservation.[14] And, being thus indissolubly connected with

Subordinate deities employed in the work of creation.

Soul of the universe.

Explanation of these hypotheses.

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[12] [*Tim.* 34, A:—οὗτος δὴ πᾶς ὅντος ἀεὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ περὶ τὸν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον θεὸν κ. τ. λ. Ib. B:—εὐδαίμονα θεὸν (τὸν κοσμὸν) ἐγεννήσατο. ED.]

[13] [Ib. p. 42. ED.]

[14] [Ib. p. 41, B:—ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ' ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτι μὲν δὴ

the world, it may be considered to *animate* it; the world, then, itself is a thing of life, an animal, giving the same indications of an animal and rational nature as man himself, in that it moves, and moves according to the most consummate harmony: it is, therefore, *ζῶον ἐμψυχὸν ἔννοῦν τε*, *ψυχὴ* being infused into the vast body, and *νοῦς* into this *ψυχὴ* or vital vehicle.[15] Such a notion has its ludicrous and its sublime aspects; and if Velleius in Cicero[16] could expose to warrantable ridicule the "mundus animo et sensibus præditus, rotundus, ardens, volubilis Deus," you are all familiar with the majestic portrait which Virgil has given of the same doctrine:—

> Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
> Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.

For the hypothesis of this soul of the world, the greatest of created deities, and of the separate intelligences governing the celestial bodies, besides the reason already intimated, (the anxiety to oppose all tendencies to theories of pure material necessity,) others doubtless may likewise be conceived. These views of intermediate agency satisfied the demands of the public creed, which presented its facts to be accounted for no less than those of external nature; and they harmonized with the disposition, natural to all inquirers, of interposing some scale of ascent between the world and its infinite Author. It probably seemed also scarcely answerable to the dignity of that sovereign controller to be laboriously and constantly engaged in the actual revolutions of the system; it was more correspondent to his majestic repose that, though ultimately deciding and dispensing all, (for Plato earnestly argues against the subsequent

λυθήσεσθε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες κ. τ. λ. ED.]

[15] [*Timæus*, p. 30, B. ED.]

[16] [*De Natura Deorum*, lib. i. c. 8, § 18. ED.]

Epicurean theory of divine apathy,)[17] he should yet distribute among his inferior functionaries the execution of his commands. This theory, also, by representing a "prerogative instance" of soul antecedent to body, added to it, and authoritatively directing its passive movements, enabled Plato to insist with special force upon one of the great principles of his philosophy, a principle at that time not at all familiar to Grecian speculation, namely, that soul (generically considered) was so far from being a composition or result of *body* even in its most refined state of attenuation, that it existed by its proper force before body had even been generated by the Father of the Universe. This object appears in the very context of the description of the universal soul. "It is thus," says Timæus,[18] "that the everlasting Deity conceived the generated Deity: he formed this being smooth, spherical, symmetrical, a whole, perfect, and compounded of all perfection; he then injected soul into the midst, interpenetrated and invested the mass with soul, and thus framed a globe revolving of itself, single, solitary, self-sufficing by its own inherent virtues, independent of all extrinsic aid, knowing and loving itself. In this way he produced a blessed god. But the Framer of all did not produce soul *the last*, in the order I have here followed; for in uniting soul and body he would never have permitted *the more ancient* to subserve and wait upon the younger. We who are conversant with uncertainty and conjecture speak thus only by conjecture. The Creator formed soul superior to body both in order of generation and in innate virtue, in order that it might be the lord and governor of that inferior nature."

But the chief reason with Plato for the host of in-

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[17] [As in the *Laws*, b. x. p. 899, D, fol. ED.]

[18] *Tim.* p. 34, B, fol. ED.]

ferior deities which he interposed between men and their First Cause was, doubtless, in order to furnish a solution, superficial it might be but plausible, for the defects and disasters of sublunary affairs. The philosopher, jealous for the unimpeachable honour of the Divine character, and well knowing that with the surrender of this last citadel of truth and virtue all must be directly or indirectly conceded, represents man, animals, and the rest of the changeable furniture of the earth, as deriving their origin from inferior and created divinities,—a supposition to which the influences of the celestial revolutions over which these divinities presided, upon the formation, growth, and decay of plants and animals, lent great apparent confirmation. In order, however, to vindicate to the human soul its dignity, Plato assigns to these inferior intelligences (or demons) the formation only of the human body and the junction of it with the soul, a diviner essence composed of a nature similar to, but less perfect than, the soul of the world itself, and proceeding directly from the hands of God.[19]

These are some of the characteristics which may be traced more or less directly to the very design of the Platonic philosophy of nature, and which, by being thus easily referred, tend to illustrate the true nature of that design. In enumerating them I have necessarily been led to intimate some of the principal features of the system itself. It will be proper to enter somewhat more closely into these,—not indeed into any of the minuter physiological details, which in the present state of experimental science can only be subjects of curiosity, and whose interest cannot pass beyond themselves, but into those larger principles which connect

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[19] [*καθ' ὅσον μὲν αὐτῶν* [*τῶν ξῴων*] *ἀθανάτοις εἶναι προσήκει . . . σπείρας καὶ ὑπαρξάμενος ἐγὼ παραδώσω· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς κ.τ.λ.* P. 41, c. ED.]

themselves with philosophical speculation in every age. At the same time, I do not know a more interesting work than would be an edition of the *Timæus* which should descend into all the specialties of its physiology, and, by comparing them with our present attainments, should elucidate the progress of natural knowledge, vindicate the sagacity of happy conjecture, and illustrate the ordinary though subtle and elusive causes of error.

Further analysis of the Timæus.

In that part of the *Timæus* to which, though not first in actual arrangement, it may be best first to direct your attention, Plato, turning as it would seem with reluctance from the contemplation of the Divine agency in the production of the angelic essences and of men, to a more obscure part of his subject, undertakes to explain, according to the most probable conception, the primitive constituents of the universe. "We have spoken," he says,[20] "of the acts and operations of intelligence. We must now add those that arise through necessity; for the world is the result of the combination of necessity and intelligence, (ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ;) intelligence governing and persuading necessity to produce all things in the most perfect way, necessity yielding to the wisdom of intelligence." "We must follow this origin, as we followed the former." That is, as the former investigation led directly to the Supreme Mind, this is to lead as directly to the antithesis of mind, which with intentional vagueness he terms "necessity." "Let us examine," he continues, "what was, before the creation of the world, the nature of fire, air, water, earth; for assuredly it is most short-sighted to be satisfied with these as ultimate principles." He intimates that these, or such like, may be considered "elements" of the world as it now is, but that they have no claim to the title when

Principles of necessity.

[20] [P. 47, E, fol. ED.]

viewed antecedently to their present mode of existence. In that point of view they will each be found to consist of, or rather to represent, three distinct principles,[21] the subject-matter on which they are impressed, the model after which they exist as they are, and the actual sensible object which they constitute and exhibit. Matter, ideas, and the objects of sense, which depend on both the former, are, then, the principles of the universe, the elements of elements; nor is there the minutest fragment in nature which does not include and require this triple origin as the rationale of its existence.

Platonic conception of Matter.

The first of these principles is obtained by an abstraction of the most refined accuracy. To term it "matter" is, in one sense of that word, already to corrupt its simplicity; for the "matter" of modern logicians possesses the inseparable qualities of extension and solidity. But the subject-matter of Plato is utterly without qualities,[22] being considered antecedent to all sensible phenomena and their qualities. It could exist only in a state of things to which none of the forms of either sense or understanding have any reference. It was, as you must by this time be aware, the spirit of Platonism to regard all mental abstractions, not indeed as in themselves realities in the absurd sense of realism so commonly ascribed to Plato, but as the signs of real existences corresponding to them in a world of reason. When a man had from contemplating instances of virtue risen to a notion of the quality common to all those instances, and which he termed by the name, Plato instructed him to regard that quality and its name as representing in the mind of the

A substance without qualities.

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[21] [P. 48, E, fol. ED.]

[22] [P. 49, E:—*ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἐγγιγνόμενα ἀεὶ ἕκαστα φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν . . ἀπόλλυται, μόνον ἐκεῖνο αὖ προσαγορεύειν τῷ τε τοῦτο καὶ τῷ τόδε προσχρωμένους ὀνόματι, τὸ δὲ ὁποιονοῦν τι, θερμὸν . . . ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων . . μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο αὖ τούτων καλεῖν.* ED.]

speculator an ineffable something, which in the sphere of immutable reality answered to the conception in the soul. And as of single qualities so of their compounds: in a perfect world all sensible objects, whether simple or complex, were correlatives to ideal archetypes. Now, though this system was mainly constructed to resist the assaults of sophistry upon the permanence of *moral* distinctions, it was of universal application. Successive abstractions can separate the passive subject from all its modifications; the passive subject then has a distinct reality in the world separate from sensible experience,—a reality, however, of a kind different from that of the occupants of the ideal world, inasmuch as the recipient of ideas cannot itself be confounded *with* ideas. In this way, the same course of reasoning would lead to the independent anterior existence both of matter and of ideas, and would yet preserve them distinct from each other. But Plato appealed also to experience in illustration of this point. He observed that all sensible qualities undergo perpetual change,—in this coinciding with the well-known doctrines of Heraclitus and the rest of the *φιλόσοφοι ῥέοντες*. The more accurate our examination becomes, the more fully we perceive that this change is incessant. But beneath all this superficial alteration we cannot but know that there is an unchanging subject, which yet is neither deity, nor ideas, nor the soul of man. To express this original subject-matter, the basis of the universe of sense, Plato has exhausted every form of expression. It is the receptacle (*ὑποδοχή*,) the nurse (*τιθήνη*) of all[23] that is produced. It alone gives any reality and definiteness to the evanescent phantoms of sense, for in their ceaseless change *they* cannot justly receive any title whatever; it alone can be styled *τόδε*, or *τοῦτο*, they rising no higher than *τοιοῦτον*,

Various designations of the primitive matter.

[23] [P. 49, A:—*πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτὸ οἷον τιθήνην.* ED.]

or *ὁποιονοῦν τι*. It is not earth, or air, or fire, or water, but it is "an invisible *species* and formless universal receiver, which in the most obscure way receives the immanence of the intelligible:"—*ἀνόρατον εἶδος καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές, μεταλάμβανον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτό*.[24] And in relation to the other two principles it is *the mother** to the father and the offspring:[25]—it is *τὸ ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται*, to *τὸ ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον*, and *τὸ γιγνόμενον*. But perhaps the most remarkable passage[26] is that in which he seems to identify it with *pure space*, which, "itself imperishable, furnishes a seat (*ἕδραν*) to all that is produced, not apprehensible by direct perception, but caught by a certain spurious reasoning, scarcely admissible, but which we see as in a dream; gaining it by that judgment which pronounces it necessary that all which is be somewhere and occupy a certain space." This, you will perceive, approaches the Cartesian doctrine which resolved matter into *simple extension*,—a view which was by both united with the rejection of vacuum.[27]

Its attributes are those of pure space.

It has been much disputed whether Plato held that this subject of ideal impression was eternal or originated in time. As on the one hand he maintained a strict system of dualism, and avoided without a single deviation that seduction of pantheism to which so many abstract speculators of his own school have fallen victims, so on the other it appears to me that he did not scruple to place this principle, the opposite of the divine intelligence, in a

Is the Platonic matter eternal?

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[24] [P. 51, A, fol. ED.]

* It substantializes them, as they to our sensible apprehensions individualize it.

[25] [P. 50, D. ED.] [26] [P. 52, A, fol. ED.]

[27] [P. 58, A:—*ἡ τοῦ παντὸς περίοδος . . . πρὸς αὐτὴν πεφυκυῖα βούλεσθαι ξυνιέναι, σφίγγει πάντα καὶ κενὴν χώραν οὐδεμίαν ἐᾷ λείπεσθαι.* In this denial of a vacuum Plato was followed by Aristotle. See the references in Stallbaum's note on the passage quoted. ED.]

sphere independent of temporal origination. This view of the groundwork of the world of sense and contingence, though it unhappily led to the impieties of Manicheism in after-ages, was never meant to countenance such tenets by Plato. But we can scarcely enter into his views unless we ascertain his notions of the nature of *Time* itself. This was considered to have been created with the rest of the sensible world,[28] to finish with it, if it ever finish,—to be altogether relative to this phenomenal scene.* I need not remind you that these views, in forms only slightly differing, have been revived in various ages of philosophical speculation. They form a leading element in the most celebrated system of the last century, that of

Plato's conception of Time.

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[28] [P. 37, A:—εἰκὼ . . . ἐπινοεῖ [ὁ θεὸς] κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος ποιησαι, καὶ διακόσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν. 38, B:—χρόνος . . . μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἂν ποτε λίσις τις αὐτῶν γίγνηται. The use of *αἰώνιος* in the former passage is noteworthy. It seems to be used in a modified sense; for shortly after we are forbidden to apply the terms "was" and "will be" to the "eternal essence," (*ἀίδιον οὐσίαν,*) past and future being mere "modes of time," (*χρόνου εἴδη.*) This seeming antithesis between *αἰώνιος* and *ἀίδιος* is not noticed by the commentators. In no part of the dialogue is the superiority of Plato's metaphysical to his physical speculations more clearly manifest than in the very noble passage (translated in the text) from which these extracts come. ED.]

* I speak thus generally, because, though *the* "*time*" spoken of seems to have, in the original, a peculiar connection with *the heavenly revolutions*, as if Plato meant only *such* time as is measured by their changes, it is equally manifest, as we shall just now see, that the strain of the reasoning is applicable to Time in its most abstract form; so that, though he speaks of Life and Motion antecedently to *this* mention of the creation of Time and its divisions, I cannot but believe that he intended the fullest sense of the metaphysical principle, but wished to defer stating it until it could be done in connection with those celestial phenomena which have in all ages been associated with the flux of time as its natural and universal indices.

Kant,[29] but in substance existed long before it in the schools of Germany. In our own country (and it would seem independently) they have been now and then suggested, but have attracted little attention, partly from being presented in an isolated and conjectural form, and partly, doubtless, from the national distaste for metaphysical inquiry. The first full and distinct statement of these remarkable doctrines (which obviously must more or less affect *every* region of any system which includes them) is too interesting to omit; and if I could induce you to study carefully the original (for the metaphysical expressiveness of the Greek language is altogether intransferable) I suspect you would agree with me that very little has been since added to their cogency and decisiveness. I will not, indeed, conceal from you my own conviction, which increases the more I study this great author, that in every thing of the higher metaphysic we can scarcely enter any chamber of the modern edifices of speculation where we shall not find that Plato has been before us.

"The generating Father," says Timæus, "having beheld this created image of the invisible powers, in life and motion, rejoiced at the sight, ["saw that it was good,"] and in his delight thought to make it yet more resemble its model; and, this being a living thing, he endeavoured to give the universe this sort of completeness as far as might be. The nature of the exemplar animal was eternal; and it was impracticable to adapt this character to any thing created without qualification: he determined, therefore, to create a moving image of eternity, (εἰκὼ κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος,) and, in disposing the heavens, he framed of this eternity reposing in its own unchangeable unity an eternal *image*, moving according to numerical succession which we call *Time*. With the

[29] [*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, i. theil, § 4. Von der Zeit. ED.]

world arose days, nights, months, years, which all had no previous existence; the past and future are but forms of time which we most erroneously transfer to the eternal substance: we say it was, and is, and will be, whereas we can only fitly say *it is*. Past and future are appropriate to the successive nature of generated beings, for they bespeak motion; but the Being eternally and unmovedly the same is subject neither to youth, nor to age, nor to any other accident of time: it neither was, nor hath been, nor will be, which are the attributes of fleeting sense, the circumstances of time imitating eternity in the shape of number and motion. Nor can any thing be more inaccurate than to apply the term real Being (τὸ εἶναι) to past or present, or future, or even to non-existence, (τὸ μὴ ὄν.) Of this, however, we cannot now speak fully. *Time*, then, was formed with the heavens, that together created they may together end, if indeed an *end* be in the purpose of the Creator; and it is designed as closely as possible to resemble the eternal nature, its exemplar. The model exists through all *eternity;* the world has been, is, and will be, through all *time.*" This doctrine, as far as regarded the formal or *accidental* nature of time, was admitted by the Epicureans:—

Epicurean notion of Time, compared with the Platonic.

> Tempus item per se non est; sed rebus ab ipsis
> Consequitur sensus.
> Nec per se quenquam tempus sentire fatendum est
> Semotum ab rerum motu placidâque quiete.
>
> LUCRET. i. 460.

The contrast with the nature of *eternal Being* was peculiarly Platonic, and does not seem to have entered into the Epicurean views; and even the tenet itself was held under different forms by these very opposite schools, though their language might resemble. The Epicureans gave thorough reality to the sensible phenomena, but held *time* to be a superadded mental relation; Plato con-

sidered both time and the sensible phenomena to be equally real, because neither of them truly so, but alike copies of supersensible realities. This part of his master's system was not accepted by Aristotle,[30] to whose cardinal argument for the eternity of the universe it would have offered a very obvious answer. The founder of the Peripatetic school argued that the creation of the universe at any definite period was inadmissible, for that the difficulty would always lie,—what had produced the delay, or determined an activity dormant from eternity? But Plato could at once reply that the objection was founded upon an assumption not only gratuitous but contradictory,—that eternity was but an infinite extension of the time with which the human mind is here conversant. If this supposition (which is unquestionably encumbered with great difficulties) be denied, if it appear that the mode of divine existence is altogether different from that of beings in successive duration, the force of the argument of Aristotle is at once destroyed, for it becomes absurd to speak of the Creator as creating the universe at any one period rather than another: it is referring creation to a standard which was itself created.

In this ineffable eternity Plato placed both the Supreme Being and the archetypal ideas of which the sensible world of time *κατὰ δύναμιν partakes.* Whether (which was the question immediately engaging us) he also included under the same mode of existence *the subject-matter* of the sensible world, it is not easy to pronounce, and it appears to me quite evident that he did not himself undertake to speak with assurance on this obscure problem. You will now, however, be enabled to perceive under what form he would have contemplated

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[30] [See *Phys. Aus.* viii. c. 1, esp. § 11:—*περί γε χρόνου ἔξω ἑνὸς δμονοητικῶς ἔχοντες φαίνονται πάντες· ἀγένητον γὰρ εἶναι λέγουσιν . . . Πλάτων δ' αὐτὸν γεννῷ μόνος, κ.τ.λ.* ED.]

the subject, in what way he would have addressed himself to the solution. And, endeavouring to fix the mind in the same attitude, I incline to think that he meant the creation of time to be subsequent (if I may so speak) to the existence of this mysterious substratum,—a doctrine which certain features of his ethical system tended to confirm, as we shall endeavour hereafter to unfold. At the same time it is proper for you to reserve your decision on this question until you shall have considered a very different view of the Platonic conception of matter which I shall briefly notice in our next lecture.

LECTURE II.

THE PHYSICS OF PLATO, (*continued.*)

GENTLEMEN:—

The Platonic conception of matter further examined.

I CONCLUDED the last Lecture by some observations on that mysterious substratum of the sensible world which it perplexed Plato so much to conceive or describe, and regarding which his real opinion is to this day so much contested. The main reason for this obscurity to modern readers, especially to readers conversant with the Epicureanism all-but universal for a long period in this division of the world of speculation, is undoubtedly the position which Plato habitually assigned to the universe of sensible experience and to the physical inquiry that undertook to explain it. It is not easy to place ourselves in a point of contemplation so utterly dissimilar to our ordinary one; as difficult as it is for the young astronomer to exchange *geocentric* for *heliocentric* measurements. With Plato truth, absolute scientific truth, was every thing; and truth he considered to be found only in the abstractions of reason, the representatives and interpreters of the only real existences,—of ideas. These latter were the proper objects of the soul of man, itself a discontented prisoner in this scene of shadows; and every philosophic tendency which deviated from the single purpose of furnishing the soul as much as might be with this its congenial food betrayed the duty of philosophy, degenerated into ingenious trifling, and, however laudable in its own sphere, fell as far below the aspiration after true wisdom as the loftiest heights of earth are below the expanse of heaven.

From these principles, it was natural that when the great Idealist descended into the world of sense he should regard that world itself under a *dialectical* aspect, that he should consider not so much the succession of phenomena as the connection of consequences with principles. Accordingly, the "matter" of which we have spoken is with Plato rather a logical entity than a physical; it is *the condition or supposition* necessary for the production of a world of phenomena. It is thus the *transition-element* between the real and the apparent, the eternal and the contingent; and, lying thus on the borders of both territories, we must not be surprised that it can hardly be characterized by any definite attribute. This leads me to notice another view of the Platonic theory of the Subject of the Sensible. Contrasted as it seems to be with the eternal basis of the world of reason, it may be doubted whether Plato meant to attribute to this condition of the sensible any reality of existence at all; and to this opinion some of the latest of his critical commentators incline. It is true that he seems to hold that, as ideas are copied in the fluent world of nature, some *subject* must be provided on which the copy may be imprinted; it is true that he speaks of it as the direct subject of the operations of the Divine Artist; but it is also certain that he appears to provide no faculty of the mind by which it can be discerned. The proper objects of the senses are distinctly mentioned; the proper objects of the reason are Ideas; beyond ideas and their copies there remains nothing that can be the object of thought. Susceptible of all forms but determined to none, how can it be reached by any mental organ? We saw already how he declares it to be caught by an *illegitimate* exertion of reason, (*νόθῳ λογισμῷ*;) and in the singular and abstruse discussion in the *Sophistes* he seems to affirm that the sensible images of eternal truth are pro-

Matter is with Plato the condition of phenomenal existence.

duced by a combination of the existent and non-existent, —that is, of ideas by the way of *μέθεξις* or participation, and of the subject-matter, which thus seems identified with the *non-existent*. While, again, the material substratum is constantly indicated by the title of *θάτερον*, or "The other,"[1] a term which implies, both in itself and

[1] [Soph. p. 249, c, fol. esp. 255, E:—*ἓν ἕκαστον ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου.* The *Timæus* presents the physical, the *Sophistes* the purely dialectical, view of the same distinction, expressed variously as that of *τὸ ἓν* to the *ἀόριστος δυάς*, of *τὸ πέρας* to *τὸ ἄπειρον*, of *οὐσία* to the *μὴ ὄν*, or, as in the passage referred to, of *ταὐτὸν* to *θάτερον*. The actual phenomenal world is that which is mixed or participant of the two, and is designated as *τὸ συμμισγόμενον, ἡ γένεσις, τὸ οὐσίας μετέχον*, or, in the *Timæus*, 35, B, even as *οὐσία*,—in the secondary sense, however, of existence, *actuality*, not of *essential* or ideal *reality*, which is the more usual meaning of *οὐσία* in Plato. The "matter" or *ἄπειρον*, &c. of Plato is a mere potentiality, *mera essendi possibilitas*, as Stallbaum truly says, in his note to the passage last quoted. It is certainly incorrect to class Plato with those less scrupulous because perhaps more superficial idealists who deny matter *in toto*. The corresponding Aristotelian designation is *ὕλη*, which is not used by Plato, though it may have been suggested to his disciple by *Tim.* 69, B. This term is found very convenient by the self-styled Timæus Locrus, who accordingly employs it without scruple as the synonym of the *ἄπειρον*, &c. of the Platonic Timæus. The term is, however, objectionable, as suggesting the notion of something corporeal, like the "wood" from which the metaphor comes; though it must be confessed that Aristotle takes sufficient precautions against this misconception.

It has been made matter of serious reproach to Plato that he allowed the existence of an independent coeternal infinite side by side with the Divine cause,—the *ξυναίτιον* as God is the *αἴτιον* of the actual Universe. Stallbaum, whose love for his author is not always governed by discretion, attempts, in his *Prolegomena* to the *Timæus*, to show that matter itself is understood by Plato as produced by the Creative Mind:—"ipsa cogitatione [Dei] ortum esse sensilis mundi principium atque fontem." (*Proll.* p. 44.) This, however, is nowhere even hinted by Plato, and seems to contradict his plain language. The creation of matter "out of nothing" is an idea which could scarcely have occurred to the mind of an ancient Greek, and the attribution of it to Plato is surely a glaring philosophical anachronism. ED.]

in its Platonic use, the notion of mere *relation*, of an existence which possesses reality only in relation to true reality, and by a relation of even contrast, which certainly approaches as near to the notion of absolute non-existence as can easily be conceived. If this account be the nearest to the truth, it would be curious to compare the very different paths through which speculatists have arrived at the denial of the reality of matter in different ages. I may add to these arguments for this interpretation of the sense of Plato, that it certainly seems far more perfectly to harmonize with the system of universal ideality that was always present to his mind. Those who are induced to reject the reality of Time (on whatever grounds) will seldom be found to maintain the reality of Space; and we have already seen that Plato draws scarcely any distinction between the sensible substratum and simple extension. If Time, then, be but the image of eternity, in the sensible scene, Space may fairly be regarded as equally imaginary; and perhaps Plato would have expressed this conviction with equal directness if he could have found in the attributes of the ideal world a model answering to Space as readily as Eternity appears to answer to Time. For, whatever be the reason, it appears more easy to conceive a generic difference, and yet analogy, between Time and Eternity than between Space and Immensity.

To what extent does Plato concede the reality of the sensible world?

If, then, it be next sought, *what degree* of subsistence Plato allowed the sensible sphere, the answer will depend upon your opinions as to the subject of our late discussion. If it be considered that he meant to allow reality to the unknown recipient of ideas,[2] we shall have the reality of

[2] [A passage quoted in note (22) in the former Lecture from *Tim.* 49, E, makes in favour of this supposition. We are there forbidden to call the unknown recipient by any name denoting quality, (ὁποιονοῦν τι,) but permitted to style it "this" or "that," (τόδε or τοῦτο.) ED.]

the sensible depend on the reality of this basis, and on the "participation" in the reality of ideas. If, on the other hand, we conceive this recipient unreal, the whole amount of reality allowed to the sensible will be resolved into its relation (of participant) to the ideal. In this case, the world, (*γένεσις, τὸ γεννητόν, τὸ γινόμενον ἀεί, κόσμος, φύσις, τὸ πᾶν, οὐσία,*) though destined for perpetual durability as an image (*ἄγαλμα*) of divine perfection, must refer for all its claims of reality to its connection with the eternal exemplars. It is the shadow that waits upon their substance. And, whichever solution of the expressions of Plato we adopt,—whether we regard the receptacle of the sensible as a *mere condition* in the nature of things for the apparition of eternal principles in a contingent form, or as *a real physical groundwork* for qualities analogous to the eternal principles,—in either case its use and purpose is very clearly stated in the passage I subjoin. "It is proper to distinguish," observes Timæus,[3] "between two forms of cause, one necessary and one divine, [*τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον,*] and to seek out the divine in all things with a view to rational happiness as far as our nature admits; but the necessary element only for the sake of the former, remembering that without this it would not be possible to apprehend or seize or partake of the other." Now, the "necessary" element is unquestionably this material condition or principle of physical existence; and we are here taught that, whatever it be, it exists as the means and occasion of the evolution of divine intelligence in the organization of the world. In another place he speaks of the Deity as "*persuading it*" to receive the impress of the eternal forms, subduing it to be the mirror of his ideas. This is what in modern language would be entitled the imposition upon the inanimate universe

[3] [*Tim.* 68, E. Compare p. 48, A. ED.]

of laws of consummate wisdom,—laws which, because they are not to be referred to the arbitrary will of Deity, but to an eternal standard of rectitude according to which the Deity perpetually directs his own actions, Plato carefully set apart by appropriating to them their own foundations in their own sphere of being.

The Psychology of the Timæus.

The manner in which Plato proceeded, upon the justest principles of logic, to construct the *objects* of the human mind in their two great divisions of successive and eternal upon an investigation of the correspondent *faculties*, and thus exemplified the true process for framing a correct ontology or philosophy of real existences, is very clearly exhibited in a well-known passage of the *Timæus*. After the exposition of this subject in the last series of Lectures, it is now, however, unnecessary to enter upon it at any length. As, nevertheless, the course of the subject (the elementary principles of the Physical Creation) requires us to hold this cardinal point in remembrance, it may be well to cite the concise passage[4] to which I allude, one of the commonplaces of Platonism, and which, therefore, ought to be familiar to every student of this philosophy. "Is that which we see or feel by bodily organs alone real? is there indeed nothing beyond it? do we idly assert that there does exist a form intelligible (*εἶδος νοητόν*) of each of these objects, or are these forms mere words? We should not affirm it without due investigation; at the same time that it would be unsuitable to extend into the minute details of any accessory subject this discourse, of itself sufficiently voluminous. But, if we could condense this important question into brief limits, it certainly would be highly advantageous to treat it. My own opinion is the following:—If Reason and Right Opinion (*νοῦς* and *δόξα ἀληθής*) are two faculties generi-

Distinction of Νοῦς and

[4] [*Tim.* 57, c. ED.]

cally distinct, it is absolutely necessary that there should be Ideas self-subsistent, not objects of our senses, objects of reason alone, (*ἀναίσθητα, νοούμενα μόνον.*) While if, as some imagine, there is no difference between these faculties, every thing on the other hand which we apprehend through the bodily organs must be taken for perfectly stable. But they must be pronounced distinct, inasmuch as they are formed within us separately and with dissimilar characters. The one comes by the way of scientific instruction, (*διδαχῆς,*) the other through persuasion, (*πειθοῦς*;) the one is always accompanied by true rational conviction, the other has no rational foundation, (*ἄλογον*;) the one is immovable by arts of persuasion, the other changeable by them. Of the one all men partake, (Opinion,) of the other only the gods, and a few among men. [Not that all human souls have not the mere faculty of scientific reason; but that only a few have been brought by discipline and reflection *to its exercise*, this discipline being the very object of philosophic education.] These things being so, it must be acknowledged that there does exist on the one hand an ideal form, immutable, ingenerate, imperishable; not receiving into itself any external element whatever, nor passing into any thing else; invisible and to every sense imperceptible; and this it is the office of pure thought to contemplate: that on the other hand there is a second nature bearing the same name and similar to the former, perceptible by sense, generated, ever in motion, rising in a definite locality and thence again disappearing, apprehended by opinion with the aid of sensibility," (*δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως περιλῃπτόν.*) He then proceeds to describe that third species of being of which we have already spoken so much,—that which *receives* the sensible images of the eternal, and which, as we have already seen, he declares to be not an object of sense, nor yet properly an object

Δόξα, and their corresponding objects.

of reason, but perceived by a kind of spurious intelligence, and known only inferentially as presupposed in the existence of sensible phenomena. Finally, he condenses his account of these prerequisites of the physical or contingent and created universe in words with which I shall leave the subject:—"Here, then, is briefly my opinion: there exist, and existed before the formation of the universe, three distinct principles, Being, Place, and Production;" that is to say, the real which we know is essentially eternal, the nature which received the subsequent sensible creation, and the creative principle which was prepared, as it were, to project the eternal and invisible in the forms of time and sense. The chaotic confusion is then represented; and then the ordination of the whole by the interposition of a Supreme Intelligence.

One remark is useful here:—that, as some of these changes are conceived out of and beyond the sphere of time itself, whose date must commence with the first activity of the productive or genetic energy in framing a sensible system, they must be interpreted sometimes as mythical representations of metaphysical principles, (as perhaps the chaos itself,) sometimes as historical successions embodying the concatenation of logical conceptions. In reading Plato you will find it a rule of almost universal application to construe every thing in its most abstract form: he represents principles by instances, general formulas by particular cases; it is as if you had to study Algebra in a book of Arithmetic. And, unhappily, the necessity of reversing the process must inevitably make his commentator, however he labour to avoid it, much duller and drier than the original. These deductions, which in their grave scholastic form appear so arid and uninteresting, are in Plato thrown off with a sparkling vivacity that never suffers the attention to slumber, or expressed with a gracefulness of phrase and a delicate attention to the rhythmical

flow of periods, which, while it never sacrifices a particle of accuracy, while it is indeed far more minutely accurate than perhaps is possible in any living language, shows us that "divine Philosophy" in some of her severest exercises may indeed be made "not harsh and crabbed,

But musical as is Apollo's lute."

Plato's physical system.

Having now considered these *à priori* or purely metaphysical principles of creation, as Plato conceived them, we may descend into some account of the physical system itself. I must here again remind you of the object of the entire, the embodiment in the facts of creation of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator, by a representation ideal in its nature, but accommodated as nearly as might be to the evidence of experience. You are not to criticize the *Timæus* fresh from the observatory of Airy or the laboratory of Faraday; you are not to insult this venerable monument of early speculation by parading in its presence the accumulated wisdom of two-and-twenty centuries. The *Timæus* is a physical romance[5]

Its optimism.

[5] [This epithet is hardly stronger than some which Plato himself applies to his own work. "Whenever," he says, "the philosopher, in the intervals of his abstract dialectical inquiries, takes up by way of recreation the contemplation of mutable nature, and thus secures a pleasure which leaves no sting behind, he will enrich his life with a resource of amusement at once temperate and rational." *Tim.* 59, D. In physical inquiries, he more than once admits that analogy and probability (*τὴν τῶν εἰκότων μύθων ἰδέαν. Tim.* l. l.) are his only guides; for, says he, "Being is related to Becoming (the Absolute to the Contingent) as Truth to Belief: consequently, we must not marvel should we find it impossible to arrive at any certain and conclusive result in our speculations upon the creation of the visible universe and its authors; it should be enough for us if the account we have to give be as probable as any other, remembering that we are but men, and therefore bound to acquiesce in merely probable results, without looking for a higher degree of certainty than the subject admits of." (P.

with a mighty moral; to that moral all is subservient; and amid many paths through the labyrinth of phenomena the author always adopted that which seemed to lead most directly to his end. It is salutary, too, for us sometimes to humble our own pride at our modern advances in these studies, by remembering for how much, after all, we are indebted to that interposition of Providence which our ignorance calls chance: had the telescope been known in the days of Plato, Archimedes might have anticipated Newton.

Introduction of the notion of fitness and beauty.

In agreement with these views of the scope of the work, the main argument employed by Plato for all that lies beyond direct experience is confessedly drawn from his own conceptions of fitness. It is "better" that it should be so, more harmonious, more beautiful; and he candidly admits that if any one else can contrive a more perfect arrangement he will "welcome him, not as a foe, but as a friend."[6] In fact, you will remember that for the principal details of this system Plato was not himself answerable; they were the Pythagorean hypotheses,[7] and the exposition itself is by Plato put in the mouth of a Pythagorean philosopher, Timæus of Locri. It was therefore natural that he should not feel personally interested in the adoption of these physical opinions by his readers; while in treating the more speculative principles, those which were in his mind always connected with the stability of moral truth, we observe an earnestness and decision prominent amid the calm con-

29, D.) Accordingly, as if to disclaim the responsibility of the opinions put forth in the dialogue, instead of employing Socrates, the usual representative of his own views, he takes care to speak through the mouth of a stranger and a Pythagorean. ED.]

[6] [P. 54, A:—*ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐχθρὸς ὢν ἀλλὰ φίλος κρατεῖ.* ED.]

[7] [Mixed, however, with Heraclitean and Empedoclean notions. The fragments of Philolaus present many coincidences with parts of the *Timæus*, as indeed Stallbaum has pointed out. ED.]

jectural tone of the rest of the dialogue. It was in these latter that he was eminently Socratic, and eminently himself.

Among those opinions which may be regarded as holding a middle place between pure dialectic reasoning and direct observation, we may mention the conclusions which he proposes, at the opening of his exposition, with respect to the universe as a whole. Having already shown that it is unquestionably not eternal, as *sensible*, and therefore in a state of constant *generation*, and therefore dependent upon a cause[8] beyond itself, (a course of reasoning not very unlike that of Clarke upon the idea of necessary and contingent existence,) and having further established that it was formed after an eternal—not a created—exemplar, inasmuch as this supposition alone corresponds with a perfect world formed by the best of causes,—and having, as was formerly explained, pronounced the divine goodness to have been the sole motive of creation,—he advances to a proposition which at once displays the chasm between our modes of thinking and those of that early age: he declares the world endowed with intelligence, and this solely on the ground that the intelligent surpasses the unintelligent, and the universe must be perfect.[9] If, however, you remember the peculiarities of that earliest age of Greek philosophy through which I had the honor of conducting some of you in the course of last year, this idea will not appear novel or startling. The extension of the entire bodily and mental nature of man to a universe which visibly possessed one element of the compound was nothing new to the speculatists of that time: motion seemed to demand mental activity, and regularity of motion mental intelligence; and these sages seemed to conceive that the instance of the animal

[8] [P. 28, A:—*παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν. Ib.* B. ED.]

[9] [P. 30, A, fol. ED.]

creation evinced it to be more in accordance with the analogy of nature that the Divine Principle should everywhere create separate centres of intelligence and will than that it should itself be the sole mover of an inanimate immense. The boundless universe, then, was quickened with a spiritual essence, and all its parts with separate portions of mind: it and they lived as well as moved. That, reasoned the philosopher, which so manifestly makes the great glory of one part of the creation cannot surely be denied to the whole creation itself: the universe is not to be surpassed by any of its contents. You will, of course, recognise in this also the secret influence of polytheistic habits infecting the stream of thought even when guarded most laboriously from the stain.

The sensible universe a copy of the intelligible.

In this supposition, likewise, you will perhaps observe an exemplification, though doubtless one to our notions strange and inharmonious, of that great principle of the Platonic philosophy, its tendency to subordinate every thing to higher and higher generalizations, and to see in the universal system a scale of being without defect in the intervals and almost without limit to the ascent. The single vast Idea of the Universe contemplated by the Creator is supposed to possess in it every noble attribute which any of its contained objects possesses; it is the fountain from which their streams are derived; it possesses in fee that treasury of perfections of which they, as it were, inherit the use. This presiding intelligible form includes the other forms, as its sensible counterpart includes its sensible contents.

Ζῶα νοητὰ and ὁρατά.

"This," declares Timæus,[10] "contains all *intelligible* animals (*νοητὰ ζῶα*) in itself, just as this sensible world encloses us and all other *visible* animals, (*ζῶα ὁρατά.*) This evidently is not a mere logical

[10] [P. 30, c. ED.]

inclusion of species in a genus, in which case the universal genus would be successively stripped of all its perfections as it rose, and left at last in the bare solitude of abstract animality, but rather the inclusion of an inferior body of laws under a single comprehensive law, itself endowed with all the prerogatives and powers of every law beneath it. [I may observe, in passing, that this is one among many instances of the gross mistakes of those who identify the Ideas of Plato with mere logical abstractions.*] And, more especially, that, as there are examples of *life* in the various departments of creation, so is there a vast law or principle of life in the huge frame of the creation itself. This is, we may object, a most unwarrantable generalization; yet is it, in the supposed absence of all experimental confirmation, more intrinsically unreasonable to imagine that the life which moves a man may move the heavens,

The Platonic Ideal is not an abstraction, but a Law.

* It also seems possible that this theory may be otherwise (and, as many may think, more simply) interpreted. It may be intended to intimate that the Supreme Idea contains *really and physically* all the inferior attributes; according to the plan so observable in the disposition of species, while all seem to rise by regular progression above each other, not, however, by total differences, but each assuming into itself all the qualities beneath it and adding to them its own. This has often been shown as regards the portion of this boundless progression that lies within our experience. I conceive, however, that the other view is more accordant with the expressions of Plato in the passage itself, and with the genius of his philosophy. "God, determining to frame the world to resemble that which is fairest and most perfect among things intelligible, made it animated, visible, single, and including in itself all other animated beings, as of the same nature with itself." Besides, it certainly does *not* literally include all the properties of the animated natures its idea comprises,—for instance, as he shows soon after, either their irregularity and diversity of motion, or their sensitive organs. We must, then, regard this Idea of the Universal Animated Being as intimating, in the peculiar forms and phraseology of Platonism, that God has originally impressed upon the visible universe a principle of life and of intelligence of which all subordinate forms of motion and harmony are deductions and results.

than to imagine that the weight which makes an apple fall directs the planetary revolutions? Or if, as many of our best thinkers maintain, all origin and continuance of motion bespeaks a volition somewhere and somehow exerted, is it at all absurd to conceive that a special agent may be appointed to urge by direct energy of volition the moving systems of the universe? And if this agent be indissolubly connected with his department, under the disposition of Providence, shall there be much difference assignable between such an arrangement and the composition of an animated being? And, however this be determined, we may perhaps ask ourselves, with a sigh, whether it might not have been better if philosophy had preferred as its motive-principle life and intelligence pervading every region of creation, to the universal adoption of a purely mechanical principle, which, though decorously reserving a nominal first mover in the last resort, has already by the mouth of some of its highest organs boasted that it can do without that superfluous hypothesis? Unfortunately, it is the very genius of a physical science acting on that philosophy, to defer the "dignus vindice nodus" to the last moment; and I fear that with too many the "nec Deus intersit" has been accepted without the poet's qualifying injunction.

The Unity of the World.

The next principle delivered by Plato is one with which you can more readily accord. It is the *unity* of the world,—a conception which, indeed, is embodied in our very word *universe*. Plato reasons it out from his own principles, and in connection with the last article. He tells us that if the κόσμος or harmonized physical system has been formed on an exemplar, and if the exemplar contain within it all intelligible beings, the world can be but one.[11] "For this universally Comprehensive Intelligible Being cannot

[11] [P. 31, A. ED.]

admit any other collateral to itself, by the supposition: if it did, it would at once be necessary that it should sink from its universality and rank with that other under a vaster idea; and the universe would then be the copy not of the two, but of that which comprises them. The Divine Artist, then, made the universe neither plural nor infinite: he made it the finite image of real perfection, and single as that is single." In the same way of thought, he pronounces it not amenable to the infirmities of disease or age;[12] no evil can accede to it from external influences, for it involves all; it is therefore dissoluble only by the will of a Being too immutably wise and good ever to destroy that which wisdom and goodness alone have created. Beyond these characteristics, he conceives it fitting likewise to separate it by further distinctions from the inferior instances of animal existence. It is devoid of organs of sense, of the machinery of ingestion or egestion, of members adapted for motion. Its shape is strictly spherical,[13] as being the most regular, the most comprehensive, the fittest for even revolution; its rotation circular, as being that among the seven species of local motion which is the most nearly allied to *reason*, (*τὴν κίνησιν τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν*;) a singular ground, indeed, and at once placing us in the midst of the Pythagorism of Plato, but which is only one instance of the most abstruse principle pervading this system,—its representation of mental natures by mathematical relations. This brings us to the remarkable account of the composition of Soul,—of soul generically; for, though the passage seems peculiarly intended for the soul of the world, this itself is the type of all inferior souls. The soul of the universe is, in a manner, soul universally.

Soul is that which stands midway between the

[12] [*τέλεον καὶ ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον.* P. 33, A. ED.]

[13] [Ib. c. See the description of the *σφαῖρος* of Empedocles, vol i. p. 315, note (12.) ED.]

The Creation or composition of the Soul.

eternal and the contingent,—itself created, and yet the interpreter of the uncreate. We may suppose, then, that its substance in some mysterious way partakes of both; that, on the one hand, it is intimately associated with those eternal realities which its rational faculty apprehends, and, on the other, sufficiently congenial to the sensible to address itself to it likewise. For, in the profound meditations of the early sages on the nature of Truth, they met, we may be well assured, with the same difficulties which we encounter in our efforts to connect knowledge with reality, and those who did not identify both (by either raising knowledge itself into coincidence with reality, or lowering reality into the mere forms of mental knowledge) were content to say that there subsisted a perfect *resemblance* between both, an inward relation of complete analogy; for that "the like could only be known by the like." It seems to be in the spirit of this conviction that Plato, obtaining by reflective abstraction the primary elements of creation, conceived the soul as analogously formed: so that ultimately the knowing and the known might be traced to the same original basis, though in the actual state of the soul we are conscious of their distinctness. This very refined analysis I suppose to be the key of the perplexing passage[14] which relates the constitution of Soul. It runs thus:—"With the substance indivisible and ever subsisting the same, and with the substance divisible and concerned about bodies, he mingled a third form of substance intermediate between both these natures of same and different, and set it midway between the indivisible and the corporeally divisible; and then, taking these three things, he compounded them into one comprehensive idea, forcibly combining the intractable nature of the Different into union with that of the Same; and, having

[14] [*Tim.* p. 35, A:—where Stallbaum's note is worthy attention. ED.]

mingled these both with that mediate nature and formed of the three one, he divided the whole into suitable parts, so that each part involved in it the three constituents of same, different, and intermediate." He then proceeds to the divisions made in this *ψυχή*, which I shall presently notice. But in the mean time you cannot fail to perceive that these ingredients of the principle of soul are exactly the logical characteristics of the three elements of creation which already came under our review.[15]

Application of numerical relations to the soul.

As then the *substance* of soul is taken from the substance of the universe, so the *divisions* of soul are identified with the harmonies of the universe. The system of the heavenly bodies as Plato held it is represented (on the Pythagorean doctrine) by the intervals of the musical scale; and these intervals are given as distributions of the Soul of the World, this universal intelligence being thus regarded as one with his own incessant operations. This soul, being diffused through the entire frame, and energizing with equal vitality through every separate part of it, is described as *divided* among its distinct localities according to the proportions they bear to each other.

For the proportions selected for this geometrical division many reasons have been assigned. The intervals stated may be represented by the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27,—which constitute the diatonic scale of the ancients, composed of two disjoined tetrachords. Proclus considers that in the scale of *Timæus* an adumbration is intended of that triple nature of soul of which we have just spoken, —an arithmetical, a geometrical, and an harmonical proportion being discoverable in it. The numbers are evidently divisible into the two progressions 1, 2, 4, 8, and 1, 3, 9, 27; and Stallbaum[16] considers that the four terms

[15] [That is, with the principles denoted as *ταὐτόν*, *θάτερον* and *οὐσία*, or *τὸ συμμισγόμενον*. See note (1.) ED.]

[16] [Note to *Tim.* 35, B. ED.]

of each progression denote the degrees by which the soul arrives at the plenitude of existence, according to the mystical language of the Pythagorean school. It is more important to observe that the same proportion immediately reappears in the arrangement of the planetary orbits; in consonance with the supposition that these bodies are directed by laws accordant with those observable in the progression of the musical octave.

The Astronomy of the Timæus.

Thus the consideration of the vital and intelligent principle of the universe brings us to the very simple and inartificial astronomy of the *Timæus*. Eight concentric spheres are provided to bear in their revolutions the bodies affixed to their interior surface.[17] It is the first and simplest effort of hypothesis; yet how far below the diviner simplicity of Nature itself! *Timæus* first presents us with two vast spheres which embody the principles of same and different.* The outer sphere includes the innumerable multitude of the fixed stars. The interior sphere is subsequently divided by the Divine Artist into seven spheres, which revolve with various velocities and in various directions. The earth is placed in the centre, and the moon, the sun, and the five planets, with the still mightier sphere of the stars beyond them, move in measured harmony around it. The central position and the immovability of the earth seem to be both asserted and implied; but one expression has offered too fair a ground for contesting this point to have failed of becoming one of the battle-fields of criticism. Plato speaks of the earth as "whirled around the pole of the universe," (*εἱλλομένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον.*) Aristotle accordingly accuses him of holding

[17] [P. 36, c. See the diagram in Stallbaum's note. ED.]

* We are informed that the Demiurgic Father first divided the mysterious composition before stated into two parts or lines, placed these lines so as to intersect obliquely, (as the equinoctial and ecliptic,) bent them into circles, and then set them to revolve.

the heresy of the earth's rotation; but I fear that that honourable accusation can scarcely be substantiated. A solitary passage susceptible of other explanations[18] cannot be admitted against the entire tone of the expressions of Plato; nor can this supposition be conciliated with the declared motion of the other spheres, which alone suffice to account for the phenomena contemplated. "Hoc etiam," says Cicero, after stating the opinion of Hicetas of Syracuse, ["neque, præter terram, rem ullam in mundo moveri, quæ cum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quasi stante terra cœlum moveretur,"]—"Hoc etiam Platonem in Timæo dicere quidam arbitrantur, *sed paulo obscurius.*"[19] The notice of Hicetas, though so incidentally introduced by Cicero, bore its fruits in future ages. Copernicus declares that it was this memorable sentence which first led him to speculate on the mobility of the earth. But antiquity does not recognise in Plato a supporter of this doctrine,—which, nevertheless, he might have obtained from the speculations of Philolaus, an inheritor of the opinions of Pythagoras. But higher claims than these have been advanced on behalf of the *Timæus*. It has been argued that the harmonic proportions of the universal soul nearly agree with the true distances of the planets from the sun, and that Plato not merely held the rotation on the axis but the revolution in the orbit; that thus the spheral music was itself only a mystical and ambiguous expression of profounder truth.* Aristotle and Plutarch attri-

[18] [The controversy turns upon the interpretation of the word *εἰλλομένην*, which may either mean "revolving," or "circumvolved,"—*i.e.* wrapped or fastened, round the pole or axis. Stallb. on p. 40, B. ED.]

[19] [*Acad. Pr.* ii. 39, 123. ED.]

* I confess this notion appears to me altogether incredible, being inconsistent, not only with the order of orbs mentioned in the *Timæus* itself, but also with the general strain of the writings of Plato. (See *Phædo*, near the end.

bute to the Pythagoreans certain beliefs respecting the motion of the earth; the dark saying of Philolaus is still preserved, that "the earth and moon revolve, like the sun, around a central fire," (for it appears that this philosopher held that the sun we behold was but an optical image of an interior luminary;) and Plutarch from Theophrastus records the report that Plato in his latter days was said to have regretted not having displaced the earth from the centre of the system. These faint gleams of ancient science have caught the observation and interested the inquiries of many historians of astronomy; but the indecision of expressions, the fragmentary character of the notices, and the veil of purposed obscurity which unfortunately conceals so much of the choicest wisdom of early ages, unite to render any satisfactory conclusion almost hopeless.

Subsequent modifications of the Platonic Astronomy by Eudoxus and others.

The hypothesis of solid concentric spheres was calculated for indefinite expansion; and, accordingly, these auxiliaries of the imagination were soon multiplied beyond their original number. The difficulty of accounting for the direct, retrograde, and stationary positions of the planets induced Eudoxus, a pupil of Plato, to attempt a further complication. In order to escape the apparent improbability of such a variety of motions in each of the planetary spheres, Eudoxus imagined the addition of three spheres to each, in such an order that the body itself revolved in the lowest, and the three above it presided over the diversity of its motions. The nearest to the planet had an oscillatory motion which it communicated to the sphere of the body itself, and this occasioned the direct, retrograde, and stationary movements: the next communicated the daily, the highest the annual, revolutions. Three spheres were thought sufficient to account for the motion of the sun, and as many were assigned to the moon,—which, with the sphere of the fixed stars,

made the number twenty-seven. Callippus was dissatisfied with any allowance under thirty-four, and Aristotle could not undertake to enclose the phenomena in any number of spheres below fifty-six. Augmentations even beyond these were thought necessary in subsequent ages; but in the mean time another system had arisen, that of which Apollonius is said to have been the author, and which, improved by Hipparchus, we have received under the title of the Ptolemaic,—a system cumbrous and complicated indeed, but recommended by many advantages above the former. I am not now, however, to enter into the detailed history of it or of its successors. The slight notice already presented is merely meant to exemplify the inevitable progress of hypothesis. A system invented to comprehend a few facts is burdened with more and more accessories as new facts appear; nature swells beyond the measure of its artificial bondage; custom and imagination are still unwilling to alter fundamentally the greater lineaments of the portraits they have so long cherished; accordingly, the system continues to live until too heavy to bear its own weight,—that is, until the explanations become almost as numerous as the facts to be explained. The imagination at this point finds no help in the hypothesis, and deserts it. "Systems," says Adam Smith,[20] in one of his many passages of happy illustration,—"Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little system, created to perform as well as to connect together in reality those different movements and effects which the artist has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine, invented to connect together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in reality performed. The machines that

A. Smith's remarks on the early physical systems.

[20] [*Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, p. 44. Most of the foregoing statements come from the same source. ED.]

are at first invented to perform any particular movement are always the most complex; and succeeding artists generally discover that with fewer wheels, with fewer principles of motion, than had been originally employed, the same effects may be more easily produced. The first systems, in the same manner, are always the most complex, and a particular connecting chain or principle is generally thought necessary to unite every two seemingly-disjointed appearances: but it often happens that one great connecting-principle is afterwards found to be sufficient to bind together all the discordant phenomena that occur in a whole species of things. How many *wheels* are necessary to carry on the movements of this imaginary machine, the system of eccentric spheres! The westward diurnal revolution of the firmament, whose rapidity carries all the other heavenly bodies along with it, requires one. The periodical eastward revolutions of the sun, moon, and five planets require for each of these bodies another. Their differently accelerated and retarded motions require that those wheels or circles should neither be concentric with the firmament nor with one another; which more than any thing seems to disturb the harmony of the universe. The retrograde and stationary appearance of the five planets, as well as the extreme inconstancy of the moon's motion, require for each of them an epicycle, another little wheel attached to the circumference of the great wheel, which still more interrupts the uniformity of the system. The motion of the apogeum of each of those bodies requires in each of them still another wheel to carry the centres of their eccentric spheres round the centre of the earth. And thus this imaginary machine, though perhaps more simple and certainly better adapted to the phenomena than the fifty-six planetary spheres of Aristotle, was still too intricate and complex for the imagination to rest in it with complete tranquillity and satisfaction."

I return to the *Timæus*. You will perceive that the fundamental conception which sustains all the Platonic or Pythagorean opinions on the cosmical arrangements is that the universal soul is to be the medium between the eternal and the successive, and therefore to have its roots in both. The Deity forms it, but he forms it of those elements which lie at the foundation of the real and the apparent, of same and different: since it is to address itself to both, it must have some original affinity for both. Now, the first grand development of these opposite attributes of soul is conceived to be the arrangement of the magnificent framework of the universe: this is the universal *type* of active intelligence; and here, therefore, in their simplest exhibition, will be found the two presiding characteristics of soul. When from this *à priori* conception the Platonist descended to inspect the facts, he found that the few then known could be without much difficulty organized as a sensible manifestation of the primary metaphysical principles already elicited; as manifestations, that is, of principles that may be said to form the *very substance of intelligence itself*. He therefore expressed the harmonies of the heavens as reducible in the last analysis to the two original principles of intelligence, the categories of sameness and difference, of permanence and change; and, inasmuch as soul was not only cognitive but active, not only an intelligence but an energy, and thus vitally present in each of its functions, he expressed the measurements of these harmonious motions as distributions of the very soul that quickened and preserved them. The proper interest to our age of such speculations is of course altogether metaphysical; we have long outgrown the cosmical hypothesis in which the conceptions were embodied; but the profound questions which arise out of these conceptions themselves are still as pregnant with interest as ever to all reflecting spirits, and the wither-

ing breath of oblivion which has passed over the mere astronomy of the *Timæus* has left its speculative philosophy as fresh and as attractive as in the days of the old Locrian himself. You will now, I trust, be prepared to enter into the purport of the following passage, which succeeds the account of the geometrical division of soul.[21]

Combination of soul with body.

"The whole composition of the soul being completed according to the design of its composer, he, after this, constructed all the bodily nature within it, and, fitting centre to centre, united them; but the soul, diffused from the middle to the uttermost bounds of creation, and investing the whole circularly from without, introduced a revolution on itself, the divine principle[22] of incessant and intelligent life to last forever. The body of the world is visible, the soul invisible; participating of reason and of the harmony of beings intelligible and eternal, it is the most perfect of all such beings as the Perfect Being has formed. Now, since it is composed of these three elements,—the same, the different, and the mediate "substance,"—divided and combined according to proportion, and returning circularly on itself, whenever it meets any thing essentially divisible, or any thing essentially indivisible, moved through its whole self, it pronounces with what any substance is identical, and from what it differs, why, and where, and how, and when, it happens that any thing either is or suffers in relation to any thing else through the whole sphere both of the created and of the eternal. Now, Reason, which is *true* when conversant with the immutable, may be engaged with both the changeable and the immutable; and when, borne along in its own silent course, it meets a sensible object,

[21] [*Tim.* p. 36, D, fol. ED.]

[22] [*θείαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο*, "began the divine commencement," "divinum fecit initium." ED.]

and the circle of difference in its regular function transmits the message to the entire soul, then are generated *opinions and beliefs firm and true:* but when, on the contrary, it is engaged with the rational, and the revolving circle of sameness declares it to the soul, intelligence and scientific knowledge necessarily result. But if any man shall say that these things are anywhere but *in the soul* produced, he shall speak what is utterly erroneous." Nothing can be more plain than that in this description the universal soul is the type of soul in general; that its circles of sameness and difference are but representatives, in the language of that celestial system with which it is directly connected, of the faculties of belief and knowledge, πίστις and νόησις, which Plato so carefully separates in the human soul, and which he evidently conceived to be the appropriate and necessary faculties of every description of soul, when once placed in relation with a phenomenal or sensible system, the image of one invisible or eternal. But this may appear more distinctly when in the next Lecture, passing from these inevitably abstruse deductions, I proceed to the Psychology of Plato, to his views of the substance, properties, prerogatives, and fortunes of the human soul.

LECTURE III.

THE SAME SUBJECT, (*continued*)—THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PLATO.

GENTLEMEN:—

Platonic Physics, concluded.

As I have already stated to you, it is not within my plan to enter at any length into the details of the system of the natural phenomena offered by Plato. For those who are interested in tracing the history of the physical sciences, the *Timæus* presents a rich magazine of ancient speculations, if not upon the anatomical construction, (in which it is brief and imperfect,) at least upon the objects and adaptation, of the parts of the human body; as well as upon the arrangement of the "elements," as they were called, and the productions of the more striking appearances of external nature. To enumerate these particulars would only be to transcribe the work itself, which is easily within your reach, and the language of which could scarcely be abridged. But even if I could succeed in condensing and methodizing the entire of these details, the result would only be to lead me away from my object in these sketches, which is to catch and portray the features and expression of the Platonic habits of thought, and to represent the opinions of this great master upon those questions of eternal interest which no variation in the science of the visible creation can ever antiquate, no successes in that field of investigation ever supersede. I know, gentlemen, that these discussions can scarcely hope to be popular: I avow that I cannot rid you of the burdensome necessity of patient meditation, if you

would think as Plato thought: the depths of the ocean cannot sparkle with the glitter of the surface, nor the student who would enter into the regions of the φιλοσοφία τοῦ ὄντος, the philosophy of the real and absolute, expect to be entertained with the brilliant varieties of the last new theory of association or of taste. To Plato himself almost alone of mankind belonged the gift of conveying the profoundest truths in the most airy vehicle of fancy, of being livelier among ideal abstractions than most men could contrive to be in the scenes of a romance; yet even Plato himself has in some respects suffered by this very perfection. The forms of Grecian art are too exquisitely wrought for our dull sensibilities; the parallel motion of philosopher and poet is too rapid and perplexing for our slow faculties; we cannot read the two languages together; we mutilate this mighty mind to bring it within our grasp, and, vexed at feeling that the life has evaporated, take revenge by talking of it as the mind of a dreamer and a phantast. In truth, there never were pages less marked by the negligent vagueness of reverie than those of Plato: the severest control governs his highest flights,—the sublimity is ever in the substance of the thoughts, not in their accidental connections; nor is there a sentence of what a modern critic would call *declamation* from beginning to end of his writings. Serenest when loftiest, he rises without effort or perceptible motion.

> "Ye cannot see
> The stirring of his wings; and yet he soars!"

These singular perfections, however, are the excellencies of a Greek, and, of all Greeks, the special excellency of Plato. The lecturer's work of cold analysis is necessarily very different: he cannot even lay the body itself on his dissecting-table, when though lifeless it would at least be entire; he must take it limb by limb, and the limb itself few can recognise after it has been disfigured

to be exposed, and its external result of beauty lost in tracing out its tissues and arteries.

The four elements according to Plato;

I shall not, therefore, attempt any minute account of the merely hypothetical explanations which Plato gives us of the arrangement of the elements and their original constitution. He obtains the four elements by arguing that corporeal nature was meant to be visible and tangible;[1] that fire was necessary for the former, (a supposition, by-the-way, countenanced by those late interesting investigations which seem to establish that light and heat are really modes of the same original essence, rays of heat being light invisible, and light caloric visible,) and earth, the principle of solidity, necessary for tactual grasp. But between these very different natures it is fitting that some connecting medium or media should intervene; and Plato shows by some geometrical considerations, which, however, have rather perplexed his commentators, that the most perfect arrangement is that in which two proportionals are inserted; so that fire may be to air as air is to water, and air to water as water to earth.[2]

their geometrical forms.

He subsequently enters into their mathematical construction, in the spirit of the Italic school, and decides it primarily on the principle of beauty. The pyramid is assigned to the particles of fire, the cube to those of earth, the octahedron to air, the icosahedron to water. The reasons for these distinctions are of course altogether fanciful: yet in the course of the exposition conjectures not wholly unlike truth occur; and it is impossible in reading it not to conceive with what pleasure Plato would have entered into the modern law of definite proportions, and still more, perhaps, into the striking and beautiful phenomena of crystallization. In such cases as these, where ancient hypotheses are con-

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[1] [*Tim.* p. 31, B–32, C. ED.] [2] [Ib. p. 53, C–56, C. ED.]

trasted with modern discoveries, and the reality found so far to excel the anticipation, it is instructive to regard the difference between the moral and the purely intellectual in man. In his moral being, it is the tendency of awakened man to aspire perpetually after a perfection which this world does not concede him, and even out of his own preconceptions of the just and the good to faintly dare to shadow a scene infinitely surpassing it; and reason and revelation alike encourage him in the noble and elevating occupation: in the sphere of simple fact, the object of his observing and theorizing faculties, on the contrary, the construction of imaginary worlds on principles of supposed perfection, if intended to satisfy the reason, is discountenanced by reason itself, while even piety bids us beware how we risk degrading that workmanship which all experience perpetually proves to rise beyond the utmost ingenuity and harmony of our best ideal constructions. And, could I believe that the very imperfect system delineated by Plato was ever meant by him to be the last term of physical speculation, I should judge him strictly amenable to this censure: every thing about it, however, seems to me to mark his clear conviction that he walked among the obscurities of conjecture, and that his attempts at theoretical representation of phenomena were only valuable as they seemed to exemplify in a vivid form what might be the real wisdom and benevolence of the Deity. You will remember also what was the actual position and vocation of true philosophy at this period. Schools existed, — popular and fashionable schools, — crowded by all that was influential and eminent in Greece, in which every principle of moral and religious truth was systematically undermined. Among other devices of this unholy warfare, the physical universe itself was raised into a fortress from which hea-

General remarks upon the physical speculations of Plato,

viewed in relation, first to current philosophical opinions;

ven might be stormed. The evidences of design in its structure were questioned; its existence attributed to necessity, to destiny, to caprice, to chance.[3] Under the pressure of these circumstances, something should be done, and speedily: to wait until full certainty should be attained was to wait for the lapse of ages. The instructor of the public mind had only to take the best account that thoughtful men had till then been able to devise; to insist upon such instances as appeared least questionable; to attire the rest in the most becoming dress, and so to arrange the whole as to leave upon the mind of his reader the ideas of order and beneficence deeply and distinctly impressed. And, as he would be obliged to admit the public religion of his country in its chief elements, his object would be so to represent polytheism as to give the moral effect of monotheism, by classing the received gods as the subjects and deputies of the Supreme, all animated by a single purpose derived from him, and moving together in harmony of will and action. For it is clear that the great moral evil of polytheism consists, not in it merely as polytheism, but in its defect of subordination among its deities, and its tendency to admit private interests, personal preferences, and even positive hostilities, among them. This Plato himself bitterly felt and lamented; and the diffusion of such debasing tenets among the mass of the people formed one of his prominent and constant charges against the popular poetry of his country. Against this doctrine of divine dissension he has forcibly and unreservedly argued in the *Euthyphron*;[4] and we can easily conceive that, while on the one hand the belief of rivalry among the presiding deities must at once destroy all the religious foundations

and secondly, to the popular religious creed.

[3] [See the tenth Book of the *Laws*, p. 889, A. ED.]

[4] [P. 8, A, fol. ED.]

of morality, on the other, the belief of their common animation by a single spirit and purpose, their conjunction in the same strict principles of right and wrong, must unconsciously infuse into the mind the very spirit of monotheism itself,—the standard in which they agree becoming in a manner the deity of the reason, and the several divinities becoming to the hopes and fears the avenging and rewarding ministers of that Supreme and Eternal Law. But this process becomes still more simple and certain when, as with Plato, the Supreme is clearly represented on the stage of creation, and the deities[5] (even Jupiter,[6] the governing divinity of the poetical and popular mythology) are classed as the descendants of powers included within that creation itself. Such, then, on the whole, seems to me the historical position and design of the *Timæus;* and to estimate fairly the execution you must remember the age and the purpose. I shall only add, lest my own selections should do injustice to the philosopher, that in the course of the work the instances of design are really taken in far the greater number from the most accessible, and what Paley, and Socrates himself, both agreed to be the most convincing, department of nature,—the organized animal creation. The few references I have made have been chosen with a different view,—in illustration of the purely speculative philosophy of Plato; with which view it is also that I now proceed to consider and generalize the principal opinions of Plato regarding the nature and destinies of the human soul.

The Platonic Psychology:

"If," said Socrates, "there be any thing about man that partakes of divine, it is the soul."[7]

[5] [*Tim.* p. 40, A. ED.]

[6] [Ib. 40, E. ED.]

[7] [*Legg.* v. init.:—*πάντων τῶν αὐτοῦ κτημάτων μετὰ θεοὺς ψυχὴ θειότατον.* ED.]

This brief sentence may stand as the text of the whole Platonic psychology. The spirit that animates the entire of his many and diversified references to this subject, whether they be general or detailed, is ever the same,—the conviction, deep and ineffaceable, that there is a principle in man which manifestly separates itself from the rest of his nature and internally proclaims an essence kindred with the skies. The whole force of his genius is bent to clear and confirm this conviction; to it, directly or indirectly, he perpetually returns; it is assumed in every dialogue in which it is not argued. And yet it is unquestionable that, though he has fortunately left us some imperishable memorials of the grounds of his belief, considerable obscurity still hangs over his opinions on some parts of the subject,—an obscurity arising partly, we may suppose, from his disinclination to speak dogmatically upon matters which he could not but feel were, without direct revelation, inevitable uncertainties, and partly from the very different periods of a long life in which his dialogues were meditated and written. The most striking of these instances in which we are still left in some doubt as to his real sentiments occurs in the very opening of the subject.

1st, as set forth in the Timæus;

Plato informs us[8] that, after the Supreme Being had created the visible and the invisible gods, he commanded them to frame the animated natures of the earth, but that in doing so he reserved to himself the formation of that portion of their being which deserved the name of immortal, "to be entitled divine, and serve as guide to all who would follow justice;" that accordingly the Father of the universe composed this diviner portion of the remainder of that mysterious substance of which the soul of the world had been already formed, but of an essence, from

[8] [*Tim.* 41, A. ED.]

some unexplained cause, much less refined.[9] This mythical representation embodies the doctrine that the soul of man, and (it would appear) that of all animals, are of the same nature with the universal soul, though of inferior excellence,—a point of view in which we have already in the last Lecture contemplated the subject; that, though of the same kind and family, they are individually distinct from it and from each other; and consequently that the notion of ultimate *absorption*,*

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[9] [*ἀκήρατα δ' οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀλλὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα.* Ib. D. ED.]

* The opinion of Warburton, who ascribes this notion of the derivation of the souls of men from the divine essence and their final resolution into it, to all the ancient philosophers without exception, is, I think, quite unsupported in the case of Platonism, as it came from the hands of Plato himself. Plato may, in the last analysis, have embraced all things in some mysterious unity,—an idea which in *some* vague sense it seems impossible for human reason to avoid; but, as far as he professes to trace the fortunes of the souls of men, he seems to me to see them distinct to the end, even when most closely combined with those great realities of the Ideal World with which their origin is so intimately blended. I have already attempted to show what appears the true foundation of the Platonic theory of the constitution of soul,—viz.: the mysterious oneness of truth and knowledge which naturally led to deriving the *rational* element of the Soul (the element that *knows*, that possesses the faculty of *νόησις*) from the *real* element in things, (the element that *is*, the *νούμενον*;) and in the original, the final, and, though imperfectly, the present, state of that rational element, he, doubtless, conceived it united with its object in an eternal conjunction or even identity. But though Intelligence and its correlative Intelligibles were, and are, thus combined, the soul is *more* than pure intelligence: it possesses an element of personality and consciousness distinct to each individual, of which we have no reason to suppose, from any thing his writings contain, Plato ever meant to deprive it. [It is thus we must explain the Platonic doctrine that the number of souls in the universe is constant. *Rep.* X. 611, A:—(*ψυχαὶ*) *ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί, οὔτε γὰρ ἂν που ἐλάττους γένοιντο μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυμένης, οὔτε αὖ πλείους, εἰ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλέον γίγνοιτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνοιτο, καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα.* This number is elsewhere defined to be that of the stars. (*Tim.* 41, D.) Whimsical as this may seem, it is at least con-

so often ascribed to Plato, is really without foundation in his theory.

2dly, in the Phædrus.

However, when from this account of the soul just recited—of the soul "the most excellent of generated beings"—we turn to the *Phædrus* which you know is supposed to have been the earliest offspring of the genius of Plato, we find an account not easy to reconcile with the above, an account which seems to attribute to the soul an essential eternity of nature.

Apparent discrepancy in the two dialogues.

Plato here argues[10] that the soul, as self-moving, is a *Principle* of motion; that a principle cannot be produced any more than it can be destroyed. Not produced, for it would then no longer be a principle, no longer the self-dependent source of its own energy; not destroyed, for if so the whole existence of things, which rests on first principles of production, might cease. "If then," he concludes, "all which is the source of its own motion is soul, assuredly the soul can have neither commencement nor termination."

That this profound argument is truly applicable to the First Principle of the Universe, no one can justly deny; and accordingly in an elaborate exposition in the tenth book of *Laws*[11] Plato admirably applies it to the proof of the existence of God; but in that very discussion he draws a marked distinction between the divine and human forms of the moving-principle, and suspends the continuance of created souls upon the will and wisdom of the Deity. I do not pretend that I can throw any decisive light upon this great difficulty. I will remark,

Its probable solution.

however, that Plato himself describes the Soul as formed of pre-existing materials; the demi-

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clusive against the absorption-theory, which indeed there is otherwise no pretext for attributing to Plato. ED.]

[10] [*Phædr.* p. 245, C:—*ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον, κ. τ. λ.* ED.]

[11] [Pp. 892, A, 894, B, fol. ED.]

urge in the *Timæus* is not the framer of either the material or mental universe out of *nothing*,—an idea, perhaps, not much embraced by the Platonic habits of thought. In the *Timæus* at least we contemplate him as intelligent and active; not as literally *creative* in our sense of the expression. But if the soul was conceived to have been the result of a composition of previous elements, and if, as we know, one of these elements (that which Plato calls "The Same") is always by him represented as eternal in the strictest sense, we may, perhaps, venture to imagine that in uniting these notions we shall have obtained some conception of the manner in which he might have contemplated the human soul as a generated being in its actual manifestations and personal history, and yet as in its ultimate constitution a principle essentially eternal. That which in the passage of the *Phædrus* is called the Principle of Self-motion ought probably to be generalized as the principle of self-determination ;[12] for motion was, in the Greek philosophic phraseology, a word almost indiscriminately applied to every species of change. Now, the self-determining principle in man is rationally inferrible from the conception of duty, (as Kant has so nobly demonstrated:)[13] if, then, the immutable element of the soul styled by Plato "the Same" be, as I have in the last Lecture supposed, the part of the Soul which corresponds to the objective "Same,"—that is, to the intelligible world,—and if, as we well know, the noblest furniture of that eternal scene was believed by Plato to be the idea of Moral Rectitude, it is not too overstrained to conceive that in this way not merely the faculty of beholding the intelligible, but the ground of the self-directing energy,

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[12] [See Ibid. 896, E :—ταῖς (ψυχῆς) κινήσεσιν . . . ὀνόματά ἐστι βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ. ED.]

[13] [*Pract. Vernunft*, i. th. ED.]

might have been involved by Plato in the element of the soul whose foundations lay in Eternity.*

This doctrine of the Eternity of the Rational and Moral[14] Elements of Soul appears more repulsive than, perhaps, it ought fairly to do, in consequence of not being accompanied by an appropriate conception of the Platonic eternity itself. As long as we regard this great Idea as merely an indefinite extension of time with its past, present, and future, the notion of the anterior eternity of soul will perhaps startle us as something altogether imaginary and incredible. But I have already remarked that Plato had risen into a very clear apprehension of the inapplicability of these relations of successive existence to the ideal sphere of being.[15] And as succession was refused to these mighty essences, (the Ideas,) so the notion of succession to the contemplative element of the soul; for the contemplation of immutability to our own experience destroys the perception of time, and the transcendent glories of the ideal scene presented in one unchangeable picture to that soul would be independent

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* We should, however, again observe, with respect to the notion of "absorption," that even this supposition—the eternity of the self-determining *Principle*—still leaves us perfectly distinct the conscious personal *exercise* of that principle, and thus saves the felt individuality of each soul now and forever.

[14] [The eternity of the "rational element" is an undoubted Platonic doctrine. But from *Tim.* 41, c, it would also appear that Plato conceived the *emotive* part, in both its divisions of *θυμὸς* and *ἐπιθυμία*, to be mortal. The word "Moral" in the text must therefore be understood as excluding these principles,—a restriction to which Plato would scarce have assented. For he perceived clearly that the pure reason is powerless against the appetites, unless allied with the principle he calls Θυμός,—a feature in his system which distinguishes it alike from the empirical rationalism of Socrates and the transcendental rationalism of Kant. ED.]

[15] [*Tim.* p. 37, E:—*τό τ' ἦν τό τ' ἔσται χρόνου . . . εἴδη, ἃ δὴ φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀίδιον οὐσίαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς. λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἦν ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσται, τῇ δὲ τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει.* ED.]

of the aids of memory to recover the past, and thus intrude the notion of successive existences. The Soul, therefore, in its elements of rationality and freedom, has existed anterior to time, because it now and essentially exists in eternity. In these respects it knows no past, present, or future: it is, as the *Phædrus* declares, a principle uncommenced and interminable.

Still, it may be asked how the notion of *Creation* can be properly applied to an essence thus supposed in certain respects self-existent. And to this I can only repeat my impression that Plato meant to apply the fact of Creation, or, as he calls it, *Generation* by the divine Father, not directly to the soul in its primitive elements, but to the soul in its *manifestation* as the mediate nature between the eternal and sensible. The Universal Soul, we have seen, may be regarded as the type of soul in general, having all those prerogatives in the highest and amplest degree which appertain to soul essentially, and which in inferior degrees characterize every separate instance of soul throughout the universe. Now, that universal soul is on one side linked with eternity, formed of that ineffable element which constitutes the real or immutable, and beyond which is nothing,—on the other side linked with the sensible and contingent, being formed of that element which is purely relative and phenomenal. The office of the Demiurgus or Creator was simply to combine these elements into the state in which they are actually presented, and thus to give a definite and positive existence, in a conjunctive form, to ingredients already prepared. When the mysterious compound is thus projected into the sphere of positive existence, the elements will still preserve indefeasible the rights of their eternal ancestry; and thus a soul, which *as* a soul owes its being and its continuance to the wisdom and beneficence of that Almighty Disposer and Parent of whom it was the first-born offspring, may yet recognise in itself the essential

powers of a *Principle*, and know that, whether in its faculty of pure intelligence or in its corresponding faculty of self-determination, it lies out of the ever-varying circle of sense, is so far the subject of no direct causation, and transcends the world of successive duration.

This portion of the soul, accordingly, it is to which Plato has assigned a proper immortality, and whose present state he believed bore manifest indications equally of a prior and a future perpetuity. The rest of its characteristics he ascribed to its junction with the body; and he clearly intimates that the object of this temporary connection was the establishment of a state of moral discipline and probation. He describes (and of course you will understand these descriptions as mainly intended for *picturesque* forms of metaphysical truth, philosophy in the dress of narrative) the souls which were to be distributed through the universe as first distributed among the stars, one to each, and the Deity as unfolding to these souls the irreversible decrees of the universal system, which consist mainly of the law of moral trial and the transmigration through various bodily vehicles of such as lose their original purity, until, after a period more or less protracted, they become fitted to recover their primal state in the star to which each has been first associated.[16]

The philosophical doctrines of the eternal existence of the free and rational elements of the soul, of the possibility and propriety of the conjunction of the soul with a variety of successive bodily organizations, and of the object of the whole arrangement,—the manifestation of the final triumph of the good over the evil principle,—these doctrines rest on their own evidence, whatever that may be, and should be carefully separated from all that mass of imaginative representation and ornament with

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[16] [*εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου πορευθεὶς οἴκησιν ἀστρου. Tim.* p. 42, B. ED.]

which in the Platonic dialogues they are combined. Nothing can be more unjust, or indeed more wearisome, than the clumsy criticisms of those unsympathizing judges of Plato who, unable to rise to the habitual elevation of his thoughts, or unable to breathe in an atmosphere so rare when they have attained it, content themselves with watching his flight through their critical telescopes from below, and registering with painful minuteness every golden cloud he pours around his path, as a solid body which he is establishing in his system. The "Homerus philosophorum," as Cicero[17] calls him, loves to see every thing flush with the colours of pure and solemn poetry: standing forever in front of the changeless and eternal, his spirit is filled with the exceeding awfulness of the presence; and, when he would speak, his thoughts swell into the strong rapture of a hymn. And *why*, upon yet profounder motives, he purposely sought thus to engage the Imagination as well as the Reason, and deemed both efforts equally his duty, we may, perhaps, hereafter inquire, when in the last section of the subject we examine the single grand object of his entire labours. It is enough here to remind you that it will be necessary to interpret constantly for yourselves the profuse language of mythological representation into the simpler dialect of scientific truth.

The anterior state of the soul, and its fall, according to Plato in the Phædrus.

To this class of imaginative shadowings of moral truth belong nearly all the descriptions which Plato has given us of the actual occupations of the soul of man prior to its present earthly existence,—descriptions which are all meant for those who can penetrate beyond the veil of imagery, and which are intentionally thrown into a form as remote as possible from scientific exposition. He constantly warns us of this. "To explain," he de-

[17] [Rather *Panætius*, whom Cicero quotes. *Tusc. Qu.* i. c. 32. ED.]

clares, "what the soul is in itself would require a science divine, and prolonged disquisitions; but, to give an idea by the way of comparison, human science is enough, and there is no need of many words." It is after making this admonition that he proceeds to present one of the most elaborate of all these allegories. It is that in the *Phædrus* in which he has described under the most brilliant and varied colourings the prior state, and the fall, of the spirit of man; a passage curious and important on many accounts, and not least on this,—that it evinces how early[18] in the annals of Plato's philosophical life the main features of his system were fixed, and thus seems to indicate that these outlines must have been, however rudely, sketched in some of the philosophies (especially, doubtless, the Pythagorean) with which he was at that time conversant. As to the doctrines of pre-existence and transmigration, these we know were Egyptian and Pythagorean: the chief question of interest regards the connection of *the Ideal Theory* with these antique traditions, which in themselves, and probably in the old Egyptian conception of them, wore rather a physiological than metaphysical aspect. And unfortunately Plato's own singular modesty (which, in spite of ancient scandal, strongly marks his writings) puts it still more out of our power to determine the exact amount of his contributions of doctrine abso-

The allegory of the chariot and horses.

[18] [I have already intimated my dissent from the popular tradition which represents the *Phædrus* as the first-born of Plato's genius. Cicero's authority may fairly be held as of equal weight with that of the Peripatetics, with whom the report seems to have originated. For those who know Cicero will not easily believe that he wrote without book, when, in reference to the notice of Isocrates, "on the last page of the *Phædrus*," he observed, "Hæc de adolescente Socrates auguratur. At ea *de seniore* scribit Plato, et scribit æqualis, et quidem, exagitator omnium rhetorum, hunc miratur unum."—*Orator.* c. 13, § 41. The vulgar tradition cannot have been unknown to the learned Academician, nor would he have contradicted it without some reason. ED.]

lutely novel to the general fund of thought; his usual practice being to assign his sentiments to others,—to Socrates, to Parmenides, to even the Sophists. All this dramatic personation was of course well understood in his own age among the literary circles of Athens; and his contemporaries and successors seem, assuredly, to have agreed that wherever he touched he superseded all who had gone before him in the same walk; but whether the miracle was achieved by absolute creation or by new and felicitous combination of previous materials,—by bestowing what men never possessed, or by teaching them the unsuspected value of what they had,—this it remains in many respects difficult to decide.

I shall give you the passage to which I have alluded. You may find some interest in comparing its picturesque and symbolical imagery with the grave account which Bishop Butler in the fifth chapter of his "Analogy" gives of the course of temptation by which persons "made upright may fall." The substance of these very different forms of deduction is not itself very different; for the "particular propensions" hostile to conscience in the Bishop's argument are personified in the unmanageable courser of the allegory I proceed to translate.

"Let us compare," he says,[19] "the soul (in its original state) to the combined energies of a winged equipage and a charioteer. The coursers and the charioteers of the gods are all noble and nobly sprung; but those of other natures are very various. With us men, for example, the charioteer does indeed direct the equipage; but of the coursers one is well proportioned and well bred, the other quite the opposite; from whence it results that the work of guiding the chariot is exceedingly difficult. And here we may explain the difference between the mortal and immortal species. Soul in general

[19] [*Phædr.* p. 246, fol. ED.]

presides over lifeless nature and makes the voyage of the universe under many forms. As long as it is in perfection, and preserves its wings in all their vigour, it traverses the ethereal regions and governs the whole world; but, when its wings fail, it is carried at random until at length it falls upon and attaches itself to something solid, and thenceforward remains there. It is thus that we call the union of soul and body a living being, this body appearing to move *itself*, by reason of the power derived from the soul. As to the immortal nature, we have no certainty upon the subject; we can only offer conjecture; and, without having even seen Deity or sufficiently understanding its being, we imagine a living immortal essence whose soul and body are everlastingly united. But, however that be, it is for us to consider and recount the causes why souls first lose those *wings* of which we have spoken.

"The power of the wings is to elevate that which is heavy to those higher regions of the gods; and they share, more than any thing else which is corporeal, in that which is *divine*. Now, that which is divine is the Beautiful, the True, the Good, and every thing that resembles them. This, then, is what feeds and nerves the wings of the soul; while, on the other hand, all that is evil and deformed injures and destroys them. Well, then, the sovereign ruler, Jove, advances in the van, guiding his winged chariot, disposing and controlling all. After him comes the host of gods and powers in eleven divisions, for Vesta remains alone in the palace of the immortals; but the eleven other 'dii majores' advance, each at the head of a detachment, in their appointed rank. And then what captivating sights, what grand opening vistas, enliven the inner depths of the heavens while the blessed discharge their divine offices accompanied by all who will or can follow them! —for far is envy from the celestial choir. When they re-

turn to the splendid banquet provided for them, and ascend to the crown of the vault of heaven, the chariots of the immortals, always in perfect balance, advance with lightness and ease; the others toil on with difficulty; for the bad courser drags down earthward the car, unless he have been right well trained by his driver. Here comes the great and sore trial of the soul. The souls of the immortals, after rising to the highest point of the heavens, dismiss their equipages and place themselves on the convex side of its vault; and while they remain there the circular motion of the system carries them round the heavens of which they contemplate the exterior region. That region above the heavens none of our poets has yet celebrated; none ever shall celebrate it worthily. I will venture, however, in truth's cause, now especially demanding it. to portray the wondrous abode. True essence, colourless, formless, impalpable, cannot be contemplated but by intelligence, the guide of the soul. Around essence is the place of true science. Now, the thinking-energy of the gods, which feeds on intelligence and knowledge, pure as that of every soul that would fulfil its vocation, loves to gaze on that essence from which it has been so long separated, and surrenders itself delightedly to the contemplation of truth, until the moment when the circular revolution brings it to the point of its departure again. In this transit it contemplates Justice, Wisdom, Science,—not that science which is concerned with change, and which appears under a different manifestation in different objects which we choose to call *beings*, but science such as it is in that which alone is indeed *being*. After having thus contemplated all essences and been fully satisfied, it returns to the divine palace in the interior of the heavens, the charioteer conducts the coursers to their stalls and spreads before them immortal food. Such is the life of the gods. Among the other souls, the one

which best follows the divine souls, and resembles them the most, lifts the head of the charioteer above the highest regions, and traverses them, borne on by the circular motion; but at the same time, embarrassed by its coursers, it has great difficulty in attempting steadily to contemplate essences. Another, again, is now lifted and now depressed; the irregular plunging of its coursers allows it to perceive some essences, but hides the rest. The last in the train follow afar, eager to contemplate the higher region, but unable to attain the object; the revolution carries them into the lower; they are overthrown, they fall over each other in attempting to advance, they crowd, they battle, they toil, and by the awkwardness of their charioteers many of them are disabled, many others lose the best part of the plumage of their wings, and all, after painful and unavailing efforts, are disappointed in the view of real being, and are obliged to find their aliment in mere conjecture. The cause of their anxiety to gain the field of truth is, that the appropriate nourishment of the best part of the soul is to be found in the fertile meadows which this plain encloses, and that the nature of the soul's pinions is thereby strengthened and refreshed. It is an Adrastean (irrevocable) law, that every soul which, in undeviating attendance on the divine souls, has caught the sight of any of the essences, shall be exempt from suffering until a new voyage, and that, if it can always succeed in thus accompanying the gods, it never experiences any evil. But when it cannot follow the gods, or contemplate essences, and that unfortunately, becoming fattened on the gross food of vice and forgetfulness, it gravitates, loses its wings, and falls to the earth, the law protects it from animating the body of any beast in its first stage." He then proceeds to describe the various fortunes of life, and the subsequent destinies of the undying spirit passing through forms of death, until at the close of ten millen-

niums it arrives again at its original state. But there is one exception, in which the period is abridged: it is that of the philosopher,—Plato's ideal of human excellence,—who after the third revolution of a thousand years recovers the wings of the liberated soul. During his human life his power of reminiscence is, as far as possible, engaged with those essences he once knew in his state of enfranchisement. "The man," declares Plato, "who turns these precious recollections to good account participates incessantly in the true and perfect mysteries, and himself alone becomes truly perfect. Isolated from earthly cares and disquietudes, attached to things divine alone, the multitude warn him to be more a man of sense, or treat him as an idiot: they see not that he is inspired!"

Explanation of the allegory.

Into the portion of this remarkable representation which concerns the *future* state of the soul it is not now the time to enter. It would appear, with respect to the anterior state, that Plato conceived the soul, after its elements had been combined by the divine Framer, to be possessed of certain tendencies distinct from the purely rational, and for which it was not indebted to the body. These tendencies are symbolized in the two coursers; and it is impossible not to connect them with the well-known division of the soul which Plato elsewhere makes into the rational, irascible, and concupiscible,[20] and in which division he always speaks favourably of the second element.[21] It seems to me, then, that either at this time he had not matured the doctrine which appears in the *Timæus* and elsewhere, and which seems to make the passions wholly the result of the bodily connection, or that he conceived the soul in its original form to possess in a germinant state those tendencies which are after-

Triple division of the soul.

[20] [See esp. *Rep.* iv. p. 436, A. ED.]

[21] [As Ibid. p. 440, E:—*φαίνεται πολὺ μᾶλλον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ.* ED.]

wards in full energy for good and evil developed in the corporeal. It is at all events certain that in this mythical portrait he represents the bodily state as the result of the incompetence of the soul to preserve its original purity, through a weakness from which the immortals, themselves created, are free; and you will remember that in the account of the first composition of human souls in the *Timæus* it was expressly stated that their substance was *inferior* in purity to the animating-principle of the universe. We are to collect, then, from this narrative that the soul of man, kindred to the powers and principles of the universe, possessed in its primal state a strong desire to enjoy the perfection of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth, which desire was partly, but only partly, seconded by its powers; that, failing to attain its mighty object through inseparable defects,—a failure which, however, varied in degree in different individuals,—it was condemned to assume the grosser bodily condition, in which a vast accession of evils alleviated by scarcely any advantage assails it, but which also affords a scene for the exercise of moral control, a period of trial, and an occasion of ultimate triumph. Any thing much more minute on this subject we shall scarcely find in Plato without overstraining casual expression. The peculiar questions which the Christian revelation has made to us so interesting were not prominently before the public mind in his age; and he consequently was not led to investigate them except briefly and incidentally.

The body, then, is the prison of the soul, which, however, defies its oppressor; and the aim of virtue is to preserve the distinctness of the two, and realize liberty even in bonds,—looking forward as its recompense to a total enfranchisement. From this seminal idea the whole moral system of Platonism springs; and it is this general conception which all the allegorical representations of the past and future state are intended to vivify and impress.

LECTURE IV.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PLATO, (*continued.*

GENTLEMEN:—

Psychology of Plato, continued. The doctrine of pre-existence.

THE doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul of man, which was widely spread through Egypt and the East, probably came to Plato by these foreign and traditional conveyances. He received it along with many other theories, of which the original reasons had, perhaps, been lost; of which, perhaps also, the original reasons had never been well worth preserving. The strong conviction which, to the honour of human nature, subsists among so many of its scattered families, that there is in the living being that feels and reasons a true composition, an element that asserts its natural superiority above the rest, took, without much difficulty, the form of a supposition that the higher element was essentially removed from the sphere of change and decay: the easy and obvious analysis by which the bodily sensations, passions, and affections were detached from the power of contemplation and the originating principle of motion, would help to define and distinguish the opposite members of the combination; and, when the conception had been thus cleared, the very misfortunes, infirmities, and diseases of the inferior element would heighten the contrast, and lead the mind to dwell with pleasurable pride upon that glorious principle for which, at length, no merely created origin would seem adequate to account. Men of reflection and virtue, anxious to impress moral principles upon society, would look with favour upon every thing which tended to exalt the rational

principle above that of mere desire, and on which a scheme of moral discipline or purification could be so readily grafted.

Why is this doctrine repugnant to modern apprehension?

Indeed, it may be doubted whether the strangeness and improbability of this hypothesis of pre-existence among ourselves (omitting now the notion of absolute sempiternity) arises after all from grounds on which our philosophy has reason to congratulate itself highly. It may be questioned whether, if we examine ourselves candidly, we shall not discover that the feeling of absolute extravagance with which it affects us has its secret source in materialist or semi-materialist prejudices, and that we believe the thinking-principle cannot have existed before its bodily apparatus, because we strongly suspect that in some unknown way out of the bodily apparatus it arises.

The doctrine of pre-existence is founded on the principle of the priority of Mind to Matter.

But, however this may be, it is certain that with Plato the conviction was associated with a vast and pervading principle which extended through every department of Nature and of Thought. This principle was the priority of Mind to Body, both in order of dignity and in order of time, —a principle which with him was not satisfied by the single admission of a *divine* pre-existence, but extended through every instance in which these natures could be compared. A very striking example of the manner in which he thus generalized the principle of the priority of Mind to Body is to be found in the well-known passage in the Tenth Book of his *Laws*, in which he proves the existence of divine agency. The argument employed really applies to every case of motion, and equally proves that every separate corporeal system is but a mechanism moved by a spiritual essence anterior to itself. The universe is full of gods,[1] and the human

[1] [θεῶν πλήρη πάντα. *Legg.* x. p. 899, B. ED.]

soul is, as it were, the god or demon of the human body.* "The systems," says Plato,[2] "which have originated impiety, have reversed the proper order of things by taking away the character of first principle from the primary cause of the generation and corruption of all beings, and setting before it that which exists only after it: thence arise their errors on the true nature of gods. . . . Scarcely one of these philosophers has truly known what the soul is, and what are its properties. They are all unaware that in every respect, and particularly with regard to origin, it truly is one of the first beings which has existed, that it has been prior to bodies, and has presided eminently over their various changes and combinations." "Have we not," he asks,[3] "fully established that the soul is the first principle of generation and of motion, of corruption and of repose, in all beings past, present, and to come, since we have seen that it is the cause of every change, and every motion in all existing things? Is it not true that motion produced by a foreign cause in a substance where one perceives no self-moving essence—this motion being nothing else than the change of a body really inanimate—ought to be set in the second rank, and, as far as possible, below the first? Certainly. We have, then, spoken the exact truth when we said that the soul has existed before the body, that it possesses authority over it as being superior to it in rank and order of existence and its natural governor. And just so, all that belongs to Soul must likewise be admitted to be prior to Body. Consequently, characters, manners, volitions, reasonings, true opinions, foresight, and memory, have existed before length, breadth, depth,

Proof of this priority given in the tenth book of the Laws.

* The "Gods" of the Platonic System are answerable in use and conception to the "Angels" of the Christian Theology. The Creator is regarded as equally superior to both.

[2] [*Legg.* x. p. 891, E. Ed.]

[3] [Ib. p. 896, A–897, B. Ed.]

and strength of bodies, the soul itself existing before bodies. It thence follows, too, that Soul is the principle of good and evil, of honesty and dishonesty, of just and unjust, and of all other contraries, if we but recognise it as the cause of all which exists. Must we not then allow," he continues, rising to his immediate subject, "that the Soul which dwells in all that moves, and governs its motions, rules also *the heavens?*" He then condenses his argument into one emphatic statement:—"Soul governs, then, all which is in heaven, on earth, and in the sea, by motions which are its proper functions, and which we call will, attention, foresight, deliberation, judgment; and, whether true or false, joy, sadness, confidence, fear, aversion, love; and by other similar movements which are the first efficient causes, and which, directing *the motions* of bodies, as so many secondary causes, produce in all things increase or diminution, composition or division, and the qualities which result from them, as heat, cold, weight, levity, hardness, softness, white, black, harsh, sweet, and bitter. Soul, which is a divinity, calling to its aid another divinity, intelligence, to govern these divers movements, governs, then, all things with wisdom, and conducts them to true felicity." In this remarkable passage, Soul appears to me to be regarded with the utmost possible degree of *generality*, as a first principle which, in all cases, preceded and presided over both bodily masses in general, and, thence, the particular organizations with which in separate instances it became specially connected. It is here considered mainly, though not exclusively, as an *active* principle,—the aspect in which, when its intellectual faculties are not directly specified, Plato most usually may be interpreted as regarding it.

Extension of the doctrine.

This universality of Plato's views of the principle entitled Soul naturally led him to extensions which to us are not less startling than the

theory of pre-existence itself. It may, I conceive, be collected, from various expressions in his writings, that he considered the animating-principle of the *brute* creation to be itself but a repressed and mutilated form of the same essence which in man shone forth in the fulness and brilliancy of reason. This supposition, as it flowed naturally from the enlarged conception of which we have just been treating, so it readily countenanced, and combined with, the doctrine of transmigration, which conducted the same substantial essence through all varieties of expansion and limitation; with, however, the special provision noted in the *Phædrus*, that the man might sink to the brute, but the brute which had not originally entered the human frame could never rise to that culminating-point of earthly mind. The astonishing diversities of intelligence which are observable in the human species, and which seem to separate man from man almost as much as the lowest form of humanity is separated from the most sagacious of the inferior animals, probably gave appearances of plausibility to this doctrine, which in Plato's age was not unfamiliar to the Grecian mind. It peculiarly pleased the intellectual disposition of Plato to comprehend, as far as possible, every variety of phenomenon under the simplicity and unity of single general formulas, and to view the whole system of Nature as one vast mechanism subject to the immediate operation of mind and solely constructed for its trial and display. Now, this complicated evolution of mental energy was conceivable enough in two regions of creation,—in the management of the human frame which was superintended by human spirits, and in the inanimate world which was in consummate harmony guided and governed by superior powers. But that intervening region which was constituted by the lower animals broke the unity of the conception, and seemed to defraud the mental essence of a large and interesting

Metempsychosis.

province of its empire. Plato might have conciliated the difficulty as Descartes did, by classing the brute creation with the purely mechanical: he preferred to see in it an inferior and crippled form of the one universal energy of Soul,—a form which was still more closely associated with the human development of the principle by often containing it in a mysterious state of transition. It has been, indeed, much doubted how far Plato in reality assented to these doctrines; and it is usual to speak of him as countenancing popular fictions for public benefit. I suspect, however, that these easy solutions are in a great measure gratuitous. It is not very manifest what public benefit was to be derived from this form of the doctrine of reward and punishment; nor can it be easily shown on what principle Plato should descend to gross deception in order to aid the cause of truth.[4] On the other hand, though I confess the doctrine is very alien to our habits of speculation,

[4] [It is clear, from more than one passage in the *Dialogues*, that, though Plato thought he had proved the doctrine of the immortality of the Soul, he was not inclined to overrate the importance of the mythical representations with which in the *Phædo*, *Timæus*, and Tenth Book of the *Republic* that doctrine is associated. One pregnant passage in the *Phædo* seems to prove that he referred all such speculations to the *εικότων μύθων ἰδέα*,—the category of probability,—of which he speaks in the *Timæus*. "No man in his senses," he observes, "would dream of insisting that the description just given corresponds to the reality: but that, the Soul having been shown to be immortal, this, or something like this, is true of individual souls or their habitations, I think reasonable in itself, and I am disposed to accept the consequences of my belief," (*ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν.*) *Phæd.* p. 114, D. Similar is the purport of a remark in the *Gorgias*, 527, A. "This" (description of the state of souls after death) "may seem to you a fable, an old wife's tale. We might indeed be at liberty to despise it, as you do, if our researches could furnish us with a better and truer account: you see, however, that all the efforts of three of the wisest men in Greece —yourself, Polus, and Gorgias—have failed to prove that there is any other right life for man than that which is conducive to his well-being in the next world," &c. He evidently means to say that the beliefs to

I seem to myself to see in it much that might have harmonized with the spirit of the Platonic system, more especially when we remember that he received it as a venerable tradition of immemorial wisdom, countersigned by many of the names to which he was most accustomed to defer.

Considerations which recommend the doctrine of pre-existence.

It must also be allowed that there is much in the hypothesis of pre-existence (at least) which might attract the speculator busied with the endeavour to reduce the moral system of the world under intelligible law. The solution which it at once furnishes of the state and fortunes of each individual, as arising in some unknown but direct process from his own voluntary acts, though it throws, of course, no light on the ultimate question of the existence of moral evil, (which it only removes a single step,) does yet contribute to satisfy the mind as to the equity of that immediate manifestation of it, and of its physical attendants, which we unhappily witness. There is internally no greater improbability that the present may be the *result* of a former state now almost wholly forgotten, than that the present should be *followed* by a future form of existence in which, perhaps, or in some departments of which, the oblivion may be as complete. And if to that future state there are already discernible faint longings and impulses which to many men have seemed to involve a direct proof of its reality, hopes that will not be bounded by the grave, and desires that grasp eternity, others have found within them, it would seem, faint intimations scarcely less impressive of the past, as if the soul vibrated the echoes of a harmony not of this world. The greatest of living poets has told us that such convictions seem to

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which he alludes, though not susceptible of proof, are consistent with proved truths, and have that degree of probability which is sufficient to influence practice. "Gross deception" is out of the question. ED.]

be a part, though a neglected part, of the heritage of our race:—

Wordsworth's Ode on the Intimations of Immortality, &c.

"Hence in a season of calm weather,
Though inland far we be,
Our Souls have sight of that immortal Sea
Which brought us hither,
Can in a moment travel thither,
And see the children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore."

And hence he has dared to pronounce, in language worthy to give utterance to the thought of Plato, that

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting.
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory, do we come
From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
Shades of the prison-house begin to close
Upon the growing boy,
But he beholds the light, and whence it flows,—
He sees it in his joy:
The youth who daily farther from the east
Must travel still is Nature's priest,
And by the vision splendid
Is on his way attended:
At length the man perceives it die away
And fade into the light of common day."

The substance of this noble stanza, which Wordsworth has with exquisite delicacy and art connected with the innocence of childhood, you will find given at great length in various passages of the *Timæus*, *the Phædrus*, and the *Phædo*, but, of course, in a form more directly philosophical. And if it were permitted to venture, except as strict interpreter of my author, upon these seductive paths of conjecture, it might be observed that

this supposition of pre-existence could be naturally connected with that most interesting fact of human nature, which all more or less experience, but minds of a pensive or imaginative cast especially,—the feeling of melancholy retrospect with which the past, and, above all, the extreme past of childhood, is recovered by the recollection, and the imaginary happiness with which the mind, in spite of its graver convictions, perpetually invests that period. A Platonist might say that this was but the natural tendency of the soul, which, haunted by dim recollections, vaguely stretches to its antenatal state of perfect bliss; but, being unable to recover it, and, by an ordinary principle, remembering the emotion where it cannot remember the cause, associates the happiness which should belong to that forgotten world with any intervening incident, or state, or period, that agrees with it in being *past*. And this association, he would add, will of course become more complete, and the illusion more perfectly deceptive, according as the period in the present life approximates more closely to the true object preceding it: childhood, therefore, will be the chosen subject of this melancholy pleasure. But I ought, perhaps, to apologize for detaining you with these excursions of fancy. If, on the whole, there be any truth in these natural hopes, and even these "shadowy recollections," and if it be a certain fact that, at least within the compass of this life, we are discontented with the present, and incessantly strain after the past and the future, what shall we say but that the spirit of man gives clear intimations of its essential unfitness for the existing world? and would it even be too extravagant to imagine that these indications, pointing equally in both directions, seem to betoken a state to be the proper inheritance of the mind which many, in every age since Plato's day, have dreamed of,—a state in which the soul, liberated to know Eternity its own, should find

both Past and Future blended and lost in one unalterable *Now?*

Thoughts of this kind in boundless variety, doubtless, traversed the mind of the great Idealist; and we are not to suppose that, if he has given us the seeds of much reflection, he has preserved among his writings all the fruit they bore in his own fertile intelligence. But one argument there is, upon which he has peculiarly and frequently insisted, and which lies near the root of his entire philosophy. You are of course aware that I allude to the doctrine of "Reminiscence," —the doctrine that the mind brought with it from a previous state, and now possessed by the way of memory, all those relations, in their ultimate and simplest form, which it here applies to sensible objects, or which, as Plato held, it recovers on occasion of sensible objects.

The doctrine of Reminiscence, (ἀνάμνησις.)

In the dialogue entitled *Meno*, Socrates is represented as entering into a very elaborate proof of this doctrine by experimental investigation. He shows,[5] what indeed cannot be denied, that by a series of well-adapted inter-

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[5] [*Meno*, p. 82, B–85, C. This experiment upon the slave can hardly be considered crucial. The doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις* is again affirmed in the *Phædo*, p. 72, E, a passage to be understood as referring to the conversation in the *Meno*. The brilliant exposition of the same theory in the *Phædrus* has already been presented to the reader. Metaphysically considered, the theory answers to the Kantian doctrine of Ideas or Forms, which exist potentially in the reason antecedently to experience, but are brought into actual consciousness *by* experience and simultaneously *with* it. To this extent the doctrine of reminiscence appeared to Plato demonstrably certain; but there is no proof that he regarded the physical hypothesis of pre-existence with which he connects it as more than a probable and salutary belief: such, at least, seems to have been his feeling when he composed the *Meno*. See p. 86, B. *τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου δυσχυρισαίμην. ὅτι δὲ κ. τ. λ.*

The greater confidence with which, in the *Phædrus*, he affirms an antecedent immortality, is as favourable to the supposition of a later as to that of an earlier composition of the latter dialogue. For Plato became more dogmatic as he advanced in life. ED.]

rogatories a person ignorant until the period of the interview may be brought to recognise and admit rational truths. These truths are perceived by the native power of the mind; they may be said then to lie concealed in the mind since they are potentially contained in its faculties: and if all knowledge must be given from some exterior cause, and the possession of these unexercised apprehensions may be called a dormant knowledge, we may then speak of a knowledge bestowed and possessed before (at any given period) it is brought into the sphere of positive consciousness,—but to gain a knowledge before possessed is nothing else than *remembrance.* If this were Plato's meaning, the doctrine would amount to nothing more than a vivid statement, in a figurative form, of the fact that in the present state the faculties of the human mind become a source of ideas to themselves which yet have a real truth independent of the mind's apprehension of them. And perhaps, if we examine the point more closely, we may be induced to believe that this important principle was the essential thought which Plato conveyed by the theory of reminiscence,—the principle in short which is expressed in Leibnitz's well-known exception, "nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu,—*nisi ipse intellectus.*"

Probable explanation of the doctrine.

An important caution, however, must here be suggested. We are not, as too many of Plato's critics are wont to do, to transgress his own express provisions, and carry the forms of sense into the sphere of simple reason. The state to which Socrates is made to refer as being the original of these reminiscences cannot be (by the very nature of the case) any state but that first and elementary condition of the soul in which alone it stood in direct contact with the ideas of beauty, truth, goodness, equality, and the rest. If then we look upon the soul of man solely in its rational element, we shall find it so disposed by its very constitution as to answer to certain ideas which,

lying at the basis of all particular perceived relations, are to us the fundamental truths of the universe. This is the divinest element of the soul: it may then, even on that ground, be fairly termed its *first*. But there is a reason more natural and obvious still. Plato, we saw, conceives it *coeternal* with its ideal objects in an ultimate unity. Moreover, we know that the soul, likewise, as an active *principle*, claims an existence extrinsic to the sphere of time; and this active principle, itself eternal, but now consciously developed in the contingent world of time, may be considered as a connective medium which preserves the identity of the soul under these two opposite aspects,—a consideration (by-the-way) which might lead us to imagine that the *οὐσία*, or intermediate substance,[6] in the composition of soul is no other than the *active energy*. But to our subject. When, now, in presence of sensible objects, and merely on occasion of their presence, relations are apprehended which, in their last analysis, resolve into certain fundamental ideas of the Reason, the conscious understanding refers for these its ideas to the Reason, receives them from the Reason, which itself in the order of nature possessed them first; that is, the Soul in the sensible and contingent world receives what the Soul possesses in the eternal world, which latter, by the most natural of figures, is conceived prior to the former. It is no violent metaphor to call this reminiscence.

I do not assert that this is the precise explanation which Plato would have given of his theory; and yet it is not impossible that to his chosen friends and disciples many highly-coloured depictions of this kind were by himself translated into their more abstract significancies.* The

[6] [On this sense of *οὐσία* see p. 179, note 1. ED.]

* The most characteristic description of the Platonic speculative system might perhaps be, that it translated Pythagorism into its metaphysical correlatives.

doctrine of Reminiscences, which thus interpreted is purely metaphysical, naturally attached itself to the *popular* notion of pre-existence; and Plato would be inclined to leave it under that veil. But whatever he supposed the fortunes of the soul in the pre-existent state, and in whatever degree Plato favoured the ordinary conception of a conscious personal existence, it must be remembered that this theory of Reminiscence, or any other of a similar ideal description, must altogether be referred to the rational element of the soul and to it alone. It therefore proves only the immortality of the rational element;[7] that is, it proves that this element of soul furnishing to the conscious mind conceptions of the immutable and eternal, which conceptions suppose their corresponding objects and are with them blended in unchangeable unity, it is itself eternal. Hence the argument in the *Meno* concludes with the words, "If then truth be perpetually in our soul, that soul is immortal."

But, even though it were granted that Plato would not have exactly thus explained himself, it may be allowable to say that there may exist points upon which we understand Plato's teaching better than himself. This is high praise, but not of ourselves,—of *him*. It supposes that there may be principles involved in his depth of view which even he himself never completely sounded; that by a kind of inspiration he may have caught truths

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[7] [It is interesting to compare the views of a great modern thinker upon this subject:—

"Mens humana non potest cum corpore destrui, sed ejus *aliquid* remanet, quod æternum est. . . . Est hæc idea quæ corporis essentiam sub specie æternitatis exprimit, certus cogitandi modus qui ad mentis essentiam pertinet, quique necessario æternus est. Nec tamen fieri potest, ut recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse, quandoquidem nec in corpore ulla ejus vestigia dari, nec æternitas tempore definiri, nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere potest. At nihilo minus sentimus experimurque, nos æternos esse." Seqq. Spinoza, *Ethices* Pars v. Prop. xxiii. Schol. ED.]

which were too vast for his own intelligence, or for any intelligence belonging to his position and period in the history of metaphysical inquiry. But though I state this as possible, and as justifying a bolder and more enlarged method of criticism than perhaps is ordinary among readers of Plato, I confess I do not think it very likely. On the contrary, I have little doubt that the logical views which I have attempted to sketch, *or views akin to them*, were really the principal foundations of the Platonic psychology, and I would thus venture to divide the entire subject of this system of the soul into two regions, which in your speculations on the views of Plato it may be well to keep distinct. One of these includes the purely metaphysical doctrines which concern the nature and relation of knowledge to the reality of things, and which lose themselves at length in the ineffable unity of the Last Principle of Being, the mysterious τὸ ἕν; and of these doctrines we have no reason to doubt that Plato had through his own path of dialectics arrived at certainty; these, doubtless, were the favourite subjects of those more private esoteric meditations in which he indulged with the few who were adapted to apprehend them. The other division of the Platonic system of the Soul embraced all those more popular and accessible doctrines of pre-existence, transmigration, and recompense, which we may fairly conclude that Plato thought to a high degree probable, but to which he never assigns demonstrative certainty, and on which, it is possible, his degree of belief often varied. It was natural that the latter division should be most insisted on in the more public discussions of the master; and it was not difficult at any time (as in the very instance of the theory of *Reminiscence*) to slip the embroidered veil of figurative depiction and admit the more thoughtful student to the sanctuary within.

Plato's views of the

Plato having thus, by the spirit of his whole philosophy, restricted essential immortality, es-

sential eternity, to the purely rational and active elements of the soul, and being habituated, with a constancy and decisiveness far rarer, I suspect, in our times than in his writings, to regard these as wholly separable from the body, he, with perfect consistency, represents the connection of such an essence with the body as a misfortune and an imprisonment. The best service the bodily organs can do is (as in the case of vision and hearing) to suggest a state in which we may be altogether independent of their aid. In the *Timæus*[8] he describes, carrying on his nomenclature of circles of sameness and difference, these circles as plunged into a river of Body,—as not allowing themselves to be hurried away by the current, and yet as unable to guide it; as distracted by the violent agitation of sensible impulse, their harmonious regularity destroyed, their appointed paths distorted. Hence the soul, when first united to a mortal body, is without intelligence. But, according as the current of bodily alimentation and enlargement decreases, the circles of the soul, gaining gradual tranquillity, assume their proper course, govern their motions in accordance with their kindred circles of the universal system, are no longer deceived about the variable and the invariable, and generate true Wisdom. Education does more still; philosophy most of all. For this he appeals even to experience. "The soul," he affirms,[9] "exerts its reasoning-faculties" (which are its eminent characteristics) "best when disturbed by no bodily connection, neither by hearing, sight, pleasure, nor pain, but when it exists self-centred, eminently itself, discharging all thought of body, neither giving to it nor taking from it, but reaching out after real being." In all its influences

connection of soul with body.

[8] [*Tim.* p. 43, A. τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν (οἱ Θεοὶ) εἰς ἐπίῤῥυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόῤῥυτον. αἱ δὲ εἰς πόταμον ἐνδεθεῖσαι πολὺν οὔτ' ἐκράτουν οὔτ' ἐκρατοῦντο, βίᾳ δ' ἐφέροντο καὶ ἔφερον. κ. τ. λ. ED.]

[9] [*Phædo*, p. 65, C. ED.]

this base companion degrades the state and dignity of the soul. It alone brings us those impressions which seduce the mighty stranger within us from its proper occupation. *It* is the sole cause of wars, seditions, conflicts;[10] and all experience ascertains to us the profound truth "either that we never can possess knowledge, or that after death alone we are to expect it." Hence, Philosophy itself is distinctly defined, the meditation[11] and discipline of death, and all its functions in this state resolved into the one maxim of a death practical and perpetual.

That this view, which undoubtedly contains a large measure of truth, is founded on a contemplation of man too extensive, and therefore absolutely imperfect,—that it must consequently be received with reservation,—that it subsequently led to gross and extravagant error,—are considerations which belong to another part of the subject. The topic to which at present this maxim of the philosophic death, arising out of the Platonic Psychology, conducts us, is that in illustration of which Plato himself employed it in the best-known of all his writings, his famous dialogue upon the Immortality of the Soul.

The arguments in the Phædo.

The arguments which Plato used, and which he attributes (many of them, doubtless, with truth) to his illustrious master on the eve of his death, may be conveniently distributed into those which involve a pre-existent, or even eternal, duration to the soul, and those which contend for only its future perpetuation without any immediate or direct reference to its origin antecedent to the present mode of its existence. Of the former class I have in a great measure treated already. The doctrine of *Reminiscence* arising out of the conceptions which we possess of ideas not

[10] [*Phædo*, p. 66, c. *καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι.* ED.]

[11] [*μελέτη θανάτου.* Ib. p. 81, A. ED.]

assignable to any sensible origin,—the argument derived from the independent power of self-motion which Plato conceives equally irreducible to any temporal origination, —these I have brought before you as essential elements of the Platonic psychology. A form of reasoning not very dissimilar to the latter makes the final argument of the *Phædo*;[12] although it is not certain whether Plato meant it to conclude with equal cogency for the eternity as for the futurity of the living state. All *principles* of being are essentially causative, and bring with them their inseparable results,—the very attributes or characters of their existence. Now, it is the nature of a principle to exclude *its contrary*, to subsist unaffected by any opposite principle, and independent of it. The first informations of our reason produce this; and Plato enters into great minuteness of example to illustrate the point. And if there be any thing so connected with a principle that where the principle is there must be likewise its associates, it is equally certain that the principle will never tolerate the direct opposite of that associate nature. Now, as fire is the principle of heat, as fever is the principle of disease, as unity is the principle of odd numbers, even so is the soul the principle of life. Wherever soul is, there also must be *life* as its necessary attendant; it therefore excludes death, it is deathless, and, if deathless, indestructible. For if it be conceded that the soul, as principle of life, is safe from that cause (whatever it be) which produces the phenomena of death, no one will deny its nature to be imperishable. The manner in which the immortal is here connected with the imperishable may remind you of the train of Bishop Butler's argument:—"If it would be in a manner certain that we should survive death, provided it were

The argument founded on the inseparableness of the ideas of Life and Soul.

Bishop Butler's argument.

[12] [Pp. 102–107. Ed.]

certain that death would not be our destruction, it must be highly probable that we shall survive it, if there be no ground to think that death will be our destruction." And the view that follows, in which it is urged that "we know not *what death is in itself*, but only some of its effects," is not dissimilar to the opposition Plato introduces between life and death as considered in their unknown causes or principles.

To such arguments as these, which seem to conclude equally for the duration of the soul both previously and subsequently to the present state, may be added those which are, without any very definite statement of their scope, drawn from what Plato calls the *divinity* of the soul, whether in its substantial being or in its faculties, —a form of expression which, as you know, is constantly employed by Cicero likewise. It seems to have arisen from the general conviction that while all things were durable in proportion to their perfection, while the best things in nature, the characteristics which we almost instinctively attribute to Deity, were in that very attribution regarded as incapable of mutation or decay, it would be strange indeed if the *soul itself*, which gave to man the *notions* of these enduring perfections, were itself destined to a transitory and evanescent existence.

Argument from the principle of the mutual reproduction of contraries.

To pass from these to arguments more immediately directed to convince of the continuance of future existence. With his usual spirit of comprehensive generalization, Plato argues this matter from the principle of contrary reproduction.[13] The System of the World, he reasons, is one of incessant change, in which opposites constantly generate their opposites. Were it not so, all the most precious attributes of existence would be lost in their contraries, and the order of the world suspended. More particu-

[13] [*Phædo*, p. 70, c–72, E. ED.]

larly is this observable in the animal system, in which all things seem to succeed in these perpetual cycles. Hunger and fulness, sleeping and waking, rest and motion, strength and weariness, are ordained to follow each other, and, without such a disposition of consecutive states, the universe would exchange its incessant activity for a dull and lifeless monotony. So, doubtless, it is with the states which we call life and death; life at length gives way to death, death in its turn must bring forth life,—the eternal Soul remaining unaltered amid the succession of these superficial mutations.

Argument from the incomposite nature of Soul.

With greater force Plato insists upon the incomposite nature of Soul.[14] Its close alliance with those beings which are themselves changeless and eternal proves the true simplicity of its essence, for that which is absolutely immutable is also perfectly indivisible. If the True, and the Beautiful, and the Good, have any real existence in the Universe, it is absurd to imagine that these ultimate essences are capable of discerption; and surely nothing less can be said for that as mysterious essence which alone in this earth is capacitated to recognise them. Its separation from all sensible perceptibility is another circumstance in which it resembles these everlasting natures. And all experience of the operations of the Soul itself confirms these views; for, as Plato alleges, it is never perfectly at rest unless when engaged upon these self-existent and immutable objects of reason. Its obvious prerogative of command, and the as obvious function of the bodily adjunct to obey, further insinuate a being wholly exalted above that inferior nature in which alone we can directly detect the successful assault of the principle of death.

Against such reasonings as these, however, one of the

[14] [*Phædo*, p. 78, B–79, E. ED.]

Refutation of the doctrine that the Soul is a Harmony.

earliest forms of materialism erected itself. It was urged[15] that the soul was, after all, analogous to the harmony of a lyre, the well-proportioned result of the bodily organization. This, too, appeared to possess some of the characters ascribed to the soul; it seemed to be simple and attenuated almost above sensible existence, in a great measure apprehended only by the understanding which perceives the proportion of harmonized sounds. To this objection Plato answers, not, perhaps, with as much psychological exactness as one could wish; for it plainly includes the essence of all materialistic theories. He replies, in the first place, by referring to the proof already given of the pre-existence of the soul. He urges, again, that the soul controls the body and its desires, instead of being, as harmony, a simple result. He argues that vice, on this supposition, could only be *discord*, and that, as the harmony would not suffer this, all souls must, on the hypothesis, be placed on a perfect equality of virtue, which contradicts all experience. It is pretty evident that the more subtle materialism of subsequent times would not have been sent away satisfied with such arguments as these. The pre-existence, in any sense of it, would be rejected as a fantastic hypothesis: and the oppositions between the soul and body would be referred to the same principles as the oppositions between even bodily desires themselves. It would appear, however, that the doctrine of harmony was not itself urged upon large and general grounds; and we know that one of the chief patrons of it was himself a *musician*. But Plato's usual promptitude at generalization might have led us to expect that he would himself have widened the grounds of the objection, and taken in its entire compass; more especially as the true answer lay within the

[15] [*Phædo*, p. 91, D, fol. ED.]

reach of his ordinary field of thought,—the answer that denies any analogy whatever to exist between a combination of sounds affecting the human ear (for such, and no more, is "harmony") and that single self-conscious being which each man calls *himself*,—which is known by a different evidence, and, properly considered, bears no one point of similarity to the sensitive impression with which it is compared. By thus reducing *harmony* from its vague sense to its only true significance, it results that the pretended analogy really amounts to a comparison instituted between the mind itself on the one hand, and a certain state or modification of it on the other, and that the argument concludes that, because the remote cause of the one effect is a certain *organization* of material substances, entitled a musical instrument, therefore the immediate cause of the other effect, which is in every respect unlike the former, must be a certain material organization likewise.

But the spirit of the Platonic investigation is not very favourable to this kind of argument, for which, perhaps, we of these latter times are indebted mainly to our advances in *physiological* science. What Plato most insists on, as the necessary corollary to all his teaching, is the possession by the mind of a class of ideas which themselves bespeak an origin immeasurably above body. It is in the furniture of the mind and its functions, rather than in its physiological aspect, that he sees stamped its essential instability. No modification of matter, however refined, however elaborated, can give to man the idea of the Absolute, Necessary, and Eternal; no modification of matter can be conceived the free and voluntary originator of motion. The brain may receive impressions as a vegetable receives air and light; the brain may be conscious of the impressions, and experience pleasure and pain; the brain may pass through a vast variety of passive states differing from each other, and even in the

present obscurely remember the past; but to know that it has within it the real laws of the universe,—principles which it knows would subsist forever, though every conscious soul ceased to exist, though none below God Himself ever had existed,—by a free choice to deliberate, determine, and act,—these are powers which, if man possess, man must infallibly be more than a chemical compound. That he does possess them it was the direct or indirect object of all Platonism to establish; and, above all, that he possesses them in their loftiest form when the one class becomes the absolute truths of immutable morality, and the other becomes the exercise of freedom in the achievement of virtue. To this last division of our subject, the Ethical System of Plato, I shall invite your attention on our next day of meeting.

LECTURE V.

ON THE ETHICS OF PLATO.

GENTLEMEN:—

THE Platonic system of the nature of Soul in general, and specially of the soul of man, conducts us, by an easy transition, to his views of *moral* rights and duties. The doctrine of the Soul's Immortality, which was the last subject of our consideration, was, indeed, by Plato himself viewed as, in some respects, resting on a moral foundation; and to the brief sketch which I offered you, of the arguments by which he persuaded himself of the great fact of an existence perpetuated in the life to come, must be subjoined the very remarkable reasoning by which, in the tenth Book of the *Politeia*,[1] he argues that any living essence, to be destroyed at all, must be destroyed by some appropriate malady; that *injustice* is the main disease of the soul; that experience proves this worst of spiritual maladies unable to make it cease to exist; and that from this undeniable fact we may conclude that nothing else can.[2] This assumption of the hostility of injustice to the very nature of the divine principle in man is certainly characteristic of the exalted tone of the Platonic morality; but the proposition will appear less surprising when we

THE ETHICS OF PLATO.

[1] [P. 608, E, fol. ED.]

[2] [*ὁπότε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἱκανὴ ἦ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχήν, σχολῇ τό γε ἐπ' ἄλλου ὀλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ πλὴν ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται . . . οὐκοῦν ὁπότε μηδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ, μήτε οἰκείου μήτε ἀλλοτρίου, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὂν εἶναι, εἰ δ' ἀεὶ ὄν, ἀθάνατον.* Ib. 610, E. ED.]

remember that the *δικαιοσύνη* of this philosophy is a term of rather more comprehensive signification than the corresponding "justice" of our ordinary language; that it less refers to the external *suum cuique tribuere* than to a certain perfect proportionality of all the internal elements of the soul itself, from which of course the former, with many other excellent consequences, would flow. This application of the word we preserve when we speak of the "justness" of proportions, or the "justness" of critical taste, usually reserving "justice" to express the moral virtue of equity. In this sense, then, it no longer appears altogether out of analogical experience to conjecture that, if the soul of man were at all capable of destruction, it could not survive the confusion of all its internal relations. But these considerations may appear plainer as we advance.

The Platonic "Justice." Comprehensiveness of the term.

The connection of ethics with psychology, in Plato's estimate, also arises out of the triple distribution of the soul, as it manifests itself in the body, into the rational and immortal, the irascible and the concupiscible, elements,—which latter two terms, belonging to the scholastic vocabulary, were, in Plato, the *θυμοειδὲς* and the *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. The rational element sprang from the formative—at least the combinative—power of the supreme Creator; the inferior elements were framed by those same junior deities to whom He had committed the composition of the body. As the ethical, and even the political, views of Plato rest on this threefold distinction, itself a psychological fact, it may be well to subjoin his own account of it. "All things," he tells us,[3] "were at first without order: God alone originated, in each and all, harmonizing proportions as far as possi-

Connection of Ethics with Psychology. The triple distribution of the human soul the foundation of the ethico-political system of Plato.

[3] [*Timæus*, p. 62, B, fol. ED.]

ble, for at that period none of them possessed any the least; nor could they, with any propriety, receive the names they now hold,—fire, water, or any other such element. The Deity began by fixing all bodies, then proceeded to compose the universe, of which He made a single animated being, which comprehends within itself all other animated beings, mortal or immortal. He Himself formed the divine, and He delivered over to his celestial offspring the task of forming the mortal. These subordinate deities, copying the example of their Parent, and receiving from his hands the immortal principle of the human soul, fashioned, subsequent to this, the mortal body, which they consigned to the soul as its vehicle, and in which they placed another kind of soul, mortal, the seat of violent and fatal affections,—first of all, pleasure, the too charming attraction to evil; then pain, the cowardly fugitive from good; boldness and fear, senseless counsellors; unrelenting anger; hope, easily deceived by unreasoning sensibility and unscrupulous love. Mingling these under laws of necessity, they framed the mortal kind; but, to avoid defiling the divine element more than was absolutely necessary, they assigned to the mortal part a separate portion of the frame, and set between the head and chest a kind of isthmus to divide them. It was in the trunk of the body that they lodged the mortal principle; and as there were, even in this mortal principle, a better and a worse portion, they divided the interior of the frame, as we separate the apartments of the men and women in our houses, and fixed the diaphragm as the partition. Nearer to the head, between the neck and diaphragm, they placed the manly and courageous division of the soul, prompt to war,—in order that, obedient to reason, and in concert with it, it may subdue the rebellion of passion and desire, when these refuse, of their own accord, to obey the commands that issue from the high citadel of reason.

. . . The division of mere alimentation was placed beneath the diaphragm, the stall or manger of the body, purposely placed as far as possible from the locality of presiding reason." This scheme of the parts of the human soul, which, whether the anatomical details be accepted or not, has itself sufficient foundation in experience, supports much of the Platonic system of moral self-government, and must, therefore, be constantly kept in mind. There is nothing very peculiar about it, except, perhaps, the special favour with which Plato views the *θυμοειδές*, or resolute division of the mortal soul,—a favour which, indeed, rises into making its proper energies, when under the government of supreme reason, themselves the subject of one of the four virtues characteristic of the perfect man.

Further peculiarities of the Platonic Ethics.

But to gain a just conception of the moral system of Plato, as distinguished from that of other teachers, we must rise into a region more peculiarly his own.

Nowhere more than in attempting some limited account of this last section of the general subject do we feel how illusive are the ordinary heads of division under which this (with other philosophies) is arranged for didactic delivery. Although the triple distribution of Logic, Physics, and Ethics is by Laertius attributed to Plato, I doubt much whether his philosophy can be most satisfactorily treated by adhering to that division, which I have followed in these sketches rather in conformity with ordinary usage than from any fixed conviction of its propriety or utility. In Plato the entire mass of philosophical topics is so closely interlaced, every thing so truly at once depends on and supports every thing, that the division of a frame thus animated with a single vitality can scarcely be effected without rending the ligatures, and dislocating the joints, and dissevering parts that combine in a common function. Platonism is, perhaps,

less a definite theory than a "way of thinking;" and the same elementary thoughts appear in the physical, the logical, the ethical views of this master. The only difficulty is to grasp these fundamental conceptions, to bring the mind into the same *attitude* in which he habitually held it, and the details of any separate branch might almost be predicted.

Union of the Speculative and Practical in Plato.

In speaking of the *Ethics* of Plato, if we use the word in a large sense, we might say that his entire labours were subordinate to ethical purposes. Never was a philosopher so speculative with so practical an object. But in these speculations you will find very little answering to the theoretical ethics of modern times. Whether from the dialogic form itself, or from the absence of definite controversy upon them, you will not discover in Plato distinct and guarded answers to those questions which make the staple of our later treatises,—the nature of the moral principle as a state or function of the mind, and the precise criterion or rule of moral rectitude. To both these interrogatories, indeed, general answers might be collected, but it is by such a *collection* alone they could be obtained. And therefore those readers who come to Plato from the exclusive perusal of the analytic disquisitions of our own age are likely to be much disappointed,—to find much taken for granted which skepticism has since questioned, and much omitted which has since been regarded as essential. And yet it may, perhaps, be found by such readers that if, in a patient spirit of candid allowance, entering into different times which required different remedies, they resign themselves to the collective influence of the whole philosophy of Plato, they shall discover that solutions tolerably accurate will develop themselves out of his writings, and, perhaps, that in some instances his replies are not distinct only because they are involved

Topics omitted in his ethical speculations.

in larger formulas; that he is busied in laying his foundations so deep that his voice is scarcely articulate when it arrives on a level with the surface. For example, the question so perpetually discussed—the nature of the moral approbation—was, with Plato, a mere corollary from his views of the supersensible origin of the rational element of soul; he would not have dreamed of degrading the immutable idea of virtue, with its appended notions of right and obligation, by referring them to any inferior region. And as to that other subject of controversy which regards the rule of duty, Plato *descended* from the elevation of his praxis of philosophical perfection, when he bade his fellow-citizens be brave, and temperate, and pious, and just. These notions of the immutability of ideal virtue, and the duty of constant effort to gain it, thereby liberating the soul in even the bondage of the body, and preparing it to meet its kindred essences hereafter, are omnipresent in the Platonic philosophy; and, if they answer the problems of modern disputation, they do so on principles which, whether right or wrong, transcend the problems themselves, and place us in a region where we no longer remember their existence.

The Perfection of the human soul the aim of his whole philosophy.

The whole philosophy, then, of Plato, is one vast scheme of moral discipline, directed to the purification of the rational element in man; and its fundamental principle is the aspiration after perfection,—such perfection as competes to an unbodied spirit. Dialectics, physics, the science of mutual duties, are all-but ancillary to this last and loftiest object of man; it is their relation to *it* which alone gives them a place in "philosophy," and, deprived (as so often by sophistical traders in knowledge) of that relation, they sink into empty counterfeits, or tricks of mechanical art. Without this idea, perpetually preserved, you will read Plato in vain; the clue of the labyrinth will

have been lost; the luminary that sheds impartial light on every object will have disappeared. It is this presiding object which still dignifies the minutest subtleties of his dialectics; they are parts of the general discipline for the apprehension of ideas perfect and changeless; it is this which gives interest to discussions, apparently worthless, on the pompous follies of the time; *they* serve to contrast the pretended wisdom of the popular schools with the only true and permanent wisdom which he professed to explain and uphold. Man is made for the immutable; this world, in all even of its best and happiest devices, is essentially the sphere of the fleeting and the variable: every thing, then, which would lead the diviner element to content itself with these transient apparitions, whether it be the rhetoric of the sophist or the poetry of the more accomplished artist, is but an ingenious illusion, and dangerous in proportion to the strength of its treacherous fascinations.

But, that we may better judge of the execution, let us observe the circumstances that regulated the design of Plato.

A complete system of human life was a desideratum in Plato's age, and one which he strove to supply.

The design of Platonic philosophy, then, in this its moral, which is its principal, aspect, was nothing less than to supply its age with a complete system of human life. The want was manifest and alarming, and it had already called out the detached but powerful efforts of Plato's illustrious and martyred master. But Socrates was formed only to commence the work; it is his highest merit that he did commence it. To do more his very excellencies forbade. Sagacious, practical, fearless, he succeeded in revolutionizing the literary mind of Athens, but the very resoluteness and sincerity of his nature laid him open to assault, alarmed the vigilance of the public corruptors, and lighted their revenge to its object. But in another respect Socrates, perhaps, was hardly fitted to

accomplish the entire task which the time demanded. With great force of ideas, he probably valued little the regularity of system; and the regularity of system is often required as well to assist the feeble combinations of inferior minds, as, by its imposing majesty of aspect, to awe down opposition. That, then, which Socrate had begun, his greatest pupil undertook to complete, in the structure of a vast and symmetrical system which should at once provide a reply to the assailants of the reality of moral distinctions in all their varieties, should give to its defenders the means of allying it with all the advances of human science and preserving its eminence unchanged, should supply appropriate nutriment to every faculty and disposition of the human soul, and should insinuate the principles of unchangeable truth in such a form as to evade that opposition of interested adversaries which had already proved so fatal to Socrates.

Adaptation of Plato's system to the religious condition and requirements of his age and country.

Had there existed at this time a public establishment of *religion*, claiming and proving a divine origin, and extending its influence over every rank and division of society, to elevate, to purify, and to strengthen, this vast enterprise would of course have been, in many respects, superfluous; and, though the powers of Plato would still have found salutary occupation in deepening and securing the metaphysical basis of morality, I persuade myself that none would have been readier than this majestic mind to ally itself, in all points of belief and practice, with such a religion, and to acknowledge that its noblest and happiest exertions were those devoted to appreciating and diffusing it. But, as Greece was then circumstanced, religion was itself to be numbered among the enemies of truth; and yet, in all that monstrous mass of fiction, there lay *some* scattered elements of reality, nor could the entire be supplanted without, perhaps, greater danger than it brought. The design of the

Platonic system was adapted to this state of things with great skill. In the last Lecture I observed that it consisted of two forms of teaching very easily distinguishable. The more popular formed the vestibule to the profounder, and, for those who could pass no farther than the vestibule, it supplied food for the imagination of a far superior quality to that furnished by any part of the degrading superstition of the state. But it is when we look at the entire, and when we thus place ourselves in the position of Plato's more gifted auditors, that we gain some conception of the completeness and grandeur of his plan. We then see in it nothing less than a vast and proportioned system of metaphysical, moral, and theological principles, designed to supersede, silently but effectively, the whole mass of the public superstitions, supplying the place of every rejected folly by some counterpart of forcible doctrine, and building up at the side of each gaudy edifice of vicious fancy some impressive tenet, decorated (for otherwise all were fruitless) with no less richness of imagination, but imperceptibly winning the spectator to penetrate into its inner chambers and there discover the precious reality of moral truth. It is hence that Plato occasionally talks of the pursuit of philosophy under his auspices as the initiation to "mysteries," and borrows, to represent the course and result of the discipline he recommends, all the expressive phraseology of these awful observances.[4] And thus this singular system, adapting itself with equal accuracy to the reason and the imagination, at the same time that it deals with the darkest questions of metaphysics, constructs, by a parallel operation, a kind of philosophical mythology, and solders the whole fast to the very heart

[4] [As in *Phædr.* 250, c, where the entire phraseology is borrowed from the "mysteries." But I am not aware of any passage in which Plato represents *himself* as the mystagogue, except the evidently sportive one in *Theæt.* 156, A. ED.]

of Greece and of the age, by adopting the more innocent stories of the popular belief among its occasional decorations. By degrees, as the student became more and more habituated to thought, the change grew more complete; and, as Olympus and its vulgar wonders melted away, a new heaven came in its place,—no other than that *ideal world* which Plato has purposely brightened with the most ethereal colouring of fancy, that the transformation might become more insensible. The "gods" slowly descend into the humble ministers of a Supreme Intelligence, holding their very immortality at his will; and the purified mind of the disciple at length finds itself alone in a world solitary and eternal,—around him the immutable forms of the good, the just, the fair, and over all the expanded arms of infinite power and infinite intelligence.

It was thus that the calm, comprehensive, all-conciliating mind of Plato conceived a system adequate to all the wants of the soul of man, and by its very nature susceptible of indefinite expansion, without losing the proportion of its parts. It was, of course, as every philosophical system, limited in its efficiency to the minds of the cultivated and reflective; but Plato knew that, if these were gained, the result would be more or less discernible in every corner of society. He could as little conceive as rival that wondrous system which, sublimer than his own, is yet simple enough for the thoughts and the tears of childhood,—which awes the contemplation of sages and regulates the morality of the cottage hearth; but we are not to expect in the philosopher the inspiration also of the prophet.

Incompleteness of the teaching of Socrates.

It was necessary to enter into these considerations of the position of Plato, as the great architect upon the Socratic foundation, in order to approach, with due preparation, his theory of human life. When, satisfied of the importance and truth

of the moral teaching of Socrates, the pupil proceeded to examine into the speculative principles on which, in systematic exposition, it should be founded, he saw nothing complete in the theoretic philosophy of his day, but the greatest dignity and the largest capabilities of improvement in that of the Pythagoreans. It has been the ceaseless burden of the anti-Platonists—from Xenophon,[5] who sneers at the *τερατώδης σοφία* of Pythagoras, to Brucker, (the worst section in whose six quartos is that on Plato)—that the philosopher alloyed the simplicity of Socrates with these heterogeneous combinations from the Italic school. I confess I never could understand what these objectors mean. The maxims of Socrates, admirable and pregnant and right-minded as they were, and forming the true elements of a great system, were *not a system*, if by that term be meant a strict concatenation of deductions from established principles, divided under distinct heads, embracing all parts of their subject, and fortified against objections. To frame *a system* it was absolutely necessary to transcend the teaching of Socrates; and they who censure Plato for having attempted to carry that teaching back into its metaphysical principles (in the spirit of Italicism) might nearly as well censure Clarke or Bishop Butler for not having been content with the profound but unconnected *Pensées* of Pascal. The System of Ideas—the great characteristic of Platonism—is no fanciful or gratuitous addition: it is a bulwark based deep in reflective inquiry, and built, in its original purpose, to resist the pressing assaults of contemporary skepticism.

This incompleteness supplied by the System of Ideas.

With that theory of Ideas *this* part, as every part, of Platonism is directly connected. The "idea," in three different views of it, stands at

The Ideal Theory in its application to Ethics.

[5] [The pseudo-Xenophon, as stated in a previous note. ED.]

the head of the three divisions of Platonism. The object of Platonic *Dialectics* is to obtain a right conception, and, as far as man may, a direct apprehension, of the idea; the object of Platonic *Physics* is to illustrate the results of the participation of the idea by the sensible universe; the object of the Platonic *Ethics* is to make the idea the subject of perpetual imitation. In the latter sense man constructs his life, as the Deity constructed the universe, after the exemplar of the ideal.

Let me once more recall to your recollection the nature of *Ideas*, which are thus the basis of the Philosophy we are studying. Every thing which becomes the subject of sensible knowledge may be said to possess three elements, which I will call the ideal, the material, and the formal. The material element is the mere impression of object on organ, itself no direct subject of consciousness; the formal is the mental element which receives, and, in receiving, qualifies, that organic impression; the ideal is the foundation of the whole phenomenon in the world of reality,—a foundation to which Plato, with great subtlety, assigned as it were another foundation, *The Good*, thereby intimating that the last principle of the existence of all that does exist was to be found in the inconceivable Perfection,—a notion which we familiarize to ourselves by saying (what we often do say without any reflection on the unfathomable depth of the thought itself) that for all that exists there *must* assuredly be, in the nature of things, some reason which makes it better that it should exist, and exist thus, than that it should not exist thus, or not exist at all. The connection between the Idea and the Phenomenon is by Plato variously stated, and in the former course I endeavoured to collect and consider his expressions. The most usual, you all know, are *imitation* and *participation*, (*μίμησις* and *μέθεξις*;) words as unexceptionable, probably, as any that could be found to denote the

Idea of the Good.

bond between the Real and the Apparent,—the real cause, the apparent effect,—the real law, the apparent instance,—but which have sadly misled the ordinary critics of Platonism, who are wont to devise an imaginary world of shadows, and, having demolished this spectral region as a phantom, to exult in dismissing forever the ideal system of Plato. The great character of the ideal essences, or original laws and reasons of things, is their *independence* of the mental act of apprehending them, as well as of all other influences: as the external world discovered by sense is independent of that discovery, so the intelligible world discovered by intellect is independent of it, and of all things. In the discovery of both we draw these conclusions of both.

The intelligible element, then, gives itself to the sensible; and the intellect of man, the appointed interpreter of the universe, refers the sensible to the intelligible. But, from causes altogether mysterious, and which Plato treats with haste and brevity, the sensible result is ever inferior and disproportionate to the intelligible ground. You will reply that, according to the interpretation already given, this is impossible, for that the effect can never be disproportionate to its own cause, the result inadequate to its own reason. But here we come upon one of those sublime arrangements of Platonism which, even when the reason hesitates to accept them, still endear it to every elevated mind. Plato, well knowing this difficulty, aware that this balance of inferiority—this melancholy *deficit* in nature—must be accounted for, determined yet to do it in such a manner as to save the ideal world unharmed. Accordingly, he ascribed it to that undefinable *something*, the substratum of the sensible, on the nature of which I have already at some length engaged you. It followed that the more we could detach phenomena from their sensible existence,—the more we could consider qualities as in themselves, and

not as elements of the visible series,—the more we should have brought them into that state in which we could consider them as images of eternal realities.

Such views as these obviously extended to every form of existence: the theory included all nature, from its vastest to its minutest constituents. But, though every phenomenon of nature might thus form a step from the sensible to the ideal, some objects there were which stood as steps far higher than the rest in this ladder of the philosophic contemplatist. For, if there be difference of rank in the ideal world itself,—if there be some laws of the Universal System that originate all the rest, and make, as it were, the very charter of its entire legislation,—assuredly there must be proportionate differences in the sensible embodiment; and the judicious aspirant after the true dignity of man will attach himself with anxious earnestness to these. In every object that even feebly exhibits them he will see the reflected light of eternity, and know the quivering beam through all its dimness and distortion; if many such objects meet his gaze, he will abstract the blessed quality from them all, and thus *condense* the light in his intellectual focus; and it may be that patient contemplation shall at length enable him to gain some conception of the splendour of the original luminary. And that which encourages such a hope is the perceived fact, that the most commanding ideas of the invisible world do actually reveal themselves in this world in a form partially *intelligible*. For example, the qualities of sense, whiteness, sweetness, odours, sounds,—though they, doubtless, are finally referrible to ideal originals, can at best bear but a faint analogy to their intelligibles; but it is not so with proportions, with mathematical regulations,—with first principles, the *ἀνυπόθετα* of the sciences: above all, it is not so with *moral virtues*. Here, though still unable to behold except in particular manifestation, an easy effort of abstraction

brings us almost within reach of the ideas themselves, and we seem to become conscious of the fact that we have but to escape the body, and with it the world of sense, to stand in the simplicity of pure rational natures in front of the awful originals.

What it is to behold ideas.

But when we inquire *what it is*, in the Platonic sense, thus to behold an idea, we cannot easily obtain a satisfactory answer. The question might be replied to in two ways. First, It might be said that the disembodied rational faculty can and shall apprehend, by a succession of generalizations, the laws of the Universal System more and more widely unfolded, perceiving in each that perfection of wisdom which gives it the highest moral necessity. The idea of virtue, or rather the various forms of the one ultimate idea, may thus expand into a vastness of glory now altogether inconceivable, and so amplify forever, itself indeed immutable, but the reason unconsciously widening in capacity. This presents a true and noble sense; nor, indeed, can any one among ourselves, who has learned to hunger and thirst after knowledge as well as "righteousness," conceive that for a little temporary endurance this infinite perspective of attainment is almost distinctly promised in the charter of our Christian hopes, without a beating heart and a resolve of high endeavour.

But there is a *second* sense in which the emancipation of the rational element for the direct intuition of ideas may be conceived. It may be supposed that the reason shall instantly apprehend the ultimate idea, shall grasp at once the very foundations of existence.

I need not again observe to you, that this anticipation supposes an ultimate *unity* between the rational element of the soul and the Ideal Realities themselves; for thus only could it be expected that the reason, when freed from its restrictions, would necessarily embrace them.

It is one thing to know that there must be ideal foundations for all existences, another thing to apprehend the ideal foundations themselves. To suppose the latter faculty *certain* is, I repeat, to suppose the last reasons of things and the reason of man to be fundamentally *one*,—a supposition which we have before seen is perfectly agreeable to the Platonic doctrine of the eternity of the soul,—a supposition which wonderfully enhances, indeed, the dignity of the spiritual principle in man, by thus supposing it to hold the key of the universe,—but a supposition for which, in *this unlimited* sense, there seems to be no foundation.

As concerns our present purpose, either of these suppositions might be accepted. I mention them because the Platonic expositions do not seem to have kept the distinction in view. But with reference to what I conceive the true and genuine value of the Platonic philosophy, speculative and practical,—with reference, especially, to the present division of the subject,—you may adopt either. The infinite progression, or the changeless intuition, would alike suit the rule and tenor of the Ethics of Plato.

You are now prepared to entertain that subject. You have seen that the phenomenal images of ideas, that ideas in their most perfect state of sensible manifestation, can be obtained by the reflective mind. Separating these from all their debasing concomitants, conceiving them in a state yet purer than any which experience in its limited range can exhibit, the thoughts are raised on the ascent to absolute perfection. In the mean time, the soul is quickened by the remembrance of its own dignity and capacities, it laments the ignoble confinement to which it is reduced, it knows the path to freedom lies through self-purification, terminated by the brief and happy gate of death; it therefore resolves to exert its anticipated freedom by realizing the high vision of per-

fection forever before it. Distinctly *to know* these truths, the necessary requisite to all useful effort,—practically to fix them as the rules of life,—this is prudence or wisdom, —φρόνησις,—the leading excellence according to the views of Plato,—the virtue without which all others are but specious vices. You perceive from hence that the idea of the *Rational* in man is the leading idea of the Platonic morals; and the main exercise of the Rational, the separation of soul, as far as possible, from body and all bodily adjuncts.

The principle of Rationality the leading principle of the Platonic Ethics.

This principle of Rationality is a direct consequence from the entire scheme of Platonism. The system supposes the original unity of the Beautiful, the Just, and the Good, in *the True;* the True being, as it were, the supporting or substantiating, the Good the characterizing, idea, the Beautiful and Just accompanying both; the True being the very reality of things, the Good the final cause of their being, and the others investing the True out of the strength of that final cause,—for wherever is the ἀγαθόν, there will infallibly be the highest measure of *harmonicus proportion;* and proportion is the essential idea of both the Beautiful and the Just. Now, the soul of man is originally formed to meet these governing ideas of the Universe; it is congenial, it is (in its rational element) coeternal, with them. This must apply equally to every human soul, however debased by its contact with, and slavery to, the body: the depth of its degradation cannot efface the fact of its original adaptation; and, though the vast majority of the race live unconscious of their privileges, the privileges nevertheless exist, and it is the function of "philosophy" to instruct how to enjoy them. The great requisite of virtue, then, is to gain the intuition of these ideal excellencies; and the original fitness of the soul to meet them is so certain, that it

Unity of the great ethical ideas of the Beautiful, Just, and Good.

cannot be conceived that it can really apprehend these eternal objects without yielding to their divine attraction. But the intuition of ideas is *knowledge or science* in its highest, its only genuine, sense; the moral and the intellectual are thus identified in their highest point; and the *νόησις* of the philosophic mind sees beneath it, on one side, all the infinite varieties of human learning, on the other, all the diversities of human virtue, as its subordinate results, or dependent developments.

From this leading conception of the nature of the human soul, consequences naturally follow which have often startled the readers of Plato, but which are really the necessary fruits of this principle.

Plato adopted the Socratic maxim, "no man is voluntarily evil."

For example, Plato inherits from Socrates the maxim that no man is *voluntarily evil*, *κακὸς ἑκὼν οὐδείς*.[6] The rationale of this doctrine seems to be that the immortal element of the soul, the directive power, is essentially formed to make good its object; that, therefore, it can only be through a suspension or eclipse of that power that evil can in fact become the aim of the man,—a suspension which even then does not allow him to choose evil as evil, but which hides from his view the perfect idea of the good. Even when he is admonished, he may pursue the delusive phantom; but it is still from a belief of its reality; it is as the reality of *excellence* he follows it; and the original, the indestructible law of his rational being, still proclaims him a devoted worshipper of virtue, at the very moment that in his temporary blindness he adores its opposite. This doctrine, which in a certain degree is true and profitable, but which may obviously, by overlooking the operation of habit and passion, be carried to a very extravagant length,* is made the basis of many

[6] [See *Protag.* p. 358, c. Tim. p. 86, d. Ed.]

* For it surely is most erroneous to deny, what all men can attest, that the force of habit or of violent propension may urge to the com-

admirable arguments on the advantage of philosophy, the coucher of the eye of reason, the legislator of true and apparent goods. In its fullest form it resolves into the proposition that all vice is ignorance.

The principle, that "all Virtue is one;" in what sense true.

The principle, often directly or indirectly propounded by Plato, that all virtue is "one," that no man can be truly virtuous by halves, is not far removed from the same leading notion. To us the doctrine seems easily derivable from the consideration that the same principle, whatever it be,—whether the will of God, or the fitness of things, or both,—which urges to partial virtue, must, if genuine, urge to all, as equally applicable to all. This seems to have been in Plato's mind, but not this only. Virtue itself, when contemplated from without, seemed to consist in a certain happy proportionality in all the elements of the system: this (which was *justice*) was the last result of the possession and exercise of that wisdom of which we have spoken. Now, the very notion of *just proportion* brings with it the idea of unity in the midst of multiplicity: it is the diversified governed by the uniform. Virtue, then, the result of the presidency of the Rational, takes from this singleness of control a character of unity;

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mission of vice at the very instant that the intellect is most abundantly cognizant of the excellence of virtue. To call *this* blindness, or the substitution of a false for a true good, seems wholly unwarrantable. Plato argues, that we commit vice *for the sake of* a supposed good, and that it is good which still is in view. This supposes man always to act with an ulterior view, which is likewise quite gratuitous. [It is difficult to reconcile this notion of the involuntary nature of evil with the passages in which Plato insists upon the necessity of allying the reason with the nobler emotions (τὸ θυμοειδές) in order to control effectually the lower appetites. The inconsistency will appear more distinctly in the course of the next Lecture. Meanwhile, it may be observed that the author of the *Magna Moralia* (attributed to Aristotle) represents Plato as differing from Socrates in *not* referring virtue exclusively to the intellectual region of the soul,—a limitation which can alone justify the paradox in question. See *M. M.* i. c. 1, §§ 5–7. ED.]

for the harmonious relation of parts is a thing in itself indivisible. To these views contemplations more metaphysical allied themselves; the very unity of the supreme idea of good, in which all inferior manifestations were absorbed and lost, reduced to its own simplicity all human efforts to copy and embody it.

The maxim, "Virtue cannot be taught:" in what sense maintained by Plato.

Lastly, the maxim which is the subject of so much discussion in the Platonic dialogues—the maxim "that virtue cannot be scholastically taught"—finds its explanation in the same system of the human soul. It is Plato's perpetual admonition that true knowledge is incommunicable, in the way of information, from man to man,—that it must be recovered out of the depths of the soul itself. On this principle turns the singular passage in the *Phædrus*, so alien to our modern habits of thought, in which Plato denounces the invention of *writing* as a misfortune to man,—as the prolific parent of borrowed, sophistical, and illusory wisdom. Now, we have seen that the fontal ideas of virtue and science are blended in the φρόνησις, or wisdom, of Plato. The same principle must, therefore, apply to virtue as to knowledge. In its true essence it cannot be conveyed; no series of practical maxims, however judicious, can reach this hidden reality; it must discover itself to the reflective mind by its own inherent light. It is when Plato treats of this subject that he rises into those expressions so deeply interesting to Christian readers, in which he intimates, though darkly, some belief of the operation of the Eternal Spirit upon the soul of man. Nor does it at all lessen that interest, that they are combined with his own theory of the *natural* prerogatives of Soul itself; inasmuch as the point alone practically important, the necessity of an aid distinct from ordinary influences, remains unaffected by any hypothesis of that description. These demands, echoing from the inmost nature of the profoundest and

purest of moral reflectors, have their own unalterable value, although Plato considered them required not so much indeed to communicate new impressions as to restore the native functions of the paralyzed mind; to "teach" virtue, but to teach it by a λόγος θεῖος,—a supernal element regained; to teach it, not by conveying truths so much as renovating faculties, not so much by exhibiting objects before inconceivable, as by brightening the tarnished surface of the intellectual mirror, which then *must*, of its own accord, reflect the unchangeable images of virtue and of truth.

LECTURE VI.

THE ETHICS OF PLATO, (*continued.*)

GENTLEMEN:—

THE PLATONIC ETHICS, *continued. Further peculiarities of the system.*

I ATTEMPTED on the last occasion to exhibit to you the leading idea of the Platonic morals,—the idea that in the exercise, and thence the gradual enfranchisement, of the rational element in human nature, its true dignity and duties consisted. The ceaseless effort at self-perfection by the imitation of ideal excellence, and in the hope of a thorough eventual union with this object of exalted contemplation, *included*, with Plato, all the obligations of life; and hence the notion of mere obligation in its directness and simplicity makes little figure in his writings. He composed, indeed, with great care, an elaborate system of Laws of public polity; but the harsh external control of positive law is superfluous to the being of Plato's conception, or, if it concern him, can only do so in its milder form of a code of moral education. Internal obligation is, in his view, less the immediate imperative of an instantaneous command, as our moralists more safely represent it, than the calm collection of a reason weighing its own dignity and glorying in progressive supremacy over the degrading seductions of sense. When I offer these general characteristics you will understand them *as* general,—that is, as not beyond the possibility of occasional, though rare, exception. Few moralists of antiquity—perhaps on the whole not one—can be said to have left maxims purer or more

rigorous behind them: Plato has the force of the Stoics without their extravagance. And in enforcing these principles he employs language which it is not difficult to translate into the exactness and decision of the ethics of Butler or of Kant. But as the general strain of his discourse he rather assails vice as degrading the majesty of humanity than as violating its explicit commands; he rather pities it as a miserable blindness than arraigns it as resolute guilt.

The four Cardinal Virtues, and their functions, according to Plato.

Wisdom, then, the philosophic insight, is the perfect glory of man, the chief of virtues, which alone gives their value to all the rest. Fortitude and temperance respect each of those two divisions into which the mortal part of man's soul is separated. And justice is the fitting proportion of the whole. The dependence of these qualities upon the presiding presence of Wisdom for all their genuineness and real value is finely illustrated in a well-known passage of the *Phædo*,[1] not less true or less instructive at this hour than when it fell from the lips of the dying Socrates. "If you but investigate the fortitude and temperance of any but philosophers, you will find them very absurd.—How?—You know that the mass of mankind fear death as one of the greatest of evils?—Certainly.—When then they suffer death with some courage they only suffer it because they fear a greater evil. . . . And, consequently, none but the philosopher is courageous from any motive but fear; and surely it is absurd that a man should be brave from sheer cowardice. . . . Is the case different with your ordinary men of temperance? Are they temperate from any other motive but intemperance,—contradictory as it seems? For they never abjure one pleasure except through dread of being deprived of another which they prefer in their

Supremacy of Wisdom, illustrated from the Phædo.

[1] [P. 68, D, fol. ED.]

slavery. They allow it intemperance to be mastered by their passions; but that does not hinder them from never thinking of subduing certain enjoyments except with a view to others; which assuredly realizes what I said just now, that they are temperate through intemperance. . . . What a spurious system of barter is this, to change pleasures against pleasures, pains for pains, fears for fears, like coin for coin—the sole coin for which all the rest should be willingly exchanged is *Wisdom*. With this, one buys all, has all,—fortitude, temperance, justice; in a word, true virtue is in and with wisdom, independently of pleasures, pains, fears, and all other affections; while without it, the virtue that consists in these transfers is but a shadowy, servile, false virtue. For the real essence of virtue is the purification of the soul from all these defilements; and temperance, justice, fortitude,—yea, wisdom itself,—all are but modes of effecting this purification. And such is the symbolical purport of initiation in the mysteries." It thus appears that the essence of perfect virtue is found in its origination in contemplative wisdom, and that its object is the purification of the soul from all earthly taint, in order to its easy passage to the state of disembodied peace.

Plato's system of disciplinary purification.

To conciliate a system so ethereal with the actual state and demands of human nature, so as to make it practically applicable and operative, may appear no easy task. Plato seems to have effected this chiefly by representing his system as one of progressive discipline,—one, therefore, in which every rank of mind could obtain its suitable place. The lowest step was dignified, for it was a step to absolute perfection. The whole array of the sciences (and Plato was conversant with all the knowledge of his time) were enlisted in the service of this great cause; for they all were subservient to the attainment of that calm and meditative spirit of abstrac-

Ethical use of the Sciences.

tion which was the temper and the instrument of philosophic wisdom. And though Plato gave no great encouragement to the exercise of active talents, on which, except in minds of singular sobriety, he was apt to look with coldness and suspicion, yet even these tumults of public life might be converted to the same high and holy purpose by becoming a school of discipline in the art of self-control. But without this motive steadily understood and maintained, a motive which, in its true sincerity, was scarcely compatible with the feverish excitement of ambitious pursuits, man could not claim the skies. When in the *Phædo*[2] Socrates is represented as speculating on the changes of the metempsychosis as determined by moral causes, after condemning the glutton and the tyrant to the state of the ass and the wolf, he declares that those who have practised those social virtues which men call moderation and justice, by mere habit and exercise, without reflective contemplation or philosophy, may be expected to reappear in the forms of the more peaceable animals, the bee or ant, or in that of good men once more; but that to reach by a bound the rank of the immortals belongs only to him who has "philosophized," and who has by that exalted process left this life in perfect purity. And to compensate the limited application of this promise, you must remember that Plato everywhere insinuates that the attainment is really within reach of all, and, were political establishments regulated on the principles he proposes, would, through appropriate education, become the heritage of all. He felt and acknowledged that no existing state of society permitted the realization of those principles; but the error, he contended, was not in the principles, but in society. And it was from this consideration that he uttered the well-known sentence in

Comparative depreciation of the civic virtues.

[2] [P. 82. ED.]

the fifth book of the *Republic*,[3] that no polity would ever be perfect until *philosophers* became its kings, or its kings philosophers.

Of the emotions, and their place in the Platonic scheme.

But even a system the most resolutely restricted to the cultivation of the rational element cannot neglect the rest of our nature. The object of such a system will be, therefore, to convert, if possible, the affections to the furtherance of its design; to recognise them but as inferior ministers of its presiding principle. This is the true link which connects Plato's doctrine of self-purification, through the intuition of truth, with his treatment of the questions of happiness and the emotions. This connection will, I think, appear by a very brief consideration.

The question of happiness, and the summum bonum, as discussed in the Philebus.

The question of happiness is discussed in the dialogue entitled *Philebus*, the oldest regular disquisition we possess on what was afterwards called the "summum bonum." The point submitted to debate is, the respective claim of pleasure and reason to constitute the chief happiness of man; and the matter is investigated with great refinement. A condition of pleasure altogether destitute of any rational element, a condition of reason altogether devoid of any element of sensibility, are both subjected to inquisition, and both rejected.[4] The true position of man ought then to consist of some union of the two;[5] and after a long, and in some respects very interesting, analysis of the characteristics of pleasure and of philosophic science, Plato concludes by giving, as might be

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[3] [P. 473, D. ED.]

[4] [*Phileb.* p. 20, E:—*σκοπῶμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τόν τε ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸν φρονήσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρίς* . . . to p. 22, B:—*τούτων γε περὶ δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν εἶχε τἀγαθόν.* The difference between the Platonic system and the purely Socratic is clearly brought out in this portion of the dialogue. See note to p. 285. ED.]

[5] [Styled *ὁ κοινός*, or *μικτὸς βίος*. Ib. D. ED.]

supposed, to the latter the unquestionable precedence, but allowing to the former its place in that temperate degree which shall in no respect interfere with the exercise and the supremacy of reason. The discussion is marked with peculiar good sense, and forms a striking contrast to the contemporary extravagance of the Cynic school.[6] The philosophic discipline of Plato does not deny sensitive happiness: it claims to regulate it, and as far as possible to show that its purity and perfection consist in its dependence upon that regulation.

The Platonic Theory of Love.

But the relation of the emotions to the immortal element of the soul, and to its objects, is still more marked in the most celebrated, and unhappily the most perverted, of all the tenets of Plato,—his philosophic adaptation of the emotion of Love. It is not impossible that the large proportion of the writings of Plato devoted to this subject, in some or other of its aspects, may have been owing in a considerable measure to the habits of the time, which rendered the topic an easy and natural one for those transitions in dialogue from things outward to things invisible which perpetually mark his philosophic style. Thus, we know that the *Symposium*, which, with the *Phædrus*, may be considered the text-books of this division of Platonism, was really the description of an ordinary Athenian scene. The succession of speeches, and even the special subject, were usual forms of festive amusement; and, though in a very different style, the custom is still found in many parts of the East, where you will remember that these intellectual encounters date as far back as the days of

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[6] [Who are generally (I am not sure whether correctly) supposed to be meant by the "seers" happily described as "prophesying under the inspiration of an austere but not ungenerous nature." *Phileb.* p. 44, c. The best analysis of this abstruse but most interesting and important dialogue is Trendelenburg's tract *De Platonis Philebi Consilio.* Berlin, 1837. ED.]

Samson. I do not find that the Platonic theory of love coloured much of ancient literature: it may, perhaps, be recognised in passages of Euripides,[7] whose pensive muse congenially adopted it. Some of the Christian fathers, especially St. Augustine, found it susceptible of a divine adaptation; but the period from which, in a form whose folly might well be enough to neutralize its danger, it became one of the staples of modern romance, seems to have been that of the revival of classical literature in Italy. It probably became, to the thoughtful and sedentary, pretty much what chivalry was to the active and ardent; and the same singular combination of devotion to the human and divine was equally characteristic of both.

The Platonic theory of ideal love rested upon principles similar to those I have already so often explained in considering his views of knowledge and of virtue, and was strictly subservient to both. As the sensible world was the exhibition (as far as its nature would permit) of absolute truth and absolute goodness, so was it also the exhibition of absolute beauty; and the faculties of the human soul were originally competent to apprehend them all. But for the illustration of his general theory, the case of the participation of the primal principle of *Beauty* was far the most convenient and forcible. It lent itself to expression with greater readiness, it found an echo more perfect in the peculiar genius of Greece, and it seemed to claim that emotion of the heart of man as

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[7] [As in the celebrated choral song in praise of Athens, where the "Loves" are described as *τᾷ σοφίᾳ πάρεδροι . . . παντοίας ἀρετᾶς ξυνεργοί.* (*Medea*, v. 838, ed. Pors.) Compare this with a fragment of the *Dictys* (Fr. viii. ed. Dindorf.) and the lyrical passage preserved by Athenæus, xiii. p. 561, A. (*Frag. inc.* cxiii. Dind.) Chronological reasons, it should be observed, forbid us to suppose that Euripides "adopted" the Platonic theory of love, at least from Plato, for the *Medea* was acted two years before the philosopher was born. ED.]

specially consecrated to it, which the imagination in all ages had laboured to celebrate and to adorn. Its internal connection with Plato's favourite principle of proportion, the very mysteriousness and power of its influences, added dignity to the theme; and even the ambiguous use of language, in which it is not easy to separate the moral and the sensitive, furnished means of heightening the effect by insinuating associations borrowed from either side of the analogy. And the very principle of Plato, that the true state of soul consisted in the *intuition* of truth, naturally led to the representation of the divine object of this contemplation as the object of love. And if all the preliminary studies, mathematical, musical, dialectical, are but preparatives for this final effort of the soul, then may they all be considered a discipline for this emotion which accompanies it. Nay, the very *anxiety* for truth becomes but a form of it; for this anxiety, when genuine, is but the struggle of the soul for the possession of the central beauty in the possession of the central truth. But, of course, the process becomes yet more direct in the contemplation of objects themselves sharing and manifesting the primal καλόν; and this holds through all the regions of creation, moral and material; for, whatever their specific nature,—whether inanimate or animate, visible forms, or actions high and heroic,—they all bring to the enraptured memory the recollection of that ideal loveliness once the immediate object of the unembodied soul, and now faintly reflected in the sphere of sense and time. Hence philosophers are declared to be, by virtue of their vocation, φιλόκαλοι and ἐρωτικοί;[8] and Socrates, in the *Symposium*, professes that his whole science is nothing but a science of "love." And in the *Theages*,[9] ἐγὼ τυγχάνω, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος πλὴν σμικροῦ γέ τινος μαθήματος τῶν ἐρωτικῶν.

[8] [*Phædr.* p. 248, D. ED.]

[9] [P. 128, B. ED.]

You will perceive that "Love" is, then, a word of very general significancy in this philosophy. It stands for all aspiration after a communion with perfection. And it assuredly is one of the peculiar excellencies of the Platonic way of thought, that it regarded the upward tendencies of the human soul in a light which no one before its author seems to have fully caught, and which few after him have seized who were not directly or indirectly his copyists. To Plato they were facts, and facts of transcendent importance.

The Platonic "love" may then be considered as developed in two forms,—a superior and a subordinate. The former takes place when the soul strains after the infinite perfection of beauty, prompted on its path by earthly manifestations. The latter is engendered when souls, as kindred immortal essences, recognise each other in the world of sense; and it thus includes the ordinary notions of exalted friendship. But the former is far more prominently Platonic, and even the latter is seldom conceived except as connected with it. And the extraordinary importance assigned by Socrates himself, as well as Plato, to beauty of outward form, as the indication of a corresponding elevation of soul, combines them both.*

The Phædrus.

"Some few alone," says Plato in the *Phædrus*,[10] speaking of the imprisonment of the soul in the body, "preserve recollections sufficiently distinct. These, when they behold any image of things on high, are transported beyond themselves, and

* It cannot be denied that this latter tenet has a tendency to promote the perversions which the subject has undergone. But, as Plato himself has explicitly unfolded his views, it is but a very *inferior* stage of the ascending science of the Beautiful which concerns itself with beauty in its outward manifestations at all. It is the first step, and only the first.

[10] [P. 250, A. ED.]

cannot repress their emotion; but they know not its cause, because they do not closely consider what passes within them. Justice, wisdom, all which soul can estimate, have lost their brilliance in the images we see of them here below: embarrassed ourselves by gross organs, it is with great difficulty that a few among us, when we approach these images, can recognise the model they represent. Beauty was then, indeed, resplendent, when, among the choir of the blessed, our souls in the train of Jove, as others in the train of other gods, contemplated the glorious sight, initiated in mysteries the holiest of all,—mysteries which then, indeed, we rightly celebrated when, enjoying all our essential perfections, and yet unknowing of sorrows to come, we gazed in rapture on those objects,—fair, perfect, simple, full of blessedness and peace, which unrolled to our eyes in the depths of the pure light,—no less pure ourselves, and free as yet from this tomb we call our body, which we drag along with us as the oyster drags its shelly prison!" "Pardon," he adds, "these fond delays devoted to the remembrance of happiness forever lost. As for the *Beautiful*, it sparkled in that world among the other essences. Fallen into this sphere, we have recognised it more clearly than the rest, through the medium of the most luminous of our senses. Sight is the subtlest organ of the frame: it, however, perceives not wisdom; for our love would indeed be boundless could we apprehend the image of *it*, and of other lovely objects, as distinctly as we can visual beauty." He then describes with exquisite force of expression the trouble of spirit, the enthusiastic awe and reverence, which the apparition of this occupant of the celestial world in its earthly forms produces; but for this I must refer you to the original.

In the *Symposium*,[11] the course of successive gene-

[11] [P. 211, c, fol. ED.]

The Symposium.

ralization by which the mind arrives at the first principle of beauty is still more distinctly portrayed. Beginning with single visible objects, it extends to many, to all; it rises next to estimate the beauty of the soul, as infinitely exceeding all exterior developments; it soon recognises the same pervading principle in actions, in laws, in the manifold creations of moral energy. But this is only the portal to the higher beauty of the products of pure intelligence; nor is the ascending soul to be satisfied till, from the loftiest eminence of thought, it sees one primary beauty commanding the whole universe of being, and recognises but one science, the science that regards it. "O Socrates," continues his instructress,—for the sage professes to be only repeating the discourse of a Theban priestess,—"the true prize of life is the sight of the eternal beauty! Compared with such a sight as this, what would be the poor images of earth which so often trouble and perplex us? What, I ask you, would be the destiny of that mortal to whom it should be given to contemplate the unmingled beauty in all its purity and simplicity, no longer invested with perishable human accompaniments, but face to face to see and know the beauty unchangeable and divine? Think you he would have ground for complaint who, fixing his eyes on such an object, should give himself solely to celestial communion with it? And is it not solely in the contemplation of the eternal beauty with that organ by which alone it can be seized, that he shall be enabled to produce, not images of virtue, because it is not to images he is attaching himself, but virtues real and genuine, because it is truth alone that he loves. Now, it is to him that thus produces true virtue and preserves it that it belongs to be the favoured of God; it is to him more than to any other that it belongs to be immortal." Such a contemplation as this is a contemplation of God. It is the ultimate idea of beauty which is the subject of the

mental vision; but ideas, distinct in themselves, are bound in mysterious unity with the very essence of the supreme of all. He guides himself by the rational principles of the universe; but these principles are at the same time inseparable from his existence. To direct the thoughts to them is to be lost in Him. You will not, then, be surprised to find that the perfection of which virtue is the effort is by Plato described[12] as *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ*, assimilation to God. This assimilation is the enfranchisement of the divine element of the soul. To approach Him as the substance of truth is science; as the substance of goodness in truth, is wisdom; as the substance of beauty in goodness and truth, is love.

You will now, perhaps, have seen by what means it is that Plato endeavours to connect the emotional part of the constitution with a system professedly providing only for the purely rational element. The baser passions are assigned to a merely bodily origin, and Fortitude and Temperance are to repress and subjugate them. The more noble are either busied in assisting the power of Reason[13] to crush all opposition, or they are themselves the wing[14] by which the philosophic soul rises into its appropriate world. Finally, the general desire of temporary happiness is consigned to the charge of presiding Wisdom, which, dreading its excesses, cautiously measures out its daily allowance.

The Politics of Plato.

I had intended to have passed from the subject of the Platonic system of morals to that of the Platonic political philosophy; but the occasion will not permit the extended discussion it would require. I shall therefore merely observe that the *Politics* of Plato are a wide but faithful development of his moral theory.

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[12] [*Theæt.* p. 176, B. ED.]

[13] [*Republ.* iv. p. 441, A:—*τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐπίκουρον τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει.* ED.]

[14] [*Phædr.* p. 246, fol. ED.]

He wrote two large works on the subject: one (*The Republic*) in which he presents the Ideal of a State then unrealized, and probably forever to continue so;[15] the other (*The Laws*) in which he undertakes to apply the principles of his ideal as far as possible to the state of his age and the world.[16] The main political engine with Plato is *Education*,—education not indeed in the vulgar sense of elementary teaching, which he thought of little comparative moment, but education in that wide conception of it which includes the training of every faculty of mind and body from the instant of birth to maturity.

The Republic.

His *Republic* is truly a large *University*, even to the "travelling fellows." The fault of Plato's ideal of political perfection is, that it converts the members of a state into mere machines of the public will, and, annihilating all individuality, endangers the impulse to personal excellence, overpowers the subjects of government with a legislation perhaps too private, officious, and minute, opposes the growth of the natural affections, (destroying at a blow all filial and connubial relations,) and leaves no room for national expansion or circumstantial alteration.[17] The necessity under which he conceived himself of making the state the exact counterpart of the individual soul—three castes (of governors, warriors, and artisans) answering to the triple division of Man—undoubtedly hampered his freedom of speculation. The systematic spirit of Plato reduces every thing under vast generalizations, and sees humanity, whether individual or social, under a single aspect, the loftiest of all, but uniform in its loftiness; and you require

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[15] [As he says himself in the *Repub.* b. ix. fin. ED.]

[16] [The relation of the polity sketched in the *Laws* to the ideal or perfect state is described in *Legg.* b. v. p. 739. ED.]

[17] [A critique at once exact and comprehensive of the Platonic State may be found towards the end of the second volume of Brandis's *Handbuch*. ED.]

nothing more to show you how remote are the political writings of this great Thinker from the spirit of our day, than to remember the fact that some of the principal texts of his profoundest metaphysic occur in the midst of *The Republic*. But with all their peculiarities—in many instances in consequence of their peculiarities—these extraordinary works maintain their interest beyond all subsequent political essays; for the union, characteristic of Plato, of sublime and comprehensive conceptions of the possibilities of moral advancement with the minutest special observation of human nature, they are still, perhaps, unequalled; nor is the literary education of any statist completed who has not made them his own.

Concluding reflections.

And now, Gentlemen, as I may trust that those among you who have accompanied me through the series of these discourses with any regularity, and listened to them with any attention, have obtained a tolerable idea of the chief features of the most remarkable of all the ancient systems of philosophy, it remains that, having traversed this vast and interesting region, we pause for a moment on its borders, and, ere we leave it, endeavour to compress in a single reverted view its beauties and its defects. I have attempted to introduce the philosophy of Plato at some length to this audience, because (no doubt on account of not presenting any single available text-book) it unfortunately forms no subject of examination, except incidentally, in any department of our collegiate studies. Yet it is certain that no accuracy of knowledge in the later Grecian theories can at all compensate for imperfect acquaintance with this mighty monument of earlier speculation,—the beginning, and yet the masterpiece, of Grecian system. To Christian students, especially, it presents topics of perpetual interest, both from the tone of the system itself, and from the influence it has exercised over Ecclesiastical Literature in almost every age. And surely nothing can be more

instructive (ought we to doubt that it was *purposely* provided?) than to watch the efforts of human intelligence often struggling in the very same path which Revelation came afterwards to clear of all obstruction: when it *coincides*, to see in it the unbribed testimony of natural reason to the supernatural communication; when it differs or omits, to mark in every separate instance the calm unboastful superiority of the message from heaven!

I shall not occupy the short time that remains with any special discussion of the pure metaphysics of Plato. The very detail of the subject brought its own criticism with it; and the occasion does not allow recapitulation. Platonism is essentially a system of *moral discipline* or purification: it was in that light its author saw it, and to that sole purpose his labours, however diversified, were dedicated. This is the point too in which false impressions of its value, of the real nature of its merits and defects, are likely to prove of highest practical importance; and I would not wish you to leave this place under mistaken notions of either.

Practical merits of Platonism.

The *merits* of the Platonic practical philosophy are clear and commanding. They perpetuate the value of Platonism to this day; they unquestionably render its records among the noblest and most elevating studies that can engage a human spirit when unoccupied by the higher lessons of inspiration. These merits consist in the immutable basis which this system assigns to the principles of moral truth, in the moral aspect under which it contemplates the creation and the Creator, in the grandeur of its conceptions of the destinies of the human soul, and in the untainted purity of its practical morality. These are high claims to our reverential admiration; they are claims which in every age have taught the noblest and purest spirits of our race to recur with veneration to the memory of Plato. For all truths, whencesoever derived, are mutually consistent;

they gladly countenance each other; and no certainty or abundance of revealed knowledge will ever place the candid mind above welcoming with joy the corroborating attestations of philosophy.

Its defects.

The *defects* of the Platonic system of humanity are not, however, less certain than its merits; and the tone of general encomium which I have so long employed in speaking of its excellences may justify me in noticing its blemishes now. After making allowances so large on its behalf, you will not attribute to narrowness or bigotry the exceptions I am next obliged to subjoin. I am not about to enlarge upon what, perhaps, are the most ordinary articles of accusation against Plato, his gratuitous theories about the origin and fortunes of the soul, partly because the practical interest of these theories has disappeared, and partly because (according to the views already laid before you) I believe them to have been by Plato himself either accepted as probabilities only, or adopted as attractive forms of profounder metaphysical principles. I speak of points which more directly concern our own habits of thinking on subjects of the highest importance, on which Plato has often before now misled, and may still mislead, his enthusiastic admirers.

In the first place, then, there runs through all the views of Plato a want of any distinct apprehension of the claims of divine justice in consequence of human sin. Even in his strongest references to punishment, it is still represented mainly, if not entirely, under the notion of a purificatory transition, a severe but beneficial *κάθαρσις*. This arises partly from his conception of the divine character, partly from his theory of the human soul itself. From the former, inasmuch as he considers the attribute of indignant wrath, or its results, inapplicable to Deity,—from the latter, because, in considering the soul essentially in its higher elements divine, he could only look upon the misfortunes of its bodily connection as inci-

dental pollutions which might delay, but could not ultimately defeat, its inalienable rights. He must be a very uncandid critic who can censure Plato severely for these misconceptions; but he would be a very imperfect expositor who should not mention them as such. There is probably no single point in the moral relations of the creation for which we are so entirely indebted to revelation as this of the enormity of sin and the severity of divine judgment. Thus instructed, it is possible that the demands of divine justice may be demonstrated accordant with the antecedent notices of the moral reason; but there is a wide difference between proving a revealed principle and discovering it before it has been revealed. We are not, then, to blame Plato severely for overlooking that mystery of divine righteousness which even the reiterated and explicit intimations of Inspiration can scarcely persuade ourselves practically to realize. But we *are* to censure those (and it is for this reason I mark the matter distinctly) who labour by unwarrantable glosses to dilute into the disciplinary chastenings of a wise benevolence the stern simplicity with which the Scriptures declare the awful anger of a rejected God. These teachers have abounded in every age, and in one remarkable era of our English Church history were so closely and avowedly connected with Platonism (especially in its later and more mystical forms) as to have thence derived their ordinary title. Gifted with extraordinary powers of abstract contemplation, and a solemn grandeur of style, they abound with noble thoughts nobly expressed, but they are all marked with the characteristic defect of Platonized Christianity,—a forgetfulness, or inadequate commemoration, of the most tremendous proof this part of the universe has ever been permitted to witness of the reality of the divine hatred for sin,—the fact of the Christian Atonement.

The next point in which the exclusive cultivation of

Platonism may become injurious is in its indirect discouragement of *active* virtue. I need not say that no moral teacher can recommend in higher terms the usual exercises of social duty; but the true influences of any moral system depend less on the duties it verbally prescribes than on the *proportion* it establishes between them. And no one that remembers the Platonic conception of the contemplative "philosopher" as the perfection of humanity can hesitate in pronouncing that Plato inclines the balance to that very side to which the students of his writings, from their reflective and sedentary habits, may be supposed already but too much biassed. The results of this tendency are obvious. To contemplate ideas is in a certain sense—if the soul and its ideal objects ultimately blended—to introvert the mind *upon itself:* to do this exclusively, or as the main excellence of man, is—if constitutional temperament combine—to endanger sinking into moral egotism, intellectual mysticism. Nor are the meditative follies of the Indian Yógi any more than the last and worst form of the tendency. The busy activity of Athenian minds and habits, perhaps, prevented Plato from clearly seeing the inevitable consequences of a system of moral discipline which perpetually represents its highest stage as one of simple contemplation; but the *αὐτοφία* of the Alexandrian school long after developed the secret genius of this element of the system, when transplanted to a more favourable soil.

Nor can it be denied, again, that Platonism is defective in those engagements for *the affections* which no system of human nature can omit without fatal imperfection. We saw how, in the scheme of social life advocated in the *Republic*, the whole body of domestic affections are annihilated by a single provision, (the community of wives.) This disregard of the original constitution of human nature is too often manifested by Plato in his projects for its advancement. Nor can it be replied that this defi-

ciency is remedied in the peculiar theory to which I have this day referred,—a theory which in its author's design bears little reference to any communion of affections in the present state, but is, on the contrary, intended to hurry the mind from the present and sensible into an invisible and impalpable scene with which the human *feelings* cease to have an element in common. And as Platonism supplies little aliment for the innocent affections, it may also be added that it does not sufficiently estimate the power of the evil ones; that, in reducing the moral education to the recovery from ignorance and the distinct perception of transcendent truth, it wholly underrates the tyranny of passion, and the still more oppressive despotism of habit, which often triumph in their most fatal vigour in minds exquisitely sensitive to moral impressions. It is in the clear apprehension of these daily experiences that Aristotle excels his master. It is in the combination of the excellences of the two with an element higher than either ever attained, that the ethics of Christianity immeasurably transcend them both.

Much, doubtless, of this practical deficiency in Platonism arose from its illustrious founder's extravagant conceptions of the essential evil of *Body* in all its possible *human* forms. Wholly engaged with the immortal essence it imprisoned, and attributing to matter the organization of almost all which restrains that glorious stranger from asserting its native skies, Plato was accustomed to regard with coldness and suspicion every principle which could not trace its connection directly with the rational part of our complex constitution. To him every thing was measured by an eternal standard: that which was not fit for eternity was of little consequence in time. A noble maxim, surely, but one whose application must depend on the nature of the eternity we anticipate. In proclaiming the perpetuation of the bodily

organization, the Christian system has forever dried the source of those delusive dreams of superhuman purity which proceed, more or less, upon the supposition that there is something inherently debasing in the very possession of a material frame. And when we enumerate the internal proofs which establish the fact that this divine system never *could* have been the natural growth of (at least) the fashionable or popular philosophy of its time, we ought not to forget that, so universal and so deep were these impressions of the ineffaceable malignity of body, that the earliest internal dissentients from the general creed of the Christian Church were those who could not believe it possible that an immaculate Redeemer could have been invested with an earthly body, and therefore maintained that the Divine Sufferer was but the shadowy apparition of a human frame.

After all,—it must be said on behalf of Plato,—and I rejoice in a qualification which allows me to close this subject in that tone of sympathy and admiration in which I began it,—after all, it must in fairness be allowed that these errors are rather the tendencies of his system than his own original representation of it. They were assuredly *in* it, but under his superintendence they did not dare to show themselves as after-ages saw them. Of the truth and value of his leading principles he thought highly, but he never long resigns himself unreservedly to their guidance. Man as he ought to be was the favourite subject of his thoughts; but man as he is was seldom forgotten. Such was the scope of this man's vision, such his wonderful equilibrium in even his loftiest flights, that, though the theory may lose sight of human nature, the theorist does not. But the principles—the commanding ideas—were too expansive for any control but his own: he was sober amidst excitements that made others insane. His spirit, practical and speculative at once, enabled him to combine what others could only

catch in fragments; ideas that he governed, governed inferior men. In that realm of new and vast conceptions which he had made his own, Plato might be compared to some mighty conqueror (to him, for example, of the succeeding generation) who founds a single empire of many discordant nations, and, during his own life, keeps it together by the mastery of his personal genius, endowing the whole with the spirit and character of one unbroken monarchy, but at whose death the combining pressure is lost, the vast aggregate falls asunder, the dissolved confederates return by degrees into the diversity of their national character, and dynasties without number originate out of the fragments of *one*.

I shall here close the subject. I trust next term to carry you farther in the history of Grecian speculation.

FOURTH SERIES.

LECTURE I.

ON THE SUCCESSORS OF PLATO—THE ACADEMY.

GENTLEMEN:—

Introductory remarks.

WITH the close of my last address to you from this place I brought to a conclusion the philosophy of Plato. I entertain some hope that the discussions which I offered to your consideration on the subject of this sublime and singular system have attained the object which alone I proposed to myself in presenting them,—that they have stimulated a curiosity which I confess they were not competent adequately to satisfy, and, by inducing a few of my hearers to recur from the lecturer to his author, have contributed to introduce some of the more advanced students of our University to the most interesting and attractive of all the rich relics of ancient thought. It is the peculiar, and in many respects the fortunate, tendency of modern criticism, that, unsatisfied with receiving the learning of antiquity through the uncertain medium of subsequent versions and commentaries, it reverts at once to the originals, and refuses all interpretations which are not verified by *them*. This spirit has, in one important department of inquiry, been unquestionably carried to an unwarrantable excess, to a disregard of all the confirmations of contemporary authority and all the lights of traditional belief; but it has as assuredly been accompanied by valuable results, in an increased knowledge of the very thoughts and expressions of the great masters of ancient lore, and in that freshness of interest which

new theories of their meaning, whether right or wrong, impart to their labours and to the subjects on which those labours were expended. And, viewed merely as a means of mental discipline, there can be no doubt that an hour devoted to this independent research is infinitely more valuable than days devoted to the patient indeed, but servile and mechanical, acquisition of a merely traditionary philosophy, however ancient or authoritative. With regard to the writings of Plato many other considerations contribute to give value to this course of independent investigation. We possess the entire body of his recognised productions, and are, therefore, placed above the necessity of explanatory supplements; and the character which Continental philosophy has for many years been assuming, leading it over the same ground which Plato trod, has more and more impressed the conviction that we see little which he did not see with equal or greater perspicuity, and that his own genuine writings may, therefore, be searched as authentic monuments of which our own age, perhaps, beyond all others, was predestined to understand the real value.

The successors of Plato in the Academy.

There is, probably, no student of the history of ancient speculation who has not felt a deep interest in addressing himself to examining the fortunes of the philosophy of Plato after the decease of its illustrious founder. We are prompt to conclude that its results must have been commensurate with its momentous importance; that such a Presence could not have visited our earth without leaving behind it a long retinue of glories. That great results of Platonism *do* live upon the page of history is, indeed, certain; but we should be much disappointed if we accepted any immediate manifestation of its power. The successors of Plato added no brilliancy to his name. They inherited the skeleton of his doctrines, but the life had disappeared; and the colouring and expression

Characteristics.

with which the frame had glowed it was beyond their power to perpetuate. Never was there in the history of philosophy an instance of so sudden an extinction. Some of the details of the Platonic teaching they preserved and transmitted; but a strange and distant element was to be incorporated with the thin cold compound before it resumed any of the warmth and expansion that marked it in the master's hands. This unfortunate result must be referred partly to the vast influence of rival systems, partly to the comparative inefficiency of teachers. In the succession of five philosophic instructors[1] who are usually named as the chiefs of the old Academy there is little to detain us; nor, amid all the learning which has been profusely lavished upon investigating their tenets, is there a single deduction calculated to elucidate distinctively the character of their progress or regression. The point most observable is, perhaps, to be found in the reign of Xenocrates of Chalcedon. Xenocrates, it would seem, revived the alliance of Pythagorism with Platonism. His psychology terminated in the affirmation that the soul of man is "a self-moving member,"[2]—a combination (as we may interpret it) of activity and proportion.[3] Such views are opposed to all forms of materialism; and accordingly Cicero tells us[4] "animi figuram, et quasi corpus, negavit esse." Of his theology we can scarcely furnish so favourable a report. "Deos enim octo esse dicit; quinque eos qui in stellis vagis nominantur; unum qui ex omnibus sideribus quæ infixa cœlo sunt, ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandus

Xenocrates succeeds Speusippus, B.C. 339. *Is succeeded by Polemo,* B.C. 315.

[1] [Speusippus, (Plato's nephew,) Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, and Crantor. ED.]

[2] [Arist. *de An.* i. 2 and 4; where Simplicius observes Ξενοκράτους ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς οὗτος λόγος. ED.]

[3] [Rather, the principle of Life and Law. ED.]

[4] [*Tusc. Quæst.* i. 10, 20. ED.]

Deus; septimum solem adjungit; octavamque Lunam,"[5] —a system of divinity on which the Epicurean narrator makes certainly the justifiable comment, "qui quo sensu *beati* esse possint, intelligi non potest." The record of his contemporary Speusippus's opinion is even preferable to this:—"Deum esse *vim animalem* omnia regentem, statuit."[6] In the estimate of Cicero, the great characteristic of this *earliest* academy was the abandonment of the Socratic principle of hesitancy,—a singular instance of the mutability of philosophical schools. In this respect they resembled the rival school of Aristotle, which had already begun to systematize its vast masses of doctrine. "Utrique, Platonis ubertate completi, certam quandam disciplinæ formulam composuerunt, et eam quidem plenam ac refertam; illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus, et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt."[7] Of Polemon, of Crates, of Crantor, Cicero (a valuable authority in the history of the school to which he had eminently attached himself) delivers the same verdict:—"in vetere disciplina Platonica nil mutant."[8] They had changed little or nothing in the formal recitation of doctrines; but every thing shows how the spirit had evaporated. And what surely confirms our conviction that, with all this superficial sameness, a deep internal change must have passed through the traditions of Platonism, is the perpetual evidence of Cicero[9] that all these teachers "ab *Aristotele* nihil magno opere dissenserunt." They agreed with him in some of the formulas of their ethical instruction and in some of the principles of their metaphysical philosophy, and they were content not to examine more

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[5] [Cicero *Nat. D.* i. 13, 34. ED.] [6] [Ib. i. 13, 32. ED.]

[7] [Cic. *Acad.* i. 4, 17. ED.]

[8] [He extends the remark to Speusippus and Xenocrates, *Acad.* i. 9, 34:—"diligenter ea quæ a superioribus acceperant tuebantur." ED.]

[9] [*De Orat.* iii. 18, 67. ED.]

deeply. A fuller appreciation of the system whose tenets they professed to represent would infallibly have committed them with Peripateticism; nor can the disciples have evaded the opposition which the master so largely attracted, except by a more or less constant evasion of his peculiar doctrines.

Further development of Platonism.

But the time soon arrived when the results of the teaching of Plato were to manifest themselves in a more definite form. And as this vast system contained within it elements of a very opposite character, such as the genius of the founder alone was adequate to harmonize, we may expect that, when relieved from his controlling hand, these elements should evince a strong mutual repulsion. Platonism presented itself under two aspects, and so forcibly under both that it became a favourite speculation of ancient criticism to determine which was eminently characteristic of the author. Whether Plato was to be enrolled in the list of skeptical or of dogmatical philosophers—among those who denied the possibility of assured knowledge, or those who maintained a fixed scheme of doctrine—was perpetually agitated. You will easily understand that the difficulty is solved by apportioning his doubts and his beliefs to different regions of the mind respectively. And according as the inquirer is chiefly busied with each will be his verdict of the Platonic theory of knowledge: if he be principally engaged in studying the value of the informations of *sense*, he will pronounce Plato a skeptic, for in the modifications of the sensitive organization we know that Plato refused to recognise any stable basis of truth; if, on the contrary, his philosophical habits lead the inquirer to meditate on the notices of the pure intellect, he will pronounce Plato the most resolute of dogmatizers, for here alone *he* professed to see the form of truth, the reality of being, and that with a fulness of perfection which rendered denial or hesitation impossible.

The skeptical side of Platonism represented by the New Academy, the doctrinal by the Neo-platonists.

From this distinction, then, we derive the great line which separates the two chief developments of the Platonic philosophy. In speaking of them we are enabled to follow the order of time; for these developments were not contemporary, but successive. The first was nearly exhausted when the second, and far more interesting, form commenced. The skeptical result of Platonism is exhibited in the Academic Philosophy, the immediate occupant of the School of Plato; the doctrinal result is revealed in that singular succession of teachers who, at Rome, Alexandria, and Athens, accompanied and opposed the early fortunes of the Christian faith, and who, under the title of the new, or later, Platonists, have intimately associated themselves with the very name of the philosopher, and materially affected his reputation.

The Academic School.

It is with the former of these—the Academic School—that we are first to be engaged; and we shall consider it, according to the plan adopted in these Lectures, not in its succession of names and forms, so much as in the course and changes of its spirit.

The Academic School was an attempted compromise between skepticism and belief, with a large balance in favour of the former. Its skepticism is its prominent characteristic; and in this respect we shall now examine the *rationale* of its existence.

Origin of the Academic Skepticism.

How then did the Philosophy of Plato lead to this spirit of doubt?

Skeptical element in Plato.

In what I have just now said of the Platonic view of the knowledge attainable through the machinery of sense, I have supplied the first answer to this question. To those who were resolute to refuse all mental capacities beyond those which were directly concerned in elaborating the products of the

sensitive consciousness, it is obvious that the discussions of Plato furnished the sure means of unlimited skepticism, in perpetually discountenancing these impressions of sense as the possible ground of real knowledge. With a reader of this limited creed, the founder of the vastest of systems must have appeared the most unqualified of skeptics. He cut from beneath such a reader the only ground on which that reader would consent to rest.

Again, by the very *form of exposition* the Platonic treatises might encourage such a spirit. The dialogue which continually invites and supposes mutual opposition has a natural tendency to suggest the possibility of objections indefinitely prolonged. This result was heightened in the dialogues of Plato by the suppression of distinct conclusions. Compositions intended merely to stimulate meditation are seldom adapted to implant definite doctrine; and the very irony in which the Platonic Socrates loved to indulge was more calculated to suggest misgivings as to the solidity of all received systems than to replace them by any settled creed.

To this must be added the *disciplinary* purpose of many of the discussions conceived or recorded by Plato. The search for truth was made a matter of mental exercise. It is not the object of the chase to capture the prey so much as to prolong and vary the pursuit. This, it is true, was in the Platonic scheme of intellectual education a merely preliminary process,—the hardening of the soldier for a genuine encounter to come. But it is not to be supposed that this arrangement of subjects and methods was understood or observed when the manuscripts of Plato were circulated in one collection. Passages which were originally meant as exemplifications of mental gymnastic were readily adopted as the philosopher's avowal and exhibition of the equal plausibility of every form of opinion.

And we can easily apprehend how these results were assisted by the very exaltation of the Platonic tone of thought. Truth when placed at such a height seemed to many minds unattainable; what was so lofty seemed out of sight. The multitude would readily declare that it was as well to say, "There is no truth," as to say, "There is truth only in ideas:" the ideal was (as so often) confounded with the *imaginary*. Keen and suspicious critics would say that a system so acrial was the magnificent escape of a defeated logician, and pronounce that the reality which was found only in the eternal exemplars of things was not the reality for which they were interested or contended,—the realities, as they are called, of life and experience. And the upholders of the inheritance of Platonism, discouraged by the want of sympathy, would gradually discard these higher elements; the opposition of influential schools would seduce them to a lower field of conflict; and on that lower field finding little countenance from their own master, yet unwilling to surrender the great cause of the reality and fixity of Knowledge, they would occupy themselves in subtle distinctions and evasive compromises, or under a show of resistance betray the question and deny the loftier prerogative of reason altogether.

Antagonistic influences of Stoicism.

The prominent tenets of the Academic succession were fixed and matured by the rivalry of *Stoicism*. The disposition to doubt was prepared already; but the dogmatism of the Stoic teachers precipitated it into form and firmness.

The Stoical theory of Perception and of the criterion of Knowledge.

The Stoics had occupied themselves deeply with the theory of human knowledge. After much consideration, they had devised a threefold distribution of the subject,—classing the varieties of assent under the titles of science, opinion, and a mediate condition of the mind which they denominated *φαντασία καταληπτική*; if, indeed, this last term

ought not rather to be interpreted as expressing that degree of conviction which belonged to those representations of which science (ἐπιστήμη) was composed. All knowledge, in the Stoical theory, resolved itself into communications between the exterior world and the soul; the φαντ. καταλ. expressed that impression which the soul detained as solid and certain. It was against this last tenet that the hostility of the Academy was chiefly directed. The doctrine of the φαντασία καταληπτική upheld that impressions from objects distinct from the mind itself, when accompanied by a thorough conviction of the reality, were sufficient to establish knowledge and to satisfy the legitimate demands of the reason. The Academics met this affirmation with their ἀκαταληψία, which denied the certainty of the conformity of perceptions with their causes or objects. In this controversy the Stoics appear to have seldom grappled with the real difficulties of the case; though, it must be admitted, the small and fragmentary portions of their earlier writings which we possess can scarcely warrant a very positive determination on this point.

Academic denial of the Stoical doctrine.

But, while the Academic teachers rejected the *certainty* of the communication between the world of reality and the soul of man, they professed, nevertheless, to admit the necessity of fixed beliefs. Accordingly, they constructed (chiefly under the guidance of Carneades) that scale of probabilities which forms one of the most distinctive characteristics of the school; and which, taken together with their "acatalepsy" or refusal of absolute certainty, completes the fundamental elements of their system. The impossibility of absolute certainty, the value of high probability, —these are the dominant maxims of the Academic philosophy.

Academic theory of Probability.

But the proportion of these elements varied at different periods of the history of the school,

Five successions in the Aca-

demy. Arcesilaus flor. B.C. 278. *Carneades died* B.C. 129. *Philo flor.* B.C. 92. *Antiochus flor.* B.C. 79.

which stretches from the age of Plato to that of Cicero, and which critics have divided into five[10] successions, whose respective heads are considered to be (after the founder) Arcesilaus, Carneades, Philo, and Antiochus. I shall proceed to notice the principal stages of progress observable in these successions,—purposely avoiding those minuter details of literary anecdote which you can easily obtain in the ordinary histories of ancient philosophy, and endeavouring to confine your attention to the changes which affect fundamental questions. Of these the accounts are often contradictory and almost always vague; a few prominent points alone direct our course in a vast and shifting landscape.

Arcesilaus, the father of the Academic Skepticism.

Arcesilaus, a brother-disciple of Zeno whom he was afterwards to oppose, a pupil of Pyrrho and Diodorus, first gave its peculiar character to the Academic school. His life and habits appear to have been perfectly suited to a teacher of the philosophy of indifference. It is recorded that he encouraged his disciples to desert his own teaching whenever they preferred that of any rival instructor; though it is indeed possible that this permission may have been the result of a thorough confidence in his own powers of attracting their attention,—powers which are attested by all the authorities. His blameless life was evidenced in the admission of even his opponents, his prompt and happy activity of intellect in the replies by which he discomfited them. None of the writings of Arcesilaus, however, are now extant; and the reports of the ancient critics and collectors are indecisive and perplexing as to his exact tenets.

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[10] [Cicero recognises but two, others only three, Academic successions, —the Old, the Middle, and the New. Sext. Emp. *Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 220. ED.]

For instance, certain passages of Sextus Empiricus and of Cicero seem to intimate that the skepticism of Arcesilaus was only apparent, and his devotion genuine to the system of Plato. "If we may believe what is related of Arcesilaus," says Sextus, (*Pyrr. Hypotyp.* i. § 234,) "his skepticism was only assumed; he used it as a test for his disciples; he afterwards intrusted his doctrine, which was no other than the doctrine of *Plato*, to those whom he had recognised as worthy to be admitted to his intimacy and capacitated to receive his teaching." The general testimony of antiquity, however, does not strongly corroborate this representation, or, if it allow to Arcesilaus any definite scheme of tenets, overbalances them by a large weight of the declared maxims and objections of the skeptical philosophy. And Cicero himself allows that Arcesilaus had collected from the books of Plato and the discourses of Socrates this principal conclusion, "nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit,"[11]—and in another place assures us that Arcesilaus had severed the feeble link by which Socrates had connected doubt with certainty,—"negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset."[12] The *positive* system of Arcesilaus, I conclude, was altogether his practical system of moral life; the higher ideal theory of Plato we have no evidence that he maintained, and the probability is that he overlooked it; and against the stoical theory of irresistible belief we have his reasonings preserved,—that there can be no medium between absolute science and mere opinion, and that it is impossible to prove that perceptions may not misrepresent their objects. These things seem to show us in Arcesilaus the first complete development of the skeptical tendency of Platonism, as yet unregulated and unsystematized,—accompanied by a

[11] [*De Orat.* iii. 18, 67. ED.] [12] [*Acad.* i. 12, 45. ED.]

conservation of moral propriety, derived from the authority of that great system, though supported on different grounds.

Carneades. His controversy with the Stoics concerning the criterion.

The second progressive form of the skeptical tendency is found in Carneades. Its character is systematic exposition. In the able administration of Carneades, the Academic philosophy assumed its definite form as a matured and finished theory. Carneades is the founder of the philosophy of probabilities. The great question of the day being the criterion of truth, Carneades denied the existence of any such criterion, but admitted differences in the degrees of assurance, and undertook to classify these differences. Of this classification some record is preserved; but we may easily believe that the philosopher carried his system into exacter details than any we possess. Truth, he held, was unattainable in absolute certainty; but we live in a world of resemblances to truth, and the practical assent of the mind must be determined by the degree of the resemblance, as far as this can be collected. You will remember that the Stoics, and the Academy in consonance with them, held that all knowledge was reducible to certain primary impressions made upon the soul by objects distinct from itself. These *φαντάσιαι* are the elements of all knowledge, and upon the certainty of them as representations of realities (it was thought) all certainty of all truth depends. Now, the *φαντασία* (I quote Sextus Empiricus's perspicuous statement[13]) has a double relation,—to the

[13] [*Adv. Math.* vii. § 166, fol. Compare Cic. *Acad.* ii. 6. This controversy between the Stoics and the Academy will remind the modern reader of that between Reid and Brown on the nature of Sensation and Perception. See Brown, Lecture XXV., and compare Sir W. Hamilton's critique, *Discussions on Philosophy*, No. II. The *Theætetus* of Plato was probably the source of the Academic theory; as the Cynics seem to have drawn the first outlines of the Stoical doctrine of *κατάληψις*. ED.]

object causing and to the mind perceiving, (*τὸ ἀφ' οὗ γίνεται*, and *τὸ ἐν ᾧ γίνεται*,)—to the external object (*τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένον αἰσθητόν*) and to the man. Hence arise two considerations or habitudes of the *φαντασία*,—*πρὸς τὸ φανταστὸν* and *πρὸς τὸν φαντασιούμενον*. Each of these *σχέσεις* or relations may be true or false, whether really or apparently. The *φαντασία* is true in relation to the *object* when it is *σύμφωνος* or conformable, false when *διάφωνος* or discordant, with it. The *φαντασία* in its relation to the subject—to the mind—is *phenomenally* or *apparently* true or false, (*ἐστὶ φαινομένη ἀληθής*;) and in the determination of the circumstances which govern this apparent truth or falsehood lies the value of logical criterions. Carneades then proceeds to establish his degrees of probability, as the measures of the practical belief. The first degree is that which he terms *πιθανὴ φαντασία*, or *ἔμφασις*, a strong persuasion of the propriety of the impression made; the second and third degrees result from comparisons of the impression with others associated with it, and with itself. You will perceive, then, that Carneades,—the great representative of the Academic school,—having very clearly fixed the double relation of mental apprehensions to the reality of things and to the mind itself, denies altogether the possibility of attaining any certainty on the former relation, and reduces the latter to mere subjective persuasion, to which he undertakes to assign laws and canons. The position held by Carneades, then, bears a strong resemblance to that occupied in the last century by Kant; as the ulterior development of Platonism by the school of Alexandria resembles with equal accuracy the reform of Kantism attempted by Schelling and his followers in our own day.

Ethics of Carneades.

The moral views of the Academics, however, as presented by this teacher, contrast very unfavourably with the inflexible ethics of the German philosopher. Their logic being degraded to the

estimate of probabilities, their ethics were placed upon no solid foundation of immutable certainty. The Sovereign Good was usually expressed by such formulas of vague and ambiguous purport as "the enjoyment of the gifts of Nature,"[14] "the union of virtue and happiness," and the like; and the opposition of the Stoics probably produced an undue tendency to elevate the inferior member of the combination.[15] This it probably was which induced Carneades to deny the reality of all justice but that which springs from positive laws,[16] and to adopt the degrading practice of defending every side indifferently in questions of moral casuistry.[17] And Cicero, the avowed favourer of the Academic method of philosophy, in the greatest of his moral treatises, deserted it for the spirit and teaching of the Stoics.

The character of the Academic philosophy under its most characteristic teacher was, then, it is evident, that of moderation and compromise. Essentially skeptical, it endeavoured to evade extreme results, and thence gained the honour of a distinction from absolute skepticism, to which it had only slender rights. The Academics, declares Sextus,[18] assert reflectively; the Pyrrhonists, by mere necessity and instinct: the Academics allow degrees of probability; the Pyrrhonists pronounce all probabilities equal. But it is manifest that these differences (and others which he mentions) draw a line

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[14] [Cicero, *Tusc.* v. 30, 84. ED.]

[15] ["Contra Stoicorum disciplinam ingenium ejus exarserat," says Cicero, *Ibid.* ED.]

[16] [Jura sibi homines pro utilitate sanxisse, scilicet varia pro moribus —jus autem naturale esse nullam. Cic. *De Repub.* iii. 15, 24. ED.]

[17] [Cic. *De Nat. D.* i. 5, 11. ED.]

[18] [*Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. § 226. The meaning is not faithfully represented in the text. Sextus alludes solely to the *ethical* difference of the two schools:—*ἀγαθόν τί φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ καὶ κακὸν οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς (οἱ Σκεπτικοὶ) ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι . . . ἡμῶν ἀδοξάστως ἑπομένων τῷ βίῳ, ἵνα μὴ ἀνενέργητοι ὦμεν.* ED.]

of distinction only between Academicism and the more extravagant forms of the Skeptical doctrines,—not at all between it and any judicious system of indifferentism. It is certain that the whole spirit of the Academic school was a betrayal of the higher logic of absolute truth, and a substitution for it of a system of practical beliefs claiming no higher warrant than the obvious utility of a practical adherence. And the character which his Stoic opponents applied to Arcesilaus—that of "the traitor to Platonism"—was really applicable to the main body of his successors with as perfect truth.

The great value of the Academical philosophy was its clear perception of *the importance of probabilities*. In this field it is, in antiquity, unrivalled. And hence it became an easy resort for those men of moderate temperament who, without force or firmness of speculation sufficient to make abstract truth a practical foundation, were yet pleased to refer to philosophy the duties and conduct of ordinary life.

Philo and Antiochus.

On the third form of Academicism I shall not detain you long. Its masters were Philo and Antiochus; its predominant character, a gradual return to the original views of the founder. This seems very discernible in the accounts given by Cicero of the force of argument with which Antiochus upheld the reality and evidence of mental perceptions; nor do I know a more interesting fragment in all the records of ancient learning than the account which this great writer gives of the views of Antiochus in the second part of the *Academical Questions*, from the seventh to the eleventh chapters. To Rome, which was now beginning to form the centre of intellectual exertion, the writings of Plato and Aristotle had been already imported; and the treasure was beginning to attract an eagerness of examination which, for a considerable time, superseded original invention. *Eclecticism* was the inevitable result, and in

Cicero himself (the greatest philosophical name of the period) we see it instanced. Upon this new ground a gradual reunion of all sects commenced: the Academics began to admit the necessity of principles more definite, the Stoics, under Panætius and Posidonius, to relax the repulsive sternness of their extreme dogmas. The fermentation at length settled in a new and distinct form of philosophy where Plato was again recognised as master, but in which a portion of his philosophy long buried from the public eye was brought once more into strong and almost exclusive light.

LECTURE II.

THE SUCCESSORS OF PLATO, (*continued.*)

GENTLEMEN:—

Eclectic tendencies of the later Greek schools.

WE have seen the gradual transformation of the Academic philosophy into a moderated Stoicism, in conformity with that tendency to universal union which seems to have characterized the speculations of the age immediately antecedent and subsequent to the rise of the Christian religion. It appeared as if the wisdom of heathenism, moved by a common danger, had, through all its divisions, combined against the common enemy. The reappearance of old philosophy upon a new stage naturally produced this disposition,—first to neglect original research in the study of the ample treasures already provided, and then to attempt general reconciliation of systems from the absence of that polemical ardour which perhaps personal authorship alone can give. It is true that the four great divisions of the philosophic world still preserved distinctive characters, still sent forth their respective pupils and representatives; but each imperceptibly received influences from all the rest, and the feeling grew each day more and more powerful, that certainty, if ever attainable, was only to be attained by an equitable estimate of the entire mass of thought, and a patient selection from all, of the best that each could bring.

This eclectic tendency seems destined to arise at all the great pauses of the march of philosophy. When every path of escape through the tangled forest of specu-

lation seems tried in vain, men are apt, as by a natural instinct, to collect in the centre and compare notes for some happier essay. But real eclecticism is, after all, a rare development; the fixity of its orbit is seldom undisturbed by surrounding attractions; and, however impartially it begins, it usually ends in some form of unqualified partisanship. There is certainly little of this equitable indifference in that Continental philosophy which claims the title in our own age; there was still less in the eclecticism of the first centuries of the Christian era.

As, then, it was to be expected that some form of positive doctrine would eventually emerge ascendant from the general chaos, it may be worth reflecting, *which* form it was likely to be, to what teaching it would bear affinity, what image and superscription it would boast to carry.

Inadequacy of the separate schools to meet the requirements of the age.

The competitors for the mastery of the age were the schools of the Epicureans, the Peripatetics, the Stoics, the Platonics. The last had, indeed, wandered widely from the prescribed injunctions of their master; but they were already showing signs of retrocession, and the multiplication and critical revisal of his works were, at all events, likely to direct attention from the expositors to their original. The *writings* of Plato were there to vindicate his fame, whatever might be the perversions or inconsistencies of those who professed to bear his standard; and it was the very spirit of the Roman and Alexandrian literature of this period to lean to the ancient and disparage the new, to prize the comment in proportion to its antiquity, and the text above all.

The Epicureans.

The philosophy of Epicurus could not claim this predominant position. Its popularity was unquestioned, its adaptation to a luxurious age could not be doubted. But it was not formed to satisfy

the wants of the time, however it might minister to its pleasures. It was, indeed, as it still continues to be, the tacit philosophy of the careless, and might thus number a larger army of disciples than any contemporary system. But its supremacy existed only when it estimated numbers: it ceased when tried by *weight*. The eminent men of Rome were often its avowed favourers, but they were for the most part men eminent in arms and statesmanship rather than the influential directors of the world of speculation. Nor could the admirable poetic art of Lucretius, or the still more attractive ease of Horace, confer such strength or dignity upon the system as to enable it to compete with the new and mysterious elements now upon all sides gathering into conflict.

The Stoics.

The chances for Stoicism were greater. Its dignity secured respect; its utility in an age of trial and oppression recommended it to men prepared to suffer. With such expositors as Seneca, Epictetus, Arrian, Antoninus, it would be likely rather to acquire new distinctions than to lose any of its original lustre. But Stoicism had its weak points too. Its rigid and inflexible formulas allowed of no expansion, no universality of application, no variety of form; its notion of Deity—majestic, indeed, but cold, and debased, too, in some respects by unwarrantable physical conceptions—was ill adapted to meet the spirit of the age, which, from various causes, had acquired a theological tendency to remote and solitary abstractions.

The Peripatetics: Aristotle and his commentators.

The philosophy of Aristotle, which attracted much attention, scarcely obtained much actual influence as a distinct guide of thought. It already, indeed, began to attract to itself those masses of commentary which at length overloaded and sunk it; the long line of Aristotelian critics begins so early as Andronicus of Rhodes, who flourished nearly a century before our era; but, exclusive of this

scholastic reverence and care, its power was not largely felt. This deficiency of influence is probably traceable to what is, in some degree, the main excellence of the Aristotelian spirit, the exceeding *moderation* of it. It is traceable, also, to the kindred characteristic of this philosophy, its absence of *appeals to the higher aspirations* of our nature,—which the age of which I speak (acted on by the influences of Christianity and of the mystical wisdom of the Eastern nations) peculiarly, and often extravagantly, demanded.*

The philosophic tendencies of the age result in Neo-Platonism.

It remains, then, that we find in the philosophy of *Plato* the object which alone could fully correspond to the secret sympathies of the time. And, in spite of all affectations of impartiality, in *this* the eclecticism of Rome and Alexandria resulted. At Alexandria, which its situation and its commerce united to elevate into the natural theatre for the enterprise, the attempt at universal conciliation was chiefly made. Its vast library, the gradual accumulation of the Ptolemies, furnished *materials* for the work; the enormous aggregate of wisdom depressed the spirit of original inquiry, and threw every speculative mind into the attitude of criticism. The general conviction, that on subjects of mere speculation the mind of man had done its utmost in producing these piles of thought, had, however, the beneficial result of urging many to those *positive* sciences in which so much remained to be done. This is a portion of the history of the literature of Alexandria which deserves, perhaps, more attention than it has ordinarily received: it lies, however, altogether beside my present object. "The expression," observes Matter, in the pre-

Influences of the schools of Alexandria.

* When the philosophy of Aristotle became really the dominant philosophy of an age, these tendencies were otherwise provided for: the human mind could bear Aristotelism as a supplement to Christianity, but it would have starved upon Aristotelism alone.

face to his valuable account of the Alexandrian writers, —"the expression 'School of Alexandria' has of itself given rise to many incorrect opinions: it is very improper, inasmuch as it can be applied equally to the School of the Jews, of the Christians, of the Alexandrian Greeks. . . . In fact, the inquiry here relates not to 'the School,' but to numerous schools. Even those I have just named may be subdivided into many others. . . . Demetrius Phalereus, Zenodotus, Aristarchus, &c. have founded at Alexandria schools of grammar, of criticism, of recension; Herophilus, Erasistratus, &c., schools of anatomy, of medicine; Timarchus, Aristillus, Hipparchus, and Ptolemy, schools of astronomy; Euclid, Apollonius of Perga, Diophantus, &c., schools of geometry and arithmetic; Eratosthenes and Strabo, schools of geography; Ænesidemus, Sextus Empiricus, Potamon, and Ammonius Saccas, schools of philosophy; the sacred interpreters, Aristobulus and Philo, Jewish schools; the emissaries of Christianity, Pantænus, Clement of Alexandria, Christian schools. Besides this, each of the philosophical sects of ancient Greece formed a particular school or family at Alexandria. The poets themselves were distributed into pleiads." Such was the diversity of intellectual exertion in the Alexandrian academies, to all of which the vast library and its appurtenances presented a common centre and a local bond of union. The Museum, indeed, of all the institutions of antiquity gives us the nearest resemblance to the modern university. The emulative, ambitious temper of the Athenian had never led him anxiously to desire, or even to conceive, this union of labour; while the very position of Alexandria—the key at once of East and West, and receiving into its magnificent harbours the commerce of both—seemed to mark it out as the natural centre for an emporium of the literature of the world.

Our path lies through only one region of this varied

field, but it is one which became ultimately the most influential of all, and which is now almost alone remembered as the characteristic teaching of Alexandria. The sciences of pure observation, or of mathematical deduction, as they advance obliterate their own steps; each inventor absorbs his predecessor in himself, and obscures his fame in adding to his labours; the last layer of the pile hides all the rest: those of mere speculation, working by no such unvaried principle of advance, leave their great names almost unaltered by subsequent changes; their symbol is not so much a structure augmenting by additions in height, as a structure augmenting by collateral edifices of every form and order; their vast monuments of thought lie scattered over the whole field of history, and their most ancient performances are almost always as interesting, often as suggestive, sometimes as instructive, as their latest.

We must now proceed to consider the circumstances that prepared the formation of this new development of Platonism on the stage of Alexandria. Perhaps the subject may become simplified by separating the Grecian and native influences from those of foreign origin. Your attention is directed in the first instance to the former. The particulars which I shall present will probably contribute to illustrate yet more fully those *superior* chances of Platonism in the contest for philosophic influence, to which I have already alluded.

The Grecian elements of Neo-Platonism.

We have seen through what varieties of depression the philosophy of Plato passed in the hands of his successors in the Academy. Having sunk into a system of restless disbelief in theory, and lost all its moral dignity in practice, it had at length, as if in weariness, reverted (though feebly and indecisively) to the lofty lessons of its founder.

1. *Reaction*

But the interests of *skepticism* were in the mean time adopted and patronized by a more

vigorous band. It has been held by some authorities that the succession was preserved without the loss of a single link in the original school of Pyrrho and Timon,—a point difficult to be clearly established, both on account of the obscurity of the names instanced, and on account of the very genius of skepticism, which tends little to decisive systematic formation, and still less to the perpetuation of it. But, however this may be, it is certain that at the period of the Christian era the theory of suspension and unbelief suddenly manifested itself with a vigour and completeness scarcely paralleled in any previous or subsequent age. Indeed, the skeptical system seems to have been the only one at this time which evinced the freshness and variety of original thought. Pyrrho, it is probable, had furnished the example—Ænesidemus, Agrippa, and, above all, Sextus Empiricus, completed the project—of systematizing all the grounds of hesitation, (τρόποι ἐποχῆς.) Sextus reasoned and wrote at the close of the second century, at the period when the Alexandrian school was rising into distinction. We can easily perceive, then, how this bold uncompromising advocacy of the philosophy of doubt must have urged to its farthest extremes the dogmatism of Alexandria; how this denial of the reality of knowledge in any of its departments must especially have led to that peculiar theory of the nature and prerogatives of the human reason from which, as we shall hereafter see, every thing important in the Neo-Platonic system arises.

against the Skeptics.

The second cause or element in the formation of this system operated not exteriorly, but within it. I have on a former occasion observed to you that the original system of Plato, as far as it depended on the teaching of previous masters, was principally due to Socrates on the one hand, to Pythagoras on the other,—these ingredients being plainly distinguishable even in the compound which Plato's peculiar

2. The Pythagorism contained in Plato's writings.

skill in fusing all things to one mass enabled him to present. As the Socratic principle became detached and prominent in the Academic scheme, so the Pythagorean rose into exclusive activity in the Platonism of Alexandria. This was due partly to the taste for antiquity which belongs to an age eminently critical, partly to the desire for the guarantee of high authority in preference to the mere force of reason which the same tendencies seem usually to generate. Those who shrank from the cold and comfortless exhortations of the skeptical teachers, from that melancholy play of argument by which every security of belief and practice was successively exhibited to be successively overthrown, and who yet found it hard to accompany the pure Platonist to his heights of speculation, naturally sighed for the easy repose of *authority*,—for authority which might at once preserve to them the form of reason, and yet base reason upon foundations deeper than its own. Now, the only existing system which professed to connect itself with an authoritative antiquity was that of Plato; and this chiefly through the medium of the Pythagorean traditions. It was well known that the old Pythagorean doctrine, delivered mainly in mysterious symbols, had itself reached Italy from remote sources, and affected an almost supernatural origin. The character of the founder was itself shrouded in mystery and miracle. Strange traditions had floated down the stream of ages; it was the very genius of the time to labour to collect them: these traditions had invested a single sage of antiquity with powers and privileges beyond those of man; it was the spirit of the time to exalt these claims to canonization. It is not unlikely that in *Italy* many local associations would contribute to increase the charm that encompassed the name of Pythagoras. And thus a remarkable revolution was effected: Plato had received the mystical formulas of the Samian sage, to transform them as far

as possible into their logical equivalents, to translate them into the language of pure intellect; the later Pythagoreans received the doctrines of Plato, to transform them back into their mystical originals. It was no longer a Platonized Pythagoras, but a Pythagorized Plato. It would appear that some teachers—as Anaxilaus of Larissa, Moderatus, Nicomachus—endeavoured to blend the traditions of Pythagoras with the physical and logical theories of Plato; that others, leaning rather to the moral and ascetic views of Pythagoras, exalted his code into a *religion*. Of the latter class, the name which has come down to our times with most celebrity is that of Apollonius Tyaneus. In this famous person the religious element of Pythagorism reached its highest pitch, and, being supported and modified by its mysticism of numbers and figures, resulted in the imaginary physics of magic and demonology. The identity of the influences in the Alexandrian school is proved, not only by the confession of its chief writers, with whom Pythagoras is evermore the symbol of the perfection of wisdom, but by the complete identity of the results,—Iamblichus, and even Plotinus, presenting, in many of their practical extravagancies, only milder forms of the folly and imposture that marked the life of Apollonius.

3. *The writings of the later expositors of Plato,—Alcinous, Apuleius, Maximus Tyrius.*

We must not forget, however, in the enumeration of these disposing causes, that there likewise existed a body of teachers who professed to expound the genuine doctrines of Plato himself. We possess the abstract of Platonism by Alcinous, which is really a valuable aid to students of this philosophy; Apuleius of Medaura, and, still more, Maximus Tyrius, were nearly contemporary with the rise of the peculiar doctrines of the school of Alexandria. The biographer and moralist Plutarch did for the Platonism of this period all which a style eminently popular, and peculiar

Plutarch, (flourished under Domitian.)

facility of illustration, could effect. But, in truth, it is not easy to appropriate these writers to a distinct class. The tendency to religious speculation is equally theirs, and to speculation of the very same character and scope. The endeavour to fortify philosophical conclusions by supposed allegories in the poetical mythology of heathenism characterizes them all. The abdication of the labour of new invention, the weariness of the seeming fruitlessness of the old, the consequent recurrence to ancient authority, and the willingness to be deceived in any thing that pretends to be such, is as observable in the Platonist Apuleius as in the Pythagorean Apollonius.

These notices may serve to indicate some of the preparatives of the Alexandrian school which pre-existed in the philosophy of the West. We must now contemplate a distinct source of influence, whose infusions of spirit and of doctrine were even more conspicuous and lasting.

Oriental element of Neo-Platonism.

There is scarcely a question in the history of literature more difficult to decide satisfactorily than the circumstances that produced a fact in itself altogether unquestionable, the introduction of Oriental ideas into the later philosophy of Greece. Some critics (as Meiners) have boldly decided that the Oriental philosophy and its influences are equally imaginary, and that the results which are ordinarily attributed to them were the simple evolution of Platonic principles. Others, again, have recurred to India as the original centre from which all these influences radiated, and have carried them through Persia to Greece and to Egypt. It is the opinion of another class of critics that the *ἀνατολικὴ διδασκαλία*, the teaching of the East, consisted merely in a few detached formulas of doctrine, which were subsequently reduced into shape by the moulding and condensing power of the Grecian spirit at the period of the conquests of Alexander and after it.

I confess I suspect that the enthusiasm of our later critics in favour of all which can exalt the authority and influences of the wisdom of *India* has sometimes urged their sagacity to see in India, and her merchants and sages, the cause of far more than they ever effected. India has become a first cause in the history of philosophy, the *ne plus ultra* of the long series of successive transmissions; and the very mystery that seems to shroud her antiquities has made it easy to refer all that is inexplicable to this inexplicable source. The striking discoveries which have of late been made in the actual philosophy of the Indian literati (of which I endeavoured to give you an account on a former occasion) have quickened the ardour of living Orientalists, and led them to hope to find in this vast and ancient people the solution of all the difficult problems in the history of speculation. But, though I conceive that the direct influence of India on the later Greek philosophy has been somewhat unduly magnified, I have no disposition to diminish that of the more adjacent Eastern nations. *Persia*, above all, retains its manifest and unambiguous representatives in the whole literature of Alexandria,—influences transmitted partly by the direct agency of the visitants from each country to the other, partly through the medium of the *Jewish* residents of Alexandria, (who had, from their well-known national relations with the Persian Empire, become imbued with many of its philosophical conceptions,) but mainly by those Gnostic sophists whose manifold caprices of heresy disturbed the early Christian church. The literary forgeries of an age betray its prevailing tastes; for men will not boast their possession of treasures which the public mind is not prepared to value. The compilations of the Alexandrian schools detect to the modern critic many of those favourite sources of ancient wisdom which they were wont partly to explore and partly to imagine. Among

Influence of Persian doctrines. Judaism. Gnosticism.

The Orphic poems, Hermes, Zoroaster.

the Orphic verses, (old Athenian records—for Plato mentions them—renewed and amplified by the Alexandrian professors,) and the Books of Hermes, are found the oracles of *Zoroaster*, which, however interpolated and disguised, clearly manifest an Eastern origin, and whose very imitations palpably prove the existence of writings and traditions out of which the imitations were constructed. These fragmentary "sentences" were first collected by Pletho at the revival of letters. In these various compilations, then, we may discern the points to which the Alexandrian mind perpetually veered. The Orphic verses represented the antiquity of Greece, the Hermetic Books passed for records of the antiquity of Egypt, the Chaldaic sentences spoke the ancient wisdom of the East; and antiquity in all three carried with it dim possibilities of Divine revelation, justified itself, and led the spirit into that repose of conviction which it coveted. But to the *East*, above all, the masters of learning emphatically pointed as the mysterious centre of all such wisdom as was alone worthy of the name. Nor, amid all the difficulties that confessedly embarrass the research into the real learning of the East, can any candid mind observe the veneration almost universally conceded to it, (as soon as *authority* became of any importance in philosophy,) the peculiarity of its doctrines, their strong internal resemblance to each other and to the truth, the sublime character of many of them, the essentially religious character of them all, without feeling assured that, however the minuter specialties of the subject may be settled, there is *that* in the ancient wisdom of the Oriental tribes which irrefutably marks the country as, in some district of it, the original scene of real revelation. The skeptic may endeavour to confound the genuine record with its imitations; but how will he explain the common character of them all,—a character which deepens in pro-

portion to the very strength of the resemblance he would establish?

The principal channels through which the stream of Oriental learning entered the schools of Alexandria were the societies of the Jews, and the occasional writings and exhortations of those cultivators of a peculiar and mystical knowledge who were by the Greeks entitled Gnostics.

That impulse to reduce facts and beliefs of all kinds to recognised principles, which is the source of all genuine science, is not restricted to the phenomena of this world; it is equally and instinctively active in every department where truths are made known to the mind of man. Hence the theology of a Divine revelation becomes subject to the same scientific activity; and, as the result will vary according to the principles of the classification, systematic theology (which *is* this result) will take its colouring from the prominent philosophy—that is, from the recognised first principles—of the age in which it appears. A creed may remain unaltered, and yet the relations of the parts of it, so far as they are the inferences of human sagacity, may alter with the alterations of a popular philosophy. The Christianity of Clemens Alexandrinus—even of Origen—was, in all its leading particulars, and omitting one or two private speculations too ardently urged, the Christianity of Taylor and Barrow; yet it is probable that there is not a single page in the extensive and various works of either of the former writers which could by any adequate judge be for a moment conceived as the production of either of the latter. Clemens and Origen lived in the atmosphere of Alexandria not more than in its learning: to breathe at all, they must have breathed its air; to reason and speculate at all, they could as little have avoided to employ the forms and language it had taught them.

Clemens Alexandrinus, (flor. A.D. 200.) Origen, (born A.D. 186, died A.D. 253.)

Now, what these writers did for the received theology of Christianity, when they thus viewed its frame and lineaments through the medium of a peculiar philosophy, was done in a much higher degree for Judaism by a school of Jewish writers who preceded them. Aristobulus,[1] Philo, and Josephus admitted all the facts and circumstances of the Old Testament; the Jewish history would remain attested by the philosophical writings of these men though the original perished, exactly as the Platonic Fathers of the Church contribute, notwithstanding all their peculiarities, to swell the majestic stream of early tradition; but in philosophizing the facts—that is, in reducing them into the grasp of such first principles as they held—they gave them—Philo especially—a position and a colouring which drew them within the Grecian field of view, and acquired for the simple and venerable record of Moses the questionable advantage of taking rank among the numerous relics that learning had discovered, or ingenuity invented, of the early and heaven-sent philosophy of the East. Plato, said Numenius, is but *Μωϋσης ἀττικίζων.*

Aristobulus. (B.C. 180.) *Philo. flor. about* A.D. 20.) *Josephus, (flor. about* A.D. 70.)

As the Jewish doctors contributed to the general body of thought at Alexandria their own ancient beliefs in this philosophic costume, so was the Museum indebted to another class of instructors for the dreamy mysticism of Persia and Syria. The history of the *Gnostics* belongs to ecclesiastical literature, from their unhappy connection with the early Church. They seem to have been of every form of professed religion, Jewish, Christian, and Pagan, —exalting their own fantastic theology above all, and insolently intruding into every society of worshippers

[1] [On the life and writings of this Alexandrian Jew, see Valckenaer's celebrated *Diatribe*, printed in the fourth volume of Dr. Gaisford's edition of Eusebius's *Præparatio Evangelica*. ED.]

to transform its worship into this. And if it be warrantable to judge of the procedures of the invisible enemy of Christianity, as we trace those of its protecting Providence, assuredly it is no enthusiasm to affirm that in the almost incredible absurdities of Gnosticism, supported by men of authority, learning, and acuteness, we may detect a fatuity more than is *natural* to man, an inspiration of evil which alone seems sufficient to account for the facts.

To these various sources of opinion transmitting their collective influences into the Platonism of the second century must be finally added the rise and spread of Christianity itself,—of Christianity which in many most important respects presented the reality of which the theories and practices of Neo-Platonism were the pompous imitation. The celestial reality and its earthly counterpart being thus met upon an earthly theatre, it would be strange if the advantage of the ground had not given some occasional successes to the inferior combatant; but we may rejoice in the conviction that the evil of its contact was never suffered to affect any vital part, nor suffered to affect any part until the entire system of Christianity had been sufficiently matured and exemplified for all future times to render its subsequent corruptions or exaggerations a misfortune only to the age that endured them. But this is too important a subject to commence at the close of a Lecture.

LECTURE III.

ON THE NEO-PLATONISTS.

GENTLEMEN:—

I PROCEED to give you some account of the mode of speculation which was patronized by the school of Alexandria. I purposely omit minuteness of details,—confining myself to the task of arresting and representing the general spirit of the system. The materials for this undertaking are ample, so ample as to perplex the student by their very extent and variety. But though ample in number and size, and various in outward form, they are singularly monotonous in spirit and substance. To master them all is indeed a task exceeding the patience of most inquirers, not only from their extent, but from their very sameness; the mind being wearied not more by multiplicity of details than by uniformity of style and purport. The same leading thoughts occur in every conceivable shape; and the effort to disguise this internal identity results in exaggerating the obscurity that still guards from vulgar eyes the mysteries of Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus.

Succession of Alexandrian philosophers. Ammonius Saccas, the reputed founder of Neo Platonism. Plotinus.

At the close of the reign of Commodus, about the year 192, Ammonius Saccas founded his school at Alexandria. The subsequent teachers of the views which Ammonius had introduced appeared in three different theatres,—Rome, Alexandria, and Athens. Plotinus (born A.D. 205 at Lycopolis in Egypt) removed to Rome and established his school there in the reign of the

Emperor Philip, about the year 244. Porphyry and Amelius followed their master to Rome, the former in the reign of Gallienus,[1] the latter some years earlier. At the death of Plotinus, in 270, the name of Porphyry became the most eminent among the cultivators of heathen wisdom. Iamblichus and Hierocles continued the succession at its birthplace, Alexandria; Plutarchus of Athens, Syrianus, and Proclus, restored philosophy to its old Athenian haunts at the close of the fourth and through the greater part of the fifth century. The death of Proclus is assigned to the year 485. He was succeeded by Marinus, who wrote his master's life; he by Isidorus; and he, again, by Zenodotus; and the last-named teacher brings us to the famous epoch of Justinian's decree for closing the schools of Athens, in the year 529.

Porphyry.

Iamblichus.

Proclus.

To proceed minutely into all the peculiarities of these successive teachers would be a laborious, though perhaps not uninteresting, task. My present object is simply to catch the predominating views which seem to have given their character to the entire.

We shall first speak of their logical views, of their theory of *knowledge*, and the privileges of the human soul in regard to it.

The Neo-Platonic Logic.

Does man's knowledge grasp the reality of things? would it remain certain even though the cognitive faculty were annihilated?—this is the question which (as I have more than once intimated) occupied so many of the Grecian speculators, and which the different sects of the ancient philosophy answered by very different solutions indeed, but which all strove to answer by some solution or other. The skeptical philosophers, we know, denied altogether the possibility of real knowledge; and they built their denial

Earlier views of the relation of knowing and being.

[1] [See Porphyr. Vit. Pl. c. 4, quoted by Clinton, Fast. Rom. ED.]

mainly on the allegation that, though real objects apart from the soul of man may exist, it would forever remain impossible to prove that these objects sent true or adequate representatives of themselves to the human mind. Such a fact could only, they observed, be proved by a medium which itself in turn required proof; and this process was obviously endless. But when it was urged that the truth of the impression was itself in the first instance established by the irresistible conviction of the mind, they replied by denying the universality of such convictions; by alleging the imperfection, and the errors, and (as they endeavoured to show) the contradiction, of the senses; and, finally, by maintaining that at best this indestructible conviction was itself but a state of the sentient mind, was purely subjective, and therefore could not warrant the reality of any thing beyond its own sphere. Their antagonists rejoined that this last assertion (the only one of any consequence in the pleading) was altogether unfair; inasmuch as it was of the very nature of this irresistible conviction that it *did* attest the reality of mental knowledge; that, consequently, the skeptical objection involved a manifest *petitio principii;* that the same evidence of consciousness which taught us that we have mental states or qualities of any kind equally taught us that some of these states were of a kind to pronounce on that which is not the mind, to transcend the subjective, and grasp the real, the absolute, the eternal.

But what, then, is *the relation* between the reality of things and the human knowledge which represents it? How are they *connected*, that the latter, a form of human thought, shall thus declare the former, which is not a form of thought? What is the bond between the substance of the universe (for example) and the mental conviction that such substance is and must be? between the

cause of all things and the law of the mind which necessitates its belief that such a cause exists?

We should perhaps be inclined to answer, that the Divine Artist, who constructed the soul of man, has *given* to it these convictions, *and obliged it to believe them* the evidences of corresponding realities. But such an answer as this, though commendable for its humility, and perhaps for its prudent sagacity, was not at all sufficient to content the more earnest speculators on the nature of knowledge. In the first place, they asked whence it was that we derived the certainty of the *existence* of this Divine Framer to whom we recurred in our solution,—whence, but from that very faculty of knowledge which we appealed to Him to accredit? They argued, again, that such an origin of certainty as this degrades the entire prerogative of the human reason; that it makes it the arbitrary creation of a superior, without any essential and inherent power of authenticating truth; that it is fraught with most dangerous consequences to the great cause of the stability of moral rights and obligations; that it might even be alleged by cavillers that it were well for man to be *deceived*, to which supposition this theory would afford no satisfactory reply. By such arguments as these it was urged that the authority of human knowledge must be set upon different foundations to be of assured value. And thus the question was still triumphantly asked,—What more has man than his own beliefs, and how can his own beliefs establish the certainty of things? What connection can be shown between the real and objective on the one hand, and the forms and modifications of the human soul on the other?

Now, you will easily perceive that there are two modes of connection supposable. The first conceives that, the two regions—the real and the mental—being distinct, the former transmits representatives to the human con-

sciousness,—that the conceptions of the mind do in some way *answer* to the absolute nature of things. As to the process of this mysterious correspondence, there might be various suppositions. It might be held that the mental states are the *immediate effects* of their objects, and they possess the connection and internal necessitude of effect with cause; it might be held that the mental states are the *images or resemblances* of their objects, (a plausible but deceptive form of expression common in all ages;) it might be said that they are arranged to be *consequent on* their objects, without any connection beyond this arbitrary arrangement,—a supposition which naturally glides into that of denying them to have any objects at all, and maintaining that mental states are incapable of evidencing any thing beyond their own transitory existence. This last is a theory of unity in which the objective is altogether abandoned. But there is another theory of unity which is formed by preserving both objective and subjective, both nature and the mind, both the Reality of Things and the Reason which apprehends it, and *identifying* them as substantially one and the same, or as two forms of one incomprehensible original. This is the *second* general hypothesis as to human knowledge; and in this the Platonism of Alexandria was founded or resulted, as to this the original theory of Plato always really tended. The great majority of the Grecian schools held the doctrine that the Reality is essentially distinct from the Reason that knows it; the Skeptical party held that there is no Reality at all demonstrable; the Platonists of Alexandria decided that there is a Reality and a Reason, but that both are blended in one absolute and ineffable conjunction.

Neo-Platonic theory of absolute identity.

The moderation of Plato was eminently evinced in the caution with which he always *hinted* this form of speculation without ever

Comparison with pure Platonism.

actually venturing to affirm it. We perceive the speculation itself (as I formerly endeavoured to show you) in his theory of the Coeternity of the Soul with its ideas, of the sameness of their original substance, of the final unity in which all things were involved; we equally perceive his cautious hesitancy in the distinction which to the very last he appears to intimate between the ideal objects of the Reason and the Reason that contemplates them. But all this reluctance to pronounce on the ultimate question of philosophy was abandoned by the Neo-Platonics. Stimulated by the boldness of certain Oriental speculations, they affirmed that the cause of truth was lost unless the theory of unity was unreservedly admitted, and fortified their tenets by the rather ungracious measure of reviling the errors and the timidity of their Grecian master. It is the perpetual lesson of Plotinus, that the object of reason is not, cannot be, external to reason; that truth is not in the conformity of thoughts with things, but of thoughts with each other. Intelligence is at once the object conceived, the subject conceiving, and the act of conception. To rest on self is to commune with the universe.

Such is the main principle of the Alexandrian theory of the human reason. But in the speculations of the masters of this school these views were united with a vast mass of theological and physical hypotheses,—these last being, however, a mere development of the former. This brings us to the second consideration,—the Alexandrian system of the Universe. As knowledge consisted in unity of the knowing and the known, so was the first principle of the Universe a mysterious unity out of which all things emanated. This principle was superessential; it was alike above Being and Intelligence. You find them here upon the road which Plato had traced, but advancing with a bold and hurried step very alien to the spirit

Neo Platonic theory of the Universe.

of the great master. The second principle is pure intelligence, (νοῦς,) the third is Soul, (ψυχή.) These fill the sphere of the intelligible world, and actuate all things. There is nothing truly real but these; and these in all their forms, which are the "ideas" of Plato, are connected together by secret links that establish a sympathy between all the parts and elements of the Universe. Let us for a moment inspect more nearly this expansion of the system of Plato.

The One, according to Plotinus.

The first principle of the Universe is declared to be the One, (τὸ ἕν.) But as every existence, though single, includes a plurality, as reason (the highest of existences) involves a duality of subject and object, the One must be actually ranked above Being;[2] it is not to be regarded as an existence, but as the ineffable fountain of existence,—a fountain which forever yields existence, itself absolutely inexhaustible. No quality or character can be ascribed to the One, for it transcends all qualifications and speciality.[3]

The Absolute Intelligence.

The second principle of the Universe is that which *contemplates* the One, and requires only it, to exist. This is the Absolute Intelligence. Thus immediately interwoven with the primal Unity, directly dependent on it, addressing itself to it, alone worthy to behold it, it is manifest that Intelligence is the first of existences, the highest essence in the world of reality and the foundation of every other. The operation of Intelligence is *thought*, and thought is (as we formerly saw) only conceivable as identical with its object: the principle of Intelligence, then, by the activity of *thought*, does actually constitute all true existences,[4]—create and comprehend them all. All that has being,

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[2] [Plotin. Enn. V. p. 491, A:—*ἐπέκεινα ὄντος τὸ ἕν.* ED.]

[3] [See the eighth book of the third Ennead, c. 8, p. 350, to end. ED.]

[4] [Enn. V. 4, c. 2, p. 518, F:—*νοῦς καὶ ὂν ταὐτόν . . . αὐτὸς νοῦς τὰ πράγματα.* ED.]

therefore, is but the infinite varieties of intelligence; the universe of real existence is but a vast aggregate of the forms—the substantial forms—of supreme Reason. Whatever is real and eternal is not the product of this νοῦς; it is the thing itself in all the multiplicity of its aspects.

Soul, or the Vital Principle.

The third principle in the Plotinian Triad is the Universal Soul, which is produced by, and reposes on, Intelligence, as Intelligence derives from the original Unity.[5] This principle of Soul seems to be described as possessing two energies,—one by which it attaches itself to Intelligence, and the other by which it becomes the active creator of the sensible universe, if indeed the latter is not implied as the result of the former. The immediate products of this universal ψυχὴ are the *Forms* of things, (εἴδη, μορφαί, λόγοι σπερματικοί;) which are *thought into* their material receptacle (if I may so render the expressions of Plotinus) by the "intuitive" force of nature. On the nature of this material receptacle Plotinus is nearly as indefinite as Plato. He tells us that where the creative illumination of Soul fails, darkness begins; and that even this very darkness becomes impregnated by the vivific influences of the light that invests and penetrates it. Thus it is that Soul in the very power of its weakness forms to itself a body,—endows blind matter with form and thought. This very allegorical representation, however, is rendered more obscure by other representations which appear to contradict it, and which leave the reader altogether in doubt as to whether Plotinus meant or not to allow to matter any reality of existence at all.[6] Thus it is that, in the inevitable feebleness of human speculation,

[5] [Ψυχὴ εἴδωλον νοῦ—οἷον λόγος νοῦ, καὶ ἐνέργειά τις ὥσπερ αὐτὸς (νοῦς) ἐκείνου (τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,) Enn. V. 1, c. 6, p. 487, F. Ed.]

[6] ["Matter" is the subject of the fourth book of the second Ennead. Compare Enn. I. 8, c. 15. Ed.]

systems which begin solely from mind are perplexed in accounting for its material antithesis; exactly as those which commence exclusively from *matter* are bewildered when they would solve the existence of the mind that arranges and governs it! The same obscurity belongs to Plotinus's account of the kindred question of *moral evil*, which by the Eastern and Alexandrian speculatists was connected with the existence and nature of matter; and which naturally shares all the difficulties and contradictions which characterize their theories of this latter mysterious essence.

Thus it was that Plotinus, reasoning down from the absolute and inconceivable Unity, attempted to construct the actual universe. The connection being purely that of emanation, the effect pre-existing in the cause, and the cause actualized in the effect, the system was essentially Pantheistic. And as naturally it was a system of fatalistic optimism, the production and all its parts and elements were as necessary, and as determinate, as the producer. These considerations led to two characteristic results, which in their turn produced one of the chief practical extravagancies of this school. The elements of the sensible universe, being all produced as developments of the Infinite Perfection, were bound together by a secret bond which suspended every one upon every other. While likewise, the principle of Soul becoming as it were arrested or incarnated in the entire material system, every visible thing was animated by this subtle essence,—not only the brute creation, but that which we falsely conceive inanimate. The poetry of our own age was thus erected into a determinate philosophy; nature was literally alive through all her regions. These tenets obviously formed a philosophical basis for all the fantastic enterprises of divination and natural magic; and the intercourse with the demons and spirits of the universe was the recognised

Emanation.

privilege of the disciplined pupil of Alexandrian wisdom. The grossest follies of theurgy were the favourite resources of the emperor whose philosophy could not tolerate the mysteries of the Christian faith.

Theosophical speculations of Porphyry and Iamblichus.

As Plotinus had laid the foundation of the system in his teaching at Rome, so Iamblichus continued the enterprise in its original and more congenial Alexandrian atmosphere. His function was to deepen the theological character of the philosophy, by laboriously blending it with the heathen mythology and mysteries. Porphyry (who died about 305) had done much for this project, as a measure of resistance to the victorious progress of Christianity. To meet this powerful adversary it was also necessary to appeal to the prepossessions of antiquity, to construct a kind of catholic church of philosophy, with its unbroken succession, its expansive universality, and its venerable traditions. This was a favourite notion with the Alexandrian sages. About the period of the opening of the new Athenian school, Chrysanthius, Plutarchus of Athens, and others, endeavoured to accredit the supposition of their "golden chain," (as it was called,) a succession of gifted men who, they affirmed, had perpetuated from the earliest times—from those Orphean days when gods haunted the earth and gave wisdom to mankind—a single unaltered philosophy. Accordingly, all their ingenuity and research was expended on the effort to discover this treasure in the records of every age: the books of the philosophers held the dogmas of it; the mysteries of Greece, Egypt, were but the rites and ceremonies of this divine theology. By Proclus, the last *great* name among the later Platonists,* this hypothesis was maintained with great pomp of language and subtlety of thought. Proclus, who succeeded Syrianus

Proclus.

* He died A.D. 485.

at Athens, (for philosophy had returned to her Grecian birthplace to expire,) treated Plato very much as Philo treated Moses. Commingling all philosophies in one, he professed to study Aristotle as the grammar of Plato, and found in Plato all he wished to find. He styled himself the hierophant of the universe, and avowed his belief that he constituted the last link in that mysterious chain of interpreters of the hidden wisdom whom Hermes of old had ordained to perpetuate divine truth in the world. His claim was not disallowed; and Proclus died with the reputation of miraculous powers. In the voluminous writings of Proclus the whole genius of the system is eminently displayed,—its sublimity, its puerility, its sagacity and poverty, its daring independence and its grovelling superstition. It is not improbable that the writings of Proclus were indebted to Christianity for a term that occurs with peculiar frequency in them,—the term πίστις or faith, which Proclus regards as direct communion with the Infinite and Absolute and the highest faculty of the human soul. This, you will remember, is a departure from the original Platonic phraseology. This author is not content with a single Trinity; his philosophical triads recur in every page. Essence, identity, variety,—being, life, intelligence,—limit, illimitation, mixture,—are some of the instances of this threefold partition which Proclus conceives to obtain universally through nature. But over all, he, in common with all his brother-teachers, enthrones the Absolute Unity; and with them he maintains that with this Unity the soul of man is by a special faculty enabled to converse, until, absorbed in the intricacy of the communion, it is lost in its object, and becomes, in a manner, itself divine.

Recapitulation. General characteristics of

Let us now endeavour to recapitulate some of the particulars which distinguish the Alexandrian philosophy as a form of Platonism. We

see, then, that the later school with peculiar force insist on the superessentiality of the Absolute One out of whom all existence and existences are projected. We observe that (doubtless to meet the Christian system) the Triad of supreme natures is asserted with a distinctness little discoverable in the genuine writings of Plato. We can observe that the habit of reasoning, not upwards, from the multitude of facts to the Unity of Laws and of the Author of Laws, but downwards, from the single and absolute to the subordinate creation, is manifested in the Alexandrian speculatists far more prominently than in their Grecian master. The activity of intelligences through the universe is another doctrine, Platonic indeed, but elevated to a height for which Plato never meant it by the theologues of Alexandria. The *sympathy* of the parts of the universe is almost wholly their own; and the superstitious practices derived from it find no countenance in the spirit of elder Platonism. But none of the doctrines of the later school is more characteristic than their exaggeration of those tenets on which Plato so often and so impressively dilated, relative to the immediate intuition of the Good and the Beautiful. This conducts me, finally, to the *moral* aspects of the school of Plotinus, which were almost wholly determined by this peculiar doctrine. This connection of the practical life with the logical tenet may appear from the following passage of Proclus, (*De Provid. et Fato.*)

Neo-Platonism.

Ethical aspects.

"There are," he declares,[7] after enumerating five functions of the soul, "also five orders of knowledge." Those which are of the lowest grade seemingly deserve the name: they include things material and subject to mere compulsion. The second order addresses itself to the characters common to sensible objects, the general no-

[7] [C. 20, p. 37, ed. Cous. ED.]

tions of Aristotle: it rises from variety to unity. The third order departs from this unity, dividing and resolving general notions, knowing causes, deducing consequences, &c.: it embraces the mathematical sciences, beginning with the unit and the point, and thence deriving its demonstrations of complex propositions. The fourth order rises to knowledge more simple still, abandoning methods, resolutions, compositions, definitions, demonstrations: it consists in contemplative speculation (autoptic) of beings and essences, it penetrates to intelligibles. The fifth and last order, which Aristotle never reached, which Plato and preceding theologues alone have described, is a knowledge superior to the understanding, an exaltation (*μανία*) which assimilates the soul to God Himself:—"for the like can only be known by the like,—objects sensible by the senses, scientific relations by science, intelligible by the understanding, unity by the principle of union." The attainment of this exalted state was the object of the entire philosophical discipline of the Alexandrians; which was thus only calculated for a very few among mankind, and liable to be even by them perverted into an indolent and inoperative quietism. The leaders of these schools professed to have themselves attained supernatural presences: not Plotinus only, but the shrewd and inquiring Porphyry, boasted to have been favoured with the actual realization of a state of the soul in which in the depths of absolute perfection it beholds and is absorbed in the very Deity it adores.

Asceticism and exaggerated contempt of the body.

Hence the means of self-perfection were all reduced to self-denial,—purification through the mastery of the body. The material frame became an object of disgust and detestation to the sublimated apprehensions of the Alexandrian; as interfering with the completeness of this contemplative effort. Plotinus refused to permit his picture to be taken, be-

cause it would unduly perpetuate the image of a body he deplored, and avoided all mention of the date or locality of his birth, as too dark and miserable an epoch to be remembered.

These exaggerations, which were displayed in a thousand fantastic forms, are indeed in this degree preposterous; yet we ought not to forget that they become absurd only when unbalanced by other principles and exalted into the exclusive objects of moral discipline. That bodily abstinence through all its varieties is in its measure suitable to a course of spiritual advancement, can only be denied by those who forget the closeness of the alliance which in this world subsists between the corporeal frame and the conscious spirit, and the peril of the influences which the former can exert to depress and fetter its divine associate. If there be such an exercise of devotion as the contemplation of God in those attributes of His nature which we can make subjects of thought, it cannot be doubted that, according to the ordinary laws of nature, certain states of the body are more favourable than others to the success of the effort. The management of the bodily frame becomes then a plain portion of Christian duty; and as such it is recognised in all the Christian Scriptures. They never derogate (with the Alexandrians) from *Body in the abstract*,—for they perpetuate it in the state of glory; but they do teach us to look with suspicion and jealousy upon the *peculiar species* of body we carry with us in the probationary state,—to mark and withstand its overweening influence, to "mortify the deeds of the body," to "keep under the body, and bring it into subjection," to "present the body a living sacrifice."

Comparison of Neo-Platonic with Christian morality.

The "show of wisdom in neglecting the body" (for of this also the apostles speak) which characterized the Alexandrian teachers, and which proceeded on extrava-

gant suppositions, nowhere countenanced by inspiration, of the radical evil of the material nature itself in all and any of its forms, was—as I have said—connected with their discipline for the ἕνωσις, or union with God by direct intuition of His substantial being. Into this interesting subject you would scarcely permit me *now* to enter at any length. I merely observe, then, (for it is most instructive,) that their view of the union with God was founded in the error common to the many forms of mysticism in all ages,—the error of conceiving that spiritual connections between God and man must be *conscious* connections, felt, and known, and anticipated, and remembered, as a part of the actual series of thought. As Christians you are bound to believe such intercourses possible and real; but as philosophic reasoners you will decide that they pass in a region of the spirit to which, though it be the basis of consciousness, consciousness cannot attain; that we must receive them in faith, and verify them not in themselves but in their results,—those results which the Christian phraseology entitles the "fruits," and "gifts," and "witness," of the Spirit.

Concluding remarks.

But, amid the errors and extravagancies to which this perversion led, surely no candid man can contemplate the peculiar design and tendency of all earthly wisdom at this very period, without regarding it as in a great measure providentially ordered. The mind of man yearned for Divine Communion, and grew extravagant through its very disappointment. The actual revelation was assuredly "the Desire of all Nations," even though it was by so many overlooked or rejected. All human wisdom seemed at length to have paused in its exhaustion, turned to heaven, and sighed for a voice from thence. The whole field of speculation had been traversed and explored; and, though glittering spoils lay around its many labourers, the treasure which all sought was not found, the deep

want of the soul of man was not met, and—as if instinctively—the whole host of earthly philosophy abandoned its position of inquiry, and in strange, wild, fantastic devotion asked of heaven to give what earth had hopelessly failed to supply. Heaven had, indeed, supplied its remedy, had anticipated and answered the call; but the capricious activity of the human mind had meanwhile constructed its own device to meet it, and the broken cisterns mocked in unhappy imitation the fountain of eternal life. Christianity was, to many, lost among its counterfeits. For every Divine wonder it could narrate, a thousand mocking miracles rose around it; for every blessed promise it could offer, ecstasies and raptures more transcendent still—the felt presence of a Deity—were boasted by its foes; its visions and prophecies were not altogether denied, but they were degraded as the easy attainments of ordinary wisdom; and its defenders might almost become ashamed of its pure and lofty maxims when they saw how easily they could be debased into the decorations of a fanatical imposture. But the genuine work of God was at length vindicated as His; it remained, it still remains, the strength and consolation of thousands; while, after a faint expiring struggle, shifting from city to city,—like the ghastly spectre of Philosophy haunting her old abodes,—the illusive Wisdom of Rome, Alexandria, and Athens vanished from the world, to become in a remote age the harmless object of speculative inquiry among the disciples of its celestial Rival.

UNFINISHED SERIES

ON

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE.

THREE LECTURES

ON THE

ARISTOTELIAN PSYCHOLOGY.

LECTURE I.

ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE.

Aristotle's method compared with that of Plato.

It will probably be found most eligible—certainly most in accordance with the usual course of modern philosophical investigation—to commence an account of the views of Aristotle with his opinions on the nature, faculties, and destinies of *the Soul*. Much of the interest which belongs to such a writer—to one of such antiquity, and in many respects so unlike our modern teachers—arises from the peculiarity of his way of contemplating the subject itself; I mean, his conception of the general problem to be solved, as contrasted with particular opinions on its details. This can best be conveyed by keeping close to the original, though perhaps with some sacrifice of grace and variety. In commenting on Plato the case is different: there we are in most cases obliged to collect the great author's principles from a vast number of distinct sources;—to gather his primary principles is itself an exercise of inductive inquiry. But Aristotle's writings are express philosophical treatises, probably among the very earliest of their kind; they profess no other object but the didactic exposition of simple truth; and though certainly the conciseness of the style, and the utter dissimilarity to modern views of many of the arguments and propositions advanced, create much difficulty,—sometimes an almost impenetrable obscurity,—it does not appear that Aristotle himself ever contemplated any object but the unadorned declaration of what he conceived to be truth,

or that his contemporaries found any perplexity in those reasonings which so painfully tax our powers. We must endeavour to throw ourselves into their attitude, to read with their eyes and hear with their ears,—a transformation difficult indeed, but necessary, if we would escape the narrow-minded superciliousness of modern criticisms of antiquity. The best preparation for either Aristotle or Plato, but especially for the former, on account of his constant habit of historical reference, is the careful study of the few relics that remain of the ante-Socratic philosophy. Without this, it is impossible to do justice to Aristotle as the great systematizer of Grecian speculation; we cannot measure his advance unless we know precisely where he stood. In a former Course, I believe, I noticed this special benefit to be derived from study of these neglected but most majestic fragments of the earliest philosophy of Greece: they are the rough-hewn masses, cumbrous and ungainly, but often solid, which Plato and Aristotle, Epicurus and Zeno, employed in constructing those magnificent edifices which are still the wonder of mankind.

Aristotle's Treatise περὶ ψυχῆς.

We will turn, then, to the treatise of Aristotle, *περὶ ψυχῆς*,[1]—a treatise which he regarded as a portion of his general course of physical inquiry. You must now be prepared for assertions laboriously supported, which you will probably deem unworthy of such anxious disquisition; but you must not outshine Aristotle with his own light, or forget that he has himself powerfully contributed to make those propositions trite and familiar whose triteness surprises you in his pages. Aristotle at one time (in that long period of gestation which preceded the birth of the modern philosophy) exerted an influence so powerful

[1] [On Soul, or "On the Vital Principle," under which latter title the book has very recently been translated by Dr. Collier. ED.]

and so universal that every thing he upheld became incorporated in the general mass of thought; and every *truth* he maintained we have directly from *him*. This influence, protracted as it is into the very philosophy of the present hour, and manifested in the common terms of philosophical language, is the great glory of Aristotle, —his truest monument. Instances of this, proofs that the phraseology and recognised principles of our late and living teachers are in a large degree such as they are just because of this man who taught two-and-twenty centuries ago in Athens, will, I think, start up before you at nearly every step in the very subject and treatise we are about to consider.

Characteristics,

I confess I consider this treatise a very extraordinary production. It is (with the exception of a few passages in which the author, perhaps, confounds merely logical distinctions with physical differences) a perfect specimen of fair inductive inquiry, pursued according to the legitimate method, and often with very satisfactory results. There can be no question, it must, at the time of its publication, have conveyed a vast quantity of new and well-arranged information; nor is it to be doubted that, however we may be perplexed with some of its conclusions, and however we may be forced to admit that now and then the illustrious author escaped with pronouncing an ambiguous verdict rather than give up a difficulty, the books *De Animâ* are the true foundation of the "inductive philosophy of the Mind."

and analysis of the treatise.

Aristotle, who never delays at the threshold of his subject, begins with a few rapid observations on the dignity of the investigation he is about to undertake. If we value *knowledge*, he observes, and if we make a distinction in the *objects* of knowlege, either for superior exactness or superior dignity, both these characteristics meet in the ἱστορία τῆς ψυχῆς,—the natural history of the soul. Fur-

Book I. *Chap. I. Prefatory inquiries.*

ther, this species of knowledge plainly tends to elucidate all varieties of truth, especially the science of *Nature;* inasmuch as the soul is, as it were, the principle of living things, (*οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων.*) This statement marks at the very outset the wideness of significancy which Aristotle imports in his use of the term Soul. You will soon see that his view extends beyond the human to the brute, and even to the vegetable, creation; though of the last he speaks briefly and conjecturally. The treatise, you must remember, is itself only one of a *series* on the various characteristics of the animate creation. We seek, he continues, to discover the nature and essence of the soul, (*φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν.*) This subject of inquiry, which modern teachers (especially after the well-known disclaimer of Locke) have generally repudiated, belonged naturally to Aristotle's conception of soul, and to the place his investigation occupied in a general course of physical instruction. It was also in some measure forced upon him by the bold assertions of the elder schools; and it corresponded, in fact, to nothing more mysterious or transcendental than our modern controversies about life and organization. Besides the inquiry as to the nature of soul, he professes further to examine its phenomena, (*ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν,*) whether actual manifestations of the soul itself, (*ἴδια πάθη,*) or indirectly its results in living beings. It would not be easy to sketch the outlines of the subject with more completeness; and we must always remember that in the history of science, whatever be the success of a solution, it is no small merit to have stated the problem correctly. But in reference to the nature and faculties of this principle of Soul, he unaffectedly confesses that it is exceedingly difficult to obtain any satisfactory assurance about it. Here we observe the struggles of a powerful intellect, whose experience of scientific discovery had not been sufficiently extensive to decide his logical views. He pro-

fesses some uncertainty as to the mode of proof by which the inquiry is to be regulated,—whether the essence, the *τί ἐστιν*, is to be ascertained in this instance as in any other, or by some peculiar process; the latter supposition increasing the difficulty of the investigation. But even when this preliminary point has been settled—whether demonstration, or division, or any other method, be adopted—other difficulties remain: the principles of different subjects are themselves different, and throw little or no light upon each other,—thus, the fundamental ideas of *geometry* and *arithmetic*. Aristotle next proceeds to mention the questions whose solution he conceives indispensable to a complete comprehension of the subject. They are such as these:—to what *genus* the Soul belongs?—is it to be entered under substance, quality, quantity, or any other of the categories? Again: is it of those things whose being is merely *potential*, (*ἐν δυνάμει*,) or is it a positive principle of activity (*ἐντελέχειά τις*?—is it divisible or indivisible? Are all souls of the same *species* (*ὁμοειδεῖς*)? and, if not, is the distinction even *generic?* A question of importance, because inquirers seem altogether to restrict themselves to the soul of *man*. Is, then, our definition (*λόγος*) to describe it simply as the common principle of animated existence? or is there to be a particular one for each class,—as of horse, of dog, of man, of the divine nature?—for, as to the "universal animal" (*τὸ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου*) of the Platonists, it is either a nonentity or a formation of the mind subsequent to observation of particulars, [*ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν, ἢ ὕστερον.*][2] Again: if there exist not a multiplicity

[2] [*De An.* i. 1, § 5. This passage is noteworthy, as it involves the controversy between the Realists and Nominalists. It is not the only passage in Aristotle in which his consciousness of the problem is apparent: but I know no other which seems to pronounce so decidedly against the realistic theory. Comp. Trendelenburg's note, and see the references in note 2, p. 107 of this volume. ED.]

of souls in the frame, but only parts of the same soul, should we first inquire into the whole or the parts? Nor is it easy to determine which of these parts—intellect, sense, and the rest—actually differ from the others. Another important point in the management of the subject is this: should the parts of the soul, or their operations, be the first matter of examination; and if the operations, should not even their *objects* (*τὰ ἀντικείμενα*) take precedence of these (the *αἰσθητὸν* before the *αἰσθητικόν*, &c.)? It is true that such inquiries as these do not directly answer the question, what the Soul *is;* but they *tend* to that answer. For as the knowledge of essences enables us to discover properties, so the knowledge of the latter leads us to the former; and hence it is that every definition which does not state, or suggest, the properties of things, is merely disputative. To resume: another most important question regards the interdependence of soul and body,—it being manifest that some affections (*πάθη*) are dependent on body, as anger, courage, desire, and all the forms of sense; while such operations as those of intelligence seem exclusively mental. Yet even (as he sagaciously observes) if intelligence require a basis of conception[3] (*φαντασία*) to work on, it would seem that to supply this requisite the material organization is demanded. The question whether soul is separable from body will depend upon the question whether any of its operations or affections are altogether and exclusively its own: if this be not the case, we can speak of its separate properties no more than we can of those of a line or surface whose purely mathematical relations can never be exemplified in real existence. Accordingly, without here stating any thing definitively with respect to the purely intellectual prin-

[3] [Rather "imagination," reproductive or passive, as distinguished from creative; for this is the import of *φαντασία*. ED.]

ciple, Aristotle pronounces that there is satisfactory evidence that the passive affections are dependent on the body, and thus that they are *λόγοι ἔνυλοι*.[4] Hence it follows that they become a portion of the territory of the physical inquirer, who defines chiefly by the material cause, as the logician chiefly by the formal; though, in truth, both these causes, as well as the final, concern the student of nature. In short, the *physical* inquirer is engaged with all the affections and properties inseparable from particular bodies, and considered as such; the *mathematician*, in properties separable not actually, but by abstraction, (*ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως*;) the student of the *first philosophy*, in those which are actually separate existences. To the first of these classes, then, belong the passive affections of the soul.

Such are the chief topics of the introductory dissertation of Aristotle's treatise. They are calculated to impress the difficulty and variety of the investigation, and do in reality comprise nearly all the principal psychological problems which have perplexed mankind since the days of the author. The materialist tendency of Aristotle's views is clearly enough observable throughout,—a tendency which is not very fully counteracted by his subsequent assertions (few and rather ambiguous) of the distinctness of the higher (or active) intellectual principle. But of this hereafter.

Chapter II. Aristotle's criticism of ancient theories.

The next chapter brings us to Aristotle's invariable preliminaries, an historical summary and discussion of the opinions of his predecessors. He observes that all inquirers have seen that the animate differs from the inanimate in two principal characteristics, (*κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι*,) in motion and sensation. And, inasmuch as they con-

[4] [This phrase is explained by Philoponus (ap. Trendelenb. *Comm.* p. 206) as equivalent to *εἰδη ἐν ὑλῃ τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα καὶ οὐ χωριστά*.—"Forms which have their being in matter, and are not separable." ED.]

ceived (erroneously, according to Aristotle, for this is one of his most cherished principles[5]) that that which moves another must itself be in motion, they pronounced the soul to be itself in this state of constant agitation.

Democritus and Leucippus.

Hence Democritus and Leucippus endeavoured to apply their coarse atomic conceptions to the substance of the soul,—with whom Aristotle joins some of the Pythagoreans, who, it seems, were guilty of the same preposterous hypothesis, that the matter of the soul was the same as the restless motes in the sunbeam, though others rose a step higher, in declaring the soul to be identical only with the influence that moved these particles. Aristotle remarks that these philosophers—as well as, in a less decided degree, even Anaxagoras himself—lost sight of the fundamental distinction between the mere moving-principle and the mind in its higher faculties, (*ψυχὴ* and *νοῦς*;) when he especially (Anaxagoras) proclaimed that Mind not only governed but directly *moved* the Universe, (*νοῦν κινῆσαι τὸ πᾶν.*) Thales, impressed with the importance of the character of motivity in the soul, attributed a soul to the magnet. In all these instances, as well as in others, we observe the universal confession of this attribute, combined in most cases with the ungrounded supposition that the mover must itself be in motion. The other class established by Aristotle is that of those teachers who were chiefly struck by the attribute of perception and of knowledge. With these philosophers there reigned a maxim of great antiquity, whose author is probably undiscoverable,—*γινώσκεσθαι ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον*,—that like is known by like; and hence they determined the nature of the soul by the number of elements they admitted into the external world. Thus Empedocles composed it of all the recognised elements.

Anaxagoras.

[5] [*Phys.* viii. c. 5, seq. ED.]

Others, struck by the intellectual capacities of the soul, and in accordance with their theory that numbers were the true principles of the Universe, applied their numerical formulas to the perceptive and cognitive powers of the mind,—to intellect, science, opinion, and sense, (*νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, αἴσθησις.*) And when to this they had added the capacity of originating motion, they obtained their well-known definition that the soul is a "self-moving number." Another influence affected these determinations, the conviction that the essence of the soul was removed from body; and hence those who did not unite all the elements selected that which seemed to be most refined to incorporeality. Democritus (indirectly) pronounced for *fire*, Heraclitus conceived it that exhalation (*ἀναθυμίασις*) from which, as ever fluent, his obscure system deduced the universe. Alcmæon, Hippo, Critias, sought it in such substances as approached, in their estimation, nearest to these attributes; and even those who formed the world from *contraries* assumed the same rival principles for the soul. The *earth* alone, Aristotle observes, except in the system of Empedocles, has not been numbered among its constituents. And thus, on the whole, the attributes apprehended in the soul have universally been motion, sense, and incorporeality, (*ὁρίζονται . . . κινήσει, αἰσθήσει, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ.*) I need not remark to you how valuable are these scattered notices of the elder philosophers to the critical student of speculation, or how the rapid summary of Aristotle attests the great attribute of his mind,—its unrivalled power of *classification.*

Empedocles.

Heraclitus, &c.

The arguments by which Aristotle, according to his usual custom, proceeds to overthrow the theories of each of his predecessors, conduct us into a world of thought so foreign to our existing habits, that I fear it would be impossible to secure them from (perhaps very undeserved)

depreciation without an extent of detail and comment for which we have now no time or opportunity. He first attacks the system which finds the essential character of the soul in self-motion; by which you are here to understand, not the power of originating motion in the body, but the power of putting *itself* in motion,—a doctrine which (as we shall hereafter see) would negative one of the main tenets of the whole Aristotelian metaphysics, the impossibility of motion being produced in any substance by its own energy. The soul does indeed move the body, but its own actual motion is only that in which it participates with the body it moves. If the soul be thus in motion, it must move either *καθ' αὑτὸ* or *καθ' ἕτερον*,—either by a proper motion of its own, or by being in that, or attached to that, which is moved,—either as a man walks, or as he is borne in a vessel. Its motion too (which seems much the same division) will be either natural or accidental. But the former of these suppositions is not admissible. A natural or essential motion of the soul would infer the occupation of *place:* it would include the possibility of a *violent* impulse of the soul to motion and rest, which is altogether inexplicable. If it be held that the soul is moved as it moves, it must be moved by a motion of translation, (*φορά*:) it is capable then of leaving the body and returning to it, of which no instance is producible. Nor, if the soul be *essentially* motive, can it be rightly conceived movable indirectly by some distinct object; yet this impulse *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, incidentally by objects distinct from itself, is the very mode of operation to which we are most accustomed in the phenomena of sensation. Aristotle pursues the subtle argument into the inmost intricacies of possibility, by urging that, as motion is the outgoing of the thing moved, if the soul (as is maintained by his adversaries) move itself, and therefore be itself also moved, it must issue out of its own very essence. Democritus, it ap-

pears, urged that the soul in its motions moved the body it animated; but Aristotle replies that the perpetual motion which that philosopher attributed to the soul would, on this supposition, prevent the possibility of rest,—while it is also inconsistent with the true mode of mental influences. Aristotle next enters into a refutation of the account (not dissimilar in principle to that just mentioned) given by the author of the *Timæus* of the constitution and agency of the soul of the world,—a refutation perfectly justifiable, indeed, if we regard that account as intended for a literal statement, and at all events not unwarranted by the unnecessary particularity to which Plato carried his too romantic hypothesis. Modern criticism will, however, I fear, pronounce that the refutation is nearly as unintelligible as the original doctrine. It attributes, says Aristotle, *magnitude* to the universal soul, and thereby deprives that soul of its purely intellectual character, degrading it to the merely sensitive or concupiscent principles. For intellect is essentially indivisible, (ἀμερής,) or, if continuous, not continuous as magnitude, but, like its thoughts, (νοήματα,) in the successive way of number. I will not delay you with the further prosecution of this part of the argument, but notice another objection which is characteristic. Aristotle denies that the operation of intellect can be symbolized by the circular motion of this general Soul, inasmuch as the act of ratiocination is not thus perpetually recurrent, but terminated at the one extreme by its principles, at the other by its conclusion; and the active exertions of intellect are similarly bounded by the end for which they are wrought.

Aristoxenus. "The Soul is a Harmony."

Another theory in much vogue in the age of Aristotle was that which was principally patronized by his own pupil the musician Aristoxenus, and which pronounced the soul to be a "Harmony."

This doctrine, you may remember, is also controverted by Plato in the *Phædo.* The harmonists alleged that the body was composed of contraries, that harmony was the "crasis and synthesis"—the temperament and conciliation—of contraries, and that, this office being performed by the soul, the soul must be truly definable as Harmony. But the soul is no composition of mixed elements, replies Aristotle; yet this alone is harmony. The soul gives motion to the frame; but what harmony originates the motion of the instrument? The *health* of the body may be styled its "harmony;" but the principle of soul is more and higher than bodily sanity. Harmony implies composition and proportion of its constituents; but, if we pronounce that the soul exists wherever these are discoverable in the body, we must admit not one soul but many, according to the number and variety of its different combinations. Hence, concludes Aristotle, after a cursory notice of some peculiar views of Empedocles, "the soul can neither be a harmony, nor move in circular motion: it can be moved indirectly, and even move itself by a reflex operation, when it moves the body in which it is; in no other sense can it possess local motion." "It is not the soul that is angry, compassionates, learns, reasons, but the man *by* the soul," and considered as *having* a soul, which gives him consciousness and recollection of all organic changes; while as to the higher intellectual principles it is essentially impassive, and undergoes the appearance of decay merely on account of the failure of its instruments.

The Pythagoreans. "The soul is a self-moving number."

The Pythagorean definition of the Soul—the "self-moving number"—is next transpierced by the rapid and penetrating criticism of Aristotle. To all the former objections to the actual motion of the soul he adds a cluster of new difficulties that beset the arithmetical metaphysics of Pythagoras. The very motion of this "unit in position" will geome-

trically form a *line!* Such a unit is incapable of being more than the agent in motion; it cannot be also moved. Numbers are capable of subtraction, and thus leave a number different from the former; but the soul remains unchanged in animals that have undergone amputations. With such arguments I will not detain you. It is hard to believe that the symbolical language of Pythagoras did not carry some weightier import than the puerilities which are here so easily overthrown; but, though we owe Aristotle much for his records of the old philosophy, we certainly are not much assisted by him to its illustration. His criticisms are almost without an exception depreciatory; nor does he seem to have known the enjoyment to be found in tracing truth through all her disguises of antique symbolism and mysterious proverb. In this he offers a striking contrast to the more conciliating spirit of Plato. We may, however, grant his concluding objection to the Pythagorean definition,—that it will be found no easy task "to explain from it the affections and operations of the soul, its thoughts, sensations, pleasures, and pains."

Chapter V. Aristotle's refutation of the theory of Empedocles.

I have already mentioned the opinion so largely entertained in remote antiquity, that "the like can only be known by its like,"—a maxim which Plato applied chiefly to the ultimate unity of Reason and Truth, of the Spirit of Man and the Spirit of the Universe. In the natural philosophy of Empedocles, this principle seems to have been employed for an humbler purpose; which indeed Plato himself did not altogether disdain, though I cannot believe that he valued it much. The soul, thought the philosopher of Agrigentum, must itself be the counterpart of the external world; to comprehend that world it must be similarly constituted; it must, then, be a composition of the same form of elementary natures which surround it, mingled and actuated by the same two

powers of concord and discord. Aristotle refutes this notion in his fifth chapter in a great variety of ways. There are, he urges, substances which the soul apprehends and which yet cannot be traced to these elements, or, at least, which depend on a union and proportion of these elements forming a new whole, which *whole* ought, therefore, according to the principle of similars, to be found in the soul. Grant that it apprehend the elements of beings by virtue of its own elementary affinity with them; *ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίνι γνωριεῖ*; unless it carry within it the very proportions and combinations (*λόγοι ἢ συνθέσεις*) which regulate these elements. His next objection is taken from the doctrine of the categories. Real being (*τὸ ὄν*) comprises *all* these generic notions or classes: shall the soul, then, be of a structure to correspond with them *all?* This is inadmissible, for the principles of these categories are mutually distinct: shall it consist only of the principles of *substances* (*ὕλη* and *εἶδος*)? how then shall it apprehend any thing *else*, as the very arrangement of these categories presumes it can? Must it not become a mere quality or quantity in order to detect these classes? and how is this consistent with its substantial being? This doctrine of Empedocles is likewise inconsistent with his own maxim, that "the like *suffers not* from the like," (*ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου*;) for his school will allow that sensation, and even intellection, are passive affections. Why also are none of the outward *earthly* constituents of Body endowed with these perceptive powers? Why, indeed, is not perception universal, and every portion of elementary existence capacitated to recognise itself through the universe? Nor is this system suitable to the real dignity of the intellectual, or even the vital and conscious, essence,—which stands altogether above the bondage of material elements, and the former, plainly prior to them in existence, [*νοῦς προγενέστατος καὶ κύριος κατὰ φύσιν.*] Aristotle

adds a curious observation, which may remind us of the peculiarity of the philosophy we have to deal with, and serve to warn us in how different a climate of speculation we are breathing when we open these ancient pages. If, he remarks, "the soul must be formed of elements, there is no need of them *all* in its constitution; for either member of a contrariety will discern both itself and its opposite;" adding a maxim which has become proverbial, —that "by the straight we judge both itself and the crooked, for the rule is singly the test of both," [*κριτὴς ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανών.*][6]

Nor will Aristotle admit that the principle of soul is diffused through the world universally, as Thales and others hastily decided. We cannot admit soul where there is no evidence of animation, without destroying all grounds of reasoning; nor will the most resolute upholder of this fantastic theory venture to give the title of "animal" to the elements singly or in their insensible combinations. But the following argument was urged, it seems, as the strength of their case. The whole and the parts of the elements are homogeneous, (*ὅλον ὁμοειδὲς τοῖς μορίοις*;) and, since the parts are endowed with animation in animal organisms, we may conclude the whole must be so. This is of course easily answered, by reminding the objector that the principle of soul may be superadded to some matters, though not to all; but Aristotle further keenly retorts, by arguing that this allegation would infer that the soul mingled though the elements must be of literally the same kind with that in animated bodies, which is confuted by the very admission of the adversary, who cannot deny the distinction between his soul of fire or air, and the principle of life, motion, and thought. c. 5. § 17.

Finally, Aristotle asserts the unity of the principle of

[6] [C. 5, § 16, ed. Trendelenburg. Ed.]

soul. It constitutes in his view the combining-power that comprehends and binds the whole organization of the frame; and, as there must be such a bond until death has removed it, we shall have to seek it in an infinite series, unless we stop with the soul itself as the simple and indivisible principle of unity. And thus, he observes, the whole soul of the insect is found in each of its parts which live and move after section. The whole soul, then, is engaged in each exercise of the faculties of the soul; and wherever one faculty exists in the frame the entire is *formally* present, even when, as in the case of the insect, not *numerically* the same in each portion. You will, I think, be inclined to consider that this obscure distinction does not throw much light on the subject: this formal presence of an indivisible soul is, however, of much consequence in the Peripatetic psychology.*

Having thus rejected all preceding solutions of this great problem, the founder of the Lyceum has cleared the way for his own views,—views which you will not expect to remove the difficulty of the question, when

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* Aristotle frequently returns to the same perplexing problem, and allows it *ἀπορίαν ἔχειν*, (ii. 2, 7.) Vid. *Hist. Animal.* iv. 7. The property itself of separate vitality and reproductive power is a characteristic of the lowest forms of organic nature, and diminishes as we ascend in the scale. Thus, (as Aristotle himself constantly observes,) it is chiefly manifested in plants, in which every slip will propagate its species; it is manifested in the polypus kind most of all the animal kingdom; in worms the sections generate a head and tail, but, as I am informed, with a limit to the number of possible divisions; when we advance further, the separative power ceases, but in the part that retains the centre of vitality the reproductive power is still strong,—thus, the lobster regains its claws. This, too, gradually diminishes: and, from the recovery of an entire limb, the power at length lessens in man to that *vis medicatrix* which heals a wound. . . . In *elementary* animals (as they may be called from their simplicity) this independence of parts is found united with another curious property,—*a facility of exchanging functions* among the different organs. If the polypus be turned inside out, its nutrition is performed with equal effect by its exterior surface.

you remember that the very interpretation of them has been among the bitterest and most protracted controversies in the whole history of philosophy. The chief obscurity of Aristotle's account arises from his having connected it with his own dark, and often, it must be allowed, ambiguous, metaphysical principles; for Aristotle, though always attached to the pursuit of truth by observation, valued the conclusions of observation mainly as they tended to illustrate these ultimate arrangements. Another cause of the obscurity of the Aristotelian definition is its exceeding generality,—a feature which you must always bear in mind in criticizing its merits. Aristotle found the principle of soul wherever there was a moving organization, a perpetual succession of changes under a common form of being, and with an internal principle regulating the change. The definition was, therefore, to be framed so as to meet all the varieties of this organic condition; it was to apply to this internal principle of organic changes wherever discernible; it was to suit vegetable, animal, and rational existence. *Εἴ τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν*,—and *τίς ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς*, is his introduction to his definition. He compares it (ii. 2, 1) to a geometrical definition of figure, common to all and peculiar to none. And, though I am aware that our proud conceptions of our own nature (perfectly just as regards its exclusive and special prerogatives) tolerate with impatience the notion of such an affinity in the inferior elements of our being, there can be no question but that the views of Aristotle as to a progressive claim of organic existence are verified by true scientific observation. Between organic and in organic beings there are plain, palpable, and absolute differences. Springing from a germ and so reproducing its species, nourished by intimate combination of matter according to laws of assimilation, every part contributing to the common purpose of the whole, and, after evincing

a peculiar power of resisting the common laws of matter, decaying and dying after definite periods, the organized portions of the creation are at once and easily recognised. Nor does it appear (though it has been attempted) that any real terms of continuity can be established (as in crystallization) between these separate provinces. But the case is very different when we have once arrived among organized natures. There are, indeed, decided differences between animal and vegetable beings,—the powers, namely, of sensation and voluntary motion which belong to the former; yet we know how difficult it is in the case of (for instance) the zoophyte to determine whether any such distinctive attribute is really possessed. And it may be questioned whether the most perfectly organized brute does not differ more from the zoophyte than the latter from the sensitive plant. Aristotle, then, by what is substantially an admissible generalization, comprehended all organized beings in one vast class as gifted with a ψυχὴ or soul, whose different kinds or faculties (δυνάμεις) distinguished the different species,—each species in the ascending scale *retaining* the faculties that preceded it, and adding on the new ones. It was necessary, then, to construct a definition applicable to all these developments of soul; and such a definition as would also compete with those characters of substantiality and yet indivisibility which Aristotle thought universally recognizable in all its manifestations. Now, there are two ways of declaring the nature of a thing:—one, to reduce it to some *known class;* the other, professing it to be unique and irreducible, to direct the mind to *observe* it, by simply pointing out where and when and how it is found to exist. It was, unquestionably, a misfortune to the Aristotelian philosophy, and one of the great causes of its injurious influence on the progress of knowledge, that it too ambitiously attempted the former of these modes of communicating scientific in-

formation. You must at once perceive how this habit of reducing all things to genera already known must inevitably confine the energies of investigation: the true business of science and its greatest glory is, as far as possible, to establish *new* genera, to discover modifications of being before altogether unsuspected. Afterwards it will, by these vast and simple properties, explain multitudes of phenomena, and thus verify its discovery; but the crown still belongs to him whose sagacity has detected the new genus. It is not too much to say that the whole of the Baconian reform turns upon establishing this simple maxim,—that the logical definition by genus and difference is *not* to be the great primary aim of physical science, but its subsequent and inferior application; and, as a consequence, that the proper work of "syllogism" is also not the establishment, but the application, of the general laws of man and nature. These remarks belong to another part of our subject, and have here been incidentally suggested by the attempt of Aristotle to define the soul, or supersensible principle of organized beings. To that definition and the further details of the subject we shall proceed at our next meeting.

LECTURE II.

THE SAME SUBJECT, (*continued.*)

The object of the Aristotelian investigations, I concluded by observing, is mainly classification, the reduction of beings to previously-known genera. The attempt to perform this office for the soul in Aristotle's universal sense of the word must necessarily lead to unprofitable subtleties, even though, as in many other unprofitable pursuits of mistaken science, valuable observations may be gained on the journey. The principle that maintains life, sensation, and reason, in conjunction with an organized body, and with whose cessation these cease, is *single* in the world; it is plainly different from any thing observable in the inanimate creation; and we may be assured that any attempt to generalize it must terminate in some false, or ambiguous, or nugatory proposition. It is clear that it can be done only by two courses,—either by quickening the inanimate world or by deadening the animate; and, as far as I have penetrated the spirit of Aristotle, it seems to me that he had an evident, though subdued and disguised, tendency to the former,—which, for the rest, is, as you know, not strange to the philosophy of antiquity. Let us now see by what means Aristotle endeavoured to fix the idea of soul among his logical assortments; premising that you will find his definition chiefly intended to apply to the inferior functions of the soul, from which he afterwards separates the supreme agency of intellect so decisively as to lead

some of his interpreters to conceive that he attributed a double soul to man.

Aristotelian distinction of soul from body.

In his strong faith of the value and efficiency of the categories, Aristotle begins with the most abstract of conceptions, in order by regular descent to obtain the due location of soul in that system of human thoughts. The most universal of ideas is *τὸ εἶναι*, bare existence, which comprises all the categories. Among the rest, and holding a position of great importance, it includes the notion of *οὐσία*, or *substance*. Substance is either possible, with a capacity of reality, or it is that which gives reality to mere possibility, or, finally, it is the compound of both.[1] In technical language, it is either matter, (*ὕλη*,) or form, (*μορφή*, *εἶδος*, or *λόγος*,) or the resultant of both in real existence,—the actual natures that surround us in the universe. Now, it is a characteristic of Aristotle's philosophy that his "forms" are essentially active; our word "actual" to express reality is strictly Aristotelian, for forms alone confer reality, and they, as real, are by Aristotle conceived to consist in a state of "energy" ever active yet ever complete. Whether this conception originally arose from regarding the soul as a "form," or from purely metaphysical speculations as to the best mode of accounting rationally for the existence and laws of the universe, it is plain that it aided the construction of Aristotle's definition, and naturally led to it. Matter, then, being *capacity*, (*δύναμις*,) and Form being *act* or *ἐντελέχεια*. Aristotle proceeds to affirm that bodies are plainly substances,[2] and that natural bodies are universally so, as being the ground-

Distinction of δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια:

[1] [*λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἓν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὑλην, (ὃ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἐστι τόδε τι,) ἕτερον δὲ μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, καθ' ἣν ἤδη λέγεται τόδε τι; καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων. De Animâ*, ii. 1–2. ED.]

[2] [*οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικά.* Ib. 93. ED.]

work of all others. When to the natural body is added the possession of *life*, it still remains a substance, and as such cannot be confounded with or affirmed of soul: it is not the attribute of a subject, but itself a subject-matter.[3] Body, then, considered apart, is materially and potentially a natural living substance; and the soul is that which formalizes and exalts to actuality this naturally living substance previously endowed with a mere susceptibility of these attributes. But we have not yet reached the entire definition. In the general notion of activity Aristotle discovers a distinction which is in various forms of very extensive application in his metaphysical philosophy. There is a principle of energy, and a direct exercise of energy; a dormant activity and an operating activity; even as there is a habitual knowledge and an immediate contemplation; or, as he otherwise illustrates it, as there is the state of sleep and the state of waking. This seems to be the previous distinction of power and act transferred to the region of energy: thus, he compares the soul shortly after, in this same respect, to *ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὀργάνου*, *sc.* the organ of sight. Now, in the nature of the case, the former of these—the *source* of energy—is prior to the other; it is the first conceivable state of the activity afterwards manifested. Here the soul becomes "the *first* energy" of the body. Further, the body, both in plants and in animals, is evidently instrumental or "organic;" a term and notion first, as far as I know, fully developed in the writings of Aristotle, and for which the world is still indebted to him. And thus we gain the entire definition, so famous and so contested, which pronounces the soul universally considered to be "the first *entelecheia*" (or

of ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια.

His definition of the soul.

[3] [*οὐκ αν εἴη τὸ σῶμα ψυχή, οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη.* Ib. 94. ED.]

energy) "of a natural organic body, which body itself has life potentially."[4] The soul, he adds, is not separable from the body in so far as it is the "energy" of this body: were the eye an animal, the visive power would be its soul, and, that power being removed, it could no longer, except homonymously, be termed an eye: thus also, passing from part to whole, the soul is the essence of the particular organized body to which it is attached. At the close of the following chapter (ii. 2, 12) he recapitulates his views succinctly. "The soul is *λόγος* and *εἶδος*, not *ὕλη* and *ὑποκείμενον*. And as substance is threefold,—form, matter, and the compound of the two,—of these matter is capacity, form is act; and as that which is made up of both is *ἔμψυχον*, animate, the body is not the act (*ἐντελέχεια*) of the soul, but the soul itself is the act of a certain body. And therefore they rightly judge that neither is the soul without the body, nor is the soul body, but (*σώματος τὶ*) something pertaining to the body. . . . And each soul is in its own proper and peculiar body; for such is the nature of things that the 'entelechy' of each thing is in that particular thing which is *it* potentially, and thus is ever inherent in its own proper matter." All this refers to the inferior nutritive and sensitive soul only; though Aristotle (not according to his usual precision) leaves us to collect this from other passages in the same and subsequent chapters, in which he expressly declares his opinion that the *νοῦς* or theoretic faculty is another genus of soul, and separable, and eternal. I may here observe that it forms no slight difficulty, in determining the sense of Aristotle's psychology, to fix in what degree he meant to include the intellectual faculty (whether passive or active) in his general descriptions of the nature and qualities of soul. He

[4] [*ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἐχοντος.* § 5. ED.]

perpetually meets us with *περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος*, (ii. 3, 10.)

Such, then, is Aristotle's effort to fix the generic character and essence of the soul. He afterwards proceeds, in the spirit of the modern method, to describe it by its properties. and with remarkable sagacity and success for his age of science. But we may pause for a moment on the investigation we have completed.

Remarks.

It is evident that this reduction of the notion of soul to the notions of substance, form, and energy is of little scientific value; that it shares the fate of all attempts to classify that which is absolutely unique. To say that it is *real* substance is merely to affirm that it has more than possible existence; to call it a form is merely to intimate that the body is more than a confused heap of undetermined capacities of being; to name it an energy of the first order is to pronounce that it has that in faculty which subsequently appears in act. The defect, then, of the definition is this,—that it adds nothing to our knowledge of the subject, and gives little or no assistance in mental classification; the merit of it, as compared with its predecessors, is, however, this,—that it also assumes nothing hypothetical. It may also be observed that, Aristotle having once divided universal being into the two classes of potentiality and actuality, of matter and form, he at least allied the vital and conscious principle with the loftiest elements his scheme of existence supplied; and, having established his form, causes, or principles of being, he found in the soul the noblest three,—the formal, the efficient, and the final; for these he blends together as accomplished in the nature of the soul, which is at once the form, the agent, and the ultimate end of the body it animates, (ii. 4, 3.)

Analysis of Chap. II. of

There is a distinction of perpetual recurrence in Aristotle (see *Phys.* i. 1, 2; *Eth. Nicom.* i. 4)

between that which is clearest in the nature of things and that which is clearest to our apprehensions; and this forms the ground of transition from his definition of the nature of the soul in itself to a description of its faculties. The animate is manifestly distinguished from the inanimate by the possession of life, which manifests itself in many various faculties. The lowest is the nutritive, possessed by the vegetable creation in common with all other living things; which world of mere vegetation is accordingly said to "live," every plant having within it this ἀρχὴ and δύναμις of increase in all directions. That this faculty can exist without the rest is plain; but that the others can exist without it is manifestly impossible, at least ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς. The ζῷον rises above the φυτὸν by the attribute of sensation, διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν; not necessarily, observes Aristotle, by that of local motion; for all admit that the animal nature truly belongs to beings altogether unable to change their place, (as the whole tribe of zoophytes and adhesive shellfish.) In the sensitive faculty itself the feeling of *touch* is itself as separable as the nutritive function from the sensitive; being frequently possessed by animals who seem to be endowed with no other sense whatever. And this according to the scheme of progress; for touch, which includes *taste* as one of its species, is the sensitive faculty most necessary for the purposes of the *nutritive*. With sensation, again, is necessarily connected *appetite*, (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν;) since sensation involves the pleasurable and the painful, (see iii. 11, 1,) and these must infer desire and aversion. Beyond these, again, is the motive and the intellectual faculty.* And thus we gain a second and more intelligible definition of the soul,

the second book of the treatise de Animâ.

The gradations of organic being.

Second definition of the soul.

* Each step of advance implies the rest that precede it:—"As," says Arist., "the triangle is implied in the square, so the nutritive in the sensitive faculty." (ii. 3, 9.)

(ii. 9, 12,) as being *that* (τοῦτο) by which we live, and feel, and reason—πρώτως—(that is) as the first principle of these faculties,—always remembering (for this he perpetually impresses) that the soul is not to be considered as the matter or simple subject of these powers, but as a nature essentially active, and which by its innate efficiency, even when dormant, rules, animates, and *realizes* the body. We are said, he observes, (ii. 2, 15, 16,) to be healthy by health itself as a principle, or healthy as to the body as a subject; this principle of health is as an εἶδος, a λόγος, an ἐνέργεια of the body, inherent in it; and it is in this sense of activity, not that other of passivity, that we are to affirm that by the *soul* we live, and feel, and understand. The history of the soul, then, is the history of the principle that pervades organized nature, and rises by regular and distinct gradations from the lowest form of vegetable being to the mind of Aristotle himself. Nutrition and reproduction, sensation by touch, sensation by other senses, desire and aversion, power of local motion, faint powers of memory and conception, intellect recipient and intellect active,—such are the successive regions to be surveyed and characterized by the philosopher of soul.

I need not remind you that this fine outline of physiological inquiry, thus drawn by the masterly hand of Aristotle, and comprehending the whole organized creation, has directed nearly all subsequent investigations, and in some form or other prefaces our treatises to this very day. It is difficult to say in what degree Aristotle was indebted for it to his predecessors: his powerful faculty of reproducing all antecedent learning in new forms doubtless was manifested here; and it is not improbable that Plato has lost much of his due credit by preferring his own graceful way of dialogue (in which systems of this kind can scarcely be clearly stated) to—except in one or two instances—the form of methodical

exposition. But though Aristotle, who, we must remember, was the descendant of a long line of physicians, may have obtained many hints towards his arrangement, the style of the whole performance is marked with characters of independent research scarcely to be mistaken.

The fourth chapter. Characteristics of vegetable life.

To the vegetative principle—the first manifestation of an organic "form"—Aristotle assigns the same two leading characters which are still attributed to it,—those of alimentation of the individual, and reproduction of the species. The latter he ascribes, singularly enough, to a certain mysterious appetency of the immortal and divine, which, unable to realize itself in the perishable individual, tends to the perpetuation of the kind. As the soul is in three respects the *αἰτία* and *ἀρχὴ* of the body,—as its formal principle of being, and the actuality of its mere capacity; as its final cause, nature working ever with an end in view, and the body being to the soul an instrument for its own purposes; as its efficient or moving cause,—so this last cause is manifested not merely in local motion, but also in the other species of motion,—those, for example, of change (*ἀλλοίωσις*) and augmentation or diminution, (*αὔξησις* and *φθίσις*.) The motion of variation is instanced in sensation; the motion of augmentation in the process of nutrition. The remaining discussion of the subject of this inferior soul does not offer much matter of interest. Aristotle censures the idle hypothesis of Empedocles, that the growth of plants downward and upward depended on the principles of earth and fire respectively, and discusses the agency of heat in the business of nutrition, —a notion which seems to have got currency, according to Aristotle, (and these rude conceptions are not without interest as illustrating the progress of physical science,) from the fact that fire alone, of the four supposed elements, appears to be itself capable of assimilation and increase. But, though Aristotle exalts fire to the

dignity of a *συναίτιον*, he still contends for the disposing and moderating power of the soul. The soul or vital principle employs heat to modify aliment; as the pilot uses his own hand to move the rudder of his vessel, (ii. 4, § 16.) Whether alimentation takes place by the operation of contraries on contraries, was another question which these early physiologists attempted to solve by supposed universal maxims; as "the impossibility of like affecting like," &c. Aristotle justly enough distinguishes by the period of the process; which in its early stage will present contraries, and in its final stage similars, as we are accustomed to recognise in our term "assimilation." The philosopher's power of distinction is next exercised upon the respective ideas of augmentation, nutrition, and generation: the animated body possesses the first, as it is a quantity, (*ᾗ ποσόν τι*;) the second, as it is a definite substance, for the conservation of the same substance is the purpose of nutrition; the third, as it is qualified to preserve, not the same, but the *similar*, (*οὐ τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλ' οἷον τὸ τρεφόμενον*, § 13.)

Cause of the imperfection of Aristotle's physiology.

The great cause of imperfection in Aristotle's treatment of these subjects is his unhappy preference of merely logical distinctions to physical observations. The reader perpetually laments that a sagacity so perspicacious and so universal should be wasted through half a treatise, in labouring to reconcile hasty observations of nature to arbitrary maxims previously assumed, and in applying a multiplicity of distinctions which at best can avail for little more than mere propriety of expression. Potential and real, passive and active, are the feeble keys, that, easily fitted into all the *wards* of nature, have yet no strength to stir the bolt. His treatise on the soul, as all his treatises, contains many valuable suggestions and many important facts; but, no matter how interesting the

particular discussion, the chance of a minute metaphysical distinction is ever sufficient to win him from his subject into a labyrinth of obscure and profitless disquisition; and he seems to value facts only as they may grace or illustrate these artificial classifications.

The fifth Chapter. On sensation.

This character is too applicable to the chapter that succeeds the one on which we have been engaged. It treats of *sense* in general, but altogether in reference to those distinctions of which you have already had so much. Aristotle determines that sensation is motion and passion, and, of all the species of motion, variation. Elsewhere he defines actual sensation with great exactness as "a motion or excitation of the soul through the body," and as thus belonging equally to both. (*De Somn.* i. p. 185, B.) The question next arises, why there is no sensation of the sensitive faculties themselves; and this difficulty is solved by establishing that the æsthetic or sensitive is only *potential*, even as the combustible has only a fitness for combustion: the sensitive, therefore, cannot feel until its power be exalted into act. This customary distinction is then elaborately reiterated and its differences multiplied by new dissections. In passive variation there are also two species,—alteration destructive and alteration preservative, the latter of which brings the faculty into act. After insisting on these distinctions, which Aristotle seems to consider of very high importance, though till then, as he tells us, without a definite name, he proceeds to the more obvious differences of the acts of sensation and of general *science*. The objects and active causes of the former are external, are singular, are necessarily present (and only occasionally *can* be present) for the act of sensation; those of the latter are inward, universal, and ever the property of the soul. The *knowledge* of things merely *sensible* is similarly restricted with its objects themselves; and thus the *αἰσθητικὸν* is in power

only until the *αἰσθητὸν* is in act: the active operation of the latter on the former is *αἴσθησις*, in the accomplishment of which the sensitive and the sensible quality become ultimately alike, (ii. 5, § 7.*)

The sixth and seventh Chapters. On the objects of sensation.

Aristotle considers that the *objects* of the senses—their external causes—should first be discussed; the acts and the faculties of sense next in succession. It of course necessarily follows that the obscurity in which the external media of sensation were in that age involved—they, as you know, forming the last and most refined subject of physical inquiry—must affect many of his conclusions with error. Yet hints of native sagacity offer themselves often to the reader, and render these pages still of interest to the historian of physical research.

The proper objects of sense, declares Aristotle, are twofold:—those which are apprehended by a single sense, and those apprehended by more, or all the senses. You will recall this division in the "Essay" of Locke. The subjects of all the senses are, motion, rest, number, figure, magnitude; of which motion is plainly sensible to touch and sight. And all the rest, he elsewhere

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* In the act of sensation, Aristotle urgently maintains a distinct being for the sensible *object*. The ancients, says he, (iii. 1, 16; see also *Metaph.* ix. 3,) have not correctly conceived that nothing is white or black except when *seen*, and that there is no saporific quality without *taste:* this is true as respects *act*, but not as respects *power*. Both the sensitive and the sensible are to be understood, each of them, as existing potentially and actively: in sensation the *act* of both is combined into one, though still essentially different; and in this *active* sense hearing and sound (for instance) arise and expire together; but potentially their existence is mutually independent. And he observes that it is only in some of our senses that language supplies distinct names for the active or energizing state in the *αἰσθητικὸν* and the *αἰσθητὸν*: thus, while we have in one case sound and hearing, we have no term answering to "vision" for the active or operative state of colour, as exciting it.

observes, are perceivable by *motion*, (iii. 1, § 5;) "as magnitude by motion; as well as figure, for figure is a mode of magnitude; so also rest, as the absence of motion; number by the negation of continuity, (*τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς*;) unity by every sense. And thus there is no special sense of each of these:—for it will be as we now apprehend the sweet by sight,—because we have a sense of both, in which when they *coincide* (*ὅταν συμπέσωσι*) we know accordingly." See also ibid. 4. To these two classes of sensible objects is to be added a sort of sensation *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, as when we are said to *see* the son of Cleon, when that he is "the son of Cleon" is really an inference from the direct object of sense. The senses are not deceived, but conclusions inferred from sensible appearances. The cases of deceit he states, (iii. c. 3.[5]) The perception of each object of proper sense is scarcely at all false, (*ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος*;) the inference as to the subject of the sensible quality may be false; judgments as to the common qualities, such as motion and magnitude, still more so. This observation might lead us to expect a close analysis of the ideas ordinarily attributed to mere sense; by which the modern inquirers might have been anticipated in that detection of associated judgments which has made one of their chief titles to glory; but Aristotle pursues it little further.

I do not purpose to present you with any detailed account of Aristotle's views as to the objects or media of the various senses. They belong less to the history of general speculation than to that of natural philosophy. A very brief notice may, however, be not uninteresting, as illustrating the slight advance the most sagacious

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[5] [This curious chapter would seem to have been suggested by the discussions on the conditions of false opinion in the *Theætetus* and *Sophista*. § 9 is an evident critique of p. 264 of the latter dialogue. ED.]

mind can make in such a field without patient experimental investigation.

On the object of vision, ii. c. 7.

With regard, for instance, to the object of *sight*, the question turns in Aristotle upon the conception of three principal subjects,—colour, transparency, and light. Colour is the direct object of vision; it affects that which is actually transparent, and by means of this actually transparent medium becomes visible; it is *κινητικὸν τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς*. The transparent medium, then, must possess some activity of transparency, some diaphanous virtue, to effect this; and it must be when deprived of this activity that colours become invisible. Now, this actuality of the transparent medium, which makes it indeed transparent, is light; which is hence described by the definition so often—and not altogether unjustly—subjected to modern ridicule, as "the act of the diaphanous considered so far forth as diaphanous." (§ 2.) Sound is the sonorous body in act, light is the pellucid body in act; and the latter reveals *colours*, as the former reveals the varieties of acuteness and gravity, (ii. 8, § 8.) They differ, however, in this,—that sound is *motion* and light is not, (*De Sens.* vi. p. 675, B.) Light, according to Aristotle, is not itself a body, nor the efflux of a body; for then it should occupy the very same place with the diaphanous medium, —which is contradictory: it is, "as it were, the colour of the diaphanous medium, when it *is actually* diaphanous by fire or the like."

On Sound and Hearing, c. 8.

He proceeds to treat of sound and hearing in the same style; maintaining for both, as for all the senses, the absolute necessity of a *medium*. He observes that there is a reflection of both sound and light, and considers both to be the perpetual conditions of hearing and seeing; plainly enough accounts for sound by impulses of the air continued to the organ, (ii. 8, § 3, &c.,) and *seems* to have had some conception

of slow and rapid vibrations as causes of differences of pitch, (ib. § 8;) though this (affirmed by Dr. Gillies, p. 50) is very doubtful in my judgment. Aristotle attempts to explain the fact of hearing by the supposition of a *συμφυὴς ἀὴρ* in the meatus of the ear,—a notion which seems to have originated in a principle countenanced elsewhere by Aristotle, and stated by Plato in the *Timæus*,—that there is an internal relation between each "element" and the constitution of each organ, and the cause of the possession and privation of voice,—observations which, as all Aristotle's physiological remarks, display wonderful vigilance and variety of observation, with an equally singular confidence in precipitate and superficial explanations.

On the senses of Smell, Taste and Touch. c. 9–c. 11.

Of smell Aristotle observes that it is our most defective sense, that air and water are its appropriate media, and that its objects are usually dry, as those of taste are eminently moist. This latter sense he considers a species of *touch*, and in truth only one of its numerous varieties. Nor is either taste or touch absolutely without a medium; though the objects of these senses differ from the rest in affecting at once the medium and the sense. It is, says Aristotle, as the soldier receives at once the pressure of the shield and the stroke that smites it. The real organ of both these senses is, he considers, beneath the outer surface,—a faint conjecture not unlike the real truth. The objects of touch he pronounces to be the differences of body *as* body, (*διαφοραὶ σώματος ᾗ σῶμα*;) in other words, the "primary qualities" of Locke. The organ holds a kind of mediate position between the extremes of its objects; and it is the excesses or deficiencies above or below this mediate intensity which it detects.

The twelfth Chapter. On sense in general, its recipi-

Aristotle closes this book of his treatise by stating of the senses in general, that they are all "recipient of sensible forms without the

ency of forms without the matter.

matter;" an assertion not absurd if understood in the author's sense of matter and form, and not in the gross way of atomic effluxions; an assertion the substance of which is, perhaps, involved in all our ordinary admissions, that the material ground of sensible qualities is not itself directly apprehended by sense. He illustrates it by the well-known comparison of the impression of the signet on the wax:—"the wax receives the brazen or golden seal, but not *quatenus* it is brass or gold; and the sense of each object is affected by that which has colour, or taste, or sound, yet not as each of its objects substantially and materially exists, but as it is *such*, and according to its *formal essence*.[6] And thus though the sensorium and the object agree, yet they differ also: the sentient organ may be a definite magnitude,[7] but the sensitive faculty is no magnitude, but a proportion and power answerable to it. This proportion must be duly maintained between the sense and its object; and hence excessive impulses destroy the organs. And the reason why plants are without the sensitive power is just this: that they are naturally without this proportioned recipient to detach the forms of the sensible objects, and are thus affected by the whole complex material mass, when they are affected at all. And in all similar cases inanimate bodies are not affected by light or darkness or sound or smell as sensible forms, but by the bodies in which these sensible forms are con-

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[6] [*ἢ τοιονδὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.* § 1, *i.e.* in virtue of its qualities, and formal description. ED.]

[7] [The vulgar reading (retained by Bekker and Trendelenburg) of this passage is, *μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οὐ μὴν τό γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι.* Read with Simplicius, *τῷ γε αἰσθ. εἶναι.* "The organ which perceives may be a definite corporeal magnitude, but not as it is sentient:" *i.e.* its perceptive power is no function of its material bulk, nor *vice versâ:* it is an immaterial power, not a certain quantity of matter. ED.]

veyed: it is not the sound but the concussion of the air that cleaves the tree in a thunder-storm." (§ 5.) Elsewhere expressions occur more emphatic as to the transference of these sensible qualities; yet they are still essentially distinct from any effluxion of matter. As (iii. 2, § 3) "That which sees is *in a manner coloured*, (ἐστὶν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται;) for each sensorium (αἰσθητήριόν) is receptive of the sensible quality without the matter; and hence when the sensibles themselves are absent, sensations and φαντασίαι remain in the sensoria." Such are nearly the expressions of Aristotle on this important question of the communication of the senses with the external world. You will observe that the sensible forms of which he speaks are essentially immaterial, and certainly, whatever may be thought of the value of the theory in any shape, are very different from the coarse caricatures which are presented of his doctrine in many modern publications. The "forms" of Aristotle may be illustrated by comparing them with the "forms" of Kant, the modern metaphysician who in every respect most nearly resembles him. Aristotle—impressed, as all must be, with the *mental* character of the qualities of the external world—separated them from their material substratum, at least in conception,—κατὰ λόγον,—and held that from their posts in the external world they, and they exclusively of their "matter," held connection with the mind, becoming in a manner one with the mind that apprehended them. And if matter be real, and the qualities of matter real, this statement cannot be thought extravagant: it *is* true that matter is directly perceived by no sense, and that the qualities or "forms" of matter are the subjects and furniture of the sentient soul; it is these that detach themselves from their material basis and alone affect the sensitive principle. The view of Kant is simpler; but it recognises, at least as regards the

The "forms" of Aristotle compared with those of Kant.

principal of these qualities, the same general problem, and attempts its solution in a way not dissimilar. He thought it preferable to regard the chief of these same forms as completely the issue of the mind itself, which according to its own laws invests external objects with them: they do not come to us, but we create them. His theory of forms was indeed more limited in its application to the objects of sense than that of Aristotle,—being confined to the ideas of time and space; and it was also confirmed by researches into the distinction of the evidence of experience and demonstration, of which Aristotle appears little cognizant; but the separation of form and matter belongs to both, and is as justifiable in the one as in the other.

Aristot. de Animâ. *The third Book.*

Aristotle proceeds to show that there exist no senses beyond those he has enumerated. The arguments employed are scarcely worth delaying your attention,—turning chiefly on the ancient notions concerning the four elements. He remarks a principal advantage in the possession of a variety of senses; that thereby we are enabled to distinguish the primary qualities of number, magnitude, motion, &c. from the secondary with which they are associated; were every thing white we should not distinguish colour and extension.[8] This is one of those pregnant observations that make us regret that Aristotle should suddenly desert the most promising investigations, after (as we should imagine) getting so admirably within view of them. He also raises the question of a consciousness distinct from the mere sensation, which you will perhaps remember has been largely discussed by a late writer.[9] "Since," says our author,[10] "we perceive that we see and hear, it

[8] [B. iii. c. 1, § 8, Trendelenb. ED.]

[9] [Dr. Thomas Brown, Lecture IX. on Consciousness. ED.]

[10] [B. iii. c. 2, § 1. ED.]

is necessary that we be conscious of our seeing either by sight or by some other faculty. The sense must be conscious of itself, or there will be two sensations of the same object. Moreover, if there be this further sense of the sensation, either the process must go on to infinity, or some sensation must be conscious of itself: this, then, may as well take place at the first stage. On the other hand arises the difficulty that, as the proper object of sight is colour, if the sight perceive itself, that self must be *coloured.*" To this he replies by a distinction, and by observing that there is a certain quality of colour even in the organ, (as before cited,)—as often, stating the question better than he solves it.

Aristotle's theory of a "common sense."

The second chapter of the third book of the treatise *de Animâ* introduces us (§ 10) to a tenet which has been considered a peculiar glory of the psychology of Aristotle,—his doctrine of the common sense, to which all sensible apprehensions are supposed to be referred. Many expositors seem to consider this doctrine, as in Aristotle's view of it, a conclusive proof of the unity and immateriality of the soul; it may, however, be much doubted whether this inference does not exaggerate and distort his real meaning. The "common sense" of Aristotle appears to be still a "sense," and generically nothing more, though invested with more extensive prerogatives than any single sensitive faculty. His argument for its necessary existence is nearly this. The differences of things sensible must be apprehended by sense. Yet this detector of differences cannot be any peculiar or special sense among the five external ones; for each can but perceive its own object, and none can compare with the rest:—*οὔτε κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν.* It can no more be effected by distinct *senses* than by distinct *persons.* There must then be some single faculty of sensation, the common judge of all. Nor, again, can the objects be presented to the

sense in different *times* any more than by different organs, if a single indivisible judgment is to be pronounced: the two objects must be included in the one instantaneous judgment. Hence, there must exist some common centre of sensation, in which all the sensations of all the senses are received and compared. This sense must indeed include contraries, and is thus in one sense indivisible, in another capable of division. It is strange that the necessity of admitting this fact should not have suggested to Aristotle that he had no right to assimilate this faculty, as a discerning-faculty, in any manner to the functions of sensation. This seems to be little raised above the confusion of Condillac and the other French expositors of Locke.* Aristotle seems to assign other senses likewise to this centre of sensation. It is it which becomes singly conscious of the separate organic affections: it is it (he sometimes seems to say) which becomes cognizant of those notions which are derived from many senses,—as motion, figure, and the rest; it is it also, he tells us, which is mainly affected in the state of sleep; the sense of *touch*, as the universal one, he appears to associate intimately with it, and argues from hence that the true seat of this sense cannot be merely external. The *sensus communis*, then, is what we should in this day call the nervous centre; Aristotle's inaccurate anatomy refers it to the *heart.*[11]

However difficult it be to conceive that the perception of a relation of difference should by Aristotle be ascribed

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* However, it *may* be that Aristotle merely meant to make it the general receptacle of sensations, and to attribute the discerning-power to the intellect. See iii. 5, 10. [This can hardly have been Aristotle's meaning. Compare the treatise *De Somno*, c. 2. *De Sensu*, c. 7, 8. *De Juventute*, c. 1. *τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητηρίων ἓν τι κοινόν ἐστιν αἰσθητήριον, εἰς ὃ τὰς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεις ἀναγκαῖον ἁπαντᾶν.* ED.]

[11] [*De Juv.* c. 3. *ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ τῆς θρεπτικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῖς ἐναίμοις.* ED.]

to sense, (whether special or general sense,) the difficulty is scarcely alleviated by his subsequent affirmation of the essential distinction between intellection and sensation. This (whether reconcilable or not with the former) he strongly asserts. Many, he observes, among living things possess the one, comparatively few the other; sense is never false in its report of its proper objects, reasoning often erroneous. Fancy again (*φαντασία*) is also very different from mere sensation; a truth with the obvious grounds of which it is needless to trouble you. From all the faculties that tell us of true or false the *φαντασία* is plainly separated; as Aristotle, repeating some of his previous reasonings, establishes through all the spheres of sense, opinion, intellect, and science, with a minute exactness which we could gladly exchange upon this evident argument for greater clearness where it was more required.* These gradations conduct us to the last division of the Aristotelian psychology,—the intellect active, passive, speculative, and practical.

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* Of *memory*, Aristotle tells us that it is founded on the *φαντασία* or conceptive [imaginative? Ed.] power, even in the remembrance of things "intelligible." He observes that recollection is guided by associative laws, in a passage which has often been quoted since modern investigations have given a peculiar interest to the topic, and, distinguishing it from *ἀνάμνησις* or voluntary reminiscence, makes the possession of this latter faculty a prominent distinction between the human and the inferior animal creation. The book *περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως* is not unworthy an attentive perusal. [The second chapter of this treatise is especially interesting, as it contains (§§ 7, 8) the only attempt at a theory of association to be found in any Greek philosopher. The student should compare Coleridge's remarks on this subject in the *Biographia Literaria* with those of Sir J. Mackintosh in his *Dissertations on Moral Philosophy*. Ed.]

LECTURE III.

THE SAME SUBJECT, (*continued.*)

GENTLEMEN:—

The intellectual faculty according to Aristotle.

WE proceed to the consideration of Aristotle's view of the intellectual faculty,—a subject of great intricacy and obscurity, from the unhappy conciseness of the author's style. For this conciseness, which is a beauty where the subject is, and properly admits of being, expounded with the exquisite exactness and regular consecution of mathematical method, becomes a most harassing tax upon attention, and a most invincible obstacle to perfect intelligibility, where the subject is new to the reader, is to be explored by observation of facts, and is liable to be viewed in a great variety of aspects. Still more is the difficulty increased when to this conciseness of each sentence is added a most perplexing collocation of the sentences themselves; uncertain queries, positive assertions, doubts, and decisions, following each other without any discernible ground of connection, and resembling less the finished treatise of a great writer than the loose hints and incomplete speculations of his note-book. However admirable the *method* of Aristotle appears in some of his writings, (the Nicomachean Ethics, for example,) and would perhaps appear in all of them if we possessed them in their original state unmutilated by the chances and changes of centuries, it is certain that some of his chapters as they now stand present the most puzzling combination of brevity and prolixity—brevity in every

clause, prolixity in their number and reiteration—to be found in the compass of philosophical literature.

The Intellect distinguished into Passive and Active. De Animâ, *b. iii. c. 5.*

The human intellect, it is well known, is divided by Aristotle into two chief departments, —the intellect passive and the intellect active; or, as they might perhaps be more truly termed in relation to his metaphysical views, the intellect potential and actual: for it is on this universal and characteristic distinction that the psychology of Aristotle, as every other portion of his philosophy, mainly turns. "Since," he declares, (iii. 5, 1,) "in all nature there is a something which is the matter to each kind, and is all things in capacity, and another something which is the cause and efficient (*αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικὸν*) in the actual effecting of all things, (just as art is related to its material,) it is necessary that in the soul also these differences should subsist. The intellect is one thing because it *becomes all things*, another thing considered as it *produces* all things,—as a certain 'habit,' even as light; for this latter intellect is as light, which actualizes those colours which without it were only potentially colours. And *this* intellect is separable, unmixed, impassive, its very essence being activity;[1] for the efficient ever ranks above the patient, and the principle (*ἀρχὴ*) above its matter, (*ὕλη.*)" The active and patient intellect[2] of Aristotle, then, are manifestly *that* in the world of mind which the efficient cause of form and matter are in the external world. The active intellect impresses forms upon the patient, exactly as the efficient cause in the universe combines them with the recipient matter; and thus the same process is acted over in the mind of man as in the

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[1] [So Simplicius understands the passage, reading *τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνέργεια.* Vulg. *ἐνεργείᾳ.* Ed.]

[2] [*Νοῦς ποιητικὸς, νοῦς παθητικός.* The latter *γίνεται πάντα*, the former *ποιεῖ πάντα.* See Trendelenburg's Commentary, p. 493, fol. Ed.]

world it contemplates. Aristotle (as you must now remember) perpetually illustrates his doctrine of power and act by the various states of knowledge. A man may be conceived wholly without knowledge, yet with a capacity of it; with knowledge habitual, yet not in direct exercise; and with knowledge in actual exercise of contemplation. These states exemplify the patient intellect in its original apathy, in its habitual condition, and in its formalized activity as inspired by the higher energy of the active. Aristotle gives no proof from immediate experience of consciousness—or next to none—of this duplicity of the human intellect; from the nature of the case it could indeed admit of none, for the patient intellect can as little be the object of knowledge as the *materia prima;* his statement altogether rests upon what he considers the self-evident universality of the principle. The same considerations that establish it in the outer establish it in the inner world. Another analogy which confirms it, and which forms a kind of transition from the material to the mental, is the process of sensation, (*αἴσθησις,*) in which we have already seen that the two elements are carefully distinguished,—the activity of the sensible object and the passivity of the organ of sense, which excited by the former accomplishes the reality of sensation. It may indeed be asked why the *νοητὰ* or "intelligibles" might not themselves, according to the spirit of Aristotle's teaching, possess enough of this "energetic" quality to be independent of the *νοῦς ποιητικός*? It seems to me that Aristotle was on this point impressed partly by the *felt* activity of the intellect in the work of thought; partly pleased by the opportunity which the doctrine gave him of identifying (in the universal spirit of antiquity) the "agent intellect" in the mind with the prime efficient cause in the universe, by thus making it energize the intelligible, as that does the sensible, objects of the soul.

The intellect recipient of forms.

Aristotle accordingly treats of the patient and agent aspects of the soul together.[3] The intellect in general must be considered as impassive, (*ἀπαθὲς*,) but as recipient of forms, (*δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἴδους*,) and as being such potentially as it becomes in act. As the sensitive faculty to sensible objects, so the intelligible to intelligible objects. There is here, however, (c. 4, § 3,) some variety of reading. It must be *ἀμιγῆς*,—unmixed,—as otherwise it could not rise superior in its comprehending-power to all things, but be confined by its peculiar composition; it must be specially unmingled with the body, as if it were corporeal in its constitution it should undergo bodily modifications,—as heat and cold,—and should possess some definite instrument as the sense does, which Aristotle denies it. The *ἀπάθεια* of the sensitive and intelligent is also remarkably different in this:—that a powerful impression fatigues or destroys the sense, while the most perfect object of intellection only strengthens and extends the intellective power,—the sensitive being bodily, but the intellect distinct from body. This noetic faculty receives and is conversant with forms of being abstracted from their particular material subjects. He therefore, in accordance with the view I have given you, pronounces the intellect, in its passive or *potential* aspect, to be the *τόπος εἰδῶν*, or place of forms, as it had been styled by the Platonists;[4] the region in which alone they could dwell in a state separate

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[3] [De An. iii. c. 4, ed. Trendelenb. Ed.]

[4] [The original runs thus:—*Καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὐτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἡ νοητική, οὐτε ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη*, c. 4, § 4; *i.e.* the Platonists would be right in affirming that "the soul is the region of forms or ideas," if they would limit the assertion to the intellective (noetic) soul; for it is *there* only that ideas exist, and even there not actually, but potentially. The intellect must produce (or, as we say, develop) them by its own energy. The passage, it will be seen, is more in the spirit of Kant than appears from Mr. Butler's translation,

from matter; an expression which (as I before hinted) is literally suitable to the most celebrated philosophical system of our day. The intellect, however, seems assigned by Aristotle a complete supremacy over all the functions of the soul, and as extracting its tribute of knowledge from each; it knows the sensible by sense, the intelligible by its own inherent power. Aristotle enters into a very abstruse disquisition to determine in what sense the intellect is to *itself* νοητός. In things "actually" intelligible, the intellect and its object become one,—a result which we before saw admitted in the case of sensation. In this way, then, the intellect becomes itself its own object, as being itself intelligible ἐνεργείᾳ. On the other hand, things potentially intelligible, and still immersed in matter, are *not* thus blended with the intellect that apprehends them. How this doctrine of the unity of the intellect and intelligible is Platonic, I need not remind you.

All this is mainly spoken of the receptive intellect, of which Aristotle in this place tells us, in words which have been so often quoted and commented, that "the intellect is potentially intelligibles, but actually none of them until it intelligize; as a *page* on which nothing has yet been actually written," (iii. 4, 11.) Of the agent intellect Aristotle adds to what I have already cited, that it incessantly is *in act*, our forgetfulness arising from the

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from which the reader should omit the words "in its passive or potential aspect," the Greek words which correspond referring to the εἴδη, not to the mind.

It may be observed that great obscurity hangs over the Aristotelian distinction (found, I believe, only in the De Animâ) of "the passive and productive νοῦς," an obscurity which Aristotle himself nowhere clears up. Trendelenburg has attempted an explanation, (in his Commentary on the De Anim. iii. c. 5, § 2,) which, however, is far from satisfactory. The difficulty is clearly stated by Zeller in his *Philosophy of the Greeks*, vol. ii. pp. 489–492. ED.]

deficiency and corruptibility of the *νοῦς παθητικός*; that it alone is separable, immortal, and eternal.[5]

The objects of Intelligence.

The objects of intelligence are simple ideas, as moderns call them, (*τὰ ἀδιαίρετα*, "indivisibles,") and propositions; of the latter of which truth and falsehood are the attributes, the office of intellect being to combine them into the unity of a single judgment.[6] The indivisibility of the act and object of intelligence in its simple apprehensions is closely pursued by Aristotle. There is that which is actually undivided, and that which is impossible to be divided. Things actually undivided are quantitative or formal. The latter—as, for example, the essence of any kind of animal—are apprehended by a single instantaneous act of the mind. The former are of different sorts; as we consider the whole,—or the parts,—or the parts as one with the whole; and the act of mind will be single or manifold accordingly. The other class—things which have no continuity,—an instant, a point—are apprehended only by their opposites: we know them as the privation of the contrary quality.

The intellect cannot act without the senses and imagination.

This whole work of intelligence depends, according to Aristotle, on sensible conceptions, (*οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχὴ . . . τῇ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει . . . τὰ εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ*;[7]) and ultimately on sensible perceptions, of which phantasms are the images *πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης*. So that, as he adds, he who has no sensible perceptions can neither learn nor understand any thing; and the business of contemplation, the theoretic function, cannot be carried on

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[5] [*Οὗτος ὁ νοῦς . . . οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. Χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀίδιον*, c. 5, § 2. ED.]

[6] [C. 6, ad fin. ED.]

[7] [C. 7, §§ 3, 5. Compare the Treatise on Memory, c. 1, p. 449, Bekk. ED.]

without these *φαντάσματα*.[8] Yet he could not but perceive that there appear laws and principles in our minds not obviously reducible to this standard; and he therefore subjoins the question as to these *πρῶτα νοήματα* which closes his eighth chapter, (b. iii.,) and in which, separating them from phantasms, he still seems to affirm that they cannot be entertained *without* them.

These *φαντάσματα*, which here may be called "associated conceptions," are peculiarly important in the practical operation of the intellect, to which a separate chapter is devoted. The intellect is moved by these in the same way as sense by sensible objects; it decides them to be, not merely as the theoretic reason, true or false, but good or evil, and according to its verdict urges the will to desire or aversion. The theoretic reason terminates in knowledge; the practical, in an end or object of pursuit, (*τῷ τέλει*,) c. 10, § 2.

Ultimate unity of the intellect with its objects.

The entire account of the perceptive and intellective faculties of the soul is closed by the remarkable proposition (before occasionally suggested and inferred) that "the soul is in a manner all things; for things are sensible or intelligible, —*αἰσθητὰ* and *νοητά*; and science is in some sense its own objects, sensation its own sensibles."[9] If, then, the *αἰσθητικόν* be thus the *αἰσθητόν*, and the *ἐπιστημονικόν* the *ἐπιστητόν*, we must at the same time perceive that this mysterious identification cannot be with the entire material things themselves; it must then be with their *εἴδη* or forms. "Wherefore the soul is as the hand; for the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the intellect is the form of forms, the sense the form of sensibles." The soul, itself the form of the organized frame, becomes one with the forms of all nature, receives and employs and produces them; even as the chief instrument

[8] [C. 8, § 3. ED.]

[9] [C. 8, § 1. ED.]

of that organized frame constructs, and wields, and combines itself with, all other exterior organisms.

Aristotle's view of the motive faculty of the soul.

The remaining subject is the *motive* faculty of the soul,—the faculty that impels the animal to local motion. On this topic Aristotle presents us with two very interesting chapters, in which, as always in questions that border on ethical speculation, he becomes remarkably plain and perspicuous.

De An. iii. c. 9 and 10.

The motion of "augmentation" and "consumption" obviously is but a development of the nutritive faculty. The motions of respiration and other internal physical processes are postponed to subsequent distinct treatises. The power of *changing the place of its limbs* is the immediate subject of the present discussion. To what faculty, then, does this belong? Not to the merely "nutritive;" for this power of local motion is always ἕνεκά του, with an end in view, and dependent on imagination or desire, being merely compulsory when not originating in the effort to obtain or avoid. It is also not possessed by *plants*, which yet possess this nutritive function. Nor, again, does it belong to the "sensitive" faculty, as is obvious in numbers of stationary animals capable of sensation, and in which we cannot suppose that nature, οὐδὲν ποιοῦσα μάτην, can have failed to supply all the requisite organs, if she has indeed supplied the power and impulse of motion. Nor can we ascribe the principle of motion to the "intellectual" power *merely as such;* which pronounces nothing directly about avoidance or pursuit, and has no direct reference to action, (πρᾶξις;) which, also, is often wilfully disobeyed. "We see," says Aristotle, "that he who carries with him the medical art is not healed;[10] so that action according to knowledge

[10] [C. 9, § 8. Οὐκ ἰᾶται, "does not exercise his art," being withheld, says Simplicius, by some opposing passion, which interferes with

plainly depends on something else than knowledge." Nor does mere "*desire*" (ὄρεξις) absolutely and necessarily govern motion; for we see that those who have the habit of temperance act deliberately against the solicitations of appetite, and follow reason.

Of the practical intelligence.

A further prosecution of the analysis thus auspiciously begun would have led Aristotle into a clear perception of the peculiarity of the pure spontaneity of the voluntary effort as distinct equally from appetite and from deliberation. His object in this place seems, however, to have been different; at least, he appears content with a lower aim. He therefore pronounces that the sources of the motions of animated beings are two, *intellect practical*—that is, intellect which reasons with an immediate view to action—and *desire*:[11] *imagination* being often (and to some animals always) the substitute for the former, and, even in the very agency of reason, interposing immediately before the operation of desire. He elsewhere, treating the same question, names other operations or faculties concerned in the work, and reduces them similarly, (*De Animal. Mot.* vi.) Both these faculties work in view of an end, (τέλος, ἕνεκά τινος.) But desire is plainly the ultimate ground of action; for the practic intellect itself and imagination tend to action only as they are animated by desire; while desire can urge to action independent of *them*. The desirable, which is either real or attainable good, when its possession is regarded as dependent on our agency, is then the object of action. This desirable (τὸ ὀρεκτὸν) is manifested in many ways, according to the faculties of the soul; thus in beings that have the χρόνου αἴσθησιν—the sense of time—contrary desires contend, pressing the

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the natural impulse of the professional man to work in his calling. Ed.]

[11] [ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική. C. 10, § 2. Ed.]

claims of the future, and mere appetite those of the present; still, however various the motives, the desirable as desirable is the prime source of action. Now, according to Aristotle's great principle, the ultimate mover must be itself unmoved; all change must originate from something itself unchangeable; nor should philosophy ever rest until it has traced up, through all the departments of scientific observation, every series of successions to its final stationary principle. In the present case, then,—animal activity,—this last immovable mover is *τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν*, (practicable good;) and as secondary to this, the appetitive faculty, which both moves the living being and is moved in the very act of appetition; that which is moved by this faculty is (as has been said) the animate being; and that organ by which the motion is effected is in Aristotle's physiology the heart, finally,—and in each limb its point of flexure.[12] And even in those animals which seem to possess no sense beyond that of touch, desire must exist, since pleasure and pain exist; and a sensitive though not a deliberative (*αἰσθητικὴ* though not *βουλευτικὴ*) fancy, which urges them by the mere force of the preponderating suggestion.

Treatise περὶ ζώων κινήσεως.

The subject of these chapters (*de An.* iii. 9, 10) is further and more largely treated in the curious and interesting dissertation on the Motion of Animals, which appears, from a citation of the present treatise (vi. apud init.) to have been written subsequently to it. It is every way worthy of perusal; but it would be premature to enlarge in this place further on a subject which, in Aristotle's comprehensive mode of treating it, belongs chiefly to ethical inquiry. The operation of appetite is reduced under the syllogistic formularies, (ch. vii.;) it becomes the general principle in an argument. *Ποτέον μοι*, declares desire; this is a potable

[12] [De Animâ, § 8. Ed.]

liquid, declares sense, or imagination, or judgment; the *act* is the conclusion. But, as he remarks, appetite is so very prone to reason in the rapid way of enthymeme, that it is only by very minute observation we can discover it to syllogize at all.

Aristotle De Animâ, iii. chapters 12, 13.

This celebrated treatise on the Soul is closed by some general observations on the utility and mutual relations of the different functions,—some of which are necessary that the animal exist, others that it exist well and happily,—and on the complex composition of the body which the soul animates. The necessity of the functions of nutrition is obvious in a being formed for growth, vigour, and decay. Sensation is impossible, as Aristotle thinks, in perfectly simple bodies, and needless when there is no faculty capacitated to receive immaterial "forms;" it is thus not found in the vegetable creation. But in animals it is plainly indispensable for alimentation, as well as the power of local motion in all whose proper aliment is not supplied by nature in their stationary abodes. And those endowed with intellect will also find in the power of sense a principle requisite both for soul and body. Of the senses, touch and taste (a species of touch) are universally needed for conservation. The others, which are affected by media, belong to the more perfect stages of animality; but touch is essentially connected with very vitality; and hence, argues Aristotle, while excesses of other sensible impressions are borne without loss of life, that which injures or destroys this universal and primary sense injures or destroys life itself.

What were the opinions of Aristotle on the Immortality of the Soul?

The real opinions of Aristotle as to the immortality of the human soul have in all ages been a subject of discussion. I do not hesitate to pronounce that to me the evidence in favour of his having really held this sublime and consoling doctrine is far from satisfactory. It is impossible

that, if he held it, the very importance of the question, and the natural earnestness which such a conviction would bring with it,—as well as its certainty of a strong sympathetic support in the hearts of all his auditors,—should not have led to statements more decisive and unequivocal than any which the most scrupulous research can detect in his extant writings. It is not sufficient to satisfy the demands of human anxiety on this subject, that an eternity should be pronounced essential to an active intellectual principle, which itself seems described as unable to exercise any *conscious* energies apart from the bodily structure,—a quickening essence whose very existence retreats into nothingness when it is left nothing that it can quicken. The spirit of Aristotle's physiology unquestionably is materiality; and in exalting the "active intellect" above the human bodily structure he seems to have exalted it above humanity itself. It is quite evident that Aristotle was (and naturally) perplexed to conceive *the kind of existence* that could belong to a *separate reason*, and has altogether evaded the consideration of it. Here a striking difference is manifest between him and Plato. Plato, perpetually regarding the intellectual principles of the universe as separate from their sensible manifestations and prior to them from all eternity, could easily imagine a state of being in which these alone might be the direct objects of the emancipated rational faculty: it was but to replace that faculty in its original state and relations to its proper objects. Reason and its objects had dwelt together from all eternity: they were both immersed in body for a brief temporary period; but it was only that they might again meet and embrace in the same eternal world to which they both inherently belonged. All this was perfectly consistent; whether true or false, it was at least beautifully harmonious. But the theory of Aristotle which, proclaiming the eternity of the world itself, conceived the forms which the reason con-

templates as naturally inseparable from matter, evidently laboured under a peculiar difficulty when it attempted to represent the reason as detached from a bodily organization, and still contemplating these objects. For though even in this state of existence he held that the mind did habitually separate the "forms" or mental element from material things, yet this he always represented as achieved only by a series of processes in which the sensuous organization and the imagination performed a necessary part. How the reason, left to itself, was to converse with its own peculiar objects, he nowhere attempts to show; and hence the sort of existence which he allows the active intellect after death fades into a state of mere being,—a state with which our present consciousness can scarcely find any thing in any degree common.

And thus, though the portion of our human nature to which Plato positively and frequently, and Aristotle occasionally and hesitatingly, allows immortality, be really the same,—namely, the rational,—yet in their historic results Plato has been the perpetual patron of the doctrine of human immortality, and Aristotle almost as constantly has been cited as unfriendly to this great tenet. In almost every age, it is unquestionable, the majority of his followers have spoken doubtingly of the doctrine,—unless where the Aristotelic views have been forced to harmonize (however rudely) with the principles of a different system. The ancient fathers assuredly regarded Aristotle as specially perilous on this account, (Euseb. *Præpar. Evang.* xv. 9;) and the ablest of his own commentators, in proportion as they have escaped foreign influences, have verged to the doctrine of utter and absolute materialism. Alexander Aphrodisiensis (perhaps the best of his earlier expositors) does not hesitate to maintain the doctrine on the part of his master; and it is well known with what eagerness and constancy the

Arabian Averroes endeavoured to uphold it. I do not speak of the professed assailants of Aristotle, (Bessarion, &c.,) who of course made his views on this question a capital article in their pleadings; but there is no mistaking the tendency of his avowed disciples, or the force of their admissions,—of such teachers as Pomponatius, and his contemporaries. I conceive it to be the safest verdict upon this long-disputed point, to conclude that Aristotle held, indeed, the imperishable nature of the supreme rational principle in man, but that he held it in such a sense as was altogether foreign to human and earthly interests,—in a sense which leaves the surviving principle scarcely any link of connection with the present form of being, or with any conscious nature of any kind. Nor, it must be conceded, has any thing, ever since his day, been done to make an utter and absolutely embodied condition of soul combined with real consciousness in any degree more easily conceivable. As far as *our* interests are concerned, the Christian revelation, by asserting the resurrection of a bodily structure, has provided for the most important section of future existence; and for the intermediate state, the hypothesis is always possible for those who find an insurmountable difficulty in the notion of a purely embodied soul, of a very refined material organism which (like many other material agents) may be imperceptible to any of our present organs of sense.

It is, indeed, scarcely possible to express the service which has been done to human knowledge by the revelation of this momentous truth,—the recovery of the bodily organization, for the purposes of a future state. It at once supersedes all those discussions of painful difficulty that regard the possibility of embodied existence in a world of space,—discussions in which every step only betrays the confined limits of our real knowledge, and whose uncertainty may best be judged from

the fact that nearly all the ancient upholders of the eternity of the pure reason of man have, like Plato,—their chief guide,—been forced to introduce it after death into a mysterious world which transcends space and time, and all the other forms of our present consciousness altogether, and in which, therefore, it is almost impossible that we should here feel any practical interest. The ordinary escape from this course has been the doctrine of a perpetual transmigration, by which the desire of futurity, and the discontinuance of the present, and the apparent necessity for some future bodily apparatus, might all be conciliated. And this did not appear altogether impossible, when the strong indications of some faculties common to those of man were observed in the brute creation: a temporary eclipse of the higher powers might easily be imagined, such as so often takes place in the state of dreaming. Still, one great difficulty seems to have been unnoticed in this hypothesis,—the removal of the conscious and vital principle from one frame to another, with its identity and immaterial quality still preserved; for it is very evident that, if the soul can exist apart from body during one minute of time or the transit of one inch of space, there is no inherent reason to prevent its doing so for any indefinite period whatever; and such a state of absolute separation from body is conceived in the period of translocation from one animal frame to the other. Whether this or any similar objection convinced them of the imperfection of this hypothesis, it is manifest that it was never regarded by the leading teachers of antiquity as an ultimate solution of the question,—as any thing more than a temporary supposition which might assist the imagination in conceiving the posthumous existence of human beings. To all these difficulties Christianity has brought its peculiar light, by informing us that for the vaster portion of the everlasting

future a system of bodily organs shall be ready to minister to the undying spirit; and, as regards the intermediate state, by leaving us (where it is of less consequence) to adopt the supposition of total, or only partial, disembodiment, as may seem most suitable to the analogies of existing nature. It has ascertained to us that not the pure reason alone, but the whole aggregate of our faculties, shall accompany us into the world to come; rendering us capable in that state not merely of an abstract intellectual contemplation, (itself surely not easily conceivable without a power other than pure intellect to supply its materials,) but also of a happiness and a misery far more exalted, that arise and can only arise from the exercise of the affections,—from remorse and hatred and despair, or from a love and hope and gratitude that then alone shall find their own real privileges of happiness when expanded to meet an infinite and eternal object.

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